BLUE LANTERN FOLLOW UP ON RDT EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS

UNCLAS TEL AVIV 000792 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR PM/DTCC (BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR, STITZIEL) STATE FOR NEA/IPA (PECCIA) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ETTC KOMC IS SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN FOLLOW UP ON RDT EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS REF: A) TEL AVIV 481 B) STITZIEL-KEAYS 3/6/08 E-MAIL C) STATE 7531 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) On April 3, emboffs met with RDT Equipment and Systems (RDT) executives to follow up on questions regarding the company's possession and transfer of a USML-controlled FLIR camera. Operations Manager Noam Sarfati acknowledged that the FLIR camera in RDT's possession was left with Fibrotex "for a few days" so that the company could perform extended tests on the materials it is producing. Sarfati was able to produce an in-house document referring to a temporary export license issued by the State Department authorizing RDT's possession of the FLIR camera, but could not show any subsequent license authorization or conditions for possession and use of the camera. END SUMMARY. -------------- BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Emboffs' April 3 visit to RDT was prompted by questions raised during a February 20 pre-license check of an Israeli company -- Fibrotex Technologies -- which was proposing to import a FLIR camera (ref A). At that time, emboffs discovered that Fibrotex had already obtained a FLIR camera on loan and without a license from the State Department. Subsequent research by the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls raised further concerns that RDT itself may have acquired the FLIR camera without a license (ref B). -------------- DETAILS ON THE FLIR CAMERA -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On April 3, emboffs met with RDT Operations Manager Noam Sarfati and Sarit Cohen to follow up on questions regarding the company's possession and transfer of the USML-controlled FLIR camera to Fibrotex. At emboff's questioning, Sarfati acknowledged that RDT salesman Oz Koren had visited Fibrotex to demonstrate the FLIR camera and "might have left it for a short time." (NOTE: Emboffs noted that this was at odds with Fibrotex engineer Vladimir Kotler's statement on February 20, that Fibrotex had been authorized by RDT to keep the camera on loan until their own camera could be delivered (ref A). END NOTE.) Sarfati said that RDT frequently does allow companies to keep licensed technologies on loan for several days so they can conduct "extended checks" of the technology before deciding to buy it. He quickly added, however, that as soon as Fibrotex's license application for the FLIR camera was denied, RDT had their lawyer send a letter to Fibrotex requesting the camera's return. Sarfati showed emboffs the camera he claimed that Fibrotex was using -- an SC4000 ThermaCAM. The serial number (S/N) on the camera was 1011. The part number (P/N) was 420-0044-04-00P. The camera also bore the following markings: Rev. 130. 320x256 InSB. The camera was contained in a large, plastic case protected by foam padding, stored alongside cables and other components. -------------- DETAILS ON THE EXPORT LICENSE -------------- ¶4. (SBU) When asked under what authority RDT received and operated the FLIR camera, Cohen produced a document on RDT systems letterhead that stated that the FLIR camera system was being consigned to RDT under "an approved temporary export license as issued by the U.S. Department of State, license no. 730001118, a copy of which has been provided to us." The document further stated that the ThermaCAM SC4000 system is to be used for demonstration purposes, and that RDT's "possession and temporary use of the....equipment is anticipated to be between the following dates: (07-11-21-07-12-15)." Neither Cohen nor Sarfati could produce a copy of the State Department-approved export license. When emboffs pointed out that the document was printed on RDT letterhead, Sarfati explained that it had been e-mailed from the FLIR manufacturer with instructions to print it on company stationery. When emboffs noted that the temporary license document specified anticipated dates of use from November 21, 2007 through December 15, 2007, Sarfati seemed confused and insisted that there must have been a mistake. He suggested that there may have been a more recent license issued, but said he never received a copy of it. He explained that RDT does not receive licenses directly from the USG for any of the controlled items in RDT's possession, but rather relies on the manufacturers to obtain the necessary authorizations. When asked, Sarfati was able to produce copies of Department of Commerce-issued licenses and terms of use for five other cameras purchased by RDT. Sarfati identified the following person as RDT's main point of contact at FLIR Systems in the U.S.: Melissa Wilkinson Trade Compliance Officer FLIR Systems, Indigo Operations 70 Castilian Drive Goleta, CA 93117 Phone: (805) 690-7176 FAX: (805) 685-2711 Sarfati said that Wilkinson may have sent the text of the RDT document. Sarfati said that there is another person in Sweden who works for FLIR and who is responsible for Israel. Without providing his name, Sarfati indicated that it is possible that either this man or Ms. Wilkinson may possess a copy of the original export license for the FLIR camera, issued by the State Department. -------------- -- DISCUSSION ON MAINTAINING CONTROL OF THE CAMERA -------------- -- ¶5. (SBU) Emboffs noted that the document specified that RDT agrees "...to maintain control of the equipment at all times and not to additionally consign the equipment to any third party not specifically named on the license," and "...to be responsible for taking all necessary steps to ensure the security of the equipment on the license from loss, theft, or unauthorized access." When asked if he believed this would allow RDT to leave the FLIR camera with Fibrotex unsupervised, Sarfati said that his company "has to be lenient on that because nobody will purchase anything if they cannot test it." He added that while he was not aware of any specific directives regarding restrictions on the use of the FLIR camera, he uses his "common sense," to ensure that the technology is protected. The document -- signed by Avi Tiv, General Manager for RDT Equipment and Systems -- further states that RDT agrees to maintain security measures for the equipment, but lacks a description of the security measures to be maintained. (NOTE: A copy of the document has been sent by FAX to PM/DDTC at FAX number 202-261-8198). ¶6. (SBU) Sarfati acknowledged that his company is regularly audited by the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Directorate for Security (Malmab/DSDE),and volunteered that all RDT employees go through background checks and receive Israeli military security clearances. He claimed not to be familiar with new GOI export control laws, however, and suggested that his security office might be familiar with them. ¶7. (SBU) At the beginning of the meeting, Sarfati said that salesman Oz Koren, who has worked at RDT for two years, had allowed Fibrotex to borrow the camera for "a few days." At another moment, he said RDT may have left the camera with Fibrotex for "a short amount of time." At the end of the meeting, Sarfati backpedaled from his original statement and suggested instead that the unit was in fact not left unsupervised overnight. He said he would have to ask the salesman to find out more about the dates that Fibrotex used the camera, and indicated that he would be able to supply a listing of the dates when Fibrotex used the camera, if such a listing is requested. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES