USSC GEN. DAYTON'S NOVEMBER 18 MEETING WITH IDF

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002619 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL IS SUBJECT: USSC GEN. DAYTON'S NOVEMBER 18 MEETING WITH IDF CENTRAL REGIONAL COMMMANDER ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The United States Security Coordinator (USSC) LTG Keith W. Dayton and members of his staff met with IDF OC Central Command MG Gadi Shamni and members of his Command at Shamni's Neve Yaakov Headquarters on November 18. The USSC discussed the establishment of a base for the Palestinian National Security Forces, equipping Jordan International Police Training Center-trained Palestinians with Level II protective headgear, and raised the recent deportation of a Palestinian logistics officer because he held a Gaza ID as well as increased IDF daylight incursions into Jenin. The USSC also asked about the level of coordination between IDF and PASF in Hebron, and IDF plans to relax access and movement in the West Bank. The following provides the USSC's account of his meeting with MG Shamni. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The USSC addressed the on-going issue of attempting to get the IDF to agree to a location within the Jenin Governorate for the establishment of a base for he Palestinian National Security Forces (NSF). n response to the USSC's latest presentation on .S. views, MG Shamni asked how long the camp woud take to build if the IDF approved the Kfar Dan location. MG Shamni explained that as the Central Command head, he had taken many risks in allowingthe PASF to operate more freely than in the past He then asked whether the USSC was willing to take a risk on the Kfar Dan location, stating: "If you are willing to take the risk, we will approve." MG Shamni noted that such approval was conditional -- if the Palestinians continue to perform "in the manner they are now, if they don't put the "old" (non-Jordan International Police Training (JIPTIC)-trained) Palestinian forces in the camp, then we will allow them to occupy the camp once it is completed." MG Shamni said if the Palestinians "go back to their old ways," then the IDF will not allow them to occupy the camp. He asked if the USSC agreed; the USSC stated that he did. ¶3. (SBU) The USSC then addressed the issue of the on-going inability to get the IDF to approve helmets for JIPTIC-trained Palestinians. The USSC pointed out that he was told the IDF-Israeli MOD had previously approved JIC Level II protective headgear -- a protection level that would prevent the penetration of 9mm rounds but not 5.56mm rounds (the standard IDF issue M-16 ammunition). The IDF tested the �0A;helmet provided by USSC staff with 9mm, not 5.56mm rounds. MG Shamni acknowledged that they had previously agreed to allow the supply of Level II helmets but demurred that there was a misunderstanding on their part between themselves and the Israeli MOD, and that in any case, he no longer agreed. "You must understand, my non-uniformed special units use 9mm pistols and I need to provide for their safety," MG Shamni said. He then stated that he couldn't approve helmets with the same level of protection that his forces use. He passed around an example of a helmet they would approve and then contradicted himself by pointing out that this was the same helmet his forces used and that he would approve their acquisition by JIPTIC-trained PASF units. MG Shamni promised that his COGAT representative, BG Pauli Mordechai, would provide the USSC with the Israeli vendor information. (Note: The USSC is currently awaiting this information. End note.) ¶4. (SBU) The USSC raised the issue of the 2nd Special BN logistics officer who was deported to Gaza by the IDF because he was a Gaza ID holder. The USSC explained how greatly embarrassing it would be for Israel, the PA and the US should this individual, who was fully vetted by Israel, allowed to train in Jordan, and returned to the West Bank, fall into Hamas' hands and be publicly exploited for propaganda purposes, especially during the very time that the PA is conducting a security crack down on Hamas in the West Bank. The USSC told MG Shamni that he would like to see this individual returned as soon as possible and would also like to see some mechanism put in place that precludes such deportation of Jordan-trained PASF members to Gaza from happening again. MG Shamni agreed that he would do both and instructed his COGAT representative, BG Pauli Mordechai, to ensure that both issues were dealt with. ¶5. (SBU) The USSC raised the Palestinian complaint that incidences of IDF daylight incursions in Jenin were on the rise. MG Shamni replied that "we're doing a lot not to embarrass them." He noted an increase in Jenin-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) activity in the last two weeks. MG Shamni said he had briefed the USSC in their last meeting on this activity, and had asked the USSC to tell the PASF to act. He noted two main problems currently in Jenin: "the quick impact economic projects are not doing well and the Palestinians are not doing enough about the PIJ problem." He reiterated the importance of acting upon intelligence as soon as it is received -- such intelligence could be passed to the USSC to check, but said "sometimes we have to (act) TEL AVIV 00002619 002 OF 003 during the day time." ¶6. (SBU) The USSC indicated it would not be necessary to check intelligence as MG Shamni has his full trust. The USSC asked that at a minimum, the IDF inform the Palestinians of the reasons why they are doing what they are doing to minimize misunderstandings. MG Shamni replied that the IDF would do so, and suggested the Palestinian population "feels better about their daily life." He said the Palestinians told him that one of the reasons why President Abbas is acting more assertively is that the PASF are doing things they have never done before. According to MG Shamni, the Palestinians said until relatively recently they couldn't enter the Jenin refugee camp, or "a time when ARAFAT couldn't enter without being shot at -- now they can go in anytime they want to." ¶7. (SBU) The Central Command Judea and Samaria Division Commander, BG Noam Tibon interjected that the Palestinians "have to deal with the PIJ -- the first mission is to deal with terror." MG Shamni told the USSC that in instances of day light incursions, it was he and BG Tibon who decided when to act, not the local IDF commanders. He noted that the IDF takes great risks in order to minimize embarrassing the Palestinians -- this includes accelerating missions at the expense of increasing the likelihood of IDF casualties. This leaves the IDF vulnerable to potential questions from the public and political leadership regarding why a mission was not conducted more slowly, with less risk to IDF soldiers. "We take risks again, thinking about the embarrassment (to the Palestinians) -- we're not playing for a tie, but are willing to take a risk," MG Shamni said. (Note: When queried by the USSC, relevant PASF sources stated that they did not see a rise in PIJ activity in Jenin. Additionally, USSC staff officers queried a panel of Israeli Shin Bet Palestinian-focused analysts on the question of an upsurge in PIJ activity in Jenin, and was told that their sources and analysis did not support this assertion. End note.) ¶8. (SBU) The USSC raised the issue of a recent IDF incursion into an area that PASF forces were operating near Hebron and asked about the state of coordination between the IDF and PASF in the area. In response, MG Shamni stated the USSC was referring to the Wadi-al-Hireh, and said he decided to act because it was important. MG Shamni said the IDF informed the Palestinians in order that there would be "no reason we would collide." "We spoke about Hebron before; Hebron is not Jenin," MG Shamni said. He noted that the IDF and PASF must operate differently in Hebron and "some things (the PASF) do well and some things they don't." BG Tibon stated that the IDF coordinates with the PASF face-to-face in Hebron because "things are not easy there -- it is such a small place to operate." MG Shamni stated that while cooperation was good, they had one problem with the hotline between the IDF and the PASF. He note that the IDF wants the PASF to place the hotline in a centrally-located command post, but the PASF has yet to comply. The USSC told MG Shamni that his Canadian contingent was working with the Palestinians to make this happen. ¶9. (SBU) The USSC briefed MG Shamni on the US Department of Justice-led Judicial Project and told him that in the coming weeks, individuals from Justice would be on the scene to help and advise Palestinian judges and prosecutors in an attempt to initially address this hole in the security spectrum. MG Shamni agreed that this was a good idea and encouraged the USSC to find a way to help train Palestinians in interrogation methods. "They had it before but have lost this (skill) and need it badly," MG Shamni said. ¶10. (SBU) Addressing the overall level of PASF proficiency, MG Shamni said the IDF was "very pleased with the way they are functioning," and that they would assess a way forward in the next two to three weeks. He said the PASF are "very determined against Hamas," but there is still room for improvement. MG Shamni described coordination with the IDF as "very good, very frank -- they are not cheating like they used to, and this is a big change." He said the USSC has "succeeded in putting something into them," and added that the IDF is putting forth great efforts as the IDF believes they can do more. MG Shamni suggested the main problem now is "a lack of transparency." He said the PASF expects the IDF to cooperate with them on intelligence, but the PASF must first function with more transparency to get more intelligence. "We ask them to share with us their investigation reports so that we can help them build a big picture -- in some cases we and they have, but they need to be more transparent," MG Shamni said. He noted that Tirawi's General Intelligence group hasn't changed much since his supposed departure -- "we're starting to see changes, but they are not there yet." MG Shamni noted that the PASF had TEL AVIV 00002619 003 OF 003 investigated a Hamas militant in Nablus and made an arrest that led to the capture of 16 M-16s that were stolen or taken from dead IDF soldiers. (Note: Shamni failed to mention that they may have been acquired from Israeli criminal or via individual IDF criminal sources. End note.) MG Shamni said the PASF must return the M-16s. He also noted that he is under considerable pressure and criticism from "settlers, pundits, and politicians" for "being nice to the Palestinians." MG Shamni asked the USSC about future training plans and time tables for the deployment of newly JIPTIC-trained PASF forces. ¶11. (SBU) The USSC briefed MG Shamni on the outlook for the remainder of the year and asked him about his plans for relaxing "access and movement" within the northern West Bank. MG Shamni told the USSC that he would remove "many things soon." He noted the start of the Economic Conference in Nablus, and hoped this will "change the environment." MG Shamni suggested the IDF would follow the conference with "more things that will ease the lives of the population -- changes within certain check points; some regulations will change." He suggested the Palestinians "will feel the difference." He added that he was working closely on all aspects of this with his military and political counterparts to gain their support so they would not oppose these upcoming changes. ¶12. (SBU) The USSC repeated a question that Secretary Rice had asked General Jones: where should the next phase take place within the West Bank? MG Shamni told the USSC that the IDF wanted to avoid pressure, and that they would find a solution to this with the Palestinians. He noted that they are currently discussing the merits of the two models of Jenin and Hebron. "Which is better: the Jenin model where you might have two or three (Palestinian) battalions stuck in a small patch, or perhaps the Hebron model?" MG Shamni asked. He suggested the advantage of the Hebron model is that PASF forces can move from "place to place -- it is much more effective." He opined that Hebron might be the better model, and added that "nobody can arrest him for being naive." ¶13. (SBU) The USSC asked MG Shamni how his soldiers had been successful at keeping the PASF separated from the settlers in Hebron. MG Shamni replied, "We designed this to keep them apart, we give the settlers a good feeling of protection and security with visible IDF forces and we drew the right lines for the Palestinians to operate. We are happy that the Palestinians are not crossing them. If they did, it would be a problem. I should say, my challenge, not problem." ¶14. (SBU) The USSC passed on the PASF complaint-request that they be allowed to establish further Palestinian check-points in the Bethlehem area in order to stop Palestinian Hebron-based criminals from fleeing there, without having these check points being closed down by local IDF commanders. BG Tibon told the USSC that he would instruct his local brigade commander to consult with the Palestinian commander, Colonel Suleiman, in order to come to a working understanding. The USSC then asked Shamni about recent Israeli activities at the Container Check-Point and asked that Shamni share the details of that with the Palestinians in order to avoid misunderstandings. Shamni told the USSC that they were making improvements to the facilities that would benefit the Palestinians and that he would keep them fully informed. ¶15. (SBU) The USSC told MG Shamni that PASF commanders told him they see no increase in the activities of PIJ. He asked if Shamni would share something with him that he could use to better influence the Palestinians to take a closer look at this issue. Shamni told the USSC that he would do so directly in a near term meeting with Palestinian Police Chief, MG Hazem Attalah, and Palestinian Advisor, Hassan A-Sheikh. BG Tibon interjected, "when it comes to terror, we will take care of it." MG Shamni then told the USSC that the overall trust and confidence was changing. "During our meetings with them, there is no frustration. We used to see a certain moment when (frustration) would come out. Now they are much more concentrated on their mission." BG Tibon stated that the international community must push for a working Palestinian economy -- "the main issues for the Palestinians are economy, economy, economy." ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** MORENO