DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/08/08

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001252 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/08/08 INDEX: (1) Japan, China need to produce visible results through strategic, mutually beneficial cooperation (Nikkei) (2) Japan-China Joint Statement on Climate Change (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) (3) Aso, Yosano, Koike, Koizumi, Tanigaki keep casting covetous eyes on prime minister's post after Fukuda (Tokyo Shimbun) (4) Kakushin (nitty-gritty) column: Debate on Constitution - international contributions likely to flare up again in the fall, with expanding scope of SDF activities reaching limit (Tokyo Shimbun) (5) Interview with Surugadai University Professor Emeritus Hiroshi Honma -- Government must not be satisfied with improved SOFA administration (Akahata) (6) Agreement reached on full lifting of embargo on Japanese rice exports to China: Farm products to become touchstone for export expansion; Still mountain of issues, including eliminating price gaps, increasing productivity (Nikkei) ARTICLES: (1) Japan, China need to produce visible results through strategic, mutually beneficial cooperation NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full) May 8, 2008 The leaders of Japan and China signed a joint statement that pledges promoting a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests, as new guidelines for future bilateral relations. The statement advocates building a future-oriented relationship and blueprints a bilateral relationship that can contribute to the world in the new era. Even so, such outstanding issues such as gas exploration rights in the East China Sea and the poisoning of frozen dumplings imported from China to Japan have been left unattended. To ensure improvement in Japan-China relations, both countries need to produce visible results through strategic, mutually beneficial cooperation. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda: "I hope this year will be recorded in history as the year of development in Japan-China relations." Chinese President Hu Jintao: "China-Japan relations are now at the 
starting point of a new chapter of history." In a conference press conference held after their meeting, Fukuda and Hu emphasized that Japan-China relations have entered a new phase. Fukuda aims to score high marks on the diplomatic front, given declining public support for his administration. Meanwhile, Hu, faced with international criticism for his response to the riots in Tibet, wants to make relations with Japan a breakthrough in the impasse in promoting foreign policy in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics in August. They had no big grins on their faces during the press conference, reflecting the difficult circumstances surrounding TOKYO 00001252 002 OF 011 them. Ten years have passed since former Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Japan. During the past decade, Japan-China relations were seriously strained over historical issues. But what affected the bilateral relations most significantly was a structural change, that is, China's growing economic strength. The two countries have become even more interdependent in the economic area, but discord also occurred in various areas. Although China has enjoyed high-speed, two-digit economic growth, distortions have also been exposed, like the widening gap between rich and poor and environmental pollution. China has come up with a national goal to create a harmonious society. But in order for China to continue sustainable economic growth and stabilize society, cooperation from the industrialized countries that have a similar experience is indispensable. For Japan, reconstructing relations with China is also essential. China's market is becoming more attractive to it, but as seen from its response to the torch relay, China is also a unique economic power. How should Japan deal with such a neighbor that is growing rapidly while being saddled with various risks? How should Japan lead that nation to making a soft landing? This question has become a major theme that will directly affect Japan's national interests. In drawing up diplomatic strategies toward the United States, Russia, and other countries, as well, it is important for the two countries to stabilize their bilateral relations. "We have unavoidably contradictions or problems in country-to-country relations. What is important is to maintain comprehensive friendship." Using almost the same expression, Fukuda and Hu emphasized the significance of Hu's visit to Japan, though some pointed out the bad timing of the visit. Despite a myriad of problems pending between Japan and China, it has become possible for the leaders of Japan and China to make reciprocal visits as promised. This is a sort of progress. The key point is how to construct a mechanism to bear fruit through cooperation on such occasions. This year marks the 30th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's visit to Japan and the start of China's reform and open-door policy. During this period, providing yen loans was a major tool for Japan's cooperation to China, but Japan has decided to end providing fresh yen loans to China starting this year. In the environment area, some have suggested creating a fund to be financed jointly by Japan and China, but the two countries have yet to crafted means for policy coordination and cooperation in response to the structural change in bilateral relations. The statement proposes promoting a future-oriented relationship, but Japan and China have separated in popular sentiment. In preliminary negotiations, a Chinese representative said: "We are no longer in the era in which only leaders make diplomatic decisions." In order to obtain public understanding, the two countries have to continue to show the results of cooperation both at home and abroad. It is also imperative to improve the political foundation to carry out new challenges. Given that the opposition camp has control in the House of Representatives, the Fukuda administration remains unable to draw up a medium- and long-term diplomatic strategy and TOKYO 00001252 003 OF 011 even a roadmap needed for resolving immediate issues. A Japanese government source said: "The Japanese government now finds it difficult to make a bold diplomatic decision. This affected China's posture in drafting the joint statement." The Lake Toya Summit will be held in early July, and the Beijing Olympic Games will take place in August. A Japan-China-South Korea summit is scheduled for this fall. Japan and China will proactively grope for chances for their leaders to make reciprocal visits, so there are still chances for the two countries to achieve results. But if they are slow to make an arrangement to that end, a hazy may hang over the blueprint mapped out during the "trip in the warm spring" as said by President Hu. (2) Japan-China Joint Statement on Climate Change Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs home page, posted May 5, 2008 ¶1. The governments of Japan and China (hereinafter called "both sides") recognized the need to make efforts together hand-in-hand and to cooperate on climate change, a common threat facing human beings. ¶2. Both sides confirmed the goals and the principles promised in the "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC)" and the "Kyoto Protocol" and again stated the "Japan-China Joint Statement on Further Strengthening Cooperation on Environmental Conservation" signed by both sides in April 2007. Based on this joint statement, the two countries have decided to further boost cooperation on measures to deal with climate change, deepen dialogues and exchanges, promote practical cooperation, and build a partnership to deal with climate change so that the two countries will put the strategic, mutually beneficial relationship into action. ¶3. Both sides confirmed that the "UNFCC" and the "Kyoto Protocol" are appropriate and effective frameworks for countries on the globe to deal with climate change. Both sides again stated that based on common but differentiated responsibilities and based on each country's capability, the industrialized countries take the initiative in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and that by providing developing countries with funds or transferring technology to them, they can implement the promises in the conventions and would endorse them. ¶4. Both sides highly value the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) assessment reports and reaffirmed the ultimate objective of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. ¶5. The Japanese side expressed a view that in order to achieve the above objective, greenhouse gas emissions in the world must be at least halved by 2050. The Chinese side expressed a view that it would pay attention to the Japanese side's view and that it would discuss methods and measures with other countries to achieve the ultimate objective in the UNFCCC. ¶6. The Japanese side again stated that it would achieve the goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 6 PERCENT during a period from 2008 through 2012 proposed by the "Kyoto Protocol" and in line with the plan to achieve the goal, and that it would continue a TOKYO 00001252 004 OF 011 country-specific goal for constraining greenhouse gas emissions in 2013 and beyond. The Chinese side will proactively deal with climate change under a framework that will enable sustainable growth, strive to implement a Chinese national program on climate change, and freshly contribute to protecting world climate. Both sides mutually appreciated their respective approaches. ¶7. Both sides again expressed their political resolve to strive to resolve the climate change issue through international cooperation, based on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" under the "UNFCCC" and the "Kyoto Protocol" frameworks. Both sides have come to share the perception that active participation in negotiations to strengthen effective processes and frameworks to be applied up to 2012 and in 2013 and beyond agreed on in the Bali road map will lead to results at a conference of parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol in Copenhagen slated for the end of 2009. ¶8. The Japanese side stated that a sector-specific approach is very significant in terms of setting a country-specific goal for reducing a total amount of greenhouse gas emissions. The Chinese side stated that the sector-specific approach is an important method to implement the emission reduction indicator and take action. Both sides stated that they would further discuss the role of the sector-specific approach. ¶9. Both sides shared the perception that measures to prevent pollution and deal with climate change would benefit each other, compensate each other, promote sustainable growth, and have a significant meaning in building an eco-civilization. Both sides have decided to strengthen studies and cooperation in this area. ¶10. Both sides have come to share the perception that because science and technology are important to deal with climate change, the two countries will strengthen scientific studies to deal with climate change as well as working-level cooperation concerning development and transfer of technology for relaxation and adaptation. Both sides have decided to carry out technical cooperation in the following priority realms: (1) Energy saving, improvement in energy efficiency, new energy, and renewable energy (2) Clean coal technology (improvement in facilities in coal thermal power plants and improvement in efficiency of such plants) (3) Capture and use of methane (4) Carbon capture and storage (CCS) (5) Adaptation to climate change ¶10. Both sides will continue to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects and encourage both sides' firms to actively participate in the projects. Both sides will discuss how to improve and maintain the CDM. ¶11. Both sides will bolster cooperation to adapt to climate change through the following measures: (1) Studies and analyses of negative effects and fragility of climate change (2) Studies and analyses of socioeconomic effects of climate change and costs (3) Strengthen anticipation competence in science, technology, and institutions on climate change and its impact TOKYO 00001252 005 OF 011 (4) Research and development of technology and measures for climate change (5) Improve awareness of the need to reduce fragility and adapt to needs when establishing and implementing a sustainable development strategy ¶12. Both sides will work together in such areas as strengthening capacity-building, improving the national awareness, human exchanges and training ¶13. Both sides will discuss the question of how to invest as much money as possible to deal with climate change, including encouraging the private-sector and banking institutions to play their roles. The Chinese side positively appreciated the Japanese side's implementation of international cooperation under its "Cool Earth Partnership" in order to deal with climate change in developing countries to which Japan has provided financial support. The Japanese side positively appreciated the policies and measures the Chinese side has taken to deal with climate change and stated that Japan was ready to help the Chinese side to engage in activities related to climate change, particularly, promoting the implementation of the Chinese national program on climate change. ¶14. Both sides have decided that the National Development and Reform Commission of China and related government offices of Japan will take the responsibility to implement this Joint Statement. Both sides will implement this Joint Statement in concrete terms by further holding talks between their related sectors. ¶15. This Joint Statement was signed by the Japanese government's representative and the Chinese government's representative on May 7, 2008, in Tokyo. (3) Aso, Yosano, Koike, Koizumi, Tanigaki keep casting covetous eyes on prime minister's post after Fukuda TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) May 8, 2008 Those Liberal Democratic Party members regarded as possible candidates to succeed Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda are now actively on the move. Fukuda's sway over the LDP has drastically declined due to the defeat of the LDP candidate in the Lower House by-election for Yamaguchi No. 2 constituency, and because of the confusion created by the reinstatement of the provisional tax rates, including the gasoline tax. Speculation is rife in the LDP that calls for replacing Fukuda will arise after the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Hokkaido in July -- the assumption being that the party could not win the next Lower House election under his leadership. Aso gives priority to harmony and strengthens own ability On April 28, the day after the LDP candidate was defeated in the Lower House by-election, Taro Aso, 67, a former LDP secretary general who has already thrown his hat in the ring for the next party presidential race, stressed in a meeting of his faction: "It is absolutely necessary to prevent the party from running about in confusion." If Aso takes a clear anti-Fukuda stand at a time when the government and ruling parties are having a hard time coping with the DPJ's TOKYO 00001252 006 OF 011 political offensive, the result would not only benefit the DPJ but also create resentment of the largest faction, the Machimura faction, which has supported Fukuda. Aso seems to have judged that it would be advisable to refrain from taking actions for the time being that would make him stand out. In fact, the Aso faction, which was formed with a membership of 15 in December 2006, now has 20 members. Aso has been energetically delivering speeches in rural areas in order to increase his supporters. Yosano suddenly emerging as candidate by criticizing Prime Minister Fukuda Kaoru Yosano, 69, a former chief cabinet secretary, has suddenly emerged as a presidential candidate. Although Yosano was once regarded as Fukuda's personal advisor, he has recently often leveled criticism at Fukuda instead. Appearing on a commercial TV program on May 1, he made a candid statement about Fukuda, saying: "The prime minister needs to make a public appeal about such major challenges as fiscal reconstruction." He has just come out with his first book, which includes such pet views as the need to hike the consumption tax to 10 PERCENT . Speculation abounds that his book might be a preparatory step to run for the presidential election. Yosano plans to focus his activities within a new study group that includes fellow lawmakers. There is a possibility that calls for him to run in the party leadership race will become stronger. Koike active to form parliamentary leagues Former Defense Minister Yuriko Koike, 55, visited China in late March along with Hidenao Nakagawa, a former secretary general. Koike and Nakagawa formed on April 1 a parliamentary league to achieve Kyoto Protocol goals. In his meeting on April 9 with Koike and Seiji Maehara, a vice president of the DPJ, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, 66, reportedly said: "There are two candidates for the prime minister's post here." Chances are that if she became Japan's first female prime minister, she would be popular among the public. However, a senior member of the Machimura faction, to which Koike belongs, took an icy view: "Should the faction field a candidate for the presidency, we would back Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura. Nobody will support her." So, it is unclear whether support for Koike will expand or not. Any possibility of Junichiro Koizumi running in presidential race Although Koizumi has clearly rejected the possibility of his running again for the party presidential election, there are strong calls from LDP members for him to do just that. His positive remarks in meetings and speeches have encouraged speculation that Koizumi might run again for the presidential post. However, a veteran lawmaker said: "He has no intention to run again for the presidency. Seeing the maneuvering between the ruling and opposition camps due to the lopsided Diet (in which the opposition camp controls the Upper House and the ruling camp holds the majority of the Lower House),he just cannot help expressing himself. He has no desire to run again." TOKYO 00001252 007 OF 011 Many LDP members say Sadakazu Tanigaki lacks demonstration Many in the LDP have said that Policy Research Council Chairman Tanigaki, 63, who ran in the presidential race before last, lacks eagerness to run again, despite his having served in a key post. He first needs to strengthen his political footing in order to be a presidential candidate, since he will be in a new faction to be formed on May 13 when his faction and the Koga faction merge. (4) Kakushin (nitty-gritty) column: Debate on Constitution - international contributions likely to flare up again in the fall, with expanding scope of SDF activities reaching limit TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) May 3, 2008 Tetsuya Furuta Debate on the relationship between the Constitution and Japan's international contributions is likely to flare up again in the fall or after. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was forced under the divided Diet to temporarily suspend the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) refueling mission in the Indian Ocean last year. Learning a lesson from that case, the LDP has now embarked on discussion of permanent legislation that would make it possible for Japan to dispatch the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad as needed. Meanwhile, the government's approach of broadening the SDF's purview of activities bit by bit has reached its limit. The relationship between Article 9 of the Constitution and international contributions need to be reconsidered. Debate on international contributions is likely to resurface as the Maritime Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) refueling mission now going on in the Indian Ocean under the New Antiterrorism Special Measures Law is to end next January and the Air Self-Defense Force's (ASDF) airlifting activities conducted under the Iraq Special Measures Law will expire in July 2009. In the Upper House, which is dominated by the opposition bloc, the major opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is opposed to extending those activities. If no action is taken, there is a strong possibility that the suspension of the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean will occur once more. Should the SDF troops who are deployed there again be forced to pull out, the government would lose a key component of its international contributions. The best policy for the government and the ruling bloc to avoid such a case would be to involve the DPJ in the process and enact permanent legislation for overseas SDF dispatch in the extraordinary session of the Diet this fall. But the LDP's junior coalition partner New Komeito remains cautious about enacting such legislation. Instead, the party has cited as priority policy agendas preventive measures against a recurrence of a collision between an Aegis ship and a private vessel. Debate on permanent legislation in the ruling camp has yet to get started. After the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Law was enacted in 1992, overseas dispatch of SDF personnel began in full swing. At first, five principles for overseas dispatches, for instance, obtaining a cease-fire agreement between the parties in conflict, were strictly observed in order to put restrictions on overseas dispatches. Destinations for dispatches and the use of weapons were TOKYO 00001252 008 OF 011 both limited. Unconstitutional judgment handed down Since the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, the government has established a series of laws, such as the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law and the Iraq Special Measures Law, in a way to respond to America's call for Japan to provide logistical support. As a result, the SDF's purview of activities has been broadened to cover even de facto "combat zones", for instance, the Indian Ocean and Iraq. In order to avoid cases of exercising the right to collective self-defense, an act prohibited in the government's interpretation of the Constitution, the government created this logic: activities in non-combat zones would not involve linking to the use of force by other countries. But last month, the Nagoya High Court handed down a ruling about the deployed ASDF personnel in Iraq that said the ASDF's airlifting (of armed soldiers in the multinational force to the Baghdad combat zone) were acts that could be identified as being linked to the use of force by other countries. The government has assumed a wait and see attitude toward the ruling, with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda noting, "There is no problem about the airlifting." But in the course of debate on permanent legislation, the government will be forced to discuss the relationship between the overseas dispatch of the SDF and the Constitution. LDP, DPJ wide apart The government and the ruling bloc are pinning high hopes on the DPJ's cooperation to enact permanent legislation for overseas SDF dispatches. Former DPJ President Seiji Maehara has noted: "The government has repeatedly added changes to its previous views to meet the reality, but now it is no longer possible to continue to do so." However, the DPJ as a party is not in a mood to directly take up the constitutional issue. Furthermore, the LDP and the DPJ are wide apart in their views over UN resolutions, which Japan has made the ground for overseas dispatches of the SDF. Some LDP lawmakers assert that the Diet should allow the SDF to operate broadly without being bound by UN resolutions in order to deal with the growing number of peacekeeping operations that are being more frequently carried out by a multinational force other than the UN or the "coalition of the willing." Some also insist that the types of activities the SDF would take part in should be broadened to cover guard, maintenance of security, and ship inspections. However, DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa will not endorse any overseas dispatch of the SDF without a UN resolution authorizing such. In addition, regarding active participation in UN operations, Ozawa noted: "It would not violate the Constitution even if such participation involves the use of armed force." His stance is opposed to the government's interpretation that even in the case of participation in UN-led operations, the use of force would not be allowed. (5) Interview with Surugadai University Professor Emeritus Hiroshi TOKYO 00001252 009 OF 011 Honma -- Government must not be satisfied with improved SOFA administration AKAHATA (Page 3) (Full) May 8, 2008 In the wake of a string of brutal crimes by U.S. military personnel, calls are growing for revising the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). But the government is dismissive of revising the pact. This newspaper asked Hiroshi Honma, a professor emeritus (of international law) at Surugadai University, about the issue. Embracing U.S. discretion -- The government intends to deal with brutal crimes committed by U.S. military personnel by improving SOFA application, based on a Japan-U.S. Joint Committee agreement. Ending the matter by improving SOFA implementation only means not changing the pact and leaving the matter to U.S. discretion. In November 2002, a U.S. Marine major attempted to sexually assault a foreign woman in Okinawa. The U.S. side subsequently refused to hand over the major to police custody before indictment, saying it was an attempted rape. Attempting to rape a woman is a serious crime in Japan. The U.S. side probably feared that since the crime was by an officer, handing him over would lower military morale. In contrast, the U.S. military is willing to hand over into police custody rank and file service members before indictment by giving "sympathetic consideration." Why is government negative about revising the SOFA? -- Why is the government reluctant to revise the SOFA? There has been no convincing explanation from the government. It explained, for example, that revising the SOFA with Japan would affect SOFAs with other countries. But the SOFA with Germany (the so-called Bonn Agreement) was revised (in 1993),the one with Italy (in 1995),and the pact with South Korea (in 2001). The revised Bonn Agreement includes a set of rules for the use of bases and environmental conservation -- contents that go far beyond that in the SOFA with Japan. The criminal trial jurisdiction clause was not revised, however. That is because the U.S. Congress takes the view that the U.S. Constitution is the best in the world when it comes to guaranteeing the rights of the accused and that the rights of U.S. military personnel overseas must be guaranteed, transcending the sovereignty of other countries. In 1957, an American soldier named William S. Girard shot to death a woman collecting spent cartridges in Gunma Prefecture. In this case, the accused argued that it was unconstitutional for the United States to abandon primary jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the argument, saying that abandoning jurisdiction was not unconstitutional, while acknowledging that primary jurisdiction rested with the United States. There is no guarantee that a similar case will not occur. Japan needs a legal system to vie with the TOKYO 00001252 010 OF 011 United States instead of being satisfied by saying that the Japan-U.S. SOFA is most advanced regarding the criminal jurisdiction procedures. Violation of police powers On March 19, a taxi driver was killed in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. In connection with this case, a U.S. sailor has been arrested on two charges: desertion and murder accompanied by robbery. The SOFA specifies which side -- Japan or the United States -- has primary jurisdiction over the one being criminally charged. But the pact does not envisage a case in which the jurisdiction of Japan and the United States vie with each other over two different criminal charges. A certain set of rules is included in what was agreed upon by the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. Still, in the event the U.S. side independently finds a suspect who is believed to have committed an extremely brutal crime, like the Yokosuka taxi driver murder case, the most fundamental and conceivable system is for the United States to ask Japanese police to arrest him. The U.S. military seized the suspect matter-of-factly and brought him back to a U.S. base without taking him to Japanese police in advance. Such an act is a violation of Japanese police powers. (6) Agreement reached on full lifting of embargo on Japanese rice exports to China: Farm products to become touchstone for export expansion; Still mountain of issues, including eliminating price gaps, increasing productivity NIKKEI (Page 5) (Full) May 8, 2008 With President Hu Jintao's visit to Japan as the occasion, the governments of Japan and China yesterday reached a final agreement on the complete lifting of the embargo on Japanese rice exports to China, one of the pending issues between the two countries. Rice consumption in Japan is dwindling. The lifting of the ban on the exports of rice to the Chinese market, where annual consumption of rice is said to be 20 times more than the amount consumed in Japan, will become a touchstone for Japan's strategy to expand exports of farm products. However, a gap in rice prices between the two countries is huge. There are also other issues to clear, including improving productivity and making Japanese rice a brand-name product. Japan and China have also agreed to cooperate with each other regarding promotion of investment and measures for small- and medium-size businesses. The first visit to Japan by a Chinese president in a decade is boosting a mood for strengthening ties on the economic front. Agreement reached on promotion of investment, measures for small- and medium-sized businesses Both the Japanese and Chinese leaders during a joint press conference announced that they had agreed to completely lift the embargo on Japanese rice exports to China. Since it had been viewed that an agreement on export conditions would be reached by the end of March, an Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) official explained, "Coordination has taken an unexpectedly long time." TOKYO 00001252 011 OF 011 Japan's rice exports to China have been suspended since 2003 due to the review of the quarantine system on the Chinese side. Exports were partially resumed last year as a provisional measure. According to MAFF, it would be possible to fully resume rice exports as early as June, if a rice milling plant and a warehouse in Kanagawa Prefecture, which have already undergone a certain extent of inspection, are used. However, starting exports using other milling plants requires another checking process to confirm that there are no harmful insects in China-destined rice, which takes one year to complete. Though the checking period has been cut short from three years as the Chinese side had originally requested, many take the view that even if the embargo is lifted, export volume would not increase anytime soon. Japan exported 940 tons of commercial-use rice in 2007. The annual domestic demand for rice is approximately 8 million tons, of which only about 1 PERCENT is for export. Some export items, such as apples, have produced some results, in China or Taiwan, where people' income level has risen. However, the price of Japanese rice was about 20 times higher than Chinese rice in general as of a time when exports were resumed last year on a provisional basis. The same MAFF official also said that 124 tons were exported in provisional shipments, of which 24 tons in the first shipment were sold out soon due to their rarity, but the remaining amount remains unsold. Rice exports will hold the key to predicting how to sell agricultural products that have great price gaps with overseas products and whether they can earn money abroad. Japanese rice is sold in China as a high-class gift item. Though there is a growing concern about a rice shortage in Asia and Africa, there are surpluses in Japan. In addition, it is difficult to expect rice demand to expand over the long term due to the declining birthrate and the aging of the population. Food imports from China in 2007 rose to approximately 920 billion yen, which is 20 times more than Japanese exports to that nation. In order to create brand-name farm products, improving productivity in the agricultural area will be crucial. Japan and China have also signed a memorandum for cooperation on the trade and investment area and between small and mid-size businesses of the two countries. Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Minister Akira Amari on the 7th met with National Development and Reform Commission Chairman Zhang Ping and Commerce Minister Chen Deming. They agreed to promote sustainable development of the economies of both countries and push forward efforts to accelerate investment. They have also confirmed that they promote close exchanges of opinions aimed at promoting investment. Regarding small- and medium-sized businesses, they have agreed to reinforce assistance for mutual market access. Other agreements reached between them include holding a regular meeting to discuss product safety and establishing a system to share accident information possibly later in the month. DONOVAN