A/S DESUTTER'S COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY VISIT TO ISRAEL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 002569

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: PARM KNNP KTIA IS
SUBJECT: A/S DESUTTER'S COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY VISIT TO ISRAEL

Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Assistant Secretary for Verification,
Compliance, and Implementation (VCI) Paula DeSutter held
consultations with GOI officials and Israeli think tanks
October 30 as a part of her Compliance Diplomacy visit to the
Middle East. The purpose of these consultations was to
discuss the importance of verification and compliance with
arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation treaties and
agreements, and to share ideas and receive feedback on ways
to better achieve effective verification and compliance. A/S
DeSutter received a strategic tour of Jerusalem led by
Begin-Sadat Center Director Efraim Inbar, then spoke before
U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv's junior officers' New Professional
Association as its first distinguished speaker, where she
discussed the VCI Bureau's functions and goals. Other
meetings during the visit included a call on U.S. Ambassador
Cunningham, and a briefing on the new U.S. radar system
deployed in Israel. End summary.


2. (U) For this visit to Israel, A/S DeSutter was accompanied
by VCI Senior Advisor Julie Connor and VCI Officer Debora
Fisher. U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv Political-Military Officer
Jason Grubb also attended the Assistant Secretary's meetings.

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COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY DISCUSSIONS
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3. (SBU) This visit to Israel was the last stop on a
three-country Compliance Diplomacy swing through the Middle
East. In each of her scheduled meetings, A/S DeSutter took
care to review her Bureau's mandate, current compliance
challenges facing the international community, and the status
of Iran and North Korean compliance with international
treaties and agreements.


4. (U) A/S DeSutter explained the three
legislatively-mandated functions of the VCI Bureau: 1) assess
other countries' compliance with arms control, disarmament,
and nonproliferation agreements and commitments; 2) develop
verification measures for existing treaties and agreements
and assess the verifiability of prospective agreements; and
3) serve as the policy community's liaison to the
intelligence community on requirements to verify and assess
compliance with arms control, disarmament, and
nonproliferation agreements and commitments. A/S DeSutter
explained how the bureau was created and co-founded by
Senators Biden and Helms. Although Senator Biden was
generally in favor of arms control agreements and Senator
Helms was against them, both agreed the only way such
agreements would be of value is if we know whether or not
other countries are cheating.


5. (U) A/S DeSutter noted that she has no direct counterparts
in any other country. As a result, a major objective of her
Compliance Diplomacy outreach effort is to encourage other
countries to assess states' compliance with their arms
control obligations. She noted that many countries have the
mistaken view that it is up to the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) or the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to make compliance judgments.
Rather, it is up to each State Party to make these
assessments. She also noted that it is acceptable for
countries to disagree with U.S. assessments and related
policies, but it is not acceptable for other countries to
oppose them simply because the U.S. has failed to explain the
rational behind them. This is an area she is trying to
improve, she explained, by doing more to explain U.S.
policies and positions - hence her Compliance Diplomacy trips.


6. (C) A/S DeSutter addressed special challenges to
compliance, in particular Iran, North Korea, and Syria. She
noted that her bureau, VCI, had the lead in removing WMD from
Libya, but pointed out differences between the Libyan case
and Iran and North Korea. She said that VCI has special
responsibility as the USG lead for developing a verification
regime for the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program. She discussed how previous U.S. policy in the 1990s
relating to North Korea and the Agreed Framework resulted in
benefits to the regime following treaty violations, and
therefore was not a good model to follow for dealing with
countries in noncompliance. Moreover, Iran and other states
saw how the North Koreans were rewarded, and they are now
playing the same game.


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7. (SBU) A/S DeSutter went on to note that the biggest
challenge to verification and compliance was spelled out by
Dr. Fred Ikle, the former ACDA Director, as early as 1961:
after noncompliance is detected, what should the
international community do about it? The world is now facing
such a challenge with Iran, A/S DeSutter argued. Iran joined
and used the NPT to acquire nuclear technology under the
guise of a civilian nuclear program. For over 20 years it
cheated and deceptively diverted this technology from civil
uses to develop a nuclear weapons program. Now the
international community is faced with the question of what it
must do to bring Iran back into compliance. The choices and
options for countries trying to bring other states back into
compliance can be very painful, she said. For example, it is
very difficult for a number of countries to implement
sanctions against Iran. For Russia and some European
countries, potential financial losses are much higher than
for the United States. For those countries, costs in the
short-term related to noncompliance sanctions are almost
certainly greater than the costs to Iran. That is why there
must be better awareness that what countries are being asked
to do is hard, but it is worth the price in the long-term.
Considering the challenges, the international community has
done a pretty good job on Iran, and financial sanctions are
helping, A/S DeSutter opined. However, we must do a better
job of collectively shaming and shunning the Iranian
leadership. Sanctions have helped to slow their nuclear
program, but they have not stopped it or turned it around.
We must come up with more tools to deal with violators such
as Iran more effectively. Enforcement is necessary to
achieve compliance. If we are not willing to bring countries
back into compliance, A/S DeSutter noted, we should not even
bother with verification.

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MEETING WITH THE GOI INTERAGENCY
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8. (U) In addition to discussing the Compliance Diplomacy
points above, there were a number of related but unique
issues raised in A/S DeSutter's October 30 meeting with
Israeli government interagency officials. Chaired by Alon
Bar, the Deputy Director General of the MFA for Strategic
Affairs, the meeting was attended by thirteen GOI officials
from five different offices (the MFA, IAEC, MOD, IDF-IDI, and
Prime Minister's Office).


9. (S) Regarding the North Korea verification package, the
Israelis suggested the United States will have its hands tied
when USG officials enter North Korea. A/S DeSutter responded
that she was very pleasantly surprised when she saw the
initial verification package for North Korea because it does
provide for removing samples and undeclared site visits, with
the consent of the DPRK. The U.S. intelligence community
(IC) had argued in favor of challenge inspections "anywhere,
anytime," but VCI had objected to that language because for
challenge inspections to be effective inspectors have to know
where to go. She argued that North Korea is a closed
society, and it is very difficult to find anything. Even if
you do know where to go and insist on going to that location,
"you are logistically dependent upon them to get there."
Inclusion in the agreement of such language would have
provided a false sense of security.


10. (C) The Israelis were concerned that some of VCI's work
carried the danger of exposing sources, and asked about VCI's
relationship with the IC. A/S DeSutter pointed out that VCI
is a strong advocate for the IC. VCI is dependent upon
intelligence and has great interest in protecting it. A/S
DeSutter invited the Israelis to come have discussions with
her and VCI staff the next time they visit Washington as the
Bureau relies on information from all sources.


11. (C) Bar stated that verification is a strongly
politicized process; to make the process work, legal
agreements are required. A/S DeSutter responded that just
because there is no agreement does not mean there is no
obligation. She also pointed out that at times not having an
agreement is better than having an agreement that provides a
false sense of security.


12. (C) The Israeli side agreed with A/S DeSutter's point
that we do not want a false sense of what is verifiable and
what is not. They concurred with A/S DeSutter's points that
intelligence should be stringently protected and should not
be given away to countries that will not protect it. They

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also noted their agreement that we should not bother sharing
information with other countries if they will not act after
detecting noncompliance.

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MEETING WITH ISRAELI THINK TANK
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13. (U) One of Israel's most prestigious think tanks, the
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS),hosted a
round table for ten Israelis featuring A/S DeSutter. In
addition to INSS researchers, representatives of academia and
members of other think tanks were invited. A/S DeSutter
reviewed the Compliance Diplomacy points noted above, and in
addition a variety of issues were raised by the participants.


14. (U) INSS Senior Researcher Ephraim Asculai discussed how
he believed Iran would be willing to close down its nuclear
weapons program for the right price. He said he did not
believe military action would work in Iran because we do not
know if they have a parallel secret nuclear program at sites
unknown. He emphasized implementing strict sanctions on
Iran, not selling anything but food and medicine, and
preventing Iranians from travel. He also emphasized that
time was short and it was very important to do as much as we
can now to stop Iran's nuclear program.


15. (SBU) A/S DeSutter reported that many countries believe
the United States is chomping at the bit to go to war with
Iran. She is not convinced that a military strike will work
because she does not believe the nuclear program we know
about in Iran is the full Iranian program. A/S DeSutter also
agreed that time is not on our side and that strict sanctions
need to be implemented targeting Iran's leadership. Asculai
noted that Iran has already produced hundreds of tons of
uranium hexafluoride, so even if we destroyed one facility it
would be too late and of little benefit.


16. (U) INSS Senior Research Fellow David Friedman, an expert
in biological weapons (BW),discussed how 90-100 percent of
the nonproliferation efforts in Israeli academia are devoted
to the nuclear issue. While this is the main problem, it is
not the only problem. He believed the United States has the
budget to work across the board, while Israel is fiscally
limited. Friedman reported that technological advances of
the past few years and those to come in the next few years
make biological warfare an area that cannot be ignored. He
also discussed how he has difficulties with the United States
position on a verification regime for the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC). He agreed verification is very difficult,
especially in the area of BW, but argued that such a regime
is necessary.


17. (U) A/S DeSutter responded that she too agrees that BW is
a big threat. There are not enough analysts in the field,
and, while recognition of the threat has grown, the
challenges remain. She discussed how virtually everything in
the bio field is dual-use, which complicates matters. The
main challenge is determining intent, i.e., is the item being
purchased or produced for peaceful or military use? She
noted that the two lead countries pushing for a BWC
verification regime are Iran and Russia. She discussed how
onsite inspections can only tell you what is going on at that
one site at that given time, and only to the degree that
inspectors can determine whether an activity has an offensive
goal. Such visits may be able to provide documentation of
what the inspected party wants you to see, but cannot with
any degree of confidence allow you to know what is happening
at other times or locations. As a result, it is not possible
to make compliance judgments based on such visits. In
addition, the BWC verification regime would have given access
to other countries' proprietary information, and would have
opened the door to free trade among members, many of whom may
have illicit programs. She expressed her desire to have an
effective BW verification approach, but said that science
does not yet offer that possibility. Mr. Friedman reported
that in several weeks Israel would enact a law designed to
provide oversight for research dealing with pathogenic
agents. It will not limit publications, but will provide
oversight of research proposals.


18. (U) INSS Senior Researcher and Tel Aviv University
Professor Yair Evron asked if the United States could not
coordinate better with Russia on missile defense. He thought
perhaps the United States still had a Cold War mentality. He
also questioned whether U.S. policy was to impose regime

TEL AVIV 00002569 004 OF 004


change on countries such as North Korea. A/S DeSutter
replied that, first, the United States views the Cold War as
being over and has moved all of its resources away from this
area. Second, the United States is not pursuing regime
change with North Korea, but change on the part of the regime.

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COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY WITH JUNIOR OFFICERS
--------------


19. (U) A/S DeSutter also extended her Compliance Diplomacy
outreach to U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv's junior officers' New
Professionals Association, which featured her as the first in
a series of distinguished guest speakers. A/S DeSutter spoke
on the common points presented in her other meetings relating
to the role, history, and purpose of the VCI Bureau. She
also reviewed the importance of and challenges to compliance,
and asked her Senior Advisor, Julie Connor, to speak as a
senior Foreign Service Officer about service in the Bureau.

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OTHER ACTIVITIES
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20. (C) A/S DeSutter took advantage of her stay in Israel
to have additional meetings: (1) The Director of Bar Ilan
University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,
Professor Efraim Inbar, gave A/S DeSutter a strategic tour of
Jerusalem, emphasizing the proximity of Palestinian towns to
Jerusalem, and recounting attacks on the city. (2) U.S.
military officers gave the A/S a briefing on the new radar
site in the Negev, explaining its capabilities. (3) A/S
DeSutter met with U.S. Ambassador Cunningham to review her
visit and plans while in Israel and to hear his thoughts on
U.S.-Israel strategic relations.


21. (U) A/S DeSutter has cleared on this cable.

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