SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' VISIT TO

S E C R E T TOKYO 001555

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2018
TAGS: PREL JA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDER SECRETARY BURNS' VISIT TO
TOKYO

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (S) While your upcoming visit to Tokyo will focus
primarily on multilateral and G-8 issues, the Mission would
like to share with you some background on where our relations
with Japan now stand.

Your meetings with Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka and your
host, Deputy Foreign Minister Sasae, will provide you an
opportunity to underline the overriding importance the United
States attaches to our relations with Japan. The U.S.-Japan
relationship is changing. Never before have the United
States and Japan been involved so intensively in so many
different issues around the globe. From working together to
denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and manage China's peaceful
rise, to our cooperative efforts on Operations Enduring
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, our relationship is truly global
in nature.

The Japanese will look forward to hearing from you that
America is committed to staying in Asia and maintaining the
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. They are also looking forward
to hearing your views on the Six-Party Talks and our thoughts
on a future Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism
(NEAPSM). Because of the primacy Japan attaches to its
alliance relationship with us -- and the special status it
affords Japan in the region -- the Japanese are wary of
anything that could undermine the security relationship.
They are also concerned that moving ahead with NEAPSM prior
to the denuclearization of North Korea sends the wrong
message to Kim Jong-il. Stressing to them that we see any
new security mechanism in Northeast Asia as being built upon
our existing alliance relationships will offer reassurance.

Japan welcomed the recent release of information on the
DPRK-Syria nuclear connection and some believe that this may
pressure North Korea to come clean about its proliferation
and other activities. Although many Japanese understand the
importance of denuclearization, past abductions of Japanese
citizens by the DPRK remain a highly emotional subject, and
Prime Minister Fukuda still worries that North Korea will be
de-listed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list without
any progress on this front. He must work hard to manage
public opinion on this matter.

Prime Minister Fukuda has moved to improve relations with
China, the ROK and the ASEAN countries. ROK Lee Myung-bak's
recent visit was hailed by both sides as a "great success."
Chinese President Hu Jintao had a good visit in May, but
attempts to use aid for the Sichuan earthquake victims to
improve further the bilateral relationship have been
hamstrung by public criticism in both countries.

The Japanese want to be good hosts to the G-8 this summer in
Hokkaido and will emphasize climate change, environmental
issues, and Africa in coordination with the United States.
Expect inquiries on what you think would constitute a good
G-8 result. They will also want to know more about U.S.
intentions with regard to Free-Trade Agreements in the
neighborhood.

In terms of its place in the world, Japan has changed in
fundamental and positive ways over the last six years.
Former Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe made hard political
decisions and took steps once considered impossible. The
Self Defense Forces (SDF) deployment to Iraq, Japan's
refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, acceptance of a
nuclear-powered CARRIER to replace the USS Kitty Hawk, the
alliance transformation process, and enhanced intelligence
sharing are unprecedented first steps in creating a more
robust Japanese national security policy. Furthermore, the
privatization of Japan Post, an institution whose assets are
roughly equivalent in size to China's GDP, and the
government's pledges to double foreign direct investment are
two indications that the priorities of a USD 4.7 trillion
economy are also shifting. In terms of a transformation in
public opinion, the once powerful, anti-American left no
longer exists. While pacifism remains deeply ingrained in
Japan, there is a new consensus among the public and the
elite -- due in part to the DPRK threat and the PRC's growing
power projection capabilities -- that the U.S.-Japan Alliance
is vital to Japan's national security. Similarly, on the
economic side, the bilateral relationship is not where it
ought to be between the world's two largest economies.
Enthusiasm for economic reform has waned among many Japanese,
and even in areas such as climate change and energy where
U.S. and Japanese positions have been closely aligned, the
Fukuda Government seeks to leverage progress on climate
change in the G-8 to boost his political fortunes.

That said, domestic political turbulence is having a negative
impact on some of our important priorities. Prime Minister
Fukuda's popularity is at an all-time low and opposition
control of the Upper House of the Diet has complicated
prospects for new initiatives. Many here believe that a
major cabint reshuffle after the G-8 is likely, bringing with
it an increased reluctance to take political risks. The lack
of political leadership has left a policy vacuum that is
being filled by narrowly-focused bureaucrats. While Tokyo
committed under Prime Minister Koizumi to expanding the SDF
capabilities and roles, it continues to shortchange its
military, delay acquisition of critical weapons systems, and
attempt to pay less in terms of operations and host nation
support, due to a difficult fiscal situation that is being
exacerbated by slowing economic growth. The Fukuda
administration has also been less aggressive in implementing
base realignment than its predecessors.

While in the short term, we will have difficulty pressing any
new security initiatives, we can still make solid progress on
items already teed up. Alliance transformation, the
associated move of U.S. Marines to Guam, and relocation of
Futenma Air Station are moving in the right direction, albeit
with some bumps in the road. Intelligence sharing is an
ongoing success story, as is Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
cooperation and preparations for the forward deployment of
the USS George Washington, the first nuclear-powered AIRCRAFT
carrier to be based in Japan. A quick reference list of
issues follows. Embassy Tokyo looks forward to your visit.

Issues
--------------

Six-Party Talks: The Japanese and North Koreans will meet
June 7 for informal discussions that may jump start formal
discussions the week of your visit. Disablement activities
at Yongbyon are proceeding, but the DPRK has yet to provide a
complete and correct declaration of its nuclear programs.
U.S. action on the DPRK's designation as a state sponsor of
terrorism will depend on progress on denuclearization and
fulfillment of legal criteria; the announcement of DPRK-Syria
nuclear ties underline the importance of North Korea's full
declaration of all nuclear activities, including
proliferation. We will continue to press the DPRK to address
Japanese abductees and will work closely with Japan on this
issue.

U.S.-Japan Alliance: Our Alliance is the cornerstone of
security in Northeast Asia, and essential for preserving
peace and stability throughout the region. Alliance
transformation spelled out in the Defense Policy Review
Initiative (DPRI) is mutually beneficial and will strengthen
Alliance capabilities. We are now entering the first phase
of Okinawa consolidation and look forward to expeditious
implementation of the agreed-to plan. We are not prepared to
discuss changes to the implementation.

Information Sharing and Security: The Bilateral Information
Security Task Force (BISTF) process is at an important stage.
Broadening participation on the Japanese side is a critical
step toward realizing government-wide measures for protecting
classified information. Improved security will allow both
sides to develop a deeper, more robust information sharing
regime, further strengthening the alliance. It is important
that Japan remains engaged in the process and make visible
progress in its ability to protect classified information.

Child Pornography: The Japanese Diet has responded
positively to the Ambassador's public campaign to criminalize
the possession of child pornography, which remains legal in
Japan and Russia alone among the G8 member countries. The
Japanese have told us that a law criminalizing simple
possession will pass this fall.

Multilateral Security Cooperation: The United States remains
committed to its close cooperation with Japan and Australia.
We look forward to a constructive dialogue during your visit
and at the June 27 Trilateral Security Dialogue Ministerial
in Kyoto following the G8 Foreign Ministerial. We also
support Japan's outreach to NATO and like-minded countries on
security initiatives.

Burma: Japan has scaled back its aid to Burma, but has not
imposed economic sanctions, although it discourages companies
from investing in Burma. Japan could do more, but fears
driving Burma closer to China.

China: Prime Minister Fukuda has worked hard to improve
relations with China, but an imported frozen food poisoning
case and the crackdown in Tibet became bilateral irritants.
Although the Sichuan earthquake generated sympathy within

Japan, the delayed dispatch of Japanese search and rescue and
medical teams generated mixed reactions in both countries.

Korea: President Lee's April visit was deemed a "great
success," and both sides have expressed a desire to build a
Japan-ROK relationship that is "different from the
relationship up until now," although Korea remains less
interested than Japan in restarting FTA talks. The United
States is interested in strengthening trilateral security
cooperation with Japan and the ROK. We are currently
considering appropriate modalities.

Iraq: With $1.5 billion in grants, up to $3.5 billion in
concessionary loans, and $6 billion in debt relief, Japan is
the second-largest contributor to Iraqi reconstruction. In
January, Japan and Iraq concluded disbursement agreements for
eight reconstruction projects worth $1.5 billion. In April,
MOFA announced an agreement on two additional projects.
These agreements signify Japan's continued strong support for
Iraqi reconstruction. Japan's Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF)
have deployed 200 personnel and three C-130 AIRCRAFT in
Kuwait to transport cargo and personnel in Iraq. However, it
is very likely that given the current domestic political
situation, the law enabling the ASDF to operate in Iraq will
not be renewed when it expires in next July.

Afghanistan: In January, Japan passed legislation to restart
refueling operation in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Japan is working more closely with the PRTs and has assigned
a full-time liaison officer to NATO's office in Kabul. Japan
is the third highest bilateral contributor (behind the United
States and UK) to Afghanistan, with $1.4 billion pledged
since 2002. Japan's most visible endeavor in Afghanistan is
the construction of a 114 kilometer stretch of the southern
ring road. This project, originally scheduled for completion
in 2005, has been beset by delays stemming from Japan's
security concerns. We have also recently been asking the
Japanese to consider providing airlift helicopters to support
operations in Afghanistan. Japan will be sending a survey
team to the region in the coming weeks to explore deployment
possibilities, but it is unlikely to commit to sending ground
forces or helicopter units.

Middle East Peace Process: Japan is moving forward with its
"Corridor for Peace and Prosperity" initiative that will
establish an agro-industrial park in the West Bank, and
pledged $150 million in project assistance at the December
Paris donors, conference. Last August, Japan resumed direct
assistance to the PA, contributing $20 million. Prime
Minister Olmert visited Tokyo February 25-28 making him the
first Israeli Prime Minister to visit in eleven years. As
G-8 President, Japan is co-chairing this year's BMENA process.

Iran: Fukuda met earlier this week with President
Ahmadinejad on the margins of the FAO Summit in Rome, and
urged him to make the "bold decision" to cease uranium
enrichment. Ahmadinejad rejected this appeal. Japan is
implementing UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803, and in April 22
became one of the first countries to announce asset freezes
against designated Iranian individuals and entities pursuant
to 1803. Japan is among Iran's top export markets (mostly
oil) and is Iran's 10th largest supplier of machinery and
manufactured goods. Most Japan-Iran trade is covered by
short-term credits. Still, since April 2006, the Japan Bank
for International Cooperation (JBIC) has ceased issuing Iran
new long-term export credits and Japan has promised to begin
closing outstanding long-term credits.

Pakistan: Japan is providing education assistance and has
said it will consider additional aid once the security
situation improves. Tokyo recently announced it will double
its loan assistance to Pakistan to $400 million for
infrastructure projects.

Russia: Russia has expressed understanding of Japan's BMD
program while showing increasing interest in U.S-Japan BMD
cooperation. A recent overflight incident involving a
Russian bomber demonstrates Russia's unhelpful attitude
toward the alliance and regional security.

Africa: Japan just hosted the fourth Tokyo International
Conference on Africa and Development, which was attended by
over 40 heads of state. Tokyo has announced a major increase
in aid to Africa and is considering sending a small number of
self defense personnel to participate in U.N. operation in
Sudan.

Beef: Japan remains closed to U.S. beef and beef products
from animals older than 20 months of age. Once our largest
overseas export market for beef, Japan now receives less than
25 percent of pre-2004 export levels. In a December letter

to President Bush, PM Fukuda proposed raising age
restrictions to include animals up to 30 months of age, a
move he suggested would allow over 90 percent of U.S. beef
exports. We strongly oppose this approach and have indicated
that we would not cooperate in its implementation. The
President has not answered Fukuda's letter.

SCHIEFFER