Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08THEHAGUE743
2008-09-09 13:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:
NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: UNDECIDED ON UNGA RESOLUTION
VZCZCXRO8541 RR RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHTC #0743 2531339 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 091339Z SEP 08 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1930 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA 0714 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4485
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000743
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: PREL UNGA NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: UNDECIDED ON UNGA RESOLUTION
REF: SECSTATE 91908
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.5(b,d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000743
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: PREL UNGA NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: UNDECIDED ON UNGA RESOLUTION
REF: SECSTATE 91908
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.5(b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch MFA staff are undecided on Serbia's
proposal for an UNGA resolution to ask the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on Kosovo's
independence. They are leaning toward opposing the
resolution, or more likely abstaining, and they will submit
the issue to FM Verhagen for a decision. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Poloff raised reftel points with MFA contacts Peter
van der Vliet, chief for UN political and legal affairs, and
Ard van der Vorst, Coordinator for Political Affairs for the
Western Balkans, in discussions September 2 and 8, as well as
with EU Correspondent Desiree Kopmels on September 9. Legal
Counselor and Deputy Legal Counselor also discussed the issue
with the MFA Legal Adviser on September 3. The Dutch are
weighing the arguments on both sides carefully. On the one
hand, noted Van der Vliet, the Netherlands' special role as
host to the ICJ supports allowing a referral, in support of
the ICJ as an institution. In addition, some are inclined
not to back down from Russian-inspired challenges: opposing
the resolution suggests the West is defensive, and in
particular, is concerned about its legal position in
recognizing Kosovo's independence.
3. (C) On the other hand, Van der Vorst and Van der Vliet
acknowledged that waiting years for an ICJ decision could
defer the West's dreams for Serbia and Kosovo to move ahead
in their political development and beyond the current
political stalemate.
4. (C) Other factors complicate the analysis for the Dutch.
First, there is the prospect of Georgia offering a parallel
resolution referring Russia,s recognition of the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the ICJ. Van
der Vliet asked how Washington would react to such a measure.
(Comment: Van der Vliet left unsaid the arguments on both
sides. The West,s opposing both the Georgian and Serbian
resolutions might be legally consistent but politically
difficult. Alternatively, taking different positions on the
two resolutions would be easy for Russia to criticize. End
comment.) Also reflecting Dutch uncertainty, the MFA Legal
Adviser, whom one would expect to be one of advocates for the
ICJ-support argument, only noted this issue in passing.
Instead, she discussed in more detail that the ICJ could not
reverse the events on the ground, including the fact that a
number of countries had recognized Kosovo. Consequently, an
ICJ opinion, including an ambiguous opinion, provided risks,
but did not necessarily provide any benefits. In contrast,
Van der Vliet suggested that any ICJ decision is likely to be
ambiguous and support both sides. Moreover, in past UNGA
votes on ICJ referrals, the Dutch have taken both sides.
5. (C) Van der Vliet concluded that "it would be difficult to
vote against the resolution," but the Dutch are inclined to
oppose the resolution, or more likely, abstain. Kopmels
thought it highly unlikely the Dutch would do anything but
abstain. France appears to be pushing the EU toward a joint
abstention.
Culbertson
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2018
TAGS: PREL UNGA NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: UNDECIDED ON UNGA RESOLUTION
REF: SECSTATE 91908
Classified By: Political-Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.5(b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Dutch MFA staff are undecided on Serbia's
proposal for an UNGA resolution to ask the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on Kosovo's
independence. They are leaning toward opposing the
resolution, or more likely abstaining, and they will submit
the issue to FM Verhagen for a decision. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Poloff raised reftel points with MFA contacts Peter
van der Vliet, chief for UN political and legal affairs, and
Ard van der Vorst, Coordinator for Political Affairs for the
Western Balkans, in discussions September 2 and 8, as well as
with EU Correspondent Desiree Kopmels on September 9. Legal
Counselor and Deputy Legal Counselor also discussed the issue
with the MFA Legal Adviser on September 3. The Dutch are
weighing the arguments on both sides carefully. On the one
hand, noted Van der Vliet, the Netherlands' special role as
host to the ICJ supports allowing a referral, in support of
the ICJ as an institution. In addition, some are inclined
not to back down from Russian-inspired challenges: opposing
the resolution suggests the West is defensive, and in
particular, is concerned about its legal position in
recognizing Kosovo's independence.
3. (C) On the other hand, Van der Vorst and Van der Vliet
acknowledged that waiting years for an ICJ decision could
defer the West's dreams for Serbia and Kosovo to move ahead
in their political development and beyond the current
political stalemate.
4. (C) Other factors complicate the analysis for the Dutch.
First, there is the prospect of Georgia offering a parallel
resolution referring Russia,s recognition of the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia to the ICJ. Van
der Vliet asked how Washington would react to such a measure.
(Comment: Van der Vliet left unsaid the arguments on both
sides. The West,s opposing both the Georgian and Serbian
resolutions might be legally consistent but politically
difficult. Alternatively, taking different positions on the
two resolutions would be easy for Russia to criticize. End
comment.) Also reflecting Dutch uncertainty, the MFA Legal
Adviser, whom one would expect to be one of advocates for the
ICJ-support argument, only noted this issue in passing.
Instead, she discussed in more detail that the ICJ could not
reverse the events on the ground, including the fact that a
number of countries had recognized Kosovo. Consequently, an
ICJ opinion, including an ambiguous opinion, provided risks,
but did not necessarily provide any benefits. In contrast,
Van der Vliet suggested that any ICJ decision is likely to be
ambiguous and support both sides. Moreover, in past UNGA
votes on ICJ referrals, the Dutch have taken both sides.
5. (C) Van der Vliet concluded that "it would be difficult to
vote against the resolution," but the Dutch are inclined to
oppose the resolution, or more likely, abstain. Kopmels
thought it highly unlikely the Dutch would do anything but
abstain. France appears to be pushing the EU toward a joint
abstention.
Culbertson