CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SECOND REVIEW

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000349 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS) NSC FOR SMITH WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE A MODEST SUCCESS REF: A. STATE 34977 (REVCON GUIDANCE) ¶B. STATE 17328 (REVCON OBJECTIVES AND REDLINES) This is CWC-16-08. ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The Second Special Conference to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (RevCon),after difficult and protracted negotiations, adopted a 152-paragraph substantive report reviewing all aspects of the Convention and setting the course for the future. The key U.S. objectives were minimally met, and none of our redlines were crossed. There was far less pressure with respect to U.S. chemical weapons (CW) destruction than expected; the final text merely expresses concern and calls upon all CW possessor States Parties (SPs) to destroy their stockpiles within their extended deadlines. Success needs to be measured in what is not/not in the report; much effort was expended by western delegations in keeping new initiatives on victims of CW, international cooperation, and corresponding budget increases out of the document. The U.S. delegation kept language on incapacitants out of the report, and only allowed the Convention language on Riot Control Agents (RCAs). The process was complicated by extremely inept chairmanship in the Committee of the Whole, as well as the obdurate positions and brinksmanlike negotiating tactics of a few delegations, most notably Iran and, to a lesser extent, India. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) PARTICIPANTS: Of the CWC's 183 States Parties, 114 participated in the Review Conference, signaling the strong support for the Convention that has grown progressively in its eleven-year life. During the Review Conference's opening days, 45 states spoke during the General Debate, in addition to collective statements on behalf of the European Union (EU) and associated states, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and China, the African Group, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),and a separate statement from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. ¶3. (U) THE FINAL DOCUMENT PROCESS: The Final Report includes 152 substantive paragraphs, addressing the overall Operation of the Convention and setting out objectives for the coming years. It was based on a draft document developed over the course of a year in an Open-Ended Working Group, chaired by Ambassador Lyn Parker (UK),in which Western delegations participated more actively and substantively than did NAM delegations. While this should have facilitated a smooth and quick process for resolving issues within the two week span of the Review Conference, the arrival of fully formulated NAM positions just before the RevCon (and, indeed, the very existence of a NAM coordinated proposal),supplemented by the more radical national positions of Iran and a handful of others, significantly raised the number of unresolved issues and the general polarization of the Conference. This, coupled with a Committee of the Whole Chairman (Amb. Benchaa Dani, Algeria) who was neither familiar with the draft document nor capable of inducing diverse views into a compromise product, made for a slow negotiating process that did not yield compromise text. ¶4. (U) After two readings in the Committee of the Whole, with an unwieldy document containing numerous counter- proposals and bracketed text, Amb. Dani turned, too late in the process, to five facilitators for help. Although the products of facilitation were useful, it was too little, too late. The facilitation groups lasted only half a day (the afternoon of April 16) before a rescue operation was set up consisting of 18 delegations invited by the Conference Chairman (Amb. Waleed El Khereiji, Saudi Arabia),initially without the knowledge of other delegations, to begin the tedious process of turning the heavily-bracketed text into a consensus document. That small friends of the chair group met continuously for 48 hours with one short nap break, while the Committee of the Whole continued its work on the introductory part of the report. El Khereiji took charge of the drafting group and pulled the text out of the ashes toward a final product. ¶5. (U) However, the lack of transparency (other delegations were not informed of the membership of the friends of the chair group, were unclear about the schedule, and worried -- correctly -- that they would be forced to accept a document without discussion) led to growing resentment among other delegations and sharp formal statements about the process in the final plenary meeting. Southeast Asian states were particularly unhappy, as they were not represented in the gang of 18. ¶4. (SBU) U.S. OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS: U.S. Del, led by Ambassador Javits and ISN/CB Director Mikulak, was successful in protecting U.S. redlines and achieving overall U.S. objectives, including: reinforcing commitment to the Convention's objectives; broadening understanding of the comprehensive nature of the Convention (the General Purpose Criterion); reinforcing the importance of compliance with Treaty commitments, and of the CWC's compliance mechanisms, including challenge inspection; reinforcing the call to meet national implementation (Article VII) obligations; laying the groundwork in a number of areas for evolution of the OPCW to more capably address its mounting nonproliferation objectives. The overall document held to our bottom line that the second RevCon not walk back from the 2003 report. Del was successful in tempering language calling for destruction by possessor states within deadlines, deflecting language on incapacitating agents, and in preventing NAM efforts to establish action plans on assistance and protection (Article X) and international cooperation (Article XI). The document instead contains extensive, redundant (but not particularly problematic) hortatory passages on these two NAM hobby horses. ¶5. (SBU) CONFERENCE DYNAMICS: Most, if not all, delegations approached the Review Conference with a seriousness of purpose and a clear desire for a success, evidenced in a willingness to work the text, and seek compromise, consensus outcomes. Unsurprisingly, Iran was particularly difficult, even duplicitous, in its negotiating tactics. However, Iran did not push some of its more troublesome agendas (assistance to CW victims; efforts to undermine the legitimacy of export controls) as aggressively as expected, and seemed motivated mainly by knee-jerk opposition to Western (especially U.S.) proposals and a desire to be seen as a key player in the negotiations, on par with the U.S., China, and other powers. The Iranians clearly demonstrated, particularly to their fellow NAM delegations, in both the small drafting group and the Committee of the Whole that they were the single biggest barrier to a constructive outcome. The Cuban Ambassador, who chairs the NAM, was far more constructive than Iran in final negotiations. (Del comment: Iran may find it more difficult in future to hijack the NAM for its own agenda. This would be a positive outcome for future negotiations.) ¶6. (SBU) India, Pakistan, and South Africa were also troublesome throughout. India, in particular, took inflexible, dogmatic stances that appear to be motivated by a desire to freeze the CWC verification regime in its current form to protect Indian industry, only yielding in the last hours. Del worked well and cooperatively with the EU, other Western Allies, and moderate NAM delegations. China played a quiet and relatively constructive role. Russia was supportive on national implementation but appeared to have no particular agenda other than avoiding criticism of their CW destruction efforts. ¶7. (SBU) WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? The Review Conference launched no new initiatives and stayed the current successful course of the OPCW. There are affirmations and statements in the final report that could be used to advance U.S. objectives in the OPCW. The report could just as easily gather dust, however. What matters now is a diligent, ongoing effort to use these key references as leverage to advance our goals. ¶8. (U) Javits sends. Gallagher