(S/REL NATO) PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED JAPANESE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001593 SIPDIS OPCENTER/AMEMBASSY PARIS PLEASE PASS SECRETARY'S PARTY FOR DOD/APSA/ASD SHINN AND SES; DOD FOR OSD/APSA/SEDNEY/HILL/BASALLA; PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5/POLAD; CENTCOM FOR POLAD/J5; JOINT STAFF FOR J5; NSC FOR WILDER/KATZ; USFJ FOR J00/J01/J3/J5 E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV IZ AF JA SUBJECT: (S/REL NATO) PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDED JAPANESE AFGHAN CONTRIBUTIONS REF: A. TOKYO 1464 ¶B. SECDEF DTG 031932Z JUN 08 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (S/REL NATO) Summary: Japan continues to review options for a new operation in Afghanistan to "off-set" the planned termination of its current Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) logistics effort in Kuwait/Iraq. The Japanese government remains focused on such options as dispatching C-130s for logistics support in addition to some form of participation in a German-, French-, or Swedish-led PRT. Officials and ruling party politicians strongly downplay prospects for the provision of CH-47s heavy lift helicopters or civilian police trainers citing security risks. The Prime Minister has approved the dispatch of survey teams to the region, but has not explicitly committed to initiating new ground operations. The junior coalition partner Komeito party has warned the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) not to take for granted that it will vote to force passage of new security legislation before the next General Election, which must be held by October, 2009. Even if the coalition is able to use its super-majority to overcome a veto in the opposition-controlled Upper House, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will be in a position to block the actual initiation of any new operation. End Summary. Three Options -------------- ¶2. (S/REL NATO) The Japanese government continues to press ahead on its strategy (Ref A) to identify a new Afghan operation to "replace" the planned termination of Japan's C-130 to Kuwait/Iraq, according to MOFA National Security Division Director Takeo Mori (Note: Mori has a close relationship with Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura. End Note). Mori said that two teams have been dispatched to Afghanistan and Central Asia on June 8 and 10, respectively, to survey possible Japanese missions in support of coalition air/ground operations in Afghanistan. Mori confirmed that the teams are charged with reviewing three options: 1) C-130 logistics support; 2) participation in a PRT; 3) dispatch of CH-47 heavy lift helicopters. ¶3. (S/REL NATO) While Japan continues to focus its attention on the first option, Mori said that Tokyo has decided to consider a more robust PRT deployment than originally envisioned. He noted that Japan has reached out bilaterally to Germany, France, and Sweden to discuss possible Japanese participation in their existing Afghan operations. Cabinet National Security Councilor Kenji Takahashi said that Japan would be willing to consider a robust (battalion-sized or larger) presence, if there is a need in a "non-combat zone." He added that the government has the authority to define what constitutes a "non-combat zone," thus such areas would presumably include much of the north and west of the country. A number of Embassy interlocutors in the LDP and Komeito have also raised the possibility of dispatching P-3Cs to TOKYO 00001593 002 OF 004 conduct maritime or ground surveillance operations. The Cabinet Office's Takahashi said that the government would consider this option, but it is not high on the agenda at this stage. Takahashi confirmed that the National Police Agency (NPA) has vetoed the dispatch of civilian police to Afghanistan. CH-47s: A Bridge Too Far? -------------- ¶4. (S/NOFORN) Takahashi noted that one of the most important roles of the survey team will be to provide a risk assessment of the various deployment options. In this context, officials and coalition politicians alike strongly downplay prospects for the dispatch of CH-47s. Japanese officials were upset over Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba's recent suggestion to the Secretary of Defense (Ref B) that Japan would seriously consider sending heavy lift helicopters. MOFA's Mori commented that many officials, including those in the Ministry of Defense (MOD),were at a "total loss" as to why Ishiba decided to raise U.S. expectations. Mori complained that Ishiba "often tells his interlocutors what they want to hear," and added that both MOFA and the Cabinet Office are steadfastly opposed to a CH-47 dispatch. MOD U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Division Director Kiyoshi Serizawa separately registered similar concerns, noting that Ishiba provided Secretary Gates a more optimistic picture of prospects for CH-47 dispatch than is warranted in the current political environment. ¶5. (S/NOFORN) Ruling and opposition politicians echo the official view on the viability of dispatching helos to Afghanistan, noting that only relatively "safe" operations will pass muster in the current political environment. LDP Security Policy Committee Chairman (and former Defense Minister) Gen Nakatani, who strongly supports a new Afghan ground mission, told the Embassy that the CH-47 mission is a bridge too far. He noted that the Japanese media and public would immediately associate the dispatch with scenes of downed helicopters in films like "Charlie Wilson's War" and "Black Hawk Down." Senior LDP Defense Policy Staffer Shigenobu Tamura stated firmly that a CH-47 dispatch is "simply impossible" in the current political environment. DPJ legislator Akihisa Nagashima told the Embassy that "we all know the United States wants us to send CH-47s, but you should forget about that and focus instead on a more realistic option such as a Japanese presence in a PRT." Diet Focused on Legislative Mandate -------------- ¶6. (S/REL NATO) Although key members in the ruling coalition have not been formally briefed on the government's strategy on Afghanistan, discussions are already underway over options to extend and/or expand legislative authority for Japan's OEF mission. Veteran LDP faction leader Taku Yamasaki, who chairs the LDP's Project Team on SDF Dispatch Legislation, said that the ruling coalition is considering three different TOKYO 00001593 003 OF 004 approaches: 1) simple extension of the current Special Measures Legislation authorizing the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean; 2) creation of a new Special Measures Law that would include an Afghan ground component; and 3) passage of a Permanent SDF Dispatch Law. ¶7. (S/NOFORN) Yamasaki painted a starkly negative picture of prospects for Diet action of any type. "The Komeito has told us that they will not support an override vote (of a veto in the opposition-controlled Upper House)," he stated, "even for extension of the current Indian Ocean operation." Given these constraints, Yamasaki said that the LDP's only option is to gain DPJ support. DPJ Lower House Member Nagashima said that party conservatives are pressing their leadership to engage in a serious discussion on a new Afghan mission, but are getting little traction. Nagashima noted that, while the DPJ itself has indicated support for participation in ISAF, party leaders have inserted a poison pill condition -- the existence of a cease-fire between the Karzai government and the Taliban. "Theoretically, we could support operations in an area of Afghanistan that does not have an active Taliban presence," he added, "but even this would require a decision on the part of (Party President Ichiro) Ozawa to forego confrontation with the Fukuda Cabinet." ¶8. (S/NOFORN) Komeito SDF Dispatch Project Team Chairman Natsuo Yamaguchi confirmed to the Embassy that his party's leadership and Buddhist Soka Gakkai sect support base remain decidedly negative on any new international commitment before the next General Election. "There are no votes to be gained," he added, "and many to be lost by assuming a risky new overseas operation." Nevertheless, Yamaguchi downplayed Komeito's warnings to the LDP over the need to work with the DPJ. "We know that Ozawa will not be drawn into a serious discussion on Afghanistan because it would split his party," Yamaguchi said. Given this judgment, he clarified that Komeito would "almost certainly" vote with the LDP to override an Upper House veto of an extension to the Indian Ocean operation. He cautioned, however, that if the LDP pushes for a Permanent SDF Dispatch Law or substantial new ground operation, it should not count on Komeito's support. Two-Step Legislative Process -------------- ¶9. (S/NOFORN) The Cabinet Office's Takahashi warned that even if the ruling party were to secure a legislative mandate for a new operation, the DPJ will still have the power to stop the actual dispatch of forces due to a requirement for Diet approval of any Cabinet order to send Japanese forces abroad. "We have been able to avoid seeking DPJ approval for our operations in the Indian Ocean and Kuwait because those plans were confirmed by previous (LDP-controlled) Diets," he stated, "this time we will not be able to use that logic." The Diet approval mechanism, he commented, gives both houses an equal voice in any decision, without a Lower House override clause. DPJ Vice President Seiji Maehara told the Embassy it is impossible to predict if his party would vote TOKYO 00001593 004 OF 004 for an Afghan mission after voting against authorizing legislation. "That would depend entirely on what (party president) Ozawa determines would best advance his tactical agenda at the time of the vote," he added. Next Steps -------------- ¶10. (S/NOFORN) Government and ruling coalition officials confirm that no formal decision on proceeding with a new Afghan operation will be made until the survey team reports back after June 18 with its recommendations. MOFA National Security Division Director Mori noted that when Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda was briefed on government's strategy, he only approved the dispatch of the survey team and gave no indication that he would support its recommendations. "No one knows what he really thinks about the concept," he added. Mori noted that Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura has personally taken the lead in developing the Afghan dispatch strategy. SCHIEFFER