ZELAYA CONSULTS WITH AMBASSADOR ON ELECTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001064 SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA, EEB E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV KDEM SOCI EFIN ECON VE HO SUBJECT: ZELAYA CONSULTS WITH AMBASSADOR ON ELECTIONS, MACROECONOMY, ALBA REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1054 ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 1042 ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 1040 ¶D. TEGUCIGALPA 1023 ¶E. TEGUCIGALPA 1021 ¶F. TEGUCIGALPA 1012 ¶G. TEGUCIGALPA 997 ¶H. TEGUCIGALPA 171 ¶I. 07 TEGUCIGALPA 1915 Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador hosted President Manuel "Mel" Zelaya for a one-on-one lunch at the Residence on November 21 where they covered a number of issues, including the upcoming primary elections, Zelaya's proposal for a constitutional referendum, the impact of the global economic crisis on Honduras and Zelaya's participation in the November 26 ALBA summit in Venezuela. Zelaya discussed the U.S. economic downturn and necessary steps to stave off a serious impact in Honduras. He suggested a meeting with bankers to discuss the U.S. economic situation and its impact on Honduras. Zelaya also offered his personal assessment of Venezuelan President Chavez and Nicaraguan President Ortega. Constitutional Reform -------------- ¶2. (C) Zelaya opened by noting his recently announced suggestion that Honduras consider convening a constitutional convention to discuss very specific changes to the Honduran Constitution of 1982. He suggested the referendum be tacked onto the November 30, 2009 general election ballots, to ask the public if they would support a convention to discuss modifying articles that the Constitution itself says may not be modified. The purpose of the change would be to clear up the recent constitutional difficulties that had prevented the Vice President from running for President and also permit former Presidents to seek a second term as President, either sequentially or non-sequentially, depending on what consensus the convention would reach. Zelaya repeated the assertion he has made to the Ambassador before that he himself had no desire to continue in office even one day longer than his elected term, and that any modification would be applicable only after his own term ended. Zelaya added that he would seek these changes only after building a consensus of all political parties. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador responded to Zelaya's proposal by reiterating the themes of USG policy toward any changes in 
the constitution or elections -- that they not be made by decree, but rather in a transparent, broadly consensual manner reflecting the will of the Honduran people, and that any changes be legal and constitutional. The Ambassador added that in the current polarized political climate, any move or change that was seen as affecting or benefiting Zelaya personally would be cause for serious concern and would surely cause a public and political backlash, particularly on the eve of the primary elections. Vice President's Candidacy -------------- ¶4. (C) Zelaya then moved to the case of Vice President Elvin Santos's presidential candidacy (Refs B, D and E). He said he was confident the Presidential Palace had the best constitutional lawyers in Honduras and they were firmly convinced Santos could not run. They noted that the Constitution barred amendment in the manner carried out in 2001-2002, and that the proper legal authorities had already made a clear, appropriate ruling against his candidacy (Refs G and H). While Zelaya agreed that the current wranglings were politically motivated, he said they were nonetheless legally sound and in accordance with the Constitution. He admitted that Santos was the most popular figure in the TEGUCIGALP 00001064 002 OF 004 Liberal Party, his ticket was favored to win the upcoming primaries with his stand-in candidate Mauricio Villeda, and the efforts to bar him were only making him look like a martyr in the eyes of many voters, increasing his popularity. But, Zelaya insisted, Santos will never win a case before the current Supreme Court, nor would he be likely to win before the next one set to be constituted in late January. Zelaya noted that in addition to the constitutional weakness of his case, politically National Party (NP) magistrates would likely vote against Santos since he was perceived as having the best chance of all the Liberals of defeating likely NP candidate Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo in a general election late next year. Teacher's Strike -------------- ¶5. (C) The Ambassador then raised USG concerns over the threats by teachers' union leaders to strike and disrupt the November 30 primaries (Ref A). Zelaya replied that it was his own burden to resolve the issue, and that he would indeed resolve it in the following week ) and predicted it would not be a problem on election day. (Note: Reporting November 24 suggested that the President had reached a tentative accord with the teachers.) Nicaraguan Elections -------------- ¶6. (C) On Zelaya's statements following the Nicaraguan elections (Ref. C),the Ambassador expressed regret that Zelaya and his representatives had blindsided the USG. The Ambassador suggested that the President should have given him the opportunity to explain the USG position before instructing advisor Milton Jimenez to issue a statement critical of the U.S. He said we remained concerned and very unhappy that Honduras would comment on an issue that involved the United States and a third country. The Ambassador then reiterated the USG position on the Nicaraguan elections, highlighting the Sandinista intimidation tactics against the opposition, early poll closures, expulsion of mesa observers and destruction of pro-opposition ballots. Zelaya retorted that the USG was laying all the blame on the Sandinistas, but it was also the opposition who had contributed to a bad political climate. The Ambassador noted that in any election, the government sets the tone, and that the government of Daniel Ortega was mostly responsible for the irregularities, a position shared by not just the USG, but also by the international community. The Ambassador offered the Nicaraguan elections as a strong contrast to the relatively open electoral process unfolding in Honduras. He noted that he had met with every presidential candidate representing a wide political spectrum from far left to hard right, and that all were allowed to freely express their views, and all had been allowed to get their message out through the Honduran press, albeit in varying degrees. In contrast to Nicaragua, he added that the United States and the international community had been invited to participate as observers in a Mission to be led by the OAS. The Ambassador's comment clearly hit a chord with Zelaya, who quickly agreed and added, "When have I used or abused my own executive power to repress a political opinion or candidate?" President Zelaya agreed that the surprise announcement was a mistake and said that in the future he would seek to consult with us. The Ambassador said he was transmitting a letter to Zelaya for his review documenting the massive irregularities that had taken place in Nicaragua's recent elections. World Financial Crisis -------------- ¶7. (C) President Zelaya expressed concern over the potential impact of the U.S. financial crisis in Honduras and therefore took measures on November 20 to inject liquidity into the TEGUCIGALP 00001064 003 OF 004 market by eliminating the reserve requirement for banks that have greater than 70 percent lempira-denominated deposits. He also said he was seeking USD 200 million in additional capital from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) and wanted to tap into IDB President Moreno's special fund that was created to stave off recession in Latin American countries. IMF Program -------------- ¶8. (C) Zelaya said he was aware the Ambassador had told senior officials in his government that Honduras urgently needs an IMF program. The Ambassador said a program would demonstrate a commitment to macro-economic stability in an election year in Honduras and in a very unsettled global economic environment. He said such an agreement would send a positive signal to international and DOMESTIC investors. In order to do this, the Ambassador said Honduras must show flexibility on the exchange rate and walked Zelaya through the economic fundamentals, including explaining that devaluation would provide more Lempiras for every dollar that is transmitted to Honduras through remittances, exports and dollar credits and have the impact of stimulating economic activity. He also explained that the fast growing economy of six months ago characterized by soaring commodities prices and high inflation no longer existed. The economic reality today was a decline in economic activity, deflation, tight credit, and higher unemployment. The Ambassador suggested that a prudently flexible exchange rate policy can act as a shock absorber and minimize the downward trends in economic activity. ¶9. (C) After a long discussion, Zelaya said that if the Ambassador is correct, he would approve a devaluation. He asked the Ambassador to meet with him Zelaya, Central Bank President Araque, and select members of the banking Community to discuss the IMF issue. Zelaya named the heads of the top Honduran banks as invitees. (Note: A meeting is being set up for the week of December 1. End note.) Merida Initiative -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador described his goals for bilateral cooperation and coordination to promote the objectives of the Merida Initiative. He said he had spoken with Security Minister Jorge Rodas (Ref F) about his plan for a high-level bilateral task force. Zelaya replied that Rodas had briefed him, he supported the USG idea and he had designated Rodas as the GOH Merida Coordinator. Zelaya added that he wanted a more detailed briefing on Merida from the Ambassador. (Note: The meeting is being scheduled. End note.) Up-Coming ALBA Meeting -------------- ¶11. (C) Zelaya then said he was going to attend an ALBA summit in Venezuela on November 26. He noted that he had joined ALBA for economic aid, but now he was starting to doubt there were many resources available. Nonetheless, he cautioned that Venezuelan President Chavez was a very intelligent, charismatic figure, and he was not sure what to expect at the summit. Zelaya added that he had spent considerable time with Chavez, and that he should not be underestimated or misunderstood. He said Chavez was not motivated by money, and partly motivated by power. He warned that above all Chavez had an almost messianic self-image -- and that made him dangerous, because he was capable of doing almost anything to further his goals. Zelaya's Opinions of Ortega and Chavez -------------- TEGUCIGALP 00001064 004 OF 004 ¶12. (C) Zelaya then noted that Nicaraguan President Ortega had initially thought Zelaya was a U.S. "plant" in ALBA, and although the relationship had improved with time, Ortega still did not trust Zelaya fully. In contrast, Zelaya remarked, Chavez understood Zelaya was in ALBA to promote his economic interest. Comment -------------- ¶13. (C) Zelaya continues to zig-zag in his public and private statements, apparently thinking he can woo both the USG and the "Chavista" left as it suits him. Nevertheless, he continues to seek U.S. input on a variety of top-level policy issues, including the two-week postponement of the primary elections and engagement on the economic program and is supportive of Merida. As long as he stays within the Honduran constitutional and electoral framework, which we will encourage, we believe we can continue to work with him and achieve our goal of ending his term with U.S.-Honduran relations in intact. End comment. LLORENS