IRAQ POST-UNSCR: JAPANESE RESPONSES ON TIMING FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001607

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/I-PM, PM, AND EAP-J

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL IZ JA
SUBJECT: IRAQ POST-UNSCR: JAPANESE RESPONSES ON TIMING FOR
FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS

REF: A. STATE 60836


B. TOKYO 1464 (NOTAL)

C. TOKYO 1554 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (c
)


1. (C) This is an ACTION REQUEST. See paragraph 9.


2. (C) SUMMARY: Workinglevel contacts tell us that Japan has
made no decision yet on what type of arrangements it plans to
pursue with regard to the presence of its Air Self Defense
Forces (ASDF) operating in Kuwait and Iraq following the
expiration of UNSCR 1790 on December 31. The contacts tell
us Japan needs to know more about the U.S.-Iraq agreement,
what other countries are planning to do, and what the UN
reaction to all this will be. When told (ref B) that we are
hearing "unofficially" from higher-level officials both in
Tokyo and Washington that Japan plans to end its operations
in Iraq this December, our interlocutors said they "lacked
the mandate to discuss this at our level." END SUMMARY.

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JAPAN HAS QUESTIONS
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3. (C) Japan has not yet made a decision as to what type of
agreement it needs to pursue with Iraq if it is to continue
to deploy ASDF personnel and equipment beyond December 31,
said MOFA National Security Policy Division Deputy Director
Takatoshi Mori and Iraq officer Takahiro Sato. In response
to our questions posed per ref A, Mori replied that Japan
needs to gather more information before a final decision can
be made. In particular, Tokyo wants to know when the
negotiations will resume and would like to have detailed
information about the ongoing U.S.-Iraq negotiations,
including the draft of the proposed agreement so that it can
determine whether it meets Japan's needs. In particular,
what kind of "vehicle" for third countries is the U.S.
seeking to include, and does the "vehicle" automatically
assure third countries will have the U.S.-Iraq agreement
directly applied to the relationships between Iraq and the
third countries, or does it assure that the same sort of
contents could be guaranteed when third countries try to
negotiate their own agreements with Iraq? In addition, Japan
is curious to know what other Coalition partners are doing --
joining the U.S. agreement or negotiating their own? And
finally, what is the UN reaction to the proposed agreement?


4. (C) Another question the Japanese have is what type of
format are we aiming for with our agreement, a full-fledged
international agreement which requires Congressional
approval, or a lower-key technical level arrangement that the
government can solely conclude? Regarding the arrangements
under which Japan has deployed its forces to Kuwait, Mori
pointed out there is no formal agreement that would have
required parliamentary approval. Rather, there is a
"governmental arrangement" between Kuwait and Japan agreed
upon by the executives. He hinted that if Japan were to
consider an agreement of some kind with Iraq, it would be
likely to follow the Kuwait model.

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THREE MORE QUESTIONS
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5. (C) In addition to the questions posed above, Mori also
wanted to know whether the U.S. is considering waiving
criminal jurisdiction over its personnel. He said that when
the Iraq SOFA negotiating team visited Japan last month (ref
C),Under Secretary Hamoud met with Deputy Vice Minister for
Foreign Police Chikao Kakwai and told him the Iraqi side has
serious reservations about giving up its jurisdiction over
any foreign forces in the country. This would be a great
concern to Japan, and Mori asked what our position on this is.


6. (C) Mori then said he read a recent statement by
Ambassador Crocker that asserted Iran is making the SOFA
negotiations difficult. Japan would like to know how Iran is
doing this and, more generally, what impact is Iran having on
the negotiations.


TOKYO 00001607 002 OF 002



7. (C) Lastly, Mori asked that we also confirm another
statement he attributed to Ambassador Crocker that there will
be no secret clauses in the SOFA.

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LEAVING IN DECEMBER?
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8. (C) All of this may be academic, because as reported ref
B, we've been hearing "unofficially" from knowledgeable
sources that the decision has already been made to end the
ASDF mission and depart Kuwait in December. The general
consensus here is that the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP)
loss of the Upper House last July makes it politically
impossible to extend the legislation authorizing the mission
when it expires in July 2009. And despite the fact that
technically the existing legislation gives the government the
authority to continue the mission even after the expiration
of UNSCR 1790, and that the Cabinet is expected to approve on
June 13 a one year continuation through July 2009 of the
"basic plan" under which the forces operate, December would
be a good time to proclaim success and go home. Resolution
1790 will expire, the U.S. Administration will be coming to
an end, and the completion of a generally unpopular mission
will bolster the fortunes of the precipitously faltering LDP.
When asked about this by Political Officer, Mori said he
"had no mandate to discuss this subject at this level."

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ACTION REQUEST
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9. (C) In spite of the uncertainty of Japan's intentions past
December, Embassy requests guidance on how to respond to the
questions posed by our MOFA counterparts in paragraphs 3 and
5-7.
SCHIEFFER