CLUSTER MUNITIONS: JAPAN PREVIEWS DUBLIN MEETING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001354 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2023 TAGS: PREL MOPS PARM JA NATO SUBJECT: CLUSTER MUNITIONS: JAPAN PREVIEWS DUBLIN MEETING Classified By: Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor W. Michael M eserve. Reasons 1.4 (B) (D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Japan remains committed to handling cluster munitions (CM) in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) but will likely join an expected consensus reached at the Dublin meeting of the Oslo Process, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo told Embassy and U.S. Forces Japan representatives on May 16. If a consensus is reached, Japan would register reservations to the text, which would still need to be signed in November in Oslo before Japan would consider ratification. DDG Shimbo said Embassy outreach to Diet members, if done discretely and in a low-key manner, now and after the Dublin meeting would be useful in educating members of the debate that will follow in Japan. He also suggested the Secretaries of State, Defense, and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff offer high-profile public statements regarding the importance the U.S. places on resolving CM in the CCW. End Summary. Dublin Meeting Preview -------------- ¶2. (S) After reaffirming Japan's preference for handling CM in the CCW, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Science Department Deputy Director-General Masatoshi Shimbo told Embassy Tokyo and U.S. Forces Japan representatives on May 16 that he expects the Dublin meeting of the Oslo Process will produce a consensus on a text banning CM. The Core Group in the Oslo Process wants to reach this consensus, as opposed to using the two-thirds vote, and as such will incorporate some changes suggested by ""Like-Minded"" nations regarding definitions of CM covered by the text, interoperability and an implementation period. This will give Japan a ""fighting chance"" to deal with the negative affect on U.S.-Japan interoperability that the Oslo Process will create. DDG Shimbo noted that France and Germany wish to avoid tampering with Articles 1 (b) and (c),which they believe hold a symbolic meaning for the Core Group and NGOs, by introducing a new article which would address interoperability issues. ¶3. (S) DDG Shimbo said that if the Dublin participants reach consensus, Japan will need to become a member of the consensus but will express reservations with the text by noting Japan's preference for the CCW and Japan's need to careful consider the text before ratification. Following Dublin, the text would be in final form and ready for signing at Oslo in November, DDG Shimbo said. He argued that the Dublin text would not be legally binding and that Tokyo would have no legal obligation to adhere to the treaty until it is ratified by the Diet. Suggestion for High Level U.S. Pressure Outside Japan -------------- -- ¶4. (S) MOD U.S.-Japan Security Division Director Kiyoshi Serizawa noted that Deputy Secretary Negronte's decision to raise cluster munitions with Foreign Minister Koumura during their May 9 meeting in Tokyo proved beneficial and increased the awareness level of the issue at senior levels in Japan. MOD now believes, however, that the perception Japanese officials have been pressured by foreign government argues against further direct approaches by other high-level U.S. officials to their Tokyo counterparts. MOFA DDG Shinbo added the GOJ would find it helpful if the Secretaries of State or Defense, and/or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff offered high-profile public statements regarding the importance of resolving CM in the CCW. Direct approaches by senior U.S. officials to NATO members, Latin American countries and the Core Group in the Oslo Process would also be helpful. This would indirectly show Japan's senior officials and Diet members the high priority the United States places on the issue and give MOFA and MOD ammunition in pushing the CCW over the Oslo Process with Core Group members, according to DDG Shimbo. Outreach to Diet Members Would Be Beneficial -------------- ¶5. (S) Embassy Tokyo representatives meeting with Diet members now and after the Dublin Conference would also be useful in shaping the debate over the implications of a cluster munitions ban if done with extreme discretion and in a low-key manner, Shinbo offered. Meeting some of the more moderate members of the new intra-parliamentary league focused on banning CM, such as LDP Lower House member Kenji Kosaka who is friendly to U.S. interests, would reap the most benefit. ¶6. (S) During meetings with Diet Members, the U.S. side should stress that CM better enables the United States to meet its treaty obligations to defend Japan and maintain peace and security in East Asia, DDG Shimbo said. If possible, the U.S. should share with Diet members specific operational requirements for CM, such as countering North Korean WMD and missile threats to Japan. Diet members will respond better to this line of argument, as well as the potential negative affect on interoperability between U.S. forces and Japan's Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Many Diet members briefed by MOD have dismissed claims that the JSDF need CM to defend Japan from an invasion that most Diet members doubt will ever occur, according to DDG Shimbo. Embassy Pol-Mil Unit Chief told DDG Shimbo that it is critical to focus on what the Alliance needs, as opposed to just what the U.S. needs, to defend Japan and maintain peace and security in the region. In a contingency, for example, it is crucial that U.S. forces be allowed operate with CM out of SDF bases. An Alliance-centric approach will also avoid accusations that the U.S. is only seeking to protect its own CM equities. Following the European Lead -------------- ¶7. (C) Following the meeting, MOFA Conventional Arms Division Director Ryuichi Hirano outlined Tokyo's position in terms indicating that Japan would refuse to be isolated in the Dublin diplomatic process. Hirano said Tokyo believed European and some other ""Like-Minded"" states would refuse to join consensus on a Dublin text that did not adequately address concerns about interoperability. Under those circumstances, Japan would join the Europeans in rejecting the text. If, however, the Europeans and others decided to join consensus on a Dublin text, even one which did not resolve interoperability issues, Japan will not block consensus. DONOVAN