U/S BURNS PARTICIPATES IN TRILAT SOM IN TOKYO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001587 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2018 TAGS: PREL ECON EAID MOPS JA AU SUBJECT: U/S BURNS PARTICIPATES IN TRILAT SOM IN TOKYO TOKYO 00001587 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER, REASONS 1.4 (B),(D). ¶1. (C) Summary. The political directors from the United States, Japan, and Australia met for more than two and a half hours in Tokyo on June 9 for a Senior Officials Meeting of the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD SOM). The principals included Under Secretary Burns, Deputy Foreign Minister Sasae, and Secretary L'Estrange. The three received a briefing on the most recent round of trilateral intelligence discussions in Washington, then turned to individual country discussions on China, Burma, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the DPRK, East Timor, and the Philippines. Toward the end, the parties discussed TSD-related issues, such as trilateral initiatives, SDCF, the Pacific Islands Working Group, counterterrorism, the Indonesia Working Group, and next steps. End Summary. -------------- -------------- JAPAN BRIEFS ON TRILAT INTEL ASSESSMENTS OF CHINA AND BURMA -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Under Secretary Bill Burns, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Secretary Michael L'Estrange, and Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Kenichiro Sasae exchanged ideas on a wide range of regional and global issues at the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Senior Officials' Meeting (TSD SOM) in Tokyo on June 9. Director General of MOFA's Intelligence and Analysis Service Haruhisa Takeuchi began by briefing the three principals on the assessments of the fourth, and most recent, trilateral intelligence exchange in Washington the previous week on the subjects of China and Burma. All participants agreed with DFM Sasae's statement that trilateral intelligence cooperation is "one of the best things we've seen develop" in recent years, and echoed his call for continued cooperation among the intelligence agencies of the three countries, both with regard to intelligence-gathering and in more general terms. ¶3. (C) DG Takeuchi outlined the Chinese government's "exceptional" response to the recent earthquake and the outpouring of local volunteers are positive signs for greater openness and development of a civil society. This potential "paradigm shift" is tempered by evidence of a return to "business as usual." There is "no room for optimism" on Tibet, regardless of dialogue, so long as the views from Beijing and Dharamsala remain so far apart. It is too early to judge whether Taiwan's elections will lead to rapprochement with Beijing, but a change in China's stance regarding Taiwan participation in international organizations will be an important touchstone. ¶4. (C) Burma's poor disaster-management response to the recent cyclone demonstrates little change in the political situation, as the junta refuses to loosen its grip on power, Takeuchi reported. Despite conflicting evidence of discord, military unity appears to remain intact in the face of a weak and aging opposition. Recent protests demonstrate that Buddhist monks are not a viable political force. Amidst the cyclone's devastation, there are some hopeful signs that China and ASEAN can exert greater influence, although the regime remains extremely distrustful of all outsiders. -------------- June 9 TSD SOM Discussions -------------- ¶5. (C) China: Secretary L'Estrange characterized Australia's China policy as "optimism without illusions," a catch-phrase that encompasses both the wide range of shared interests TOKYO 00001587 002.2 OF 004 between the two countries and the many gaps that remain on issues such as human rights and climate change. The principals noted similarities between this formulation, the Zoellick model of China as "responsible stakeholder," and Japan's "strategic relations for mutual benefit." Australia views Chinese cooperation on the DPRK, Sudan, and Darfur as positive signs that this formula works. All three models see continued engagement as "vital." DFM Sasae reflected on the importance of private discussions and high-level visits to its own improved relations with China, noting that China now accepts a larger role for both itself and Japan in regional affairs. China also "gets it" on defense transparency, and is waiting for the trilateral partners and others to provide specific guidelines on what they expect. Bilaterally, China no longer opposes, and has even hinted that it will support, Japan's bid for a UNSC seat. East China energy issues are also largely solved, Sasae noted, and an agreement may be announced just before the G-8 Summit. ¶6. (C) Burma: The three principals agreed on the importance of gaining access for the UN/ASEAN assessment team in order to maximize aid efforts. They lamented the lack of flexibility on the part of the military regime, and deplored the sham referendum. Sasae called for a re-examination of the "carrot and stick" approach, arguing that Burma's allies in the UN have rendered the sticks irrelevant, and that no one has yet articulated the right mix of development incentives. He expressed dismay that Burma now views Japan in the same way it views most Western nations. ¶7. (C) Afghanistan: Secretary L'Estrange laid out four major challenges for the coalition: 1) consolidating security gains on the ground; 2) coordinating UN assistance countrywide; 3) encouraging additional international support and developing a "whole country" approach to aid; and 4) preventing narcotics from impeding legitimate development and threatening security. The other two principals echoed agreement with his statement that there is a direct connection between the trilateral partners' shared goals of stopping Afghanistan from becoming an exporter of TERRORISM and bringing order to Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). DFM Sasae expressed appreciation for the increased U.S. military presence in the south and hoped the improved security environment would enable completion of Japan's portion of the Ring Road. He also urged wider European participation in the upcoming Paris Conference, which he suggested should be more than just a "pledging" conference. ¶8. (C) Pakistan: Recent elections were flawed, Secretary L'Estrange noted, but still more successful than might have been expected. Pakistan is now in transition, and it will be difficult to build coalitions in the short-term. Musharraf's support in the armed forces remains strong, and they will not allow him to be publicly humiliated. Nevertheless, they will continue to keep their distance from politics for as long as they see no major threat to the national interest. Neither the armed forces nor the paramilitaries are capable of overcoming problems in the FATA, forcing the government to forge peace agreements with tribal leaders. Still, Pakistan is in no danger of becoming a failed state at this time. Political solutions run the risk of empowering tribal leaders, but may also serve an important political objective, Sasae countered. He cautioned that social and economic problems in the FATA continue to be ignored in the face of security concerns, and urged a balance between political solutions and outside aid. ¶9. (C) Iran: The three parties generally shared the view TOKYO 00001587 003.2 OF 004 that Iran's behavior continues to create problems in IRAQ and Afghanistan and that Iran is unlikely to respond favorably to the EU's new package of incentives. U/S Burns stressed that neither unilateral financial sanctions nor the sanctions from UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 have had a fundamental impact on Iran's nuclear program, although they have had an economic effect. Secretary L'Estrange agreed with the U.S. assessment, but added that Iran's economic troubles are not severe enough to allow outside pressure to force changes in the regime's behavior. ¶10. (C) DPRK: DFM Sasae stated that Japan and North Korea agreed last weekend to resume bilateral dialogue on the margins of the Six-Party Talks, including discussion on the abduction issue. He said the Japanese government hopes the talks will yield substantive progress, but that resumption of the talks, by itself, is not sufficient from Tokyo's perspective. ¶11. (C) East Timor: L'Estrange noted the worsening political situation in recent years, including the February assassination attempts on President Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao. The Australian government seeks to redirect a significant part of aid to infrastructure in order to reduce unemployment in East Timor, as the problem is more greatly attributed to uncontrolled street violence than to organized terrorism. L'Estrange also stated that the UN needs to remain involved for the foreseeable future, and that any effort to reduce police and security presence in East Timor should be synchronized with other efforts on the ground, rather than an arbitrary timetable. Sasae said Japan is keeping a wary eye on China's attempts to position itself as a player in East Timor development assistance. L'Estrange agreed, stating that the problem stems from the fact that Australia's development assistance money has too many linkages and demands, making Chinese offers comparatively attractive. ¶12. (C) The Philippines: Sasae said the Japanese government remains committed to its contribution to the Philippines as part of its Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD) program, but is concerned about the weakened power base of President Arroyo and Malaysia's withdrawal of its members in the International Monitoring Team overseeing the ceasefire between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao. Japan intends to re-engage with Malaysia on the International Monitoring Team issue, but is not optimistic about convincing Malaysia to return to the team. L'Estrange affirmed Australia's intention to persuade Malaysia to remain a part of the International Monitoring Team. ¶13. (C) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: L'Estrange said Australia is ready to adopt the joint ministerial statement on trilateral cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region upon its release at the June 27 TSD Ministerial. Prime Minister Rudd will present the Australian draft guidelines to his counterparts. Australia hopes the joint statement will act as a trigger for wider cooperation between the trilateral efforts and existing, broader initiatives in the region. ¶14. (C) Security and Defense Cooperation Forum: U/S Burns highlighted the outcome of the April 2008 session of the trilateral Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) in Honolulu, stressing the usefulness of such practical cooperation and the agreement among all three countries to convene Director-level intersessional events. In response to TOKYO 00001587 004.2 OF 004 Sasae's request for an update on Australia's missile defense (MD) policy, L'Estrange explained that Australia is maintaining the status quo on missile defense as it is currently conducting a comprehensive review of its defense strategy, spending, and planning for its 2009 defense white paper, which will address in part Australia's MD policy. He also stated that PM Rudd will, among other issues, address bilateral information sharing and information security cooperation with Japan in the context of sea and airlift cooperation. Sasae acknowledged the importance of this issue, noting that Japan has a number of deficiencies in this field. ¶15. (C) Pacific Islands Working Group: L'Estrange noted Japan's query from the April 28 meeting in Canberra of including New Zealand, adding that Australia believes it is too early to include New Zealand in a working group created out of the TSD context. He called on support from the United States and Japan to pressure the Fiji military government to hold to the 2009 elections timetable. Sasae noted the irresponsible way that China and Taiwan have conducted development assistance in the South Pacific. L'Estrange expressed hope that the recent Taiwan elections would reduce cross-strait tensions and positively affect China's checkbook diplomacy. Noting that both Australia and the United States have been engaging China directly on the issue, L'Estrange urged Japan to do the same. ¶16. (C) Counter-terrorism: U/S Burns described counter-terrorism cooperation as yet another area of solid cooperation and coordination among the three countries. He stressed the importance of maintaining momentum on the issues during the upcoming meeting of the three countries' CT coordinators. As such, the United States will host the next round in September in Washington. ¶17. (C) Indonesia Working Group: Sasae questioned Indonesian President Yudhyono's ability to sustain political support in light of Indonesia's recent decision to withdraw from OPEC and Yudhyono's publicly unpopular decision to scale back Indonesia's fuel subsidy program, which raised fuel prices. Sasae noted that it was a correct decision from an economic standpoint, but had considerable political backlash. ¶18. (C) TSD Next Steps: Japan will host the next TSD ministerial and present a draft agenda beforehand. All parties expect the joint statement on HA/DR to be adopted at the ministerial. U/S Burns proposed that the next TSD SOM be hosted by the United States in September on the margins of the UNGA in New York, urging all sides to consider making all regular TSD SOM take place in New York as a stable point of reference. ¶19. (U) Under Secretary Burns has cleared this message. SCHIEFFER