U.S.-ISRAEL JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM GROUP (JCG)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000941 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PTER IS IR SY LE EG JO IZ SUBJECT: U.S.-ISRAEL JOINT COUNTERTERRORISM GROUP (JCG) MEETING FOCUSES ON HAMAS AND GLOBAL JIHAD Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons 1.4(B) and (D). ¶1. (S) Summary: On February 26, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) hosted the latest meeting of the U.S.-Israel JCG. State S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Dell Dailey led the interagency U.S. delegation. The two sides discussed the spread of Islamic extremism and changing regional threats, from Hamas to what the GOI characterized as Global Jihad. End Summary. -------------- "The Global Jihad" -------------- ¶2. (C) In a 26 February meeting of the Israel-U.S. JCG with Ambassador Dell Dailey, GOI intelligence official Nina Shemesh provided analysis on what she termed the Global Jihad, the collaborative movement of terrorist organizations, including al-Qaeda, which poses several significant regional threats. She reported that al-Qaeda (AQ) elements specifically are increasingly interested in securing strongholds within the Middle East region, and listed the challenges being posed in several countries. ¶3. (C) Lebanon and Syria. Shemesh described Lebanon as one of AQ's new and developing arenas outside of Iraq. She noted that while AQ has not yet established a significant presence in Lebanon, there is extensive cooperation between AQ and groups in Syria, "the backyard of Lebanon." She claimed that these groups have developed safehouse networks comprising multi-national fighters that funnel foreign terrorists into Iraq. According to Shemesh, these networks have the potential to destabilize Syria itself, and their recent decline in numbers may be due to crackdowns by the Syrian regime. ¶4. (C) Iraq. Shemesh reported that Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the new head of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),is not as prominent nor as successful as his predecessor, Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi. Al-Masri has not been able to unify Sunni elements, nor access all of AQI's funds, Shemesh said. She emphasized that that AQI is now at its weakest point since Zarqawi's death, and that it has been driven from the Sunni triangle to Kurdish areas in the north. ¶5. (C) Egypt and Jordan. Shemesh listed three sectors of terrorist elements in Egypt: 1) grassroots jihadist elements with no established AQ contacts; 2) local elements in and around the Sinai that have contact with local AQ affiliates; 3) AQ elements with strong, established direct contacts to AQ leadership. While she emphasized that the terrorist infrastructure in Egypt is not what it once was, she added that it is increasingly difficult for the Egyptian security services to penetrate remaining cells, particularly in the Sinai region. She also warned that these groups seem to be able to transition from logistical support to the operational mode very quickly. By contrast, she claimed that Jordan has served primarily as a terrorist "transit state," with little operational planning going on within its borders. It also remains a target for terrorist attacks. ¶6. (S) Gulf States. Shemesh reported that the Gulf States continue to be a priority target for AQ. She noted the 2007 arrest of hundreds of AQ elements in Saudi Arabia as evidence of increasing SAG concern. Many of those arrested, Shemesh said, were part of an infrastructure built up by Pakistani supporters and financiers. Shemesh highlighted Kuwait as a recruiting point for fighters being sent to Iraq and Afghanistan. She juxtaposed Kuwaiti efforts to this end with Yemeni groups, which are sending fighters to Iraq with the intention of bringing them back to Yemen better-trained and able to participate in local insurgency efforts. -------------- THE GROWING HAMAS THREAT -------------- ¶7. (S) Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI) Captain Yair Samban provided the JCG with an analysis of Hamas Gaza operations as one of the main threats to the Israeli home front. He identified Hamas as a growing threat, and reported that current arms smuggling operations are unprecedented in their scale. In the past year Hamas smuggled in 60 tons of weapons, up from 17 tons the previous year. These weapons include arms, explosives, as well as anti-tank rockets. Samban noted that the simplicity of these arms makes them more difficult to target. He reported that clans of Sinai Bedouin, often with ties to influential families in Gaza, are frequently contracted by AQ and Hamas to dig tunnels for smuggling these weapons across the border. TEL AVIV 00000941 002 OF 002 ¶8. (S) Samban stressed that the threat emerging from Gaza has dramatically increased since the breach of the Israel-Egypt border on January 23. During the breach, more rockets with longer ranges were brought into Gaza, fortifying Hamas and enabling the organization both to escalate violent attacks much more quickly, and potentially to sustain incoming fire for longer periods of time. Most significantly, Samban warned that Hamas may now have the ability to raise what he called a "guerrilla army." GOI Counterterrorism Bureau Chief Nitzan Nuriel speculated that it is now "just a matter of time" before the IDF enters Gaza to destroy the Hamas terrorist infrastructure. He acknowledged that while there are well-drawn plans for accomplishing this objective, questions remain about how to execute an exit strategy. ¶9. (C) Ambassador Dailey asked the Israelis why they have not supported recommendations that the Egyptian government provide additional border guards on the Gaza border. Einat Schlein-Michael of the Israeli Embassy to Washington replied that the GOE already has 1400 police and border guards on the border, but that the lack is in political will to secure it. Schlein-Michael added that requests to increase the number of border guards is seen by the GOI as trying to erode the annex to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, and advised that the GOI would prefer to see the GOE do more with "existing resources." -------------- HIZBALLAH -------------- ¶10. (C) Regarding Hizballah, Samban noted that while UNIFIL troops are active and searching for weapons, UNSCR 1701 has been only partially implemented and Hizballah has continued to operate south of the Litani River. These operations include moving and hiding weapons caches, working to build underground storage facilities, and collecting intelligence, Samban said. He added that Hizballah continues to receive nighttime arms deliveries from the Syrian border, in part because UNIFIL does not coordinate with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the border security apparatus is not sufficient to stop smuggling. According to Samban, Hizballah actively solicits and has succeeded in gaining Lebanese Armed Forces' cooperation in concealing weapons. He suggested that Hizballah aspires to have a force of 12,000 troops south of the Litani River, and 8,000 troops north of it prepared for any combat situation. ¶11. (SBU) Attendance for both delegations: USG: Ambassador Dell Dailey, Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Richard Jones Reginald King, NCTC, Middle East Branch Chief Fred Bunke, Department of Homeland Security Michael Jakub, State S/CT Patrick Worman, State S/CT Marc Sievers, Embassy Tel Aviv, Political Counselor Lauren Gottlieb, Embassy Tel Aviv, Political Officer GOI: Ambassador Miriam Ziv, Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs, MFA Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Nitzan Nuriel, Head, Counterterrorism Bureau, Israeli NSC Eliezer Rozenbaum, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Public Security Daniel Taub, Senior Deputy Legal Advisor, MFA Reuven Azar, Director, Palestinian and Economic Affairs, Center for Political Research, MFA David Roet, Director, North America Department II, MFA Oded Joseph, Director, Coordination Division, MFA Nina Shemesh, Prime Minister's Office Captain Yair Samban, Israeli Defense Intelligence Einat Schlein-Michael, Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Israel, Washington Ariel Shafransky, Deputy Director, Counterterrorism, Strategic Affairs Division, MFA Roy Dvir, North America Department I, MFA ¶12. (U) Ambassador Dailey has cleared this message. 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