Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08THEHAGUE790
2008-09-23 11:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:
NETHERLANDS: S/WCI AMB. WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES
VZCZCXRO9271 RR RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHTC #0790 2671112 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 231112Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1992 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA 0715 RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0164 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4490
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000790
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL UNGA NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: S/WCI AMB. WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES
SERBIA, KOSOVO, BELARUS
REF: A. THE HAGUE 789
B. THE HAGUE 743
C. SECSTATE 91908
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.5(b,d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000790
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL UNGA NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: S/WCI AMB. WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES
SERBIA, KOSOVO, BELARUS
REF: A. THE HAGUE 789
B. THE HAGUE 743
C. SECSTATE 91908
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.5(b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Williamson explained U.S.
priorities on Serbia, Kosovo, Belarus, and international
tribunals during a September 16 meeting at the Dutch MFA.
(Recent Georgia discussions, including those with Ambassador
Williamson, reported reftel A.) The Dutch will firmly resist
further EU integration overtures to Serbia until it fully
cooperates with the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Dutch will support Serbia's
resolution on Kosovo's independence in the General Committee,
but probably abstain on the measure in the General Assembly
debate. The Dutch see positive developments in Belarus, but
adopt a "wait and see attitude". END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On Serbia, the Dutch position on the integration of
Serbia with the EU is unchanged: Serbia must first fully
cooperate with the ICTY. Williamson spoke with Hugo Klijn,
Head of the Southeast and Eastern Europe Department, Klijn's
deputy Cees Roels, and Peter van der Vliet, chief of the UN
Political and Legal Affairs. Williamson noted that
Washington is pursuing two goals: justice for war criminals
and integration of Serbia with the West. Roels noted Dutch
opposition in the recent GAERC to the majority EU member
states, interest in extending an SAA to Serbia should not be
a surprise -- further overtures will have to wait on the
cooperation of the government of Serbia. FM Verhagen feels
his past efforts to pressure Serbia have been successful
(i.e., Serbia delivered Mr. Karadzic to the ICTY). Moreover,
Serbia is now in a "good position" to deliver the remaining
ICTY indictees. President Tadic is in a strong position, and
the radical parties are in disarray. ICTY Prosecutor
Brammertz has also noted to the Dutch in private that the
Serbs must have know Karadzic's location all along.
3. (C) On Kosovo, the Dutch have shifted their previously
reported position (reftel B) on Serbia's resolution that asks
the ICJ for an advisory opinion on Kosovo's independence.
Van der Vliet said FM Verhagen has decided the Dutch will not
block Serbia's resolution on Kosovo's independence in the
General Committee, but the Dutch will abstain on the measure
in the General Assembly debate unless the EU agrees to oppose
it. (With respect to the General Committee, the Dutch
believe that every Member State should have the right to
present a proposal to UNGA, and consequently, do not want to
use the General Committee to block Member State proposals).
The Dutch found it compelling that Serbia is pursuing a
peaceful, legal recourse and refraining from violence. Roels
added that one group in Kosovo was not concerned about the
prospect of an ICJ ruling, and a group in Serbia suggested a
ruling by the ICJ on independence might provide political
cover to accept the Kosovo situation.
4. (C) On Belarus, Klijn described the existence of a strong
Belarus lobby within the EU, and Belarus, achievement of
certain benchmarks (e.g., release of political prisoners and
"fairish" elections). In particular, Klijn noted that some
EU nations are suggesting a more forward-leaning, favorable
approach to Belarus. GONL, however, is adopting a "wait and
see attitude." Klijn noted that Belarus may join Nicaragua
and Russia in recognizing the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. According to Klijn, the EU position, at this
time, continues to be no official ministerial contacts.
5. (C) Regarding the international tribunals, the Dutch have
agreed to contribute 4.5 million euros to the Special Court
for Sierra Leone during the next three years (2 million this
year; 2 million next year; and 500,000 in 2010). With
respect to the ICC, Van der Vliet raised the issue of a
Security Council deferral of the Prosecutor,s investigation
of Sudanese President Al-Bashir, noting that the United
Kingdom and France have been sending out "feelers" on the
issue and an OIC request for deferral. In particular, Van
der Vliet asked whether there would be a solid P-3 veto.
Williamson responded that the U.S. was unlikely to support
any deferral proposal without some "extraordinary
circumstances." Van der Vliet said the Dutch supported that
approach.
Culbertson
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PREL UNGA NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: S/WCI AMB. WILLIAMSON DISCUSSES
SERBIA, KOSOVO, BELARUS
REF: A. THE HAGUE 789
B. THE HAGUE 743
C. SECSTATE 91908
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.5(b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: S/WCI Ambassador Williamson explained U.S.
priorities on Serbia, Kosovo, Belarus, and international
tribunals during a September 16 meeting at the Dutch MFA.
(Recent Georgia discussions, including those with Ambassador
Williamson, reported reftel A.) The Dutch will firmly resist
further EU integration overtures to Serbia until it fully
cooperates with the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Dutch will support Serbia's
resolution on Kosovo's independence in the General Committee,
but probably abstain on the measure in the General Assembly
debate. The Dutch see positive developments in Belarus, but
adopt a "wait and see attitude". END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On Serbia, the Dutch position on the integration of
Serbia with the EU is unchanged: Serbia must first fully
cooperate with the ICTY. Williamson spoke with Hugo Klijn,
Head of the Southeast and Eastern Europe Department, Klijn's
deputy Cees Roels, and Peter van der Vliet, chief of the UN
Political and Legal Affairs. Williamson noted that
Washington is pursuing two goals: justice for war criminals
and integration of Serbia with the West. Roels noted Dutch
opposition in the recent GAERC to the majority EU member
states, interest in extending an SAA to Serbia should not be
a surprise -- further overtures will have to wait on the
cooperation of the government of Serbia. FM Verhagen feels
his past efforts to pressure Serbia have been successful
(i.e., Serbia delivered Mr. Karadzic to the ICTY). Moreover,
Serbia is now in a "good position" to deliver the remaining
ICTY indictees. President Tadic is in a strong position, and
the radical parties are in disarray. ICTY Prosecutor
Brammertz has also noted to the Dutch in private that the
Serbs must have know Karadzic's location all along.
3. (C) On Kosovo, the Dutch have shifted their previously
reported position (reftel B) on Serbia's resolution that asks
the ICJ for an advisory opinion on Kosovo's independence.
Van der Vliet said FM Verhagen has decided the Dutch will not
block Serbia's resolution on Kosovo's independence in the
General Committee, but the Dutch will abstain on the measure
in the General Assembly debate unless the EU agrees to oppose
it. (With respect to the General Committee, the Dutch
believe that every Member State should have the right to
present a proposal to UNGA, and consequently, do not want to
use the General Committee to block Member State proposals).
The Dutch found it compelling that Serbia is pursuing a
peaceful, legal recourse and refraining from violence. Roels
added that one group in Kosovo was not concerned about the
prospect of an ICJ ruling, and a group in Serbia suggested a
ruling by the ICJ on independence might provide political
cover to accept the Kosovo situation.
4. (C) On Belarus, Klijn described the existence of a strong
Belarus lobby within the EU, and Belarus, achievement of
certain benchmarks (e.g., release of political prisoners and
"fairish" elections). In particular, Klijn noted that some
EU nations are suggesting a more forward-leaning, favorable
approach to Belarus. GONL, however, is adopting a "wait and
see attitude." Klijn noted that Belarus may join Nicaragua
and Russia in recognizing the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. According to Klijn, the EU position, at this
time, continues to be no official ministerial contacts.
5. (C) Regarding the international tribunals, the Dutch have
agreed to contribute 4.5 million euros to the Special Court
for Sierra Leone during the next three years (2 million this
year; 2 million next year; and 500,000 in 2010). With
respect to the ICC, Van der Vliet raised the issue of a
Security Council deferral of the Prosecutor,s investigation
of Sudanese President Al-Bashir, noting that the United
Kingdom and France have been sending out "feelers" on the
issue and an OIC request for deferral. In particular, Van
der Vliet asked whether there would be a solid P-3 veto.
Williamson responded that the U.S. was unlikely to support
any deferral proposal without some "extraordinary
circumstances." Van der Vliet said the Dutch supported that
approach.
Culbertson