SCENESETTER FOR G-8 LABOR MINISTERS' MEETING MAY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001230 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DOL FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY RADZELY, DEPUTY U/S PONTICELLI DOL FOR ILAB NSC FOR BROWN AND TONG STATE FOR E, G, DRL, EEB, AND EAP/J PARIS FOR USOECD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ELAB PGOV OVIP JA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR G-8 LABOR MINISTERS' MEETING MAY 11-13 Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Japan's economy is in its longest postwar expansion, but for many it does not feel that way. Japanese consumers are pinched by rising commodity prices and stagnant wages, and the country is facing long-term fiscal and demographic challenges. Reform, particularly in the labor market, would raise productivity and prosperity and make it easier for Japan to support a range of bilateral initiatives. Our bilateral challenge in Niigata is to explain how flexible and responsive labor markets would help more Japanese benefit from today's global market. End summary. Economic Expansion Not Felt By Many -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Japan's economy is in its longest continuous expansion of the postwar period, but for many it does not feel that way. Despite moderate GDP growth and strong corporate profits, Japan's nominal GDP in 2006 was marginally smaller than it was a decade before. Wages have been relatively stagnant over the past six years. Moreover, the labor market has split between career employees with benefits and "non-regular" workers, who now account for more than one-third of the workforce. Japanese today talk of "winners" and "losers" in the economy, a politically potent shift in a society that has prided itself on economic equality. Fiscal and Demographic Challenges -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Long-term structural pressures have added to a sense of malaise. Japan unsuccessfully tried to spend its way back to growth after its economic bubble burst in the early 1990s, and it is still coping with the aftermath. Government debt was around 180 percent of GDP in 2007 -- the highest among OECD countries -- and although Japan cut its deficit to around 4 percent, it will need to tighten its belt further if it is to meet the government's goal of balancing the budget (excluding interest payments) by 2011. ¶4. (SBU) Exacerbating its fiscal challenges, Japan's population began shrinking in 2005. The government recently predicted the labor force could be one-third smaller by 2050 and that more than 30 percent of Japanese will be older than 65 by 2035. The resulting squeeze means Japan's pension and medical benefits system is unsustainable in the long-run, absent significant changes. Extending the retirement age, raising premiums, cutting benefits, and bringing more women into the workforce could mitigate the severity of oncoming problems, but (in lieu of an unprecedented shift in immigration policy) Japan will need to increase its productivity to maintain its economic standing. Labor and Productivity -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The "good news" is there is plenty of room for improvement, particularly in Japan's labor markets. The OECD recently reported labor productivity in Japan is 30% below the U.S. level. Foreign-invested firms have shown how much can be done in the current environment, as they are more productive than average domestic companies in both the manufacturing and service sectors. Regulatory reform, greater openness to trade and investment, and greater labor mobility would all raise average productivity and bring greater prosperity. ¶6. (SBU) Parts of the Japanese government and bureaucracy understand what needs to be done. Former Prime Minister TOKYO 00001230 002 OF 003 Junichiro Koizumi initiated a number of broad financial and economic reforms after 2001, and members of the cabinet-level organization he used to drive his reforms forward, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP),had grand ambitions about labor market reforms to start in 2007. Last summer's Upper House election, however, interfered with those plans. Reform Fatigue and the Divided Diet -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Economic reform lost steam under former Prime Minister SHINZO Abe, who focused more on his diplomatic and security agenda than on pocketbook issues and was criticized for never fully enunciating an economic agenda. When it was exposed in 2007 that the pension system had lost or garbled 50 million records, endangering people's retirement savings, the government's handling of the situation -- layered over cabinet gaffes and an intensifying national conversation about growing income and regional disparities -- led to a defeat for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in July's election. The opposition took extended control of the Upper House for the first time since 1955. ABE resigned in September 2007. ¶8. (SBU) Prime Minister Fukuda, also of the LDP, inherited a divided Diet. The LDP maintains a two-thirds supermajority in the Lower House with which it can pass legislation over the objections of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),but Japanese fondness for consensus decision-making weighs against its frequent use. The current session of the Diet has thus been consumed by debate over 30-year-old "provisional" taxes that fund road construction and a fight over appointing a new Governor of the Bank of Japan -- a fight that culminated in the post falling vacant for the first time in the postwar era (a compromise candidate was found after several weeks). The DPJ continues to prolong fights on contentious issues, hoping to force a Lower House election and topple the LDP-led coalition government. Debate on necessary economic and structural reform has languished, and the CEFP's relevancy as a driver of reform is increasingly in question. Prime Minister Fukuda's cabinet support rates have plummeted. ¶9. (SBU) Significantly, two different interpretations of the LDP's electoral loss -- and preferred policy future -- have emerged among Japanese politicians. One is the LDP lost because Japanese people tired of former PM Koizumi's economic reform agenda. The other is the reforms did not go far enough, and people voted against what they saw as the resurgence of the "old LDP" of entrenched interests. Through the Labor Ministerial, we have an opportunity to support the reform interpretation and explain how reform, rather than a return to a nostalgic past, is the way for Japan to reach greater prosperity in a globalized economy. Your Message -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW) Yoichi Masuzoe's portfolio includes recent hotbutton issues such as the pension and medical systems. Nonetheless, his popular support in the polls remains strong. In your conversations with Minister Masuzoe, other Japanese government and political officials, and the media, we suggest the following points: -- To address successfully its fiscal and demographic challenges, Japan needs to raise productivity over the long TOKYO 00001230 003 OF 003 term. Labor market reform would contribute significantly to those efforts. -- Expanding the workforce, increasing labor mobility, and enhancing competition would all lead to higher growth and greater prosperity. Supporting women's ability to work and simultaneously raise a family would boost productivity by bringing skilled but underutilized workers into the economy. -- So would greater openness to foreign investment. Foreign-invested firms, both in the manufacturing and service sectors, have higher average productivity than their purely Japanese counterparts, and they bring needed jobs and know-how to Japan. -- America's experience shows a flexible and responsive labor market can provide continuous opportunities for workers to build their skills and grow throughout their careers. The key is a policy structure that facilitates transitions to the most productive areas of the economy and encourages skill formation. -- An example is defined contribution pension plans, which have proven very popular with American workers. Making saving via Japan's defined contribution pension system more attractive would benefit firms, workers, and the economy as a whole. -- Japan has benefited greatly from globalization over the past 30 years, but some Japanese economic structures have not kept pace with today's global marketplace. Reforming those structures would broaden the reach of globlization's benefits. DONOVAN