GERDEC AFTERMATH - GOA INDECISIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TIRANA 000328 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, ISN, PM/WRA DOD FOR OSD/WPOPOVICH E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018 TAGS: MASS PARM PREL NATO AL SUBJECT: GERDEC AFTERMATH - GOA INDECISIVE REF: A) TIRANA 200 B) TIRANA 219 Classified By: Charge S.A. Cristina, reasons 1.4 (b),(d) Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In response to the March 15 Gerdec tragedy, the international community has mobilized efforts to provide humanitarian relief and unexploded ordnance (UXO) clearance and stepped up plans to rid Albania of over 100,000 tons of decaying munitions before another catastrophe happens. The GOA has claimed to be eager for assistance in dealing with the remediation of the Gerdec site as well as with demilitarization of the stockpiles of aging weapons and munitions disbursed throughout the country. Unfortunately, a combination of lack of experience, lack of coordination, and bureaucratic confusion on the part of GOA officials is delaying both. End Summary. ¶2. (U) The March 15 munitions explosion in Gerdec (Ref A) scattered dirt, scrap metal, thousands of fused and unfused munitions, propellant and explosive material across a 30 hectare valley leaving seven craters where a munitions dismantling factory once stood. It left unexploded ordnance (UXO) buried under meters of dirt and debris. Torrential rains helped to drive the heavier pieces further underground while camouflaging the entire area with mud. ¶3. (C) The tragedy, which has claimed 26 lives so far, focused public attention on what could happen at the significant number of MOD munitions storage facilities near populated areas and appeared to create a sense of urgency in the government to deal with this ticking time bomb. GOA Asks for Assistance -------------- ¶4. (C) Immediately after the accident, State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) dispatched its SALW program manager and senior adviser, Mark Adams, to assess the situation. Adams came up with a proposal to use ArmorGroup North America (AGNA),already under contract with WRA to destroy rifles, handguns, and 82 mm mortars, to clear the core area of UXO and directed the International Trust Fund (ITF) to provide a further $2 million in USG funds to AGNA under a separate contract. ¶5. (C) Director of PM/WRA, Richard Kidd, came to Albania April 7-9 to discuss with Minister of Defense Oketa and Prime Minister Berisha further plans to clear Gerdec's "core area" ;of UXOs as well as longer range plans to eliminate Albania's stockpile of aging munitions and its MANPADS. Oketa made an official request asking the USG for help to clear the core area of UXOs, to destroy Albania's MANPADS arsenal, and to accelerate Albania's timetable for the destruction of its obsolete munitions (Ref B). He also committed to Kidd that the ministerial order would be signed as soon as possible, promised the MOD would turn over the MANPADS for destruction by May 1, and agreed to develop a long-term munitions reduction plan. But is Making it Difficult for U.S. Help to Begin -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) AGNA cannot start working without a ministerial order (MO) instructing MOD personnel to work with and provide access to AGNA. Previously, MOs have gotten bogged down in bureaucracy, taking months to sign. Oketa has said he is trying to expedite it this time, but we still have not received it. In subsequent April 15 meetings with Embassy personnel and the EUCOM Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST),Oketa confirmed his decision to dispose of the MANPADS. While final approval must come from the Council of Ministers, Oketa said he was ready to receive a U.S. team immediately to inspect and make preparations for shipment of the MANPADS. On April 19, however, Oketa said that he had received advice from his Joint Forces Commander that they were still a viable system of air defense and should be TIRANA 00000328 002 OF 002 maintained. Since he is new to the portfolio, he is reluctant to move forward without expert opinion to counter the JFC. He has asked for U.S. information that could help disprove that assertion. ¶7. (C) Even with the ministerial order, AGNA will not be able to begin operations at the Gerdec explosion core area until the GOA commits to provide a secure work area. Prime Minister Berisha assured Director Kidd and the DCM that his government was ready to implement whatever conditions the USG required to clean up Gerdec and to deal with the larger munitions problem facing the country. Director Kidd stressed the importance of site security, both within the blast zone as well as in a wider radius where citizens could face danger from planned detonations of damaged UXOs. He and Colonel Chad Sparks, who leads the HAST team evaluating environmental and structural risks, also highlighted potential dangers to the civilian population of moving back into their homes before soil and water analyses are finished and homes have been carefully screened for structural stress. The Prime Minister said the GOA would clear whatever area the USG recommends. Reality -------------- ¶8. (C) Post, the EUCOM team, and WRA have stressed to the GOA at all levels the importance of clear lines of responsibility and authority in dealing with the Gerdec crisis. While the PM and Oketa concurred during our meetings, word has yet to get to the people on the ground. In an April 8 letter to the PM, Ambassador Withers expressed concern that the Gerdec Emergency Management Committee, headed by Minister of Interior Nishani, is off to a slow start. Nishani's choice of Alfred Olli, the MOI's Emergency Management Coordinator, to lead the Gerdec working group was also a disappointment. The site commander, General Bahja, who is supposed to play a support role to Olli, clearly does not get along with Olli and has been making site security decisions on his own -- most of them efforts to reduce the area of security. Bahja has insisted that he is responsible only for controlling the core area, but claims he does not have authority to control access to the larger unsafe zone around the blast site. While the MOI is theoretically responsible for that area, police officers stand by while villagers move in to their houses, light fires to clear brush, and generally act as if the area is safe. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) The GOA needs to pull out all the stops to begin removal and demilitarization of the remaining UXO at Gerdec. Each day of delay increases risks. Absent the Ministerial order and adequate safety assurances, we will not be able to assist with clearance of the core area. Post, including the Ambassador, continues to press the Government at the highest levels to sign the order and provide the requisite assurances. We are also pressing Oketa to give the ok for removal of the MANPADS. ¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by WRA Director Kidd. CRISTINA