CLUSTER MUNITIONS: ISRAELI'S OPERATIONAL DEFENSIVE

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001012 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2018 TAGS: MASS MARR MCAP PTER LE SY IS SUBJECT: CLUSTER MUNITIONS: ISRAELI'S OPERATIONAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES CRISIS Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (S) During the May 1 inaugural meeting of the U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG),Israeli MOD, IDF and MFA officials warned that the current U.S. legislative prohibition on exporting cluster munitions seriously degrades Israel's operational capabilities to defend itself. The prohibition on exporting cluster munitions with more than a one percent tested failure rate means that Israel cannot access U.S. cluster munitions in pre-positioned War Reserve Stockpiles in Israel (WRSA/I). As Israel's defense plans assume access to the munitions -- which constitute greater than 60 percent of the overall WRSA/I holdings -- the officials warn that unless the prohibition is lifted, Israel will have to revise its defensive doctrine, find a solution to the one-percent dud rate requirement for cluster munitions, and look to another type of weapon system on which to center its self defense strategy. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) Civilian and military representatives from Israel's MOD, the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) Operations Branch and the MFA expressed grave concern to the U.S. interagency CMWG delegation led by PM DAS Frank Ruggiero May 1 that the current U.S. legislation banning exports of cluster munitions with more than a one percent tested failure rate means that Israel cannot gain access to the cluster munitions -- constituting the majority of its defensive holdings -- in pre-positioned War Reserve Stockpiles in Israel (WRSA/I). Israel's defense establishment is acutely concerned about this as defense doctrine requires access to the cluster munitions within one to two days of new hostilities -- a fact which is all the more at the forefront of concerns due to Hizballah's presence and growing offensive capabilities in southern Lebanon, Iran's aggressive rhetoric, and Syria's unpredictability (especially after the September 6 Israeli strike against a nuclear facility in Syria). ¶3. (S) Specifically, U.S. and Israeli officials discussed five aspects of the current legislative prohibition on exporting the cluster munitions that are particularly problematic for Israel: ¶A. Supply of WRSA/I stocks to Israel -- even in times of crisis -- constitutes an export. The U.S. legislation not only prevents Israel from receiving emergency re-supply of cluster munitions during a crisis, but also denies the IDF legal access to the cluster munitions in the pre-positioned stocks in Israel. (NOTE: Until the munitions are transferred, they are considered to be under U.S. title, and U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate. END NOTE.) ¶B. As such, while the legislation is not specifically targeted towards Israel, and affects a number of other key U.S. allies, both sides believe the legislation did not anticipate second and third order effects (e.g., access to WRSA/I stocks). ¶C. The legislation covers cluster munitions that exceed a one percent tested failure rate. This applies to most cluster munitions in existence, and all cluster munitions in the WRSA/I. The Israeli defense contractor, IMI, is currently conducting research and testing on a number of cluster munitions it has designed and which it claims meet the one percent requirement. That said, if IMI were successful and had two years to produce cluster munitions for Israel's stockpile, Israel still would not have enough cluster munitions for its operational defensive use. The Israeli delegation stressed that domestic production is not the answer to its requirements. ¶D. IMI also will be testing for the U.S. Army its efforts to recapitalize M864E2 cluster munitions (155mm projectiles). Israel will submit a formal proposal for this recapitalization program that would specifically seek to address WRSA/I cluster munitions with more than a one percent tested failure rate. This program, however, would not be a silver bullet answer for Israel's operational needs as it would take considerable time to implement (requiring first the development of a prototype program) and be very costly (estimated to be at least half of the cost of replacing the cluster munitions). Moreover, the issues associated with transferring the WRSA/I munitions to Israel for the recapitalization would also still need to be considered ¶E. Israeli contractors and lawyers are unclear how one defines a one percent field-tested failure rate and the requirements to overcome it. ¶4. (S) The Israeli officials stressed that as long as Israel cannot receive cluster munitions from the U.S. or gain access to the cluster munitions in the WRSA/I, it must consider severe alternatives. These include: ¶A. Changing defensive doctrine, possibly to include greater reliance on pre-emptive strikes. ¶B. Dedicating more efforts and funding towards creating a cluster munition that meets the one percent requirement, drawing effort and funding away from other vital programs. ¶C. Identifying another weapons system with capabilities as similar as possible to the cluster munitions, and re-centering defensive doctrine around that weapons system (which in turn would likely divert from other IDF air missions). ¶5. (S) IDF lawyers also expressed frustration with the U.S. legislative prohibition, noting that Winograd Report recommendations concerning cluster munitions were being implemented, as well as recommendations conveyed in the Military Attorney General's (MAG) concluding report. Since the summer of 2006, the IDF has improved command and control over cluster munitions, improved the documentation system utilized by firing level units, revised its training program to ensure widespread familiarization of the requirements for using cluster munitions, and placed a greater emphasis on accountability. ¶6. (S) In summary, the Israeli civilian and military officials stressed to DAS Ruggiero and the U.S. team that lack of access to the U.S. cluster munitions severely degrades the IDF's artillery and rocket capabilities, significantly affects the capabilities of the IDF's infantry and fielded forces, reduces the IDF's capabilities for close ground support, diverts attention from other IDF air missions, and limits the IDF's maneuverability. One Israeli operations officer stressed his view that the above -- in attempting to defend Israel from future, assymetric "terrorist guerrilla" warfare -- will lead to a longer war and an increase in casualties on all sides in the next conflict. The Israeli delegation concluded the day's discussion stressing the urgent need for access to cluster munitions. ¶7. (U) This cable was cleared by PM DAS Frank Ruggiero. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES