CWC: WRAP-UP FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION,

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000898 SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) NSC FOR FLY WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, OCTOBER 14-17, 2008 (EC-54) REF: A. THE HAGUE 569 ¶B. STATE 108991 ¶C. THE HAGUE 891 ¶D. THE HAGUE 896 This is CWC-51-08 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) Like the Dutch weather, the sunshine and progress of Executive Council 53 in June (Ref A) returned to more typical dark clouds and rain in Executive Council 54, October 14-17. Despite daily meetings, lobbying, and a small group of key delegations meeting to try and find compromise, the week ended with no agreement on the Budget and Program of Work for 2009. The Iranian delegation, still without an ambassador, held up a large number of agenda items starting with the agenda itself, and keeping the U.S. 90-day report hostage until midnight on Friday evening. The Iranian obstructionist drama reached a climax on Wednesday during the discussion of the Director-General's Note on the Secretariat's readiness for a challenge inspection, when the tolerance of the rest of the Council for Iranian tactics hit its limit. Delegation after delegation spoke of the need to carry on the business of the EC, backed by the Secretariat's pronouncements on procedure. Several delegations called for a vote, with only China and South Africa arguing for a "bit more time" to resolve Iran's issues (and save its face). ¶2. (SBU) While the Iranians eventually allowed most agenda items to move forward, including the challenge inspection report, they introduced or insisted on report language on an unusually large number of issues, most likely a sign of their strategy ahead for the Conference of States Parties when the Budget must be approved. The final item on the agenda which the Iranians blocked until the very end of the Council was the U.S. 90-day destruction report, with Iran insisting on adding unacceptable new reporting requirements for future facilities. The U.S. delegation succeeded in gutting that proposal, but only after other Council members objected to discrimination against a single member state (the U.S.) and the Director-General (DG) himself spoke to the past nature and factual basis required for the 90-day destruction reports. ¶3. (U) In a surprising denouement, the Council session concluded at midnight with a series of accolades for Ambassador Javits, begun by the EC Chairperson and echoed by regional group representatives and other delegations around the room, ending in applause for his last Council session. ¶4. (SBU) The dynamic highlights of this EC are detailed below, followed by a review of the actions taken by the Council, and reports on sidebar meetings held by the U.S delegation. A full listing of the agenda items deferred and reports noted can be found in the official OPCW Report for EC-54. The October 13 meeting of donors to the Russian destruction program and the EC's destruction informals, as well as Deputy Assistant Secretary Staley's meetings and a meeting with the Libyan delegation are reported in separate telegrams (refs C and D). End Summary. -------------- NO DEAL ON THE BUDGET -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Budget facilitator Martin Strub (Switzerland) patiently continued negotiations during the EC lunch break throughout the week. By Friday (October 17),most delegations were either supporting or resigning themselves to the position led by the U.S. delegation against raising member states' assessed contributions for 2009. At week's end, the original draft budget document from June was the only one under discussion, with the income lost from revised Article IV and V payments to become a reduction of some 530,000 Euros from the 75 million Euro total. By Strub's analysis, the single major issue left on the table was the increase in the number of inspections of Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs),with Western European and Others Group (WEOG) members insisting on the minimum of ten additional inspections the DG had put in the original budget draft, and some Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states insisting on no/no increase in inspections over the 2008 level. ¶6. (SBU) Strub told WEOG that China and India opposed the increase in OCPF inspections on principle; other NAM members appeared to be more flexible, apparently seeing what they might add to the International Cooperation and Assistance programs following a decrease in inspection funding. Others, most notably South Africa, appeared to be jockeying for leverage without a clear objective or national position. The Cuban delegation had indicated to some WEOG delegates that there was no agreed NAM position on the OCPF issue. ¶7. (SBU) Strub invited a small group of the most interested delegations (U.S., UK, China, India, Iran, and others) to meet on October 17 as soon as the council adjourned its morning session. While Ambassador Javits proposed a possible compromise, it did not gain traction. At an emergency WEOG meeting later in the afternoon, Strub made a plea for compromising on OCPF numbers to try and isolate Iran. (Iranian attendance at budget meetings was spotty all week with old issues raised as ongoing concerns, such as the key performance indicators, and the required cost of living increase that the TS had repeatedly stated it could absorb.) U.S. Delrep and other WEOG reps argued that isolating Iran would not work, as Iran did not see the end of the EC as a real deadline, having argued there was "no rush" to conclude the budget before the CSP. There was broad agreement in WEOG that any concessions made early in an effort to compromise would just be pocketed by Iran and other NAM members blocking any final negotiations and agreement before the CSP. ¶8. (SBU) When the EC formally reconvened at 20:00 hours the evening of October 17, Strub informed the Chairperson that no agreement had been reached on the draft budget and it would have to be deferred to another (special) EC session. -------------- IRANIAN OBSTRUCTION/ COUNCIL CONFRONTATION -------------- ¶9. (U) In terms of Iranian behavior, EC-54 saw what many WEOG colleagues later termed a "return to normal". The Iranian delegation deferred almost every agenda item on the first pass, although it Qevery agenda item on the first pass, although it later agreed to note or approve all except a few documents that were then deferred to EC-55. At times, however, it was difficult to discern whether actions fell under the category of obstructionism or confusion. Both were evident. With no Ambassador to replace previous Iranian Ambassador Ziaran, the delegation was noticeably lacking in leadership and coherence. Iran often appeared to defer items simply because of an inability to grapple with the substance or lack of internal agreement among their nine-man delegation. Internal dynamics aside, Iran returned to center stage at this Council session. ¶10. (U) A noticeable change, however, was Iran's increasing isolation and lack of support from otherwise vocal members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). On the Director General's Note on Challenge Inspections, Iran made the tactical mistake of clearly stating that it would be "unable to note this item until appropriate report language had been developed in order to retain its leverage." After a number of interventions across the regional groups that expressed outrage at this procedural game- playing, Mexican Ambassador Lomonaco asked the Chair whether any other delegation shared Iran's view, and if not, whether the Council might consider a vote. To avoid breaking from the long-established tradition of consensus, South Africa and China finally intervened to request more time, but exasperation with Iran was unmistakable. Cuba also intervened, but in a way that indicated Iran was acting without the support and consensus of the NAM. ¶11. Even during Iran's final push to trap the U.S. with unacceptable report language on "operationalization" of destruction facilities, a topic that would normally enjoy widespread NAM engagement, interventions were entirely in support of a more reasonable approach, further highlighting Iran's isolation. In general, Iran was inconsistent in its final position on various issues and report language. If the Iranian delegation's only "must- have" was a public confrontation with the U.S., they met their goal, but at increasing cost to their credibility. -------------- END GAME - U.S./ IRAN -------------- ¶12. (U) Having hinted for weeks that a confrontation on the U.S. destruction program was inevitable, Iran did not disappoint. Beginning with questions and insinuations at the destruction informals about the "lack of transparency" the U.S. displayed by refusing to provide start-up dates for its facilities at Pueblo and Blue Grass, Iran carried on throughout the week but, true to form, refused to come forward with report language on the U.S. 90-Day Destruction Report until Thursday evening. Despite Iranian requests to solve the issue bilaterally (i.e. in a backroom deal),the issue was aired, discussed, and eventually resolved, on the Council floor on Friday at U.S. insistence. Tactically, this served U.S. interests, as it only increased the Council's already significant exasperation with Iran. Support for the U.S. came from more corners than usual, despite some agreement with the substance of the Iranian complaint. The Council ended at midnight Friday, having devoted approximately six hours over two days to this particular discussion. ¶13. (SBU) Del comment: Although eventual incorporation of very general language in the chapeau above all of the 90-Day reports may quiet the Iranians for the next several sessions, Del expects this line of questioning to continue. Although Iran was isolated this time, it is likely only a matter of Qwas isolated this time, it is likely only a matter of time before others begin to press the U.S. for more detailed information on the status of the two facilities that will bear primary responsibility for running the U.S. destruction program well past the 2012 deadline. -------------- EC-54 OPENING SESSION AND GENERAL DEBATE -------------- ¶14. (U) Chairperson Oksana Tomova (Slovakia) formally opened EC-54 on October 14 thirty minutes late after the prior Bureau meeting discussed at length Iranian insistence on deletion of the agenda item on OCPF declarations. The Bureau's compromise solution was to expand the original item to include the cluster of industry issues. Iran proposed that change from the floor, which the Council accepted as it adopted the agenda, much too many delegations' relief after several weeks of Iranian opposition to the draft agenda. ¶15. (U) In his Statement, Director General (DG) Rogelio Pfirter congratulated A State Party for the complete destruction of its entire chemical weapon stockpile, to which the EC broke into applause. Of note in his long review of OPCW activities, Pfirter expressed optimism that Lebanon would accede to the treaty in short order. He indicated that he had sent a letter to the Secretary General (SG) of the Arab League recently asking the SG for his full support in helping to bring the remaining Arab states outside of the convention in as members. He also announced the appointment of Marc Vogelaar, former Dutch Ambassador to the OPCW, as a special consultant on universality matters at no cost to OPCW (courtesy of the Dutch government). Pfirter concluded his remarks with an announcement that he had tasked the Technical Secretariat (TS) to prepare two papers on the Scientific Advisory Board following the recommendations of the Second Review Conference, and a paper on incapacitating chemicals for law enforcement purposes. ¶16. (U) The General Debate included group statements from French Ambassador Jean-Francois Blarel on behalf of the European Union, Cuban Ambassador Oscar de los Reyes Ramos on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and China, and South African delegate Marthinus van Schalkwyk on behalf of the African Group. Japan, China, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the U.S., Spain, Iran, India, Korea, Brazil, Tunisia and Libya gave national statements. A key theme in nearly all the speeches was praise for A State Party's completion of destruction on time, along with the importance of CW destruction to the treaty. Several statements included support for the OPCW as a forum to help prevent the spread of chemical terrorism, most notably the NAM statement -- for the first time. ¶17. (U) Several of the NAM statements called for the full implementation of Article XI, and for the improved sharing of technology and equipment. Russia strongly linked implementation of Article XI with full implementation of Article VII as a precursor. Most statements voiced approval for the zero nominal growth budget before the Council. South Africa, in contrast, argued that a lack of budget increase hampered the activities of the OPCW. The only strong difference in the national statements was on OCPF inspections. The EU and U.S. called for an increase in these inspections, while NAM delegates urged improvement in site selection for the inspections first. ¶18. (U) Iran used its statement to highlight a "grey Q18. (U) Iran used its statement to highlight a "grey area" in how States Parties were addressing destruction, namely that the two major possessors-- the U.S. and Russia -- did not have a detailed timeline to complete their destruction efforts. It also called for intensified consultations regarding Article XI and for additional efforts to assist States Parties under Article X, including the need for help regarding terrorist threats or other threatened use of CW. Iran concluded by stating that the number of OCPF inspections must be treated as a policy issue and be intricately linked to overall Industry Cluster policies. India echoed that view. Brazil took a middle road, stating that the OPCW should not move away from a zero-growth budget and that the OCPF methodology should be improved, but not just by increasing the number of inspections. ¶19. (SBU) India reiterated that it had destroyed more than 97% of its stockpile and that it was on target to complete destruction by the April 2009 deadline. Libya reported that it has established a national committee to oversee implementation and that it has passed national legislation. It also highlighted that it had held a national conference to education stakeholders regarding the Convention. -------------- VERIFICATION PLANS AND FACILITY AGREEMENTS -------------- ¶20. (U) After evident confusion on the part of the Iranian delegation, Libya's Facility Agreement and Verification Plan were approved, as were changes to the U.S. Verification Plan and Facility Agreement for the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility. Del met bilaterally with Iran to answer questions on the new U.S. Schedule 1 Facility Agreement, which initially stemmed from a lack of Iranian understanding of the purpose of several accompanying documents (comparison with Model Facility Agreement and corrigendum),but then turned to more pointed questions about a paragraph on sampling and analysis drafting to take into account the requirements of Condition 18. Despite U.S. explanations and the fact that this language was consistent with the U.S. Schedule 2 Facility Agreement, Iran deferred consideration of the agreement to EC-55. ¶21. (U) A number of questions also arose on Iran's Schedule 1 Facility Agreement, changes to which were distributed during the EC week. Several delegations asked for legal clarification as to the difference between "agreement" (title of the previously approved document) and "arrangement" (title of the revised version),as well as between "shall" and "will" in Farsi. The Legal Advisor offered assurances that the document's legal standing had not been diminished. The U.S., supported by Germany, requested additional information from the Iranian government and deferred the item to EC-55. -------------- CONVERSION -- LIBYA'S DEADLINE -------------- ¶22. (U) Despite concerns that Libya's missed conversion deadline could attract attention, this subject escaped with little discussion. Germany expressed concern, noting that missing deadlines was not good for the integrity of the Convention, and urging Libya to speed up the conversion of Rabta. ¶23. (SBU) A rather confusing DG Note issued without warning just prior to the EC added nothing to the dialogue and caught the Libyans themselves by surprise, a fact that Libyan rep Hesnawy intended to discuss personally with the DG. The Note, EC- 54/DG.17, is titled to refer to the Completion of Conversion of Production Facilities in general, but QConversion of Production Facilities in general, but the content deals only with Libya. The Note lays out Libyan progress and steps taken and states in the final paragraph that the Note has been provided to "facilitate the decision of States Parties on appropriate measures to be applied." A similar paper was not issued for India or Russia, both of whom have long since passed the deadline for conversion of their chemical weapons production facilities. Delrep heard later from a member of the TS that this was a political step taken to satisfy "one or two" delegations. -------------- DESTRUCTION - 90 DAY AND SHCHUCHYE REPORTS -------------- ¶24. (U) Although Iran briefly deferred the Libyan 90- day report without explanation, their delegation eventually agreed to note this document and shifted its considerable attention to the U.S. report, as described above. The Secretariat and States Parties alike vocally resisted the discriminatory treatment of one State Party's factual report. Of note, the DG himself, in an attempt to separate Iranian concerns about the U.S. program from the noting of a factual report, suggested that a more appropriate forum for such discussions would be the discussion of the next EC visit to the U.S. (Del comment: While helpful in the context of EC-54, this philosophy is likely to come back to haunt the U.S. and the Council when it comes time to prepare for and discuss the results of the visit next year to Pueblo and Umatilla.) ¶25. (U) Earlier in the week, South Africa requested a consultation to discuss the report of the Shchuchye visit. In a brief meeting on October 16, South Africa thanked the Russian delegation for their cooperation and the patience of all and proposed acceptable report language. The report was noted in the afternoon session with far less controversy than the analogous report of the EC visit to Anniston in ¶2007. -------------- ARTICLE VII IMPLEMENTATION -------------- ¶26. (U) Said Moussi (Algeria),facilitator for this topic, made a brief report on the three consultations held since the previous EC meeting. Luxembourg reported that their government had forwarded a "pre- draft" of their legislation to the TS on October 13 for comments. After the EC noted the DG's Note, Iran stated that they felt that the DG's Note expressed some "views" of the TS that may go beyond strict facts, and requested that consultations on that point be held. -------------- ARTICLE X ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION -------------- ¶27. (U) Iran continued its efforts to keep this issue on the agenda and push for a primary focus on the needs and care of victims of CW use. Russian facilitator Victor Smirnovsky reported to the Council; his list of consultations and activities illustrated the work that has been done on Article X since the agreement of the CSP-12 mandate for the Council to "conduct intensive deliberations to develop measures for emergency assistance, including with regard to the victims of chemical weapons." Iran proposed report language that veered far too close to establishing a mandate for care of current (Iranian) CW victims, but agreed fairly easily to more acceptable language. On the Council floor, as the result of confusion over an edited version, Iran Qthe result of confusion over an edited version, Iran surprisingly agreed to the deletion of a key paragraph referring to their victims' proposal. (DEL COMMENT: As Iran has been discussing the concept of a victims' network since CSP-12 with virtually no progress, it is still not entirely clear what the Iranian delegation hopes to achieve on the issue this year. Bargaining at CSP-13 is likely. END COMMENT.) -------------- -------------- ARTICLE XI ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT -------------- -------------- ¶28. (U) Facilitator Li Hong (China) reported on recent consultations. Cuba presented its earlier proposal, now a national paper, for a workshop to develop ideas on concrete proposals toward the full implementation of Article XI. Of note, the paper states that due allocations within the 2009 budget, along with additional voluntary funding, would be needed. This proposal received broad support during the consultations. Iran, in turn, presented a competing proposal during the EC for the workshop, including measures to promote free trade in chemicals and identification of measures "to avoid hampering the economic development of States Parties." ¶29. (SBU) Del Comment: In WEOG meetings on the margins of the Council, several delegations expressed concern about funding the workshop if it might turn into an "Australia Group bashing." Funding for the workshop remains one of the issues to be negotiated in the draft budget before its final approval. -------------- UNIVERSALITY -------------- ¶30. (U) Facilitator Lee Litman (UK) gave a report early in the week on the consultation held in September. Iran initially moved to defer the annual report to the next session of the Council, but later permitted it to be noted. Iran insisted that language be included in the Council report on continuing consultations on universality. The UK subsequently drafted language that was accepted by the EC for the report. -------------- INDUSTRY ISSUES AND OCPF PAPERS -------------- ¶31. (U) After Iran changed the agenda item to reflect all industry issues, the EC discussion centered more on what should be addressed than anything substantive on industry. Iran stated that more time was needed and that all industry issues should be treated equally; their delegate also referred to a "package" without further detail. The Mexican Ambassador questioned Iran on what it expected on the new agenda item. The UK and others noted the opportunity for the Council to discuss the two TS papers on OCPF declarations. U.S. Delrep welcomed the two new facilitators for industry issues and suggested that report language reflect their appointment and the need for other facilitators to volunteer to lead consultations on frequency and site selection. The Chairperson requested that the Algerian Ambassador, as Vice Chair for the industry issues, coordinate report language; the Algerian delegate agreed to do so on behalf of her ambassador. ¶32. (SBU) Negotiation of industry report language moved to the corridors but failed to progress in Ambassador Dani's absence. On Thursday when Algerian delegate Said Moussi returned to The Hague, he began working with interested delegations privately to construct suitable language. The Iranians worked to remove references to OCPFs and the two TS papers; Qremove references to OCPFs and the two TS papers; WEOG delegations insisted on welcoming the new facilitators by name for Schedule 2a/2a* low concentrations and OCPF declarations by name and urging the appointment of facilitators for other industry issues. In the end, the report language reflected western views on the facilitations but had no mention of the two TS papers that initiated the original agenda item. -------------- CHALLENGE INSPECTION -------------- ¶33. (U) As described above, Iran seized upon the DG's annual report on TS readiness to conduct a challenge inspection to make it painfully clear that it intended to hold virtually all documents hostage until it was guaranteed "appropriate" report language. While isolated on process, Iran did receive support from several NAM delegations on the substance of calling for the resolution of the "unresolved issues" from the Preparatory Commission days. Report language, while toned down from Iran's original proposal, eventually supported this. Del anticipates few delegates will want to volunteer for a facilitation that is doomed to political stalemate and has been dormant since the previous facilitator left over a year ago. -------------- ABAF ACTION -------------- ¶34. (U) After the Council noted the reports of the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial matters, U.S. Delrep, supported by UK and Germany, requested the deferral of the entire slate of nominations for the ABAF to the next session. Delrep noted the late letters of appointment and the need for independent financial experts, and requested resumes for all of the candidates. ¶35. (SBU) Del comment. In a private conversation later with OPCW Administrative Director Ron Nelson, he welcomed the move toward ABAF reform. ¶36. (U) Currency exchange risk report: Iran asked about the basis for the TS calculations included in this Note, to which the TS responded. Iran then asked that this item be deferred to the EC meeting following the next ABAF meeting, a highly unusual intervention for a routine report. Mexico asked what the practical consequences would be to this deferral, to which the DG said there would be no consequence as this is a report only and does not affect their current practices. The item was then deferred to EC- ¶57. -------------- MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE EC: QUAD LUNCH -- DG SEARCH -------------- ¶37. (SBU) During Amb. Javits' lunch in honor of DAS Ken Staley on October 15, the question of the succession of the Director General was raised. The new French Ambassador asked when his term was done (July 2010) and agreed that it would be important to start a systematic search early. UK Ambassador Lyn Parker agreed with U.S. Delreps that Amb. Tomova as current EC chair should become engaged early, and that it would be better for her to propose a process than to open it up for discussion. Amb. Burkart, the German Vice Chair in the EC, agreed, and discussion turned to who might raise the issue with Tomova and when. The group generally agreed that it would be ideal for Tomova to announce to the Conference of States Parties that she would be outlining steps early next year for nomination of candidates, to be followed by a letter as Chairperson setting out the process. ¶38. (SBU) Representatives at the luncheon also discussed the election of the leadership for the CSP, with the Asian Group to hold the new chair, and the African group to chair the Committee of the Whole. All agreed that some careful diplomatic maneuvering would be needed to avoid the Algerian Ambassador repeating his dismal performance as COW Chairman in the Review Conference and the unfortunate procedural vote in the CSP last year when Morocco disputed the election of the Sudanese Ambassador as Chairman of the Conference. No one had news of an Asian candidate for the Chairmanship but delegates will pursue discreet inquiries with Asian contacts. -------------- -------------- MEETING WITH OPCW CHIEF OF CABINET RICHARD EKWALL -------------- -------------- ¶39. (U) ISN/CB Director Bob Mikulak met Richard Ekwall for lunch on Friday, October 17. Following up on Deputy Assistant Secretary Ken Staley's meeting with the Director General, Mikulak and Ekwall discussed terrorism and the evolution of the U.S. position. Ekwall responded positively to the idea of the OPCW being a forum for exchange of information and experience relative to chemical safety and security. ¶40. (U) Ekwall confirmed that during the Director General's trip to New York on October 15, the DG met with representatives from non-States Party Egypt, Somalia and Israel, and Myanmar though not North Korea. According to Ekwall, the tone was positive though it was apparent that there was no real change in attitude or the states' general positions. ¶41. (U) A Seminar on Universality will take place in Istanbul, April 16-17, 2009. Ekwall and Mikulak discussed the necessity of having separate side meetings there with Israel, Egypt and Syria. ¶42. (SBU) Finally, Mikulak raised the issue of the choice of the new Director General and Ekwall confirmed that he would be working on it. Mikulak gave the U.S. view of how the process might best be accomplished. -------------- --- U.S./TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS -------------- --- ¶43. (U) A DOD technical expert from Washington met with representatives from the Secretariat to discuss ongoing implementation issues. Discussions resulted in resolution on the following: verification approach for short term destruction operations at Blue Grass; verification during the processing of ton containers with high heels; an agreed approach for the analysis of HT; and modalities for upcoming quality review visits. -------------- --- INCLUSION OF NON-SCHEDULED CHEMICALS IN THE OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE -------------- --- ¶44. (U) Two weeks prior to EC-54, OPCW Laboratory Head Gary Mallard (U.S.) requested U.S. feedback on a draft TS note on inclusion of non-scheduled chemicals in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD). The note distinguishes between data on analytical derivatives, degradation products, and riot control agents. Its goes on to recommend that only data for Qagents. Its goes on to recommend that only data for scheduled chemicals and their analytical derivatives be used on Article VI inspections, which is a concern for future verification as it essentially excludes the possibility of checking for degradation products on an industry inspection. Delrep worked with senior TS officials to ensure the draft was not distributed prior to EC-54, a move that was supported by the UK, which shares U.S. concerns on the draft. On the margins of EC-54, ISN/CB Office Director Mikulak and Delrep met with Mallard to discuss the reasoning behind the TS approach. ¶45. (U) Mallard explained that India has categorically refused the addition of any non- scheduled chemicals, including necessary analytical derivatives, to the OCAD and that the TS had attempted to separate the issues in order to have important degradation product data available for use in the event of a challenge inspection or investigation of alleged use. The U.S. reiterated its concerns about the paper, and Mallard recommended that concerned delegations approach India to better understand its concerns and work toward a more acceptable solution. -------------- -- DISCUSSION WITH THE TS ON SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS -------------- -- ¶46. (U) On the margins of the Council sessions Delreps Mikulak, Clagett and Denyer met with the TS to discuss sampling and analysis at Schedule 2 sites, drawing on guidance (Ref B). Representing the TS were H. Reeps (Director, Verification Division),W. Kane (Head, Industry Verification Branch),P. Runn (Head, Planning Review Branch),V. Artos and A. Dolea (Senior Industry Officers) and B. Whelan, (inspector/analytical chemist who had been involved in a substantial fraction of the Schedule 2 inspections in which sampling was carried out). Kane led the discussion from the TS side. ¶47. (U) Delreps opened the discussions by indicating they were seeking to understand the reasons for the differences in views between the U.S. and the TS. Kane presented the TS view that sampling and analysis is one of the verification tools, provides assurance about the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals, is a unique tool and was intended to be used on all Schedule 2 inspections (per para 27 of Part VII of the CWC Verification Annex). Runn added that sampling and analysis is strongly supported by the Director-General. Delrep explained that the U.S. expects a rationale before sampling and analysis is undertaken, that it should be used only if it adds value since it is highly intrusive, and that the U.S. questions the necessity and practicality to use it on every Schedule 2 inspection. Further, the U.S. view is that decisions to use sampling and analysis should also take into account paragraph 20 of Part VII of the Verification Annex, which specifies that a variety of other factors are also relevant, and the Confidentiality Annex, which provides that the least intrusive methods should be used. ¶48. (U) Kane and Runn countered that paragraph 27 is sufficient unto itself as a reason for doing sampling and analysis. Del asked about TS plans for doing sampling and analysis on every Schedule 2 inspection. Kane said the TS would approach this goal gradually. Reeps added that sampling and analysis would be QReeps added that sampling and analysis would be limited by budget, equipment and personnel restraints so that sites would be selected according to perceived risk; it would be unrealistic to plan to do sampling and analysis during every Schedule 2 inspection. Delreps also pointed out that confidentiality and safety concerns might limit an inspection team's ability to employ sampling and analysis and that decisions to employ this tool should address technical credibility. Runn expressed concern that the host might conclude that the rationale provided by the inspection team might be judged inadequate, leading the host to refuse to allow sampling. Delreps said that they did not envision such an outcome. ¶49. (U) The TS also presented its preparations to cope with false positives and made clear that in 2009 it should be possible to use an expanded database of reference spectra while still operating in a "closed" mode. This would facilitate prompt resolution of unexpected results that might look like "false positives." Delreps gave the TS an overview of U.S. regulations as they pertain to sampling and analysis. ¶50. (SBU) Comment: Perhaps the most important things to come out of the consultation was a clear indication that the TS is concerned that the U.S. would refuse to allow a sample to be taken if it judged that the "rationale" was inadequate. Delreps explained the difference between rationale and justification in this context. It was also apparent that differing views exist within the Verification Division on whether or not the goal should be to take samples during every Schedule 2 inspection. Del recommends that the USG assure the TS that the U.S. does not intend to refuse to allow samples to be taken, while stressing that the TS needs to more clearly articulate under what circumstances sampling and analysis add value. End Comment. ¶51. (U) JAVITS SENDS. CULBERTSON