CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000089 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) NSC FOR SMITH WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR WEEK ENDING JANUARY 25, 2008 This is CWC-03-07. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) for Preparations for the Second Review Conference (RevCon) began its work on the draft report in earnest this week. Many delegations offered substantive interventions on "Block 1" of the Chairman's draft text, drawing early lines on the relative importance of disarmament and non- proliferation, the role of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB),and other points as captured below. ¶2. (SBU) The WEOG met in its expanded format (including members of the EU, Japan and Korea). Most interventions were made by WEOG members, although Slovenia spoke on behalf of the EU. In a private conversation later, the UK indicated its concern that EU members are too hesitant to speak individually in support of a common position, a tactic the NAM continues to use effectively to add weight to its statements. ¶3. (U) Although an Article XI consultation was added last-minute to the OPCW calendar, the schedule in general remains fairly open, indicating that the focus of delegations has in large part shifted to preparations for the RevCon. -------------- EXPANDED WEOG MEETING -------------- ¶4. (U) The expanded WEOG meeting on January 22 included non-WEOG EU member states, Japan and Korea and lasted longer than regular WEOG meetings owing to extensive discussion on a number of subjects. Discussion started on "Block 1" of the OEWG Chairman's draft text. Most delegations agreed that the text appeared to be balanced and neutral. The UK noted that while the Chairman's text differs from the UK national position on certain issues, it is not in a position to take the lead in proposing significant changes but would be able to support others who did. The UK also reported that there had been debate in the Bureau about whether to produce two separate RevCon documents -- a Report and a Political Statement -- or one consolidated report; in his capacity as OEWG Chair, UK Amb. Parker feels that having two documents is important to keep a sole report being held hostage by certain delegations. ¶5. (U) A number of delegations raised issues they would like to be added to or expanded in the Chair's draft text. Canada and the UK both stated their desire for strengthening the role of the SAB. Citing the reference to Albania's landmark completion of destruction of its CW stockpile, Canada also suggested including a reference to Libya's accession as a possessor state since the First RevCon. Germany indicated its desire to highlight destruction deadlines, including intermediate ones, though it admitted that this might be problematic vis-a-vis Russia. Referring to its national paper on measures to be taken in the event of chemical crises, Japan raised the issue as a possible RevCon discussion topic. ¶6. (U) Turning to the NAM's RevCon statement, Amb. Javits characterized it as unbalanced and clearly a position from which the NAM will try to negotiate. He also pointed out a number of contradictions within the text, suggesting that they could be good points for the WEOG to focus on. Many other delegations agreed with the U.S. assessment, with the Netherlands and Japan both citing their concern at the NAM's apparent interest in focusing on increased assistance. Canada and Sweden both noted that the NAM's claim that non-proliferation is not part of the CWC is flawed, particularly as the First RevCon report set the stage for non-proliferation (Sweden) and the OPCW's budget specifically lists non- proliferation as a core objective (Canada). Spain agreed with the U.S. suggestion that moderate NAM members might be more inclined to WEOG positions than those of the most-vocal and radical NAM delegations. ¶7. (U) Speaking in its EU Presidency capacity, Slovenia said that it plans to increase EU coordination in the run up to the RevCon. It plans to host a conference in Ljubljana with the goal of formulating common EU positions on a number of areas, including the General Purpose Criterion, verification regime, and universality. ¶8. (U) Amb. Lak (Netherlands) reviewed his donor coordination initative, as reported last week. He stressed that the initiative's goal is to be forward- looking and to involve concrete plans for current or future assistance. Slovenia noted that the EU -- as a major contributor of voluntary funds to the OPCW -- wants to carry out a cost-benefit analysis of assistance programs to determine the focus for future EU support. Among others, Germany expressed its support for Amb. Lak's plan, saying that donor coordination and unity was necessary to set the OPCW's assistance and international cooperation priorities and to combat the NAM's apparent push solely for a "proliferation of ICA funding." ¶9. (U) On sampling and analysis, Germany suggested discussing it during the Industry Cluster meeting on February 19, especially as they plan to have a German expert from Berlin in attendance. The UK, which also plans to have an expert from London at the meeting, agreed that discussions either during or on the fringes of the meeting would be beneficial. Japan recommended focusing discussion on how to implement sampling and analysis as, in its view, the TS has already exhibited the technical capacity to carry it out. However, the Netherlands noted that it would be premature to look at implementation before discussing the broader principle of sampling and analysis. ¶10. (U) Picking up on a topic from last week's WEOG meeting, Australia said that it also had been approached by the TS to arrange a visit to "inspect" Australia's offers of assistance under Article X. Like many of the other countries already approached by the TS, Australia said that its offer of assistance had been very general and that there was nothing concrete for the TS to inspect. It emerged that the TS's motivation for visiting Article X donors may in part be driven by a need to spend EU Joint Action voluntary funds before they expire. -------------- ARTICLE X -------------- ¶11. (U) As reported last week and above, the TS has approached a number of SPs to "inspect" their offers of assistance made under Article X, as provided for in Article VIII, paragraph 39b. On January 22, at the request of Gennadi Lutay (Head, Assistance and Protection Branch (APB)),Delreps met with him and Christina Rodriguez, another member of APB. Lutay spent quite a while extolling the virtues of the initiative described above. He explained that in a number of cases, the request for a visit has acted as a catalyst for States Parties to withdraw or update their original offers, often made ten years ago following entry into force. While this is certainly a valuable exercise, Del questions whether actual visits to capitals are necessary to accomplish this. ¶12. (U) As expected, Lutay eventually indicated an interest in visiting the U.S. Delreps noted the general nature of the U.S. offer (medical antidotes/treatment as needed),and inquired as to what precisely the TS would hope to "inspect" or gain by such a visit. Lutay and Rodriguez were unable to clearly articulate a purpose, although they eventually suggested that perhaps the U.S. could consider a presentation or demonstration of a representative sample of medical antidotes that we might provide. Lutay also pointed out that it would be difficult for the TS to justify excluding the U.S. from this initiative; the broader concept of excluding a number of States Parties whose offers would not benefit from inspection did not seem to catch on with APB as a viable alternative. Delreps reiterated the need for a clear purpose for the visit, but committed to discuss the matter with Washington. ¶13. (SBU) COMMENT: The most important question is clearly whether or not this is an appropriate and/or effective use of OPCW funds. However, the effort raises additional questions as to the ability of the TS staff involved in the effort to analyze individual SIPDIS offers in this context. END COMMENT. ¶14. (U) Iranian Proposal Regarding Victims of Chemical Weapons: Jitka Brodska, the facilitator for Article X, informed Delrep that Iran has requested she circulate its paper regarding victims of chemical weapons prior to the next consultation scheduled for February 18. She is willing to do so but wants to avoid creating a separate agenda item and plans to allow the proposal simply to be brought up under the discussions regarding readiness to provide assistance. Brodska noted that the Iranians are insistent on making the issue a topic on the agenda of the RevCon and expressed an interest in hearing how the U.S. would like to see the issue handled in the coming weeks. -------------- INDUSTRY CLUSTER -------------- ¶15. (U) On January 22, Delrep met with Bill Kane (Head, IVB) at his request to discuss the current state of the Industry Cluster. Amb. Dani (Algeria), in his capacity as EC Vice-Chair for the Industry Cluster, is considering holding a session during the February 19 Cluster meetings on the status of the Cluster's work and goals for the future. In advance of that, Amb. Dani asked Bill Kane to touch bases with several delegations who are most involved in the work of the Cluster. ¶16. (U) The basis for the discussion was the "List of Issues Formally Open" that was prepared for the RevCon OEWG (dated 23 March 2007). In the end, the TS position on many of these issues is similar to SIPDIS that of the USG. The TS sees no value in opening or re-opening issues that have little chance of forward progress. Of course, the TS acknowledges that they will be criticized by some delegations for the long list of open items coming from the First RevCon, but they are also realistic about the prospects for true progress. A few topics that Kane expects to be of particular concern to some include: - Low concentration thresholds for Schedule 2A/2A*: Kane understands that the U.S. position on this issue is not the most extreme; that distinction seems to belong to Germany. Without some effort to resolve the concerns of Germany, Japan, and the U.S., this issue will not move forward. - OCPF site selection: The TS believes that the newly modified methodology the TS has begun using this year gives most delegations exactly what they wanted in distributing OCPF inspections in a more balanced way based on the size of their domestic industry. The TS would prefer to let the new methodology have at least one year of application to assess its true impact. So, if delegations continue to insist that consultations resume on this matter, the TS preference is that they focus only on VA Part IX para 11(c) ("proposals by States Parties") for the time being. ¶17. (U) Kane also mentioned briefly the OCPF declaration "upgrade" which is the subject of an upcoming TS paper. The TS does not see a need to start consultations on this necessarily. The TS sees the option of handling this in a way similar to site selection. Although we might agree with the options available to the DG, we will need to withhold judgment on the matter until the TS paper has been thoroughly reviewed. ¶18. (U) Another issue that Delrep discussed with Kane in a later setting came from the introduction to the list referred to in paragraph 16 above -- the fact that the EC Bureau took a decision on March 1 to delete certain entries and no longer consider them to be formally open. The presumption is that this was done because these items had been resolved in some other way. Kane said he would consider the value of the TS doing a further review of the issues in the March 23 List to see if there were other items that might be proposed to the Bureau for removal for similar reasons. This could ease the backlog that would need to be discussed at the RevCon. -------------- WEOG MEETING -------------- ¶19. (U) The January 24 meeting of the WEOG was uneventful. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss delegations' positions going into the OEWG meeting. Del shared the general aspects of its comments on the first section of the draft RevCon report. The only other delegations to share their positions were the UK and Germany, whose points overlapped the U.S. points substantially. -------------- OEWG: PREPARATIONS FOR THE REVIEW CONFERENCE -------------- ¶20. (U) On March 24, Amb. Parker (UK) chaired the seventeenth meeting of the OEWG to date. The agenda items were: (1) draft provisional RevCon agenda; (2) the first section of the draft RevCon report; and (3) participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the RevCon. ¶21. (U) Prior to beginning the agenda, Amb. Parker briefly discussed the history of the issue of rotation of the Chair of the RevCon between regional groups. He noted that an amendment to the rules of procedure appears to be needed to address this issue for this RevCon and into the future. The Legal Advisor is drafting an opinion on the matter, which the DG will circulate soon in a note. Also, Parker gave some time to the Pakistani delegation, in their role as chair of the Asian group, to announce the group's agreement to nominate Saudi Arabian Ambassador El Khereiji to serve as the RevCon chair (given the assumptions already explained). ¶22. (U) On the topic of the draft provisional agenda, there was significant discussion on the following items: - item 9(c)(vi): Consultations, cooperation and fact-finding including the relationship with other multilateral efforts. This topic met with a number of questions from delegations. India encouraged a discussion about Article IX, apart from other organizations. Russia suggested that discussions about other organizations might fit better under item 9(e): the functioning of the OPCW. - item 9(c)(viii): Economic and technological development and steps to the full implementation of Article VII and Article XI. This topic also met with a number of questions from delegations. India and Algeria suggested that Article XI be given separate consideration on the agenda. - There was also some discussion on the best place on the agenda to discuss terrorism, given the limited mandate of the OPCW in this area. ¶23. (U) On the first section of the report text, most delegations limited their comments to general observations, committing to giving specific textual changes to the Chair directly. Iran was the first to intervene, mentioning many of its pet interests: "delicate balance," CWC primarily as a disarmament instrument, caution over the introduction of "new" terms (e.g., preferred use of "verification of activities not prohibited" over "non-proliferation"), focus on destruction and deadlines, replacement of "regions of tension or instability" in the universality discussion with "those whose non- adherence is a cause for serious concern," and adding the idea of "free trade." ¶24. (U) India shared many of these same points, adding their concern for how the discussions on terrorism and reference to the SAB are handled. South Africa announced that their comments would focus on the reference to UNSCR 1540 and being more proactive on many areas, including assistance and protection. Germany noted the importance of balance between destruction and other matters, and questioned why the SAB is singled out amongst the several boards that function in conjunction with the TS. On destruction, the Netherlands cautioned against too congratulatory a tone in this area, and the UK pointed out that some intermediate deadlines have not yet been met. Del deployed general points, drawing on the revised text received from Washington, and has submitted specific suggestions in writing to the Chair. ¶25. (U) The use of the term &non-proliferation8 was a common theme throughout the meeting. After several interventions (including Iran,s),Canada expressed surprise and confusion at the debate in a well timed intervention that included a reference to previous agreement to non-proliferation as a core objective in the annual budget. Sweden also noted that the term appears throughout the report of the First RevCon. Germany introduced the term &confidence in non- proliferation8 and Mexico questioned the need for, relevance of, or the chance of a healthy debate on nonproliferation v. disarmament, as they saw it as much too early to narrow the many ways this balance could be achieved. ¶26. (U) On the topic of the participation of NGOs, India expressed its concern over the poor geographical distribution of NGOs that participated in the summer 2007 event and whether another event would yield significantly different results. South Africa noted that, although they did not question the removal of certain NGOs from the summer event, they would like to see as complete a list as possible this time before invitations are sent out. -------------- ARTICLE XI -------------- ¶27. (U) On January 25, Li Hong (China) led a consultation on Article XI ("fostering of international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities"). The facilitator acknowledged that he had neither a particular agenda for the meeting nor any particular expectations. As a result, he achieved exactly what he set out to do. He did, however, ask delegations for their thoughts on whether consultations should move forward with substantive work at this point or instead focus on preparations for the RevCon and then resume afterward. There was a general consensus expressed that work should move forward now based on the mandate from CSP-12. ¶28. (U) The facilitator referenced the working paper distributed by Cuba on behalf of the NAM and China at CSP-12 (C-12/NAT.1, dated 6 November 2007),along with, as an afterthought, other older national papers distributed by countries such as Switzerland and New Zealand. He encouraged delegations to look at these as a source of ideas for substantive work by the group. Del intervened to state that, although many of the ideas presented in the NAM paper could serve as a good basis for the work of the consultation, this should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the paper as a whole, which presents these as "indicative elements of a plan of action." The Cuban delegation intervened to state that they shared the U.S view of the mandate and work of the group, at least at this time. Iran, however, felt it necessary to note that, even though the mandate was clear, they still had hope that "dynamic" positions might shift over time to allow the eventual undertaking of an action plan. Del views substantive work in the time leading up to the RevCon as a way to reduce the urgency of calls for an action plan during the RevCon. -------------- IRAQI ACCESSION -------------- ¶29. (SBU) Delrep met with Director of Verification Horst Reeps and UK Delrep Wolstenholme on January 25 to provide imagery forwarded by Washington and share general thoughts on the progress of accession and steps to take in advance of and following Iraq's submission of its initial declaration. Reeps has heard nothing further from Baghdad, but expressed his desire to convene a short-notice trilateral (U.S./UK/TS) meeting in The Hague, preferably involving experts from capitals, to review the newest version of the Iraqi declaration upon receipt. (Del rep did hear directly from Iraqi Amb. Banaa that he expects accession to occur "any day" but, as his predictions have tended toward the overly optimistic in the past, does not necessarily take this as an indicator that accession is imminent.) ¶30. (SBU) Reeps mentioned a recent conversation with the Iranian delegation, who indicated an Iranian desire for some sort of full admission of guilt regarding the use of CW in Iran immediately following accession. Reeps also noted that a number of delegations have been inquiring about the general possibility of coalition forces having discovered old CW rounds. ¶31. (SBU) In terms of steps following accession, Reeps still recommends that the Iraqis introduce their declaration at the EC session following their accession. He and the DG also believe it would be preferable for the Iraqis themselves to state up front that they are unable to guarantee the safety and security of an inspection team, thus justifying postponing initial inspections until the situation improves significantly. The UK delegation expressed concern that Iraq has no concept of the political difficulties it is likely to encounter from Iran following accession. ¶32. (U) Javits sends. Schofer