Impact on Japan of Rising Food/Agricultural Commodity

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001201 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EEB/TPP/ABT/ATP - SPECK STATE PASS USTR FOR CUTLER, BEEMAN TREASURY FOR IA/AUSTIN AND MCCOY E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAGR ETRD ECON PGOV PREL JA SUBJECT: Impact on Japan of Rising Food/Agricultural Commodity Prices REF: State 39410 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The run up in commodity prices and fear of proliferation of export restrictions by long-standing suppliers has led to the reemergence of food security as a national political issue in Japan. The GOJ has seen the situation as underscoring the urgency of boosting its food self-sufficiency rate. A particular concern among Japanese on this front vis a vis the U.S. comes from memories of President Nixon's decision in 1973 to halt soybean exports to Japan due to U.S. domestic economic situations, while apparently glossing over subsequent U.S. policy developments in the following decades. While Japanese consumers are able to outbid other countries for traded food commodities, physical stocks of wheat and feed grains are tight and there is very little cushion against disruptions in trade. End summary. Demand and Supply of Foodstuffs -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The value of Japan's agricultural output has been in decline since the mid-1980s. Japan's farm population is rapidly aging, with more than 70% of farmers over 60 years of age. The average farm size is only about four acres, and south of Hokkaido the size is substantially smaller. Advanced fertilizers and farm machinery and fiscal help through a vast array of price supports are essential to maintaining agriculture in Japan today. Japanese policy makers are concerned because Japan imports over 60 percent of its food on a calorie basis. The major reasons for such a low rate of self-sufficiency are a shortage of arable land and increasing consumption of meat, which is either imported or produced locally with imported feed. ¶3. (SBU) The most important commodity in the Japanese diet is rice, in which Japan is largely self-sufficient. Rice imports face prohibitive tariffs and international trade has only a marginal impact in the overall supply and demand picture. Consequently, unlike many other countries, Japan is not experiencing a crisis in supplies of its staple food. In addition, Japan has stocks of 2.3 MMT including 1.5 MMT of imported rice (mostly U.S. origin). This amount roughly equals 3.3 months supply. In fact, to deal with a chronic rice surplus, the GOJ increasingly has been diverting rice stocks to the feed sector. ¶4. (SBU) In the recent past, Japan held emergency stocks of wheat equivalent to 2.6 months' worth of demand. Due to the shortened time necessary to obtain alternative supplies in case of an emergency, stocks were reduced to 2.3 months' supply at the end of JFY 2005, and cut further to 1.8 months' worth in 2006. Although the actual stock figures are not disclosed, 1.8 months' worth of stocks translates to around 900,000 metric tons. The United States is Japan's largest supplier and provided about half the wheat Japan imported in 2007. ¶5. (SBU) Japan, however, has almost no domestic feed grain production. The GOJ holds emergency stocks of three essential feed grains: corn, sorghum, and barley. The breakdown for 2007 is 536,000 MT for corn, 64,000 MT for sorghum and 350,000 MT for barley. MAFF instructs the private sector to hold a similar level of stocks. In addition, approximately 650,000 MT of surplus rice is used for feed annually. Combined with these privately held stocks, the entire feed grain stocks are equivalent of about one month to six week's worth of demand. ¶6. (SBU) Japan is the largest export market for U.S. corn, valued at $2.6 billion, or 15 MMT, in CY2007. In recent months, Japan's normally high dependence on U.S. corn grew to nearly 100% and, put TOKYO 00001201 002 OF 003 starkly, most cattle, pork, and poultry would quickly starve without constant supplies of U.S. corn. Feed use accounts for about 70% of corn consumption and, on average, half of the calories consumed by Japanese livestock come from U.S. corn. There is a separate market for food-use corn, accounting for about 30% of consumption. Other corn suppliers, such as China and Argentina, have put in place export restrictions or taxes on corn and, in any case, would not be able to supply sufficient quantities to replace imports from the United States. Government and private stocks combined provide only a four to six week buffer. As corn markets have tightened, anxiety has increased within the government and the feed industry about the availability of U.S. corn in the coming crop year. Domestic Politics -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Many in Japan, including some government officials, are quick to blame biofuels, for example, for the increase in global food prices. In April, MAFF Minister Wakabayashi was questioned in the Diet about the role U.S. biofuels policy has played in increasing food prices. As a result, Japan has proposed that food security be included as an agenda item at the G8 Summit, which will be held in Japan this July. Economy -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Japan remains the world's second largest national economy and boasts some of the world's wealthiest consumers. This economic muscle allows Japan to outbid other importing countries for available supplies. Similarly, in recent months, the yen has appreciated relative to the dollar, helping to mitigate some of the dollar price increases for agricultural imports. For Japan's economy as a whole, no significant macroeconomic impact is expected from the run up in agricultural commodity prices. ¶9. (SBU) Initially, retailers and manufacturers bore most of the increase in input costs. More recently, these costs are being transmitted to consumers. For example, since May 2007, flour prices have edged up twice - after having been stable for 24 years. This comes as a 15 year period of deflation, when almost all prices were stable or falling, is ending. So even though they are financially able to pay more, consumers are still making the mental shift from a buyer's to a seller's market. This situation is further stimulating increased media coverage and political attention on food prices and food security. Environmental Impact -------------- ¶10. (U) There has not been a significant impact on Japan's environment resulting from the run up in international commodity prices. Government Response -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Japan's policy response to tight supplies has been to focus on the (unrealistic) goal of increasing self-sufficiency. The Food Self-sufficiency Improvement Council of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF),which was established in 2005, set forth six objectives for 2007-08: 1) conduct strategic public relations programs on the importance of raising food self-sufficiency; 2) promote rice consumption; 3) improve self-sufficiency in feed; 4) reduce oil/fat intake; 5) expand vegetable production; 6) conduct a "food education" campaign (e.g., TOKYO 00001201 003 OF 003 "Grow locally, consume locally"). Impact on Post Programs -------------- ¶12. (U) Post programs have been unaffected by the increase in food prices to date. Policy Proposals -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Despite public statements from the U.S. Department of Agriculture that the United States will remain a reliable supplier, the recent grain price situation has exacerbated concerns over food security in Japan. In early 2008, FAS/Japan developed a multi-faceted strategy to counter the fallacy that food self-sufficiency equals food security. Our message is that, in fact, imports are part of the solution not part of the problem and as Japan's number one supplier we can be relied upon to supply high quality products. In addition, Japan needs to view biotechnology as part of the solution to its own food security and that of the rest of the world. ¶14. (SBU) Given Japan's high and increasing dependence on food imports, the USG should endeavor to change the paradigm in Japan to seeing expanded trade with its democratic ally as a solution rather than a threat. This situation presents an especially clear area of opportunity in 2008 as many other exporters (e.g., Argentina, China, the EU, India, Russia, Viet Nam, etc.) have put in place food export taxes or export restrictions. Our assurances of U.S. commitment to Japan's food security would reinforce Japanese confidence both as a trading partner and as a strategic ally and potentially provide an opening to engage Japan more meaningfully on the need for structural reforms of its agricultural economy. List of Relevant Reports/Cables -------------- See GAIN Report Number JA8021 (4/21/2008)