CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): PARIS SEMINAR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000419 SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) NSC FOR SMITH WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC FR SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): PARIS SEMINAR 25-26 MARCH 2008: THE NEW CHALLENGES OF CHEMICAL PROLIFERATION - POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE OPCW REF: A. STATE 017328 ¶B. STATE 29828 This is CWC-19-08. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (U) The French Ministry of Defense through its Delegation for Strategic Affairs and its Foundation for Strategic Research sponsored a seminar limited to Australia Group members plus China and Russia March 25 and 26 at the Ecole Militaire in Paris. The seminar was held to provide background information for the upcoming Chemical Weapons Convention Second Review Conference (CWC Second RevCon) in relation to the current threat presented by chemical stockpiles, how the CWC regime can take into account scientific and technological developments, and the emergence of non-state actors in the context of globalization. About 100 persons attended, representing 26 countries and 3 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The conference was opened with a speech by Rogelio Pfirter, the Director-General of the OPCW, and closed with comments by Ambassador Lyn Parker of the UK, Chairman of the OEWG for the CWC Second RevCon. ¶2. (U) In sum, the presentations and the discussions concluded that the existing chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles do not present a CW warfare threat, and advances in science and technology likely do not presage initiatives by States to develop new chemical weapons. The likelihood of non-state actors being involved in CW developments based on advances in science and technology was considered remote, although it was still considered important for the OPCW to stay abreast of developments. However, the interest by non-state actors in the use of industrial chemicals and chemical products for terrorist actions was considered real. CEFIC, the European chemical industry interest group, has initiated activities to identify chemicals and chemical products with threat potential. It was noted that the chemical industry is moving into developing countries. The last decade has seen about a 10% production shift from traditional producing countries primarily to West and East Asia. Changes to the CWC in light of 
developments were considered unnecessary, and the view was expressed that the CWC in its current form provided the tools to deal with challenges, including terrorism. ¶3. (U) The U.S. delegation, led by Ambassador Eric M. Javits, included Don Clagett, Brian L'Italien, Abigail Robinson and Sarah Rodjom. The following paragraphs abstract the formal presentations and the subsequent question and answer sessions. -------------- OPENING OF THE SEMINAR -------------- ¶4. (U) In his opening statement, Mr. Michel Miraillet (Director of Strategic Affairs for the French MOD) indicated that the OPCW has made much progress in 10 years, but new developments have occurred including the importance of non-state actors and the necessity for the future focus of the OPCW to be on nonproliferation issues. He said France wanted to reinforce the effectiveness of the tools available to the OPCW. ¶5. (U) Director-General Rogelio Pfirter noted that currently, 36% of declared CW stockpiles have been destroyed under OPCW supervision, but that 2012 is approaching and that the U.S. and Russia must commit all possible resources to meet this 100% destruction deadline. He said that if there is evidence "near to 2012" that the deadline will not be met, that an "extraordinary conference" could be convened. He concurred with Mr. Miraillet that nonproliferation will be the future of the OPCW, that much has changed in the ten years of OPCW existence, to include terrorist threats, science and technology advances, biotechnology applications in the chemical industry, incapacitating agent developments, among others. Particularly related to incapacitating agents, he stressed the use of the General Purpose Criterion, as it covers all toxic chemicals and not just Schedule 1 chemicals. And finally, he said that it is critical that the 12 countries still not States Parties to the CWC should accede without delay. He named as examples North Korea, Myanmar, Israel and Syria. -------------- ASSESSING THE THREAT OF CW USE TODAY -------------- ¶6. (U) Securing the Chemical Weapons Stockpiles and Verification by the OPCW. Mr. Dominique Anelli, head of the OPCW's Chemical Demilitarization Branch, presented background information on the progress of CW and CWPF destruction and conversion (One CWPF to be destroyed in India and three to be converted )one in Russia and two in Libya). He noted 16 of 37 CWSFs remain. He digressed to Article VII issues noting that only 79 of 183 States Parties have complete implementing legislation. When asked whether industry inspections as currently executed were able to recognize new technological threats, Mr Anelli said that inspections are limited to facilities using scheduled chemicals and that the schedules needed to be "updated," or failing that, the general purpose criterion needs to be reinforced. He added that perhaps the Second RevCon might find suitable language. ¶7. (U) Possibility of Non-Declared Chemical Weapons States Parties to the Convention. Richard Guthrie of CBW Events noted that there have been wild claims of States currently possessing active CW capability. For example report by Noaber (ed: Noaber Foundation, Lunteren, The Netherlands) indicated that seventeen States had such a capability, implying that five States Parties are in violation of the CWC. Guthrie further noted while cheating on CWC obligations is possible, it is improbable in that it is cheap to comply and expensive to cheat. He noted that no State Party has an overt CW program. Still one must be alert to three cheating scenarios: undeclared past CW possession, undeclared current CW possession and undeclared future possession. Any confirmed cheating detection would need to be dealt with at the highest levels. ¶8. (U) In sum, he concluded that CW is no longer a currency of power, accession to the CWC reduces inclination to cheat, wild claims are counterproductive, and use of CW possession accusations for short term political gain must be measured against effects on long term global security. In response to the observation that NGOs primarily based in the developed world are viewed with suspicion by the developing world, Mr Guthrie said that some NGOs are working to broaden their base and are assisting growth of related NGOs in the developing world. ¶9. (U) Chemical Threat represented by States not Party to the Convention. Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, Director of the Pugwash Geneva Office, observed that the threat of use of CW in the traditional sense has declined and that threats of use of toxic chemicals by terrorists have increased. An additional threat lies in the fact that 12 States are still not party to the CWC (5 have signed but not ratified: Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Guinea-Bissau, Israel and Myanmar) and 7 have not even signed (Angola, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Syria). In judging the CW threats posed by States Not Party, factors to be considered include reported use of CW in the past; manifested interest in CW and available industrial capability, and positions taken in relation to the CWC and the Geneva Protocol of ¶1925. ¶10. (U) Applying these criteria, the Bahamas, Dominican Republic and Guinea Bissau present only illegal chemical trafficking threats. Myanmar has pharmaceutical and fertilizer industries, is alleged to have interest in CW and thus may present a certain chemical threat. Israel is widely perceived to have CW know-how and industrial capability, has an excellent WMD protection system, but has decided against CWC ratification. However, there are no indications that it has any intention of creating a CW arsenal or has the need to use CW in a military conflict. Iraq and Lebanon have had active contacts with the OPCW and are moving toward accession to the CWC. In Somalia, which is in a continual crisis, traditional CW threats are low, while the threat of use of toxic substances by terrorists is high. Angola is developing its chemical potential, but presents little threat. ¶11. (U) Syria and Egypt are on record against joining the CWC, citing Israel's nuclear threat and Israel's reluctance to join the CWC. Egypt has been reported in the past to have used CW and to have had an active CW program, so there are reasons to suspect some sort of chemical threat in the regional context. North Korea is widely assumed to have CW capability, but little reliable information exists. Amb Batsanov suggested that the situations of all these States not Party are different, and that tailored strategies should therefore be used to encourage them to accede to the CWC. Amb Batsanov was queried as to what tailored strategies to encourage ratification of the CWC might entail. He responded that tailoring might contain the following elements: doing serious work to understand the countries' problems; determining what is possible to attain in the short to mid-term period; identifying political forces; understanding the financial forces; determining the assistance needed; and getting attention at the highest levels in the countries in question. Mr Guthrie added that consideration of domestic politics is very important. -------------- -------------- POSSIBILITIES FOR THE CWC VERIFICATION REGIME TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS -------------- -------------- ¶12. (U) The Dual Use Problem and Technical Changes: Chemical Research Laboratories, Misuse, and the General Purpose Criterion. Dr. John R. Walker of the UK Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (Foreign and Commonwealth Office),indicated that declared Schedule 1 laboratories pose negligible threats, and of the various laboratories conducting research activities in academia, chemical industry and the pharmaceutical industry, the smaller laboratories posed the greatest risk for toxic chemical and technology diversion, particularly to terrorist groups. Necessary controls need to be put in place, and the types of controls will in part be dependent on the terrorist threat. These might include promulgation of rules and regulations in relation to documentation, access to facilities, accounting for equipment and chemicals, physical security training and supervision. Implementation of rules and regulations must include consideration of the general purpose criterion of the CWC. Dr Walker was asked about whether challenge inspection would be useful against rogue laboratories to which he replied that it would. ¶13. (U) Which Are Presently the Most Sensitive Technological Fields, and What Potential Risks Could Result from Convergence between Chemistry and Biology? Professor Jean-Claude Tabet (Pierre and Marie Curie University, Department of Structural Chemistry and Biology) outlined the scientific and technological area that might pose risks to the CWC: accelerated chemical and drug discovery processes; nanoscience and technology; advances in production technologies; advances in delivery systems; bioengineering; and the convergence of chemical and biological science and technologies. All of the above can be considered building blocks for the development of new chemical and biological agents. Professor Tabet stated his view that, of these, nanotechnology poses the greatest threat, but that in any case the threats are real now. It was pointed out that there is likely to be a rather large time gap between discovery of a new technology and its weaponization. Professor Tabet agreed and said that "now" could be as long as 10 years in the future. ¶14. (U) What Fair and Effective Controls Could Be Implemented to Further Strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Regime? Emmanuel Sartorius (HFDS, French Ministry of Economics, Finance and Employment) reviewed the experiences of France with the OPCW Article VI verification regime for Schedule 2, Schedule 3 and OCPF facilities during the past 10 years. He noted that so far, France has received 53 inspections (32 Schedule 2, 11 Schedule 3 and 10 OCPF). He observed that the emphasis on Schedule 2 inspections may not be deserved as, in his opinion, the relevance of the Schedule 3 and OCPF sites to the interests of the Convention was about the same. He noted France was concerned that advances in science and technology such as movement of industry to developing countries, the biological- chemical technological convergence, microreactor production technologies and modern process controls might not be taken into account by the OPCW. He further noted that the OPCW had not yet observed noncompliance and asked whether this was because there had been no noncompliance, or because the verification regime was not capable of detecting noncompliance. ¶15. (U) Sartorius suggested that the verification regime could be strengthened by: improved declarations (quality control, frequency of updates, nil declarations as appropriate); improving the Technical Secretariat's efficiency (enhanced declaration analysis and feedback to States Parties; declarations of OCPFs to contain more activity information such as multipurpose/dedicated, continuous/batch, linkage between government and industry); increased numbers of industry inspections; increased numbers of OCPF inspection with concomitant reduction in Schedule 2 inspections; improved geographic distribution of inspections; improved selection of plant sites for inspection (taking into account quality of information in the declaration, prior inspection information, level of State Party cooperation, technical changes in the plant site, use of relevant open source data); reduced costs of inspection by reducing inspection team sizes; and adapting inspection procedures to account for advances in science and technology including microreactors, biotechnology and advice of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). ¶16. (U) Sartorius noted that sampling and analysis should be employed only where needed, and as required beyond Schedule 2 facilities to include Schedule 3 facilities and OCPFs. Sampling should be done at valid sample points, and there should be an operational mode between open and blinded modes. Further, sampling and analysis should include quantification, and sampling and analysis equipment should be modernized. Mr Sartorius suggested that the Verification Division should be augmented by a Documentation Center whose role would be to locate information from open sources to augment declared information of plant sites and track developments in science and technology. He hoped that the Second RevCon would take his points into account. It was observed that changes in Technical Secretariat structure would require financial and organizational means. The importance of the SAB in addressing advances in science and technology was generally supported. And it was pointed out that use of open source information could have difficulty finding political support, but that additional information would be a valuable resource to the Technical Secretariat for improving the efficiency of the inspection regimes. ¶17. (U) The Importance of Taking into Account Non- State Actors. Mr. Claude Wachtel, of the French Secretary General's Office of National Defense, noted that terrorist attacks using chemicals, whether the Tokyo attack of 1995 or the chlorine attacks in Iraq have been crude and non-optimized. However, the scenarios are different, and this creates the problem of how to prepare for an attack with an effective security plan. There is the risk of overestimation. Balance is required. With non-state actors we are facing a very wide range of chemical possibilities, blurred boundaries between terrorism and crime which might be motivated by maliciousness, vengeance, rebellion against society, and criminal intent. The spread of knowledge is also a problem, and the availability of skilled technician and high-level scientists for recruitment by non-state actors increases the threat. Thus, involvement of non-state actors creates complexity and uncertainty for which, to date, there is no easy solution. As a suffix to other comments suggesting OPCW involvement in anti- terrorism activities, Amb. Javits commented that the OPCW cannot go beyond the tools provided by the CWC and that the Second RevCon can address how to apply these tools, one of the most potent of which is investigation of alleged use. ¶18. (U) Mapping of New Flows Involving Chemical Products. Mr. Neil Harvey (Head International Trade, UK Industries Association) presented background information on the chemical industry that was collected by CEFIC, the European chemical industry trade organization, that was current as of 2006. He noted that the chemical industry in the EU alone produced over 30,000 products that fell into 4 groups: basic (42.7%),pharmaceuticals (27.9%), specialties (19.2% and consumer (10.2%). Of these, the specialty chemicals would offer the best resources for terrorist chemical activities although consumer products are, of course, more readily available. World wide, $1.6 trillion worth of chemicals were produced in 2006. The relative values of production globally are: Asia (33%),EU (29%), NAFTA (25%),Eastern Europe (5%),Latin America (5%), Others (2%). These figures include a shift of approximately 10% in production from the EU and NAFTA mainly to Asia in the past decade, which is likely to continue, as GDP growth is the driver for chemical industry investment. ¶19. (U) Mr. Harvey noted his concern that illicit chemical activities might be promoted in the increasing numbers of available closed chemical facilities in the Western World. In response to questions about what industry was doing to fight terrorism, Harvey said CEFIC had initiated a program to identify consumer chemical products that might find use in chemical devices and will seek to find ways of reformulating these products to reduce their potential. He also noted that the International Association of Chemical Industries had promoted the idea of knowing your customer before you sell or ship chemicals, and that it is promoting membership to countries in the developing world. (U) Use of Chemical Products as Devices for Non- Conventional Terrorism. Mr. Brian L'Italien (Intelligence Officer, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency),focused on terrorist organizations' interest in poisons and chemical warfare, particularly by Islamic extremist groups in Iraq. He noted that the terrorists tend to rely on conventional explosives for attacks due to their easy accessibility, familiarity, ease of use and perhaps, less perceived population backlash against the use of conventional rather than chemical devices. Various groups have shared information on CBRN over the Internet. Open press reporting cites ten attacks (including attacks on Coalition Forces) in Iraq since October 2006 that involved chlorine, an industrial chemical. The last reported chlorine attack occurred in July 2007. Few people were killed by the chlorine, but the attacks received extensive publicity. There have been no reported chlorine attacks in Afghanistan. The terrorists have not re-initiated chlorine attacks. ¶20. (U) Terrorists have evidenced interest in traditional CW, especially in Iraqi pre-1991 legacy munitions. There has been some evidence of interest in homemade CW, as evidenced by captured documents in Afghanistan. However, it is seen as unlikely that toxic chemicals and or CW agents will be widely used by terrorists and that conventional explosives will continue to be the weapons of choice. In response to a question about the threat recovered Iraqi CW munitions posed to Coalition Forces, L'Italien noted that their psychological impact was likely to be far greater than their lethal effects. -------------- CLOSING REMARKS -------------- ¶21. (U) UK Ambassador Lyn Parker, Chairman of the Open Ended Working Group for Preparation of the Review Conference, indicated that preparations by the OEWG for the Second RevCon had been ongoing for one and one-half years with a goal to provide a draft report document with clearly delineated texts, parts of which had received consensus and some of which would continue to be debated. This process had proved difficult. Amb. Parker said that this was perhaps due to the OPCW being in a transitional period in which CW destruction is moving towards completion and nonproliferation is becoming more the focus of the Organization. In spite of changes that have occurred since entry into force of the Convention, particularly developments in science and technology and changes in industry, he noted that the Second RevCon was unlikely to pursue significant initiatives, but would more probably recognize what the OPCW has achieved and consolidate what has been accomplished. ¶22. (U) Ambassador Jean-Michel Gaussot, Permanent Representative of France to the OPCW, said that the OPCW had made significant progress since its inception, but not all goals had been achieved. In his view, remaining goals included completion of CW destruction; universal adherence to the CWC; full implementation of Article VII obligations by all States Parties; achieving an efficient and improved verification system with increased emphasis on OCPFs (and even the possible installation of a Documentation Center with open source responsibilities); better coordination with the UN in relation to terrorism; and response to the new developments in science and technology. These are all challenges for the Second RevCon. ¶23. (U) Javits sends. Gallagher