CHINESE PRESIDENT HU'S JAPAN VISIT SIGNALS EFFORTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001344

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2018
TAGS: ENRG PREL PGOV PHUM CH JA
SUBJECT: CHINESE PRESIDENT HU'S JAPAN VISIT SIGNALS EFFORTS
TO STREGTHEN TIES

REF: A. TOKYO 001138

B. TOKYO 01267

TOKYO 00001344 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Charge d' Affaires Joseph R. Donovan for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Both MOFA and the PRC Embassy in Tokyo told
Embassy Tokyo Prime Minister Fukuda's summit meeting with
President Hu Jintao was a success and important step forward
in advancing bilateral ties. Both sides regarded the
Fukuda-Hu summit, fourth joint communique, and joint press
statement, as historic accomplishments. The visit signaled
Tokyo and Beijing's commitment to advancing bilateral ties
while leaders continue to work quietly behind the scenes to
resolve ongoing disputes. While both MOFA and the PRC
Embassy said the visit was a success, they gave different
reasons why, and Embassy Tokyo noted slightly different views
from the Japanese and Chinese on the interpretation of the
joint communiqu text (UNSC) and on prospects for progress on
the East China Sea. End Summary.


2. (C) Japan considers President Hu's May 6-10 visit to Japan
and summit meeting with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda a success
MOFA China and Mongolia Division Director Akiba told Embassy
Tokyo on May 12. It is an accomplishment that the visit was
even held at all, he added. When faced with increased
tensions over food safety caused by the gyoza poisoning,
coupled with the human rights situation in Tibet, MOFA
officials, even privately, never considered canceling the
visit, Akiba stated. "I attended Fukuda's summit meeting
with Hu and noted both Fukuda and Hu had a very positive
attitude and the atmosphere was warm," Akiba noted. Hu
displayed a willingness to take a risk by coming to Japan
when bilateral relations are under increased public scrutiny
so the visit, in and of itself, was a success that Japan
considers "historic and exceptional," he added.


3. (C) Prime Minister Fukuda's personal efforts to improve
relations with China is one of the reasons Hu's visit to
Japan was able to take place, and was one of the factors that
made the visit so successful, PRC Embassy Political Officer
Chen Zhiwen told Embassy Tokyo on May 12. When compared with
former Prime Minister Koizumi and former Prime Minister Abe,
Chinese leaders, and the public, like Prime Minister Fukuda.
Abe reluctantly tried to repair damage to relations caused by
China whereas Fukuda truly values Japan's ties with China.
Fukuda likes China and strived to not only repair and restore
relations with Beijing, but improve and strengthen them, Chen
noted. Abe broke the ice on thawing bilateral ties, but the
relationship is "getting warmer and warmer thanks to Fukuda's
efforts," she said.

Negotiating the Joint Communique
--------------

4. (C) Signing a fourth joint communique with Beijing and
releasing a joint press statement are two additional
"deliverables" that contributed to a successful visit. The
joint communique is "objective, rational, and not so
emotional," Akiba relayed. Negotiations on the text of the
document continued until twelve hours before Hu met with
Fukuda. The negotiations were tense, not because Japan and
China had big differences of opinion, but because each side
needed to choose their words carefully, which is one reason
some of the text could be views as ambiguous, he explained.
For example, China "always tries to use the phrase "strategic
mutual trust" when referring to Japan-China ties. However,
this does not translate well into Japanese but Hu insisted on
using this language when speaking with the press anyway.
Japan prefers using the phrase "mutually beneficial
relationship based on common strategic interests" which is
the phrase used in the official title of the fourth joint
communique. This phrase was coined during former Prime
Minister Abe's October 2006 visit to China.


5. (C) A reference to historical issues was "limited to a
minimum in both documents, Akiba stressed." It is important
to note what was not said on history. In other words,
China's flexibility and willingness to keep references to
differences over history to a minimum signals Beijing is
willing to strengthen and improve ties with Japan even though
unresolved differences remain, he added. Tension over
history issues has not been resolved, and could become

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problematic in the future, but it is unlikely that Beijing
will "allow" the anti-Japanese riots that occurred several
years ago from happening again, he assessed.


6. (C) It is noteworthy that references to "historical
issues" were kept to a minimum, agreed Chen. History issues
are no longer the focal point in the relationship, but it is
too early to say that history issues have been resolved, and
too early to say that anti-Japan riots in China will not
happen again, she stated.


7. (C) Both Chen and Akiba agreed negotiations on the text
on Taiwan and on Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat were
among the most contentious and time consuming. In section
four, sub-paragraph 5 of the joint statement, Japan and China
refer to Japan's "position and role" in the United Nations.
Japanese and Chinese were used as the official languages for
the joint documents and MOFA said an official English
translation will not be produced. Both Japan and China have
subtle but important differences in the meaning of the text
and how it should be accurately translated.


8. (C) MOFA provisional English translation states that "The
Chinese side attaches importance to Japan's position and role
in the United Nations and desires Japan to play an even
greater constructive role in the international community."
Akiba stated this text is very significant because it is
"new" and is the first time China has expressed "in writing"
support for Japan's goal of obtaining a permanent UNSC seat.
Premier Wen first verbally expressed support for Japan to
have an expanded UN role, but this is the first time it is in
writing, Akiba emphasized. The text might not "mean much" at
first glance but it is significant, Akiba noted.


9. (C) Chen told Embassy Tokyo the MOFA English translation
contains errors. Chen stated, that it is misleading and
inaccurate to say that China "desires and hopes" for Japan to
play an even greater role in the international community.
Rather, China is "willing to see" Japan play an even greater
role in "world affairs." Chen noted that the Chinese text is
most accurately translated into English as "world affairs" in
contrast to "international community. (Comment: While the
differences in translation are subtle, they illustrate the
perception gaps continue to exist in how MOFA assesses China
views Japan. Since there will not be an official translation
into English, the ambiguity in language allows MOFA to cast
this perceived Chinese show of support for Japan's role in
the UN and international community as a foreign policy
victory to the Japanese public. End Comment.)


10. (C) Turning to Taiwan, Akiba said China knows "there are
certain things both sides must accept the other country's
position on." While Japan did agree to include one sentence
on Taiwan in the joint statement, the text does not state
anything new, he added. The text in the joint statement
states "Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side again
expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the
Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the
Government of the People's Republic of China." Chen noted,
somewhat triumphantly, that Beijing did not ask Tokyo to say
anything new regarding is position on Taiwan and said Beijing
"wanted nothing more than affirmation of the text included in
the three previous joint statements."

In Search of Progress on East China Sea
--------------

11. (C) The lack of substantial progress on the East China
Sea was disappointing, agreed Akiba and Chen. Akiba noted
that the Japanese press was "inaccurate" and emphasized the
media overstated progress on negotiations. Japan and China
still need to work out many details before an agreement can
be reached, and this may take time to accomplish. Chen,
however, was much more optimistic. She predicted that "great
progress" will occur at the next round of negotiations, which
will likely be held before the G-8 Summit, according to Chen.
She shared Akiba's assessment that the disagreement over the
demarcation line will not be resolved and success in the near
future means an agreement on joint development in a
particular area of the East China Sea. (Note: Akiba was must
more pessimistic on the prospect of progress on the East
China Sea dispute compared to his April 22 assessment
reported reftel. End Note.)

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Tibet and Human Rights
--------------

12. (C) Japan and China agreed to resume dialogue on human
rights issues but a date and agenda has not been set for
future talks, Akiba stated. Agreeing to resume dialogue on
human rights was the easy part, but setting the date for
future talks, and agreeing on a mutually acceptable agenda,
will be the hard part, Chen noted. Akiba said Japan has
requested China be more transparent on Tibet and said Fukuda
delivered a "strongly worded message" to Hu on the importance
of improving human rights and handling the situation in Tibet
without the use of violence, Akiba said. It is notable that
China did not react negatively and signals a qualitative
change in Japan-China ties. Japan can now state things in an
open way, and China in turn, is willing to engage in
dialogue. This is an important step forward, Akiba
emphasized. Fukuda told Hu if China does not make progress
on human rights, it might be difficult for the international
community to celebrate the Beijing Olympics. Japan
understands China does not like the Olympics to be linked
with human rights concerns in Tibet but noted Fukuda "spent a
lot of time" discussing this with Hu. Moreover, Beijing kept
Japan informed before and after Beijing held talks with the
Dalai Lama. For the first time, Japan was informed at the
same time the United States was, he added.

Boosting Cooperation on Aid
--------------

13. (C) Japan proposed boosting cooperation with China on
aid to third countries, Akiba stated. While Japan proposed
this, and China agreed, both sides realize this could be
difficult to accomplish. Aid officials in China and Japan
have already starting working on potential areas of
cooperation, and this will continue after TICAD, he noted.
Japan still has problems with some of the ways China extends
aid to African countries, but by increasing cooperation with
China, Tokyo will have more opportunities to voice its
opinion on "areas of concern," he explained. Fukuda also
raised the situation in Burma with Hu and outlined Japan's
concerns on the political situation there. Hu shared
Fukuda's concerns for the Burmese people following the
devastating cyclone but did not say "anything new" regarding
the political situation.

Hu's Visit to Kansai
--------------


14. (SBU) Hu visited Osaka and Nara before departing for
Beijing. He arrived in Osaka on May 9, and amid extremely
heavy security, went directly to a downtown hotel for a
meeting with Kansai leaders hosted by Osaka Gov. Hashimoto
followed by a banquet with 200 top business leaders. The
scattered Tibet-related protestors and right wing sound
trucks were not seen or heard by Hu's party, according to the
Chinese Consular General in Osaka. Hu's meetings with local
leaders (including mayors and governors from nearby
prefectures and heads of the Kansai business organizations)
included televised exchange of pleasantries. Despite a
passing reference to the East China Sea gas development
dispute, neither Hu nor Hashimoto raised any controversial
issues. Similarly, Hu's comments to business leaders at the
banquet were described by several participants as "careful
and bland." In all meetings Hu repeatedly used the mantra of
"strategic mutually-beneficial relations" (senryakuteki gokei
kankei) in regard to Sino-Japanese relations. The local
officials and business leaders spoke positively about their
impression of Hu, both privately to Osaka-Kobe Consular
General and publicly in the media. Several described him as
"very western" in style, and all said they found him
personable and determined to make a good impression.


15. (SBU) Both Hu and his hosts made repeated reference to
then-Vice PM Deng Xiaoping's visit to Osaka and Nara exactly
30-years earlier. Like Deng, Hu visited Panasonic's Osaka
headquarters on May 9 and also met briefly with the company's
Chinese employees. Hu visited Nara where he met with the
Governor and visited two historic temples founded in the
Ninth century by a famous Chinese Buddhist monk. Although a
group of Japanese monks held a silent prayer protest nearby
in support of Tibetan monks, there were no disruptions and
rain and heavy security kept the crowds small and far away.

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Screened groups of Chinese students and residents, however,
greeted Hu's arrival at each stop. Hu always made a point of
walking over and chatting briefly with them, much as a
western politician would, according to a senior Japanese
official.


16. (C) Bio Note on Hu Jintao: MOFA Ambassador-at-Large
Yamazaki briefed Osaka Consulate-General following Hu's visit
to Kansai visit and confirmed that Hu's performance had been
"smooth". Not only was Hu smiling and personable in public,
he was remarkably relaxed throughout. Moreover, Hu's staff
seemed at ease and comfortable in the Chinese President's
presence - in stark contrast to Yamazaki's experience with a
Jiang Zemin visit to Southeast Asia. Yamazaki said the
business community was very favorably impressed with Hu and
noted he appeared more than willing to set aside political
points of contention such as Tibet and the East China Sea
dispute. Nearly everyone used words like "careful" or
"bland" to describe his comments and "good" to describe his
performance.


17. (C) Bio Note on Hu Jintao's Wife: Yamazaki said that Mrs.
Hu appeared to have some health or at least diet "issues".
She had her meals prepared separately through the visit and
did not attend any official meals. Her staff was unsure of
whether she would accompany Hu to the temples in Nara until
shortly before their departure from Osaka (she went).
DONOVAN