DAS BRYZA VISIT WITH DEFENSE MINISTER KEZERASHVILI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000923

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM KGOV RS GG
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA VISIT WITH DEFENSE MINISTER KEZERASHVILI


Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On May 9, Georgian Defense Minister
Kezerashvili and First Deputy Defense Minister Kutelia told
DAS Bryza that they were very concerned by the build-up of
Russian forces in Abkhazia, claiming that at least 600 of the
forces that purported to be peacekeepers are actually
paratroopers deployed outside the conflict zone. They
foresaw that the Abkhaz situation will soon calm, and the
Russians will bring in businessmen and official
representatives to Abkhazia to "normalize relations."
Kezerashvili assessed that in the absence of political
consequences for the latest Russian actions, the current
situation will soon become the status quo from which Medvedev
will operate. He believed it was vitally important to return
to the status quo ante. Bryza explained his effort to
de-escalate tensions by working with the Georgians and the
Abkhaz on a new forum to negotiate a settlement. He
cautioned that should Georgia go to war, it would go alone
and would lose to Russia's stronger force. He said that
Georgia would also completely lose politically and
economically in such a situation. End Summary.

Doubtful of MAP in December
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2. (C) Kutelia told Bryza that CDU MPs from within German
Chancellor Merkel's inner circle had told them informally
that Georgia will not be offered MAP in December, citing the
issue as "too politically sensitive." Kezerashvili said that
Europe was reluctant to side with Georgia against Russia,
even in the face of the recent investigation into the downing
of a Georgian UAV by Russian aircraft on April 21.
Kezerashvili said that if international support disappears
for Georgia, it will be harder for the GOG to make the right
decisions in response to Russian provocations.

Build-Up in Gudauta
--------------


3. (C) Kezerashvili found worrisome the build-up of troops
at Gudauta which he stressed were not only peacekeepers but
also 600 paratroopers and 600 pensioners (Note: Although
Kezerashvili said retirees, it is likely he was referring to
mercenaries with previous military service, who are now
civilians under contract. End Note.) He found particularly
troubling the fact that no one is able to verify the exact
number of troops there. Kutelia said that Georgian
authorities had inquired about Open Skies flying over Gudauta
in an attempt to clarify troop levels, but it was deemed too
dangerous. Kezerashvili emphasized that the international
community cannot expect Georgia to wait forever to respond to
the troop build-up situation. As he put it, "I am not a hawk
but each day we are losing on the ground there, and if
finally there will be 10,000 troops, artillery, anti-air
defense weapons and tanks, Abkhazia will be lost forever."
He worried that one day Georgians would look back at this
time and assess that they had missed their chance to stop
Russian annexation. Although he was not pushing for war,
Kezerashvili would rather fight and lose than not fight at
all. He warned that Georgia's redlines included killing of
Georgians living in the Gali district of Abkhazia, an Abkhaz
and/or Russian military action to take the Kodori valley, and
a significant further Russian troop increase in Abkhazia. He
told Bryza that without Western political support against
Russia, it was hard for him and other moderates to put the
war option to rest. Bryza said bluntly that if Georgia were
to go to war, it would go alone and it would lose not only
militarily but also politically--by losing U.S. and European
support, including for MAP--as well as economically.
Kezerashvili acknowledged Georgian offensive military actions
would squash any hopes for MAP, as well as ruin the Georgian
economy.

Abkhaz Motives
--------------


4. (C) Kezerashvili was doubtful that Abkhazia truly wants
independence. He opined that perhaps the "old warriors"
wanted independence, but the current de facto ruling elite
looks to Moscow for direction--and that the "boots on the
ground" of Russian troops underscores this. Kutelia was
doubtful that establishing direct dialogue with de facto
authorities would build political capital which could be used
against the Russians. As he put it, whenever they had tried
to establish informal links with the de facto regime,
meetings were canceled at the last minute due to KGB
intimidation of Abkhaz or there were assassination attempts
if meetings were planned in a third neutral country, like
Turkey. Kutelia said that all the Abkhaz have their families
safely tucked away in Russia, which further strengthens the

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Abkhaz-Russia bond.

Return to the Status Quo Ante
--------------


5. (C) Bryza said that he is trying to establish a new
forum with political teeth which would overshadow the Friends
format and become the primary locus of direct Abkhaz-Georgian
negotiations. In this way, the U.S. could help Georgia move
toward a political settlement. Bryza said he supported
President Saakashvili's proposal to the Abkhaz which would
permit IDP returns and create an economic zone. Bryza's idea
is to work with the Black Sea Trust and members of the
international community such the EU, UN, OSCE, Ukraine,
Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and the current members of the
Friends to implement such a plan. Such a forum will yield
positive results, build political capital with the Abkhaz
from the Georgian side, which could then be used to block
Russian political moves. This new forum would emerge
organically alongside the Group of Friends, at first to
support economic and social links between Abkhazia and the
rest of Georgia, and then evolving into a forum to support
direct Abkhaz-Georgian talks.


6. (C) Both Kezerashvili and Kutelia attributed Putin's
recent actions not only as punishment for Georgia's pursuit
of NATO membership, but also to a strong demand within
Russian domestic politics to respond to Kosovo independence.
Kutelia's big concern was that if the international community
does not react demonstrably to Russian's latest provocative
steps--Putin's announcement of withdrawing from the CIS
economic and military sanctions, the Kremlin's April 16
instructions to establish semi-official relations with the
separatist authorities, building up troops in Abkhazia--that
soon the situation will morph into a new status quo from
which all future negotiations would begin. They asked the
U.S. to help return the situation to the status quo ante.


7. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.




TEFFT