NETHERLANDS/SYRIA: "REAL CHANGE" BEFORE EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000927 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018 TAGS: PREL PINR SY EU NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/SYRIA: "REAL CHANGE" BEFORE EU ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT REF: A. STATE 115017 ¶B. MONZ-SMITH EMAIL 10-14-08 ¶C. THE HAGUE 632 ¶D. THE HAGUE 123 Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons 1.5(b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch state they want "real change" in Syria's behavior before expanding relations. At the same time, the Dutch have exchanged high-level visits with Syria, including an October 22 meeting between FM Verhagen and D/PM Dardari. The Dutch requested more information on the reported U.S. attack against Al Qaeda targets in Syria and inquired generally about U.S. policy after the presidential election. END SUMMARY. DUTCH POLICY: SEEK CHANGE IN SYRIA -------------- ¶2. (C) Responding to reftel A points concerning the November 10 EU GAERC, MFA Syria Desk officer Peter van der Bloemen told poloff October 28 that the Dutch want "real change in Syrian attitude and behavior before we could deepen EU relations with an association agreement." In an earlier discussion, responding to ref B points on Syria, and Van der Bloemen stated he was surprised by the Spanish-German-Italian letter to Syria, but he agreed it was a "good step," and a good set of requirements for Syria to meet before deepening EU engagement. The Netherlands also agrees with the UK policy of seeking "concrete steps" from Syria. GROWING CONTACTS -------------- ¶3. (C) In January 2008, FM Verhagen visited Syria for meetings with Syria's President Asad and FM Moallem (reftel D). In a recent discussion about that visit, Van der Bloemen acknowledged that FM Verhagen's visit to Damascus in January was disappointing, with "no pay off," and that signals from Syria have been "mixed." Nonetheless, the Netherlands is opposed to isolating Syria. The GONL regrets the lack of a coordinated EU policy on engaging Syria. "We should signal that positive steps will give a positive response." Van der Bloemen added that we "need Syria to play a constructive role." ¶4. (C) In September 2008, Verhagen met Syrian FM Moallem in New York during the UNGA. Van der Bloemen stated the meeting was "not friendly or constructive." Moallem accused Verhagen of holding up deeper engagement with the EU. The Syrian side was reportedly "bitter." ¶5. (C) Syria's Deputy PM Dardari visited the Hague October 
22-23. In a pre-brief for his meeting with Dardari, FM Verhagen told MFA staff that he was hoping for more positive meeting with the Syrians than in September. Van der Bloemen reported that the 30-minute meeting with Dardari was indeed "friendly" and "more constructive" with "mutual understanding." ¶6. (C) On the economic front, Dardari, along with Syria's Minister for Oil, reviewed Syria's 5 year economic reform plan with FM Verhagen. Dardari reported that much has been done and there is much left to do. However, there is a huge potential for investments in banking and insurance as the Syrian markets are now "more liberal." Dardari expressed hope that the GONL would continue with its water project, which supported "capacity building," according to Van der Bloemen. The Dutch are looking for resources to continue funding and in the past have provided about 1.2 million euros per year. ¶7. (C) On the political front, Verhagen told Dardari he was positively surprised by Syria's decision to establish ties with Lebanon. Dardari responded that Syria expected to establish an embassy in Lebanon before the end of the year and send an ambassador in early 2009. Syria expects to "revitalize" the border discussions with Lebanon, except with Q"revitalize" the border discussions with Lebanon, except with regard to Sheba farms. Syria is pleased with the EU rapprochement but wants the EU to "offer" an agreement. Syria will not "ask for" the agreement. Verhagen noted Dutch and EU concerns about human rights, Syrian support for terrorism, and Syrian cooperation with the IAEA. Dardari responded that he could not be seen as "someone who takes home conditions" for an EU agreement. Conditions were unacceptable. Verhagen explained that he would need some sort of "signal" from Syria to win support in the Dutch parliament for expanded relations. Asked "what kind of signal," Verhagen suggested taking action on the 12 individuals detained for signing the "Damascus declaration," THE HAGUE 00000927 002 OF 002 perhaps by releasing the "ill detainee." Dardari said he couldn't go into detail on those cases, but would take the idea back to Damascus. (Note: Van der Bloemen noted that the subsequent sentencing of the activists "was not the signal we were looking for." End Note.) Verhagen also asked for Syrian assistance in accepting the return of roughly 100 Syrians who had been refused asylum in the Netherlands. Dardari noted the Syrian ambassador in Brussels would soon seek accreditation in the Netherlands. ¶8. (C) Dardari spoke publicly to a group of roughly 200 people in The Hague on October 23. Van der Bloemen noted that Dardari is a "good speaker," who "has a way with words," and that he spoke for 45 minutes without notes. He was reportedly "headhunted" by the GOS to put a "friendly face" on Syria for western audiences. Dardari's public remarks echoed what he said in private: reviewing economic reforms and expressing hope for better relations. Van der Bloemen also noted the remarks were "unfriendly toward the USG." When asked about the special tribunal for Lebanon, Dardari said Syria would cooperate but would prosecute any Syrians involved rather than handing them over. Asked about Jews traveling to Syria, Dardari responded that Jews were "always welcome" but then asked the audience member's nationality. Van der Bloemen thought Dardari wanted to confirm the questioner was not from an Israeli. ¶9. (U) Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad published an interview with Dardari. In the report, Dardari made several points: (1) the policy of isolating Syria has been ineffective, (2) the human rights situation has improved in Syria, (3) corruption remains a problem, (4) Syria hopes to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict but peace with Israel is impossible without withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and (5) "extremism and terrorism are a threat to the entire region." Asked about IAEA cooperation, Dardari said "you can't make new demands all the time....My country was bombed in defiance of international law." ¶10. (C) Van der Bloemen, asked about whether the visit of a deputy prime minister was "stepping up contacts" between the Netherlands and Syria, said "no." He noted the Dutch are waiting for the Syrians to say that they want a constructive dialogue. Asked about the Dutch response to Syria's proposed closure of the American school in Damascus, Van der Bloemen noted that the Dutch ambassador had children at the school. In addition, a few EU ambassadors mentioned their concern about the school closure to FM Moallem. The Dutch have a sense that the closure is temporary. INTEREST IN U.S. POLICY -------------- ¶11. (C) MFA Deputy Director for Political Affairs Robert De Groot told DCM in an October 28 meeting, and Van der Bloemen told poloff separately, that the Dutch would like to "hear a bit more about" the alleged U.S. attack in Syria. Post shared Department press guidance stating the United States will continue to press Syria to improve border controls and stop the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq. Van der Bloemen also asked about the direction of U.S. policy after the election, noting with interest the readout the Dutch embassy in Washington had received from the Syria desk. CULBERTSON