DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/07/08

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 TOKYO 001233 SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 05/07/08 INDEX: (1) Japanese, Chinese leaders in summit meeting agree to develop a strategic, mutually-beneficial relationship (Yomiuri) (2) Foundation of Japan-U.S. alliance rocking (Asahi) (3) Futenma relocation plan still up in the air two years after Japan, U.S. reach agreement (Asahi) (4) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Hill meets with members of Japanese delegation sent by organizations related to victims kidnapped by North Korea (Sankei) (5) WTO talks: Agreement within year at crucial juncture (Mainichi) (6) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gas tax (Asahi) (7) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gasoline tax (Tokyo Shimbun) (8) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, provisional gas tax, new health insurance system for elderly (Mainichi) (9) Simulation of next Lower House election: If 2 PERCENT of LDP votes go to DPJ, two parties would trade places (Tokyo Shimbun) ARTICLES: (1) Japanese, Chinese leaders in summit meeting agree to develop a strategic, mutually-beneficial relationship YOMIURI ONLINE (Full) May 7, 2008 Prime Minister Fukuda this morning met at his official residence with China's President Hu Jintao, who is visiting Japan as a state guest. The two leaders agreed to strengthen even further a "strategic, mutual relationship" that is aimed at expanding the interests of both countries by cooperating with the international community. After the summit meeting, the two leaders signed a political document titled, "Joint statement between Japan and China on comprehensively promoting a strategic, mutually beneficial relationship." In the statement, "facing history directly, aiming at the future" was the expression used regarding the historical problem. On the other hand, on global warming countermeasures, the two issued a "joint statement between Japan and China on climate change," in which China took a positive stance. This is the first visit to Japan in ten years by a Chinese president, who is the head of state. The summit meeting lasted approximately an hour and a half, starting at 10:26 this morning. Attending from the Japanese government were five cabinet ministers including Foreign Minister Koumura and Finance Minister Nukaga. The Chinese side included Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. At the start of the meeting, the prime minister stated: "I would like to offer my hear-felt welcome to you on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the Japan China Treaty of TOKYO 00001233 002 OF 017 Peace and Friendship." President Hu replied: "Relations between China and Japan are now blessed with a new chance to develop even more." The joint statement issued today is the fourth political document since the first one in 1972. That statement was followed by a treaty of peace and friendship in 1978 and by another joint statement in ¶1998. The latest statement in referring to a new bilateral relationship went: "We will directly face history, facing the future, and build together a good future for the world." Compared to November 1998, when then President Jiang Zemin visited Japan during a time of bilateral friction and repeatedly stated, "with history as a mirror," this time, the Chinese side stressed a future-oriented relationship. Also included in the statement was an agreement for visits by the two leaders once a year, and the promotion of broad exchanges, such as mutual visits by senior officials in the national security area. As areas for mutual cooperation, the statement specified energy and the environment, as well as "food and product safety," which has become an issue due to the poisoned dumpling incidents. In addition, the two countries included in the document the words, "We will closely cooperate to understand even more and pursue common values." Having in mind the Tibet issue, on which the international community is now focused, the two countries took a stance of placing emphasis on human rights issues. On the pending issue of developing gas fields in the E. China Sea, there does not seem to be a specific agreement in the document. Regarding Japan's becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, which Japan is seeking, the expression used was the same as in last year's statement when Chinese Premier Wen visited Japan: "We hope to see Japan play an even greater constructive role in the international community." On the other hand, in the joint statement on climate change, a positive stance regarding negotiations on a post-Kyoto Protocol regime that starts after 2013, China, which is a world-class emitter of greenhouse gases, took a stance of actively participating. (2) Foundation of Japan-U.S. alliance rocking ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) May 6, 2008 By Yoichi Kato, bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the Asahi Shimbun The foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance is being rocked. Priority gaps over the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and other matters are emerging. The mood in the United States to place a high priority on the alliance with Japan has run out of steam. In the post-Cold War era, Tokyo and Washington have overcome the alliance "adrift" relationship by redefining the alliance as capable of playing a role in the Asia-Pacific and in the world instead of being a set of security arrangements for the defense of Japan alone. The need to revamp the alliance is again being mentioned. Priority gaps over Futenma relocation and FX selection TOKYO 00001233 003 OF 017 Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba was scheduled to visit the United States during the Golden Week holiday period from late April through early May. Coordination for that clearly exposed the growing priority gap. According to a connected source, the U.S. side reacted strongly to Japan's initial agenda for it did not include the issue of U.S. force realignment. For the United States, the biggest problem is that the construction of a Futenma replacement facility and the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam are lagging behind schedule. Washington fears that if this situation persists, the relocation plan will not be completed by 2014, as originally scheduled, especially given Tokyo's noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the plan under the Fukuda administration. Ishiba's trip to the United States fell through in the end. Japan is discontent with the United States, as well. Washington declined Tokyo's request for the provision of information on the state-of-the-art stealth fighter F-22 as a possible candidate for Japan's next-generation mainstay combat jet aircraft (FX),citing U.S. law prohibiting exports of the aircraft and the need to hold strategic talks first. Last spring, even then-Prime Minister Abe asked for U.S. cooperation. Japan cannot easily back down on the matter that concerns the foundation of the bilateral alliance transcending the question of procuring a piece of equipment. A priority gap also exists in the United States. The difference is specifically between one group who attach importance to direct dialogues with China and North Korea in dealing with them and another placing priority on talks with such U.S. allies as Japan, South Korea, and Australia. Former National Security Council Asian Affairs Director Michael Green thinks the Bush administration belongs to the former. "The administration eyes achieving results in a short term. Its strategy regarding the North Korean nuclear issue is a prime example." That has resulted in Japan's mistrust of the United States for its lack of consideration, causing the bilateral alliance to become adrift. There is concern in Japan that such gaps will grow larger following the change of administration in the United States next January. The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, the legal basis for the Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, will also expire next January. This will be followed by expiration in July of the Iraq Special Measures Law, the legal basis for the Air Self-Defense Force's airlift mission in Iraq. In view of the Japanese political situation, extending laws and enacting new legislation seems difficult. SDF pullout might prompt the next U.S. administration to conclude that Japan is not dependable. Move for new declaration To prevent such an eventuality, an idea has emerged to issue a new strategic document in 2010 that is similar to the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security. 2010 marks the 50th anniversary of the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The new U.S. president is also expected to visit Japan to attend the 2010 annual APEC Summit to be hosted by Japan. The idea is for the Japanese prime minister and the U.S. President to reaffirm a wide-ranging Japan-U.S. alliance not confined to the Asia-Pacific region and security. TOKYO 00001233 004 OF 017 The U.S. government is reluctant to do so, saying that outstanding bilateral issues, such relocation of Futenma Air Station, should be settled first. This is another example of a priority gap. Experts are also split on the matter, with Pacific Forum CSIS President Ralph Cossa underscoring the need for revitalizing the alliance, while Green noting, "Another fancy document with no substance is ineffective. Given the Japanese political situation, determining when to produce such a document is a difficult question." Will Japan and the United States be able to keep pace with each other? The envisaged new declaration is likely to be a test to prevent the Japan-U.S. alliance from becoming further adrift. Interview with former US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless -- Realignment agreement must be implemented swiftly What is your view of the Japan-U.S. alliance today? The implementation of reform (realignment) of the bilateral alliance (as was confirmed in the 2006 U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation) has been adrift since the establishment of the Fukuda administration. The relocation of Futenma Air Station is one example. I hear that the project will be delayed by one year. Unless the replacement facility is completed, U.S. Marines cannot be relocated to Guam. This agreement is like a complex instrument. If one component freezes, the entire instrument freezes. Will the U.S. side comply with a request for making changes to the Futenma plan? No. The reason is because the current plan was presented by the Japanese government; it is not what the United States hoped for. The Japanese side guaranteed the plan's fruition, so the (U.S.) side made a compromise. Change would follow change endlessly, and that would delay the relocation further. Third, revision talks would drag the United States into the conflict between Tokyo and Okinawa. Why is the Japan-U.S. alliance adrift? That is because the leaders of the Japanese government are preoccupied with other matters. Procurement scandals and the Atago collision accident hit the Defense Ministry. Under the previous Koizumi and Abe administrations, Tokyo had a considerably strong interest in (U.S. force realignment). Funding the realignment agreement should be made Japan's national priority. If Japan handles this agreement as merely a nominal pact, the U.S. Congress would take an extremely negative view and alter its effort. Although I do not think the alliance is adrift, unless change is made swiftly, the alliance would lose its capability that an edge in the Asia-Pacific region. What about the idea of issuing a new security declaration? I think it is an extremely good idea. But unless what is agreed upon between the two countries is implemented, (the new declaration) would be meaningless. It would then be known by all countries in the region. What is the challenge facing the Japan-U.S. alliance? It is a new tempo that has emerged in Asia regarding security policy. Until now, Japan has enjoyed the luxury of taking seven, TOKYO 00001233 005 OF 017 nine years to decide on one policy. In that time period, other counties make three decisions and finish implementing them. Japan must change its tempo in one way or another; otherwise, Japan and the Japan-U.S. alliance would be marginalized. (3) Futenma relocation plan still up in the air two years after Japan, U.S. reach agreement ASAHI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged) May 3, 2008 Two years have passed since the governments of Japan and the United States reached a final agreement on realignment plans for U.S. forces in Japan. The municipalities housing U.S. military bases had initially taken a stiff attitude in reaction to the agreement reached in disregard of their wishes. But they have since softened their attitude in response to the policy of dialogue being taken by the Fukuda administration. A thaw in the atmosphere between the central and the local governments is now expected. Even so, the plan of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station remains up in the air. Three-way standoff over Okinawa call for moving construction site further offshore To break the impasse in negotiations on the Futenma relocation issue, government officials concerned kept in mind the following blueprint this spring: 1) The central government and the affected municipalities would agree on revising the construction site that involves building a pair of runways; 2) Defense Minister Ishiba would visit the U.S. during the Golden Week holidays to begin full-scale negotiations with the U.S; and 3) Around the G-8 Summit in Hokkaido in July, Japan would reach an agreement with the U.S. and include necessary expenses in the budget for next fiscal year. On April 9, representatives from the central and the affected municipalities held a meeting of the council on the Futenma relocation issue at the Prime Minister's Official Residence. Representatives from Okinawa insisted that a working-level consultative body be established. But the central government's reply was that the issue should be discussed at the council level. After the meeting, Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima, Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Futahashi stayed behind. Twenty minutes later, the three emerged from the room with hard looks on their faces. An informed official complained: "The possibility of settlement this year has become remote." The Koizumi and Abe administrations took a tough stance toward the government of Nago city, the site of the Futenma relocation, because of its opposition to the government's plan. They took such tough measures as freezing subsidies to Nago. But then, Vice Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya, who was taking the initiative in dealing with Nago, was arrested for corruption. The affected municipalities placed hopes on the Fukuda administration for its policy of prioritizing dialogue, and they agreed to resume negotiations last November for the first time in 10 months. In a drive to reach an early settlement, Machimura also expressed a flexible view in a meeting of the said council in February about Okinawa's request for moving the construction site for the runways further offshore. He said: "We would like to reach a settlement at an early date, while keeping Okinawa's request in mind." TOKYO 00001233 006 OF 017 U.S. Ambassador Thomas Schieffer, however, told Machimura: "Modifications will be impossible. We have finally gotten control over the Marines, so (if we make modifications,) it would result in opening a Pandora's Box. The Marines would demand that the runways be made longer." Okinawa Governor Nakaima has basically approved the plan of transferring the Futenma Air Station to waters off Henoko district. The prefecture also tacitly permitted the Defense Ministry's start this March of a full-scale examination in preparation for the planned environmental impact assessment. Nakaima is also calling on the central government to turn Okinawa's requests into action. Many residents of Okinawa do not want the air station to be moved to another part of the prefecture. Nakaima remains unable to make a decision ahead of the prefectural assembly election in June. He fears that he might come under fire unless he shows a willingness to reflect the wishes of the local people. Meanwhile, the central government is worried that if it swallows all requests from Okinawa without securing a guarantee for its cooperation in promoting the relocation plan, "the negotiations on the Futenma relocation issue may not move forward," a senior Defense Ministry official said. The central government and the Okinawa government remain at odds despite their desire to find a point of compromise. They plan to submit a preliminary report on results of the environmental impact assessment this summer, but the submission is now likely to be deferred to December or later. It is uncertain whether the relocation plan is completed by 2014 as agreed on between Japan and the U.S. A government source involved in negotiations with Okinawa vented: "The Fukuda administration is losing its grip on power due to declining public support. Nakaima remains unable to make a decision out of fear of criticism from the people of Okinawa. The U.S. does not want to take any risk that could upset the U.S.-Japan agreement. The three parties concerned are now in a three-way standoff." On the other hand, the Japanese government has agreed to finance a plan to move U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam starting next fiscal year. Japan plans to pay about 600 billion yen of the total construction cost of approximately 1 trillion yen. (4) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Hill meets with members of Japanese delegation sent by organizations related to victims kidnapped by North Korea SANKEI (Page 3) (Full) May 4, 2008 Takashi Arimoto, Washington A joint delegation sent by the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) and the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NAEKN) at noon of May 2 (before dawn of May 3, Japan time) met with Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill (for East Asia and the Pacific),the U.S. chief delegate to the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. Japanese delegates asked Hill not to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Hill is seen as an "advocate" in the U.S. administration of delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, but he TOKYO 00001233 007 OF 017 refrained from answering directly to the question posed by the Japanese delegate. Hill also admitted that in negotiations with North Korea on a declaration of its nuclear activities, he has not received any account of where a nuclear bomb-manufacturing facility is located. The fact that the U.S. has not grasped the location of the facility means that North Korea's attitude is far from the stage of making a complete and correct declaration, as demanded by the U.S. government. Hill, in fact, noted: "That is a problem." Hill estimated that North Korea may possess 30-50 kilograms of plutonium, noting, "The problem is that plutonium is stored in a way to be easily passed on to terrorist groups." Referring to uranium enrichment programs and cooperation on development of nuclear weapons, Hill said: "Those activities have now been suspended." Teruaki Masumoto (52),secretary general of the AFVKN and the younger brother of Rumiko Masumoto who had been kidnapped by North Korea at the age of 24, asked Hill not to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism by putting aside the abduction issue. In response, Hill went no further than to say: "I am not in a position to define abductions as an act of terrorism." Dennis Wilder, senior director for East Asian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC),who met with Masumoto and other delegation members on May 2, gave this account of the question of whether to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism: "President Bush has not decided anything yet. He will make a decision, taking into consideration not only U.S.-North Korea talks but also how Japan-North Korea relations are progressing." Emerging from the meeting, Masumoto said: "Among the reasons why countries are listed as state sponsors of terrorism is abductions. If the U.S. removes North Korea from the list, it would mean that the U.S. makes light of abductions. The probability of Washington delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism is said to be 30 PERCENT . In order to further lower the probability, the Japanese government's response is an important element." In the meantime, the U.S. Department of State's North Korean Desk head Sung Kim is to travel to North Korea shortly and again hold talks with the North Korean side on the details of a declaration of its nuclear programs. Depending on the result of their talks, Hill will travel to Singapore and meet with North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan for final coordination. Major exchanges of views between Hill and the Japanese delegation The following are major exchanges of views between Hill and the joint Japanese delegation composed of (the AFVKN and the other group). Takashi Arimoto, Washington Nuclear issue Jin Matsubara, deputy secretary general of the Council of Parliamentarians to Quickly Rescue Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea: Has the U.S. lowered the hurdle of removing North Korea from the list of state sponsor of terrorism? Where is the facility producing nuclear bombs located? This is an important part of a TOKYO 00001233 008 OF 017 declaration of nuclear programs. Hill: The nuclear issue consists of three elements: nuclear proliferation, uranium enrichment, and plutonium. When it comes to nuclear proliferation, we have had in-depth discussions with the North Korean side. They said there was no ongoing nuclear program with Syria. American intelligence agencies also take the same view. It's no mistake, however, that they jointly developed nuclear weapons in the past. As for uranium enrichment, there is no doubt that North Korea obtained 140 tons of aluminum tubes, which can be used only for nuclear development. We've confirmed that they are not used for a centrifugal machine, but the bad news is that they are used as missile parts. As for how much North Korea possesses plutonium, I presume it possesses 30 to 50 kilograms of plutonium. The problem is that plutonium is stored in a way to be easily passed on to terrorist groups. We need to verify how much plutonium was extracted and where it is stored. It's not fair to criticize us as lowering the hurdle. We sent a U.S. diplomat to that country and examined aluminum tubes. Matsubara: Reaching a lukewarm agreement would mean that the U.S. has placed more emphasis on North Korea than Japan. Hill: Relations with North Korea can't be compared to those with Japan. Matsubara: Did you get any information from the North Korean side about the place of a facility to produce nuclear weapons? Hill: No. That is a problem. Abduction issue Teruaki Masumoto, secretary general of the AFVKN: Delisting North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism before resolving the abduction issue would be tantamount to nullifying Japan's efforts to resolve the issue by pressuring that country. Mr. Hill appears to have believed the North Korean side's assertion that the victims died. Hill: I have no idea about whether the victims are alive or not. I don't want to raise expectations. Japan has enforced the sanction of banning North Korean vessels from entering Japanese ports. The U.S. has previously enforced this sort of sanction. Matsubara: We view abductions as an ongoing act of terrorism. It's strange to remove that country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Hill: I am not in a position to define abductions as an act of terrorism. The North Korean people are quite different from those whom I have ever met. An Iranian Air office is located near the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo. In Iran, U.S. diplomats were detained in the past. Among them was one of my friends. He still suffers the pain he had at the time. What do you think about this? Matsubara: I can understand that feeling. (5) WTO talks: Agreement within year at crucial juncture TOKYO 00001233 009 OF 017 MAINICHI (Page 7) (Full) May 4, 2008 It has been more than six years since the multilateral trade talks (Doha Round) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) started in November 2001. The talks now face their real test of meeting the goal of reaching an agreement before year's end. The primary concern for the time being is whether an agreement in principle, a premise for a final agreement, can be reached or not. A mood for pushing forward the talks is heightening as a senior official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) noted. However, the future course of the talks is unclear, as there are still many challenges and areas of contention in the agricultural, and mining and manufacturing areas. Ministerial meeting to be held possibly in late May The Doha Round has encountered difficulties right from the beginning. It has been repeatedly suspended or broken down. A timetable for reaching a settlement has been postponed each time the talks get bogged down. Chances are that if talks collapse, it will last a long period of time because the U.S. president will be replaced early next year. A final agreement must be reached this year. Negotiators of concerned countries need to take what was agreed on in principle to their home countries to work out details before a final agreement is reached. This process takes about six months. As such, a ministerial meeting must be held before the end of June at the latest. The work of revising the chairman's proposal regarding the agricultural, and mining and manufacturing sectors are now in progress. The process will likely be completed by mid-May. Then whether a ministerial meeting can be held based on the chairman's proposal, following talks at the vice-ministerial and ambassador levels, will come into focus. Conflicts of various countries' interests Compared with the Uruguay Round, which reached an agreement in 1994, the coverage of the talks at the Doha Round has expanded from trade in goods to services and rules. The talks have become extremely difficult due to an increase in the number of member nations and with 151 nations and territories at odds over various areas of interests. Regarding the agricultural area, the top agenda item, exporting countries, such as the U.S. and Australia are calling on Japan, the European Union (EU) and India to cut tariffs. On the other hand, Japan is seeking a cut in agricultural subsidies from the U.S. Industrialized countries, such as Japan, the EU and the U.S. are calling on developing countries like Brazil and Argentina, to cut tariffs. Thus, various countries' stances are intertwined in a complex manner. High hopes for comprehensive agreement Hopes are now high that the talks will make progress, as one negotiator said, "The atmosphere has changed." The U.S. appears eager to settle the talks while President Bush is in office. Some developing countries that had thus far taken a hard-line stance have reportedly begun showing flexibility. TOKYO 00001233 010 OF 017 While the future of the global economy increasingly becoming unclear due to the subprime mortgage crisis and a sharp rise in food prices, some take the view that a mood for establishing a free trade system is growing, as one official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) opined. Even so, in view of the fact that the talks have involved years of twists and turns, a cautious view that there is no way of telling the outcome of the talks until the very last minute remains deep-rooted. Japan's major challenge is agricultural sector Japan's major challenge at the Doha Round is the agricultural area. In particular, how to deal with key trade items, such as rice, will be in the spotlight. Since special treatment of constraining the margin of tariff cuts to a modest degree is allowed for key trade items, Japan is nervous about how many such items it can secure for protection of its domestic agriculture. The chairman's proposal presented in February sets the number of key items at 4 PERCENT -6 PERCENT of taxable items. The number of Japan's dutiable items stands at approximately 100, which is 40 PERCENT -60 PERCENT of the total number. Japan's proposal for such a number is over 10 PERCENT , showing a big gap with the chairman's proposal. In the meantime, even a partial liberalization of key items will be imposed in the form of an expanded import framework for low-tariff imports. Japan accepted the minimum-access quota system for rice at the Uruguay Round. It now annually imports approximately 770,000 tons of low-tariff rice. It wants to constrain the margin of the expansion of the import quota to the minimum for protection of domestic rice farmers. An increasing number of countries are now restricting exports of food due to a sharp rise in grain prices. Japan has proposed introducing a system of mandating prior talks between exporting and importing countries in order to keep the move from escalating. It aims at having its proposal included in the agreement in principle with Agriculture Minister Wakabayashi saying, "Rules for invoking the export restriction should be clarified." (6) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gas tax ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) May 2, 2008 Questions & Answers (Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. Bracketed figures denote proportions to all respondents. Figures in parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Apr. 19-20.) Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? Yes 20 (25) No 59 (60) Q: Which political party do you support now? Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 24 (26) Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 28 (22) New Komeito (NK) 4 (2) TOKYO 00001233 011 OF 017 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2 (2) Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 0 (1) People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (0) New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) Other political parties 0 (0) None 34 (41) No answer (N/A) + don't know (D/K) 8 (6) Q: A law adding a gasoline surcharge of 25 yen per liter to the gasoline tax expired at the end of March. The government and the ruling coalition have now restored the surcharge in order to secure tax revenues. Do you support its reinstatement? Yes 22 No 66 Q: A bill adding a surcharge to the gasoline tax did not pass the House of Councillors. The ruling coalition then took a second vote in the House of Representatives and passed the bill with a concurring vote of more than two thirds. Do you think it was appropriate for the ruling coalition to take a second vote in the House of Representatives? Yes 29 No 54 Q: Following the reinstatement of a gasoline surcharge with a second vote this time, the ruling coalition will take another second vote in the House of Representatives in mid-May on a bill to use gasoline tax revenues for road construction and other road-related infrastructure projects. Do you think it is appropriate to do so? Yes 28 No 59 Q: Do you support the idea of incorporating gasoline taxes and other road-related tax revenues into the state's general account budget to use the tax revenues for other purposes? Yes 67 No 22 Q: (Only for those who answered "yes") What would you like to be done about the gasoline surcharge? Do you think it's all right to add the gasoline surcharge if gasoline taxes and other road-related tax revenues will be incorporated into the state's general account budget, or do you otherwise think it would be better to repeal the gasoline surcharge? It's all right to add the gasoline surcharge if gasoline taxes and other road-related tax revenues will be incorporated into the state's general account budget 44(29) It would be better to repeal the gasoline surcharge 44(29) (TN: Figures on a par) Q: The DPJ is considering submitting a motion in the House of Councillors to censure Prime Minister Fukuda over the gasoline surcharge's reinstatement and other issues. Do you support the DPJ's standpoint on these issues? Yes 42 No 40 TOKYO 00001233 012 OF 017 Q: Even if a censure motion is passed in the House of Councillors, the prime minister does not have to respond. What do you think Prime Minister Fukuda should do? (One choice only) Resign 9 Dissolve the House of Representatives for a general election 60 No need to resign or dissolve the House of Representatives 25 Q: If you were to vote now in a general election, which political party would you like to vote for in your proportional representation bloc? (Figures in parentheses denote the results of a survey conducted Feb. 2-3.) LDP 22 (30) DPJ 39 (32) NK 4 (3) JCP 2 (2) SDP 1 (1) PNP 0 (0) NPN 0 (0) Other political parties 1 (1) N/A+D/K 31 (31) Polling methodology: The survey was conducted from the evening of Apr. 30 through May 1 over the telephone on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. Respondents were chosen from among the nation's voting population on a three-stage random-sampling basis. Valid answers were obtained from 998 persons (58 PERCENT ). (7) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, gasoline tax TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full) May 3, 2008 Questions & Answers (Figures shown in percentage. Parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Apr. 4-5.) Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? Yes 19.8 (26.6) No 66.6 (59.6) Don't know (D/K) + no answer (N/A) 13.6 (13.8) Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the previous question) What's the primary reason for your approval of the Fukuda cabinet? Pick only one from among those listed below. The prime minister is trustworthy 16.1 (20.7) Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Liberal Democratic Party and New Komeito 16.4 (11.7) The prime minister has leadership ability 0.8 (1.7) Something can be expected of its economic policies 4.6 (2.9) Something can be expected of its foreign policies 4.1 (1.3) Something can be expected of its political reforms 3.5 (1.7) Something can be expected of its tax reforms 0.8 (2.1) Something can be expected of its administrative reforms 3.6 (2.5) There's no other appropriate person (for prime minister) 48.1 (52.0) Other answers (O/A) 0.7 (0.9) D/K+N/A 1.3 (2.5) TOKYO 00001233 013 OF 017 Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the first question) What's the primary reason for your disapproval of the Fukuda cabinet? Pick only one from among those listed below. The prime minister is untrustworthy 11.1 (8.9) Because it's a coalition cabinet of the Liberal Democratic Party and the New Komeito 4.5 (5.2) The prime minister lacks leadership ability 25.7 (32.5) Nothing can be expected of its economic policies 26.6 (24.0) Nothing can be expected of its foreign policies 1.3 (2.0) Nothing can be expected of its political reforms 8.0 (7.9) Nothing can be expected of its tax reforms 11.6 (6.5) Nothing can be expected of its administrative reforms 6.9 (6.8) Don't like the prime minister's personal character 3.3 (4.2) O/A 0.3 (0.7) D/K+N/A 0.7 (1.3) Q: The ruling coalition of the LDP and New Komeito took a second vote in the House of Representatives on a bill reinstating a gasoline surcharge to ensure tax revenues for road construction and other road-related infrastructure projects. A gasoline surcharge of about 25 yen will be added to the gasoline tax again. What do you think about this? Appropriate 21.4 Inappropriate 72.0 D/K+N/A 6.6 Q: The ruling coalition of the LDP and New Komeito agreed to prepare legislation within the year in order to incorporate gasoline taxes and other road-related tax revenues into the state's general account budget from fiscal 2009. Do you support this? Yes 37.7 No 53.6 D/K+N/A 8.7 Q: The DPJ is considering submitting a motion in the House of Councillors to censure Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda over the gasoline surcharge's reinstatement and other issues. Do you support the move? Yes 54.7 No 31.9 D/K+N/A 13.4 Q: What do you think Prime Minister Fukuda should do if and when a censure motion is passed in the House of Councillors? He does not have to resign because the motion is not legally binding 18.5 His cabinet should resign en masse 8.4 He should dissolve the House of Representatives for a general election 68.1 D/K+N/A 5.0 Q: In April, the government started a new health insurance system for the elderly to deduct premiums from their pensions. Prime Minister Fukuda has ordered his administration to improve its implementation. Meanwhile, the DPJ and other opposition parties are calling for the new system to be abolished. Which do you think is TOKYO 00001233 014 OF 017 better? Improve implementation 44.0 Abolish the new system 46.5 D/K+N/A 9.5 Q: Which political party do you support? Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 24.3 (27.6) Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 30.3 (25.7) New Komeito (NK) 3.6 (2.5) Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3.7 (4.1) Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.6 (1.4) People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.7 (0.3) New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) --- --- Other political parties, groups --- --- None 34.4 (36.8) D/K+N/A 1.4 (1.6) Polling methodology: The survey was conducted across the nation on May 1-2 by Kyodo News Service on a computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. Among randomly generated telephone numbers, those actually for household use with one or more eligible voters totaled 1,478. Answers were obtained from 1,027 persons. (8) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, provisional gas tax, new health insurance system for elderly MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) May 3, 2008 Questions & Answers (T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female) Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? T P M F Yes 18 (24) 16 19 No 61 (57) 70 56 Not interested 19 (18) 14 23 Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why? T P M F Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 37 (38) 40 35 Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 8 (10) 8 7 Because there's something stable about the prime minister 28 (23) 21 31 Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy measures 18 (24) 24 15 Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why? T P M F Because the prime minister is from the Liberal Democratic Party 8 (5) 9 8 Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 37 (45) 29 42 Because there's no fresh image about the prime minister 5 (5) 7 4 Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy TOKYO 00001233 015 OF 017 measures 49 (44) 54 45 Q: Which political party do you support? T P M F Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 20 (24) 18 21 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 28 (22) 36 24 New Komeito (NK) 3 (5) 3 4 Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (3) 2 4 Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 3 (1) 3 3 People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (1) 1 0 New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 1 (0) 1 0 Other political parties 1 (1) 0 1 None 39 (41) 36 41 Q: The ruling coalition of the LDP and New Komeito took a second vote in the House of Representatives on a bill reinstating a gasoline surcharge and other provisional tax rates and passed the legislation with a concurring vote of more than two thirds. Do you appreciate this? T P M F Yes 19 21 18 No 74 75 73 Q: The DPJ faced off with the ruling coalition over the gasoline surcharge and the Bank of Japan's governor post. Do you appreciate this? T P M F Yes 41 47 47 No 51 49 53 Q: In April, the government started a new health insurance system for those aged 75 and over. Do you appreciate this system? T P M F Yes 17 16 17 No 77 80 75 (Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the results of the last survey conducted Apr. 5-6. Polling methodology: The survey was conducted May 1-2 over the telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit sampling (RDS) basis. Answers were obtained from 1,042 persons. (9) Simulation of next Lower House election: If 2 PERCENT of LDP votes go to DPJ, two parties would trade places TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 3) (Full) May 5, 2008 Rei Shiratori, a professor at Akita International University, conducted a simulation on how many votes the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will garner in the next House of Representatives election. According to the simulation, if two percent of the LDP's supporting votes go to the DPJ in the next House of Representatives election, the DPJ will become the largest opposition party in the Lower House. This newspaper analyzed TOKYO 00001233 016 OF 017 based on the simulation how the next Lower House election would turn out to be if the LDP was buffeted by a headwind and how the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) votes in the single-seat districts where the party will not file its candidates would move. Sharp decrease in LDP seats According to the Shiratori's simulation, the number of Lower House seats to be obtained by the LDP would be 230, a large drop from the 296 that the party won in the previous election, while the DPJ would garner 194, making great strides from the 113 current seats. The LDP would win 12 district seats (23 in the previous race) of the 25 single-seat constituencies in Tokyo and 11 seats (21 in the previous race) of the 33 single-seat constituencies of the Tokai bloc. The party would drastically decrease its Lower House seats in urban areas. The New Komeito, the LDP's junior coalition partner, would garner 32 seats (31 in the previous election),the Social Democratic Party (SDP) - eight seats (seven in the previous election) and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) - nine seats (nine in the previous election). The seats to be obtained by the three parties would be nearly unchanged from those they garnered in the previous election. The simulation shows that although the DPJ would make great stride, the ruling parties -- the LDP and New Komeito -- would keep the majority of the Lower House seats. If LDP buffeted by unfavorable wind If the unpopularity rating for the Fukuda cabinet continues, the simulation concludes the number of seats the LDP will capture would further drop. If one percent of the LDP supporting votes go to the DPJ, the LDP would garner 216 seats and the DPJ - 207. Should two percent of the LDP's supporting votes go to the DPJ, the LDP would get 205 and the DPJ - 217. The number of seats to be obtained by the LDP and New Komeito would reach a majority. If three percent of the LDP's supporting votes go to the DPJ, the DPJ would have an advantage. According to Shiratori, if the election is conducted under the unpopular Fukuda cabinet, one percent of the LDP's supporting votes would go to the DPJ; and if the LDP suffers from an issue similar to the pension-record mess, a major campaign issue for the Upper House election last August, about three percent of the LDP's supporting votes would move to the DPJ. If JCP narrows down candidates The JCP, which had initially planned to field its own candidates in all the 300 single-seat constituencies, intends to decrease the number of its candidates for the next general election to about 140. Therefore, the JCP's supporting votes in the 160 single-seat districts will likely greatly sway the outcome of the Lower House race. For this reason, both the LDP and DPJ aim to score with the JCP's supporters in 160 single-seat constituencies. According to various exit polls in the April 27 Lower House by-election for the Yamaguchi No. 2 district, more than 80 PERCENT of the JCP's supporters voted TOKYO 00001233 017 OF 017 for the DPJ candidate; so, the JCP's supporting votes seems to be going to the DPJ. Should 30 PERCENT of the JCP's supporting votes in single-seat districts in which the JCP will not file its candidates, the LDP would win 221 and the DPJ would increase to 204. Should 50 PERCENT of the JCP's supporting votes go to the DPJ, the LDP would secure 217 seats and the DPJ - 204. Should votes supporting the LDP be added to the 204 seats, the LDP would be placed at a disadvantage. If 30 PERCENT of the JCP's supporting votes and one percent of the LDP's votes go to the DPJ, the DPJ would become the largest party. If 50 PERCENT of the JCP's votes and three percent of the LDP's votes go to the DPJ, the LDP would win 238 seats, exceeding the 184 seats the LDP would secure. Regarding the above predictions, Shiratori said: "The LDP won overwhelmingly the 2005 Lower House election. Seeing the analysis that the two parties would trade places if a just few percentages of votes go to the DPJ, the LDP did not win big. This is the result of a mixed electoral system of small and proportional constituencies." Shiratori conducted the simulation, assuming that the next Lower House election would be held on Sept. 6, 2009. If JCP's supporting votes go to DPJ 0 PERCENT 30 PERCENT 50 PERCENT If LDP's supporting votes go to DPJ 0 PERCENT LDP DPJ 230 (seats) 194 221 204 217 208 1 PERCENT LDP DPJ 216 207 209 215 203 221 2 PERCENT LDP DPJ 205 217 198 225 192 231 3 PERCENT LDP DPJ 197 225 190 232 184 238 DONOVAN