KADIMA PARTY PRIMARIES AND/OR EARLY ELECTIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001180 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR IS SUBJECT: KADIMA PARTY PRIMARIES AND/OR EARLY ELECTIONS REF: TEL AVIV 1021 -------------- SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Less than a week after Morris Talansky testified that he gave numerous envelopes of cash to the Prime Minister (reftel), Olmert has given no indication he intends to step down. Assailed by the media, and by members of his own party, the Prime Minister is trying to maintain a business-as-usual outlook, and he has not changed his schedule or his June 2-6 travel to Washington. Olmert has asserted his right to state his case in the Talansky affair, and lashed out at his principal coalition partner, Minister of Defense Ehud Barak of the Labor Party, for jumping the gun before Olmert's lawyers have had an opportunity to cross examine Talansky (either in mid-June or mid-July). Even so, Barak's May 28 ultimatum to Olmert was taken up by Kadima's front-runner in the developing succession battle, Tzipi Livni, who, on May 29 criticized the PM's attempts to characterize his actions as within "the norms which everyone who enters the political arena is obliged to adopt." ¶2. (SBU) Summary continued: On May 29, Livni publicly stated her belief in the importance of party primaries and called on the Kadima Party to prepare for all possible scenarios, including elections. Olmert has indicated that he will not openly obstruct Kadima primaries, but has insisted on his role in controlling the timing of those primaries. Kadima MK Tzachi Hanegbi has been canvassing the contenders and will meet with Olmert in mid-June to discuss possible primary dates. Meanwhile, the opposition, led by Likud, is preparing the first Knesset showdown with Kadima on June 18 when it may call for the first of three votes required to pass a law to dissolve the Knesset and hold early elections. -------------- OLMERT VERSUS TALANSKY -------------- ¶3. (SBU) One of the most urgent decisions facing PM Olmert is whether to advance the current July 17 date for cross-examination of Morris Talansky in light of the severe damage caused to Olmert's public image by Talansky's May 27 deposition. Olmert and his lawyers met last week to discuss next steps, according to press reports. "We understand the law, but he understands the politics" was how one of Olmert's attorneys, Ron Shapira, reportedly put it. If Talansky agrees to an earlier date, the earliest it could take place is mid-June when Talansky returns to ISRAEL for a one-day family event. Olmert's attorneys have already noted that they will require two days to complete the cross-examination. -------------- - DISSOLVING THE KNESSET REQUIRES THREE READINGS -------------- - ¶4. (U) Likud MK Sylvan Shalom has drafted a Knesset dissolution bill (that's reportedly been in his pocket since the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War) that would launch the political system into an early-elections-orbit, but he has held back from pushing it to a vote. A dissolution attempt that does not win the support of 61 MK's carries a sting in its tail: the draft may not be submitted again for another six months. Shalom is now planning to bring this "private member's bill" to a preliminary reading on June 18 -- subject to rounding up the requisite majority, which he would need to maintain over the ensuing three formal readings before the bill would become law. The 12 Likud MK's together with support from Yisrael Beiteinu (11) and the National Religious Party (9) could be enough if the 19 Labor MK's and 12 Shas MK's decide to support early elections (and do not object to Likud taking the lead on the dissolution bill). This tally, reported by Yediot Ahronoth on June 3, does not take into account at least four likely defections from Kadima, or any support for early elections from Meretz, the Arab parties, the newly-split Pensioners parties, or United Torah Judaism. -------------- MOFAZ VERSUS LIVNI AS HEIR APPARENT -------------- ¶5. (SBU) According to all recent public opinion polls, Kadima will fare better in elections with Tzipi Livni at its head than any of the three likely contenders (Ministers Mofaz, Sheetrit, Dichter); however, a Livni-led Kadima is generally still in second place to Netanyahu's Likud Party. Nonetheless, the potential Livni offers to salvage Kadima as a weighty political party means that many Kadima Knesset members as well as general party members will work for her to succeed Olmert. Mofaz, for his part, has cultivated the municipal grass roots - visiting 150 mayors over the past two years -- and may be able to benefit from Olmert's control of the party apparatus and his animus towards Livni. Mofaz can also claim Sephardic support: the word on the "street" is that there are many in Likud who wish to see their one-time party member in a position TEL AVIV 00001180 002 OF 002 of real political power -- specifically as defense minister in a Likud-led government. One recent report even alleged that Likud vote contractors were engaged in recruiting voters to turn out for Mofaz in future Kadima primaries. Likud connections aside, Mofaz is attempting to woo Shas in an effort to outflank the more popular contender, Livni. -------------- SHAS WEIGHS ITS OPTIONS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ever since the Annapolis conference in November 2007, Olmert's coalition has been routinely threatened by the Shas Party with resignation over the Palestinian track and more recently Syrian track negotiations, as well as Kadima's refusal to roll back financial reforms initiated by then-Finance Minister Netanyahu. Much of Shas rhetoric is just that: Shas maintaining the pressure for economic policy concessions -- always of a budgetary nature, on the issues of social welfare allowances - specifically the restoration of child allowances to their pre-Netanyahu levels -- so close to its electoral heart (septel). Since the Talansky deposition, Shas threats have assumed a new dimension as speculation increases as to the willingness of Shas to vote in support of early elections. No one in Kadima is better placed to coax Shas away from this option than Shaul Mofaz. In media appearances, Mofaz is making it clear that he feels a real kinship with Shas not only on account of his Sephardic origin but in terms of his political perspective which is well to the right of Olmert's -- or as one media commentator put it -- "on the right flank of Likud whence he hails." ¶7. (U) On June 3, however, Shas Minister of Communications, Ariel Attias, told ISRAEL Radio that "Shas is not seeking elections or a pretext to hold them nor will it resign over the issue of child allowances." Attias noted that "Shas still believes there's a chance of forming an alternative government during the current Knesset session." Kadima MK Tzachi Hanegbi has been canvassing the contenders and will meet with Olmert in mid-June to discuss possible primary dates. ¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: With Shas on the fence regarding its preference between early elections (and a new government likely led by Netanyahu) or new Kadima leadership (and preservation of the current coalition),much will depend on issues of timing. If PM Olmert attempts to delay Kadima primaries for too long, the opposition may attract support from coalition parties for Likud's bid to dissolve the Knesset. Labor can signal its unhappiness with Olmert's intransigence with a move in this direction by voting for the Likud legislation in its preliminary reading. Brinkmanship will characterize the subsequent readings, which could take several weeks of Knesset politicking to play out. Despite media speculation about the possibility of early elections coincident with November 11 municipal elections, we cannot predict the likelihood of such a scenario at this juncture. We do anticipate that all parties - in the coalition and the opposition -- will come under great pressure to accede to Shas demands. Judging from Atias' statement, Shas has not given up on the current coalition and may not want to hasten a return to a government with Netanyahu, who cost them their allowances in the first place. END COMMENT. -------------- POSTSCRIPT ON THE EARLY ELECTIONS SCENARIO -------------- ¶9. (U) In the event the Likud draft dissolution bill wins a 61-member majority in three readings, the Knesset must disperse within a maximum timeframe of five months. If all three readings and votes on dissolution were to take place on June 18 this would place the latest possible date for dissolution at mid-November. Media reports have mentioned Tuesday, November 11 as a likely date as it happens to be the date already set for the local authority elections. The rationale for holding elections on a Tuesday as explained by the Knesset administration is as follows: Friday, Saturday and Sunday are rest-days in ISRAEL for the three major faiths. Thursday and Monday are too close to the rest days and do not permit sufficient time to organize a nation-wide ballot. Tuesday is therefore the first day of the week in which voting on a national scale can be fully implemented and which also allows for two full days of vote-counting and clarifications prior to the onset of the ensuing rest-days. (NB: There is a 1988 precedent for postponing municipal elections if general elections fall on the same date, but general and municipal elections reportedly have been held on the same date once before and some now argue that it would be both cost-effective and help get out the vote.) JONES