NETHERLANDS/GAERC: FLEXIBILITY ON SERBIA SAA/ICTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000372 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018 TAGS: PREL EU XF ZL NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/GAERC: FLEXIBILITY ON SERBIA SAA/ICTY CONDITIONALITY REF: A. STATE 43742 ¶B. GIAUQUE GAERC EMAIL 4/21/08 ¶C. THE HAGUE 355 ¶D. FALLS-GIAUQUE EMAIL 4/22/08 THE HAGUE 00000372 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.5(b ) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On April 22, Charge d'Affaires reviewed ref B points on the Middle East with Baroness van Lynden-Leijten, Dutch MFA Director for Middle East and North Africa Affairs, and her deputy, Gert Heijkoop. Also on April 22, 2008 POLOFF delivered ref B points to Dutch MFA EU Correspondent Desiree Kopmels and other key contacts. The Dutch reaction on Iran was discussed in reftel C. FM Verhagen's pre-GAERC overview letter to the Dutch parliament was reported in ref ¶D. ¶2. (C) On the Balkans, the Dutch are willing to look at "creative" solutions to reach out to Serbia (para 3-5). Regarding the Middle East, the Dutch would encourage and support a trip by Solana to Baghdad (para 6-7). Paragraph 8 reviews Dutch concerns on Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe. END SUMMARY. Balkans -------------- ¶3. (C) In an April 23 briefing for allied nations, Deputy EU Correspondent Rochus Pronk repeated that FM Verhagen is open to "creative solutions" but remains firmly opposed to signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia until it cooperates with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, on March 24, the parliament gave Verhagen leeway to negotiate. The opposition put forward a motion to require him to oppose an SAA signature, but the proposal was defeated by the ruling coalition. (Comment: Prospects for Dutch flexibility are offset by the ICTY prosecutor Brammertz's recent statement that Serbia is not cooperating, and by past Verhagen statements requiring Serbian cooperation before approving an SAA.) ¶4. (C) On Kosovo, the Dutch remain concerned about developments in northern Kosovo and want the GOK and EULEX to show authority in the area. The Dutch want EULEX to deploy as quickly as possible. The Serb proposal for local elections creates the prospect of a de facto partition. ¶5. (C) Bosnia may not be discussed at the GAERC. The Dutch see signing of the police reform measure important, but further integration is needed. The Dutch are undecided on signing an SAA with Bosnia given Brammertz's description of ICTY cooperation as only "satisfactory." Middle East -------------- ¶6. (C) In her April 22 discussion with the Charge, MFA Director for the Middle East Van Lynden-Leijten said the Dutch are looking for "ways and means" to support Iraq, which they currently offer with military and diplomatic training. The Dutch would encourage and support a trip by Solana to Baghdad. The Dutch want the Iraqis themselves to be stronger. On the Middle East peace process, Van Lynden-Leijten inquired about U.S. visits to the region in support of a peace agreement. She would like to believe the "closed door sessions mean there's progress." FM Verhagen will visit Israel in May for the 60th anniversary of bilateral relations. The Dutch continue actively engaging with funding and development support to Palestine. On Syria and Lebanon, Van Lynden-Leijten indicated the FM encouraged the Syrians to be constructive during his visit to THE HAGUE 00000372 002.2 OF 002 Damascus. There are not positive signs coming out of Syria, but it's good to keep the door open to dialogue. Van Lynden-Leijten's Deputy, Gert Heijkoop, noted that there is speculation that Lebanon will operate without a president until parliamentary elections in 2009. "The government doesn't do much but pay debt anyway." The Dutch continue to support good governance programs for Lebanon, and participated in UNIFIL. ¶7. (C) On April 23, Pronk said that the EU should continue supporting the Annapolis process for a Middle East peace agreement, but there are no recent positive developments. On Iraq, the Dutch see positive signs in the push to end criminal and sectarian violence. The Dutch support EU funding to assist refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. The Dutch will continue to raise the human rights situation in Iraq, especially the plight of women and minorities. Pronk said it was his personal opinion, but he saw no reason that Solana should not visit Baghdad. Other regions -------------- ¶8. (C) Pronk also made the following points in his April 23 briefing: -- Afghanistan: Afghanistan is not on the agenda but the Dutch will express concern about the GOA Supreme Court's approval of 100 death sentences. -- Burma: the EU should continue pressure on the regime with demarches and sanctions -- the GOB's proposed elections and constitution do not lessen Dutch concern. The Dutch remain concerned also about restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi. The Dutch want to go further than the EU's October 2007 sanctions and include oil and gas on the sanctions list, but there is "not a lot of support for that." The Dutch expect the EU to expand the number of companies and individuals subject to the asset freeze. -- Pakistan: the Dutch believe the EU policy from 2007 is "still valid" as it emphasizes human rights, counter terrorism efforts, and regional cooperation. The Dutch look forward to working with the GOP. -- Uzbekistan: the Dutch support ending the suspension of sanctions. The Dutch human rights ambassador is critical of the current situation in Uzbekistan. The Dutch do not see sufficient improvements to support ending sanctions or continuing the suspension. -- Zimbabwe: the Dutch support condemning Zimbabwe and bring in election observers for the next election. The election process was not credible. The results of the mediation by the South Africa Development Community are disappointing, but a solution to the crisis "should have an African mark on it." Gallagher