KOMEITO SOLIDLY BEHIND FUKUDA, AGAINST EARLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001111

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: KOMEITO SOLIDLY BEHIND FUKUDA, AGAINST EARLY
ELECTIONS

REF: A. TOKYO 1076 - FUKUDA FACES KEY HURDLES

B. TOKYO 0904 - FUKUDA IN NO HURRY TO CALL ELECTIONS

C. TOKYO 0548 - DECISION TIME IN DIVIDED DIET

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4(b),(d).


1. (C) Summary. Komeito Election Strategy Chief Yosuke
Takagi emphasized his party's commitment to the ruling
coalition with the LDP, in a recent meeting with the Embassy,
and confirmed that Komeito will stand by Prime Minister
Fukuda on use of a second vote in the Lower House to
re-instate the gasoline and other road-related taxes at the
end of April. Takagi was certain that Fukuda would resist
calls to reshuffle his Cabinet or dissolve the Lower House
prior to the July G8 Summit, despite the likely passage of a
censure motion in the Upper House. Beyond that, he said,
elections/political realignment will be much more difficult
to avoid if the ruling parties don't find some way to make
their policies more relevant and appealing. End summary.

Komeito Backs Use of Override for Gas Tax
--------------


2. (C) Senior Komeito Lower House member and party Election
Strategy Chair Yosuke Takagi assured the Embassy recently
that the ruling coalition will use its two-thirds majority in
the Lower House to re-impose the gasoline and other
road-related taxes. The key will be to gain public support
for the move prior to April 29, the date that the
opposition's 60-day hold on the budget-related legislation in
the Upper House ends. This can be accomplished by stressing
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's willingness to compromise with
the opposition and end earmarks for road-related construction
beginning in FY2009, Takagi believes.


3. (C) The problem is that while vested road construction
interests within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
appear to have accepted the Prime Minister's proposal as a
means to break through the current state of legislative
gridlock in the Diet, they may still try to keep the
statutory language regarding earmarks murky -- a "typical"
LDP solution. The media will attack the ruling coalition
mercilessly if the language is not absolutely clear regarding
the need for reform. Takagi expects the opposition to keep
up its political attacks in the days leading up to April 29,
despite a March 27 agreement to engage in consultations.


4. (C) The Diet will meet on April 28, and then close on
April 29 for a national holiday. Business will then resume
for three days before breaking again for two more holidays on
May 5 and 6. Takagi and other ruling coalition members are
unlikely to travel abroad during this period, referred to as
"Golden Week," when Diet members and government officials
traditionally schedule overseas business trips. Other
Embassy contacts report that the LDP has told its members not
to plan any travel over the break.

Passage Will Trigger Censure Motion
--------------


5. (C) Takagi expects the opposition to ratchet up its
criticism of the Fukuda administration after the
budget-related legislation passes again in the Lower House.
The opposition will likely pass a censure motion against the
Prime Minister in the Upper House, but is equally certain
that the ruling parties will simply ignore the non-binding
resolution and continue with business as usual in the Lower
House.


6. (C) This will result in a "test of endurance" as the
opposition rejects all coalition-initiated deliberations in
the Upper House and business essentially comes to a halt
until the Diet adjourns on June 15, Takagi explained. The
media will grow increasingly critical of both the ruling and
opposition parties for placing politics before the work of
government and the wishes of the people. The key will be
which party gives in first. Takagi, citing the tendency of

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Japanese lawmakers to put off tough decisions on important
issues in the run-up to an election, noted the possibility
that tax system reform could be delayed.

No Cabinet Reshuffle Before G8
--------------


7. (C) The voices calling for a Cabinet reshuffle in order to
change the image of the Cabinet are growing stronger within
the coalition, Takagi acknowledged. At the same time, he had
heard from Komeito leader Akihiro Ota and Secretary General
Kazuo Kitagawa that Prime Minister Fukuda would like to avoid
this scenario by placing greater importance on implementing
policy measures step by step. Fukuda does not care whether
he is popular among the public or the media, according to the
Komeito leaders, and would prefer to work on realizing his
policy goals by retaining the current Cabinet until after the
G8 Summit.


8. (C) Takagi himself agrees that this is not such a good
time for a Cabinet reshuffle, given the confused political
situation. Even if Prime Minister Fukuda reshuffles his
Cabinet, the public and media may think he is only doing so
in order to prolong his political life and change the image
of his administration, Takagi added.

No Election Either
--------------


9. (C) Regardless of the impact of a censure motion, Takagi
asserted, the government and ruling parties have agreed that
Prime Minister Fukuda will not dissolve the Lower House
before the G8 Summit in July. Coalition leaders fear damage
to Japan's international credibility should the coalition
lose its majority in the Lower House and the political
situation become even more confused prior to the arrival of
world leaders.

Election Scenarios
--------------


10. (C) The ruling coalition will definitely lose its
two-thirds supermajority in the Lower House in the next Lower
House election, Takagi asserted. He sees three possible
scenarios for the outcome. In the first case, the
LDP-Komeito coalition could win a simple majority, after
which they would try to woo opposition members to bring about
some sort of realignment in the Upper House and end the Diet
gridlock. Alternatively, the opposition could win a
majority. What Komeito does then will depend on the
situation. Finally, we could see an election where no party
or parties win a majority, in which case political
realignment will be the only answer. Absent some new order,
the largest party in the Lower House will have to form a
Cabinet and call for another election in a year or so. This
last scenario means more chaos internally, and more lost
prestige for Japan internationally.

Bold Leadership, Policies Can End the Deadlock
-------------- -


11. (C) Takagi urged bold leadership by the LDP to resolve
the crisis that has resulted from a divided Diet, citing the
decision of then LDP Secretary General Hiromu Nonaka to
accept opposition policy proposals without condition back in
1998, the last time the LDP lost its majority in the Upper
House. (Note: The LDP was defeated in the July 1998 Upper
House election, leaving it with only 102 of 252 seats and
forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.
His replacement, Keizo Obuchi, formed a coalition with Ichiro
Ozawa's Liberal Party later that year, followed soon after by
Komeito, to regain a majority in the Upper House.) As Nonaka
did then, current Secretary General Ibuki should have
accepted opposition demands to lower road-related tax rates
and earmarks for road-related construction long before Prime
Minister Fukuda finally announced his compromise proposal in
late March. The ruling parties could have then worked

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cooperatively with the opposition to come up with a sound
plan to remedy the shortfall of approximately JPY 2.6
trillion, much of which is funneled to the prefectural
governments.


12. (C) To change the current situation now that things have
deteriorated further, the coalition parties need to make
policy choices clearer for the voters, Takagi believes. He
criticized the policies of the main opposition Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) as "unclear" and "nothing more than
words on paper." If DPJ leader Ozawa's policies are
implemented, he warned, Japan will go bankrupt. What's more,
even if the DPJ is elected to a majority in the Lower House
and takes over the government, it will be unable to implement
its policies, and the public's distrust of politics will
deepen further.


13. (C) As for Komeito, Takagi expects his party to continue
serving as a "party for ordinary people," with special
consideration for its Soka Gakkai lay Buddhist support base.
As a responsible ruling party, he conceded, Komeito cannot
always present its supporters with rosy policy prescriptions.
That said, Komeito continues to prioritize the development
of realistic policy measures to resolve pension, medical, and
social security problems.


14. (C) Looking beyond Japan, Takagi stressed the importance
of sketching out a new map of the world order in the 21st
century. In doing so, Japan's position in the U.S.-Japan
relationship needs to be more clearly defined. Takagi is
dismayed that the few bills to reach the Diet have been
primarily budget-related, with little or no foreign policy
issues under discussion since the January passage of the
Anti-terror Special Measures Bill re-authorizing Japanese
refueling efforts in the Indian Ocean. Takagi is afraid that
the Diet is "bottoming out" in terms of foreign and security
policies, even as important foreign policy issues, such as
the Six-Party Talks and Tibet, are in play.


15. (C) After all, Takagi argued, politics is not about
populism. Politics must achieve not only what the public
wants, but also what needs to be done as a nation. From that
perspective, there is no reason for the DPJ to oppose the
Special Measures Agreement (SMA) governing host nation
support for U.S. forces in Japan. (Note: The DPJ announced
April 21 that it will vote against the SMA in the Upper
House.) As the absence of some DPJ members at the Lower
House plenary vote showed, even DPJ members knew it was right
to pass the bill. The DPJ will have to change its position
if it ever takes over the reins of government, he opined.

LDP-Komeito Coalition Strong, for Now
--------------


16. (SBU) The LDP-Komeito coalition remains strong, Takagi
confirmed, and his party has every intention of honoring the
commitment it made to voters in the 2005 Lower House campaign
when its members ran as coalition partners of the LDP. That
does not mean there are not problems. For example, Komeito
members generally prefer to follow a reform line in the Diet,
but if they called loudly for amending additional
road-related tax legislation before May 12 to appease their
own supporters, the delicate balance with the LDP could
collapse. This is why Komeito leaders are very cautious when
speaking their true thoughts, he observed.


17. (C) Takagi predicted that Komeito members would probably
work hard to maintain the coalition after the next election,
but that would depend on whether or not the ruling parties
can win back a majority of seats in the Lower House. He was
not certain what would happen if the two parties lose the
majority, but said only that Komeito would have to decide at
that time whether to continue policy coordination with the
LDP or break away.

Future LDP Prospects Uncertain
--------------

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18. (C) Most coalition lawmakers are convinced that Prime
Minister Fukuda will not dissolve the Lower House, Takagi
revealed. For one thing, the Cabinet support rate is too
low. A more likely scenario is that voices within the LDP
will call for his resignation after the conclusion of the G8
Summit, well after the nasty fight over the budget-related
bills is settled. Komeito does not relish the idea of an LDP
leadership change, preferring a stable coalition. At the
same time, Komeito will be happy as long as the LDP can come
to consensus on a leader, whether it is Fukuda or someone
else. Komeito leaders Ota and Kitagawa will be very cautious
about making comments on LDP personnel changes, he
anticipated.


19. (C) Personally, Takagi thinks former LDP Secretary
General and Foreign Minister Taro Aso is the strongest
candidate to succeed Fukuda. He has a great public image and
is also one of the more powerful candidates. Former Finance
Minister Sadokazu Tanigaki might have had another chance, but
did himself a disservice by not asserting his leadership on
the budget-related issues. His reputation has declined
substantially. Takagi sees former Defense Minister Yuriko
Koike as another potential candidate, but worries that the
public may object if she is put forward simply because of her
media appeal.


20. (C) Looking back on the "good old days" of the LDP,
Takagi lamented that the LDP no longer had many good
candidates from which to choose. He blames this on the
introduction of the single-seat district system. In essence,
he said, the selection of a Japanese Prime Minister is
becoming more like a U.S. presidential race, where a
successful candidate must be able to appeal directly to the
public. Both the LDP and the DPJ will need to suffer through
a trial and error process before they can "raise" winning
candidates.
SCHIEFFER