DAS BRYZA'S MEETINGS WITH GEORGIA MINISTRY OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000808 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC AND DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RU SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETINGS WITH GEORGIA MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OFFICIALS Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Bryza met on May 9 in Tbilisi with Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (MOIA) Eka Zguladze and the Head of the MOIA Analytical Department, Shota Utiashvili. On May 12, he met separately with Minister of Internal Affairs Vano Merabishvili. Bryza told Merabishvili and his deputies about his meetings with Abkhaz de facto officials and promoted the creation of a new negotiating forum to augment the existing Friends group. He urged Merabishvili to be patient while a new format is being devised. He warned that military action by Georgia will likely fail and cost Georgia not only its chance for NATO membership but also much of its support in Washington. Merabishvili was unconvinced that the Abkhaz will ever enter into serious negotiations, or that they can be dissuaded from a course that he believes will ultimately lead to their absorption into Russia. Bryza focused his discussion with Zguladze on the upcoming May 21 parliamentary elections. Zguladze is a member of the government's interagency commission on elections, and explained the Ministry of Internal Affairs' efforts to ensure police and other local government officials do not pressure voters to vote for the ruling National Movement. She said that recent amendments to the election law that allow release of only limited amounts of videotape to document alleged election-day misconduct, and that set deadlines for filing and considering election-related complaints are designed to ensure that election results are released without delay while providing adequate means to adjudicate misconduct. End Summary. TOWARD A NEW NEGOTIATING FORMAT -------------- ¶2. (C) In his meeting with Minister Merabishvili, Bryza described his May 10-11 visit to Sukhumi and his effort to convince the Abkhaz de facto government to agree to direct talks with the Georgian government. He said that the Abkhazia peace process is now drifting, and some in Tbilisi viewed the only alternatives now as war or the complete loss of Abkhazia for Georgia, both of which would be a disaster for the Georgians. Abkhaz de facto leaders moved beyond the polemics of de facto president Bagapsh,s demand that Georgian withdraw from the Kodori Gorge as a pre-condition for talks, Bryza said, and now appears interested in a real discussion of the issue. Bryza said he was heartened by public statements by de facto foreign minister Shamba to Russian TV during their joint press conference in Sukhumi that the Abkhaz see the USG as a source of security and that during the meeting, the U.S. and Abkhazia explored options for re-starting direct Abkhaz-Georgia negotiations. Shamba wants four things from the Georgians in the short run: removal of Georgian soldiers from Kodori Valley, a promise of non-resumption of hostilities, lifting of Georgia's economic sanctions against Abkhazia, and establishment of maritime transport links from Trabzon in Turkey to Sukhumi. Shamba was vague about what the Abkhaz were willing to exchange for that, Bryza said. He added that the Abkhaz seem to be increasingly worried about the ever-tightening grip of Russia on Abkhazia, especially the presence of more Russian troops and the increasing sales of land to Russian investors. ¶3. (C) Merabishvili noted the presence of new, heavily armed Russian troops in Tkvarcheli and Ochamchira, which he said are providing psychological security for the Abkhaz, and which are not peacekeepers. The troops are placed so as to block any attack by Georgian troops along the coastal highway and their presence violates the spirit of the Moscow agreements, if not the letter, Merabishvili said. Bryza agreed their removal would be an important confidence building measure. Of the 1000 new troops, Merabishvili said, 400 are supply and logistics personnel. But there are frequent visits by reconnaissance specialists from Russian units based in Russia, studying the situation in case the Russia-based units are deployed. The 600 combat troops are paratroopers and possess ten armored personnel carriers and ten large mobile artillery. The troops do not man checkpoints as peacekeepers normally do, but are based in large groups of 200-300. Their visible activity gives the Abkhaz a feeling of military superiority and detracts from their willingness to negotiate, he said. DOUBTS ABOUT ABKHAZ DISENCHANTMENT WITH RUSSIA AND READINESS TO TALK -------------- - ¶4. (C) Bryza suggested that feelings of insecurity are what have been keeping the Abkhaz from negotiating. He added that his experience in Sukhumi was that the Abkhaz are concerned about the increasing influence of Russia in the breakaway region, which could be exploited to create new room for TBILISI 00000808 002 OF 003 negotiations. Merabishvili disagreed. He said that the Abkhaz are happy to have the employment opportunities increasing Russian investment brings. Even if many ordinary people fear too much Russian investment, there are only 100 to 200 people in Abkhazia who make decisions. If those individuals gain opportunities, they will be happy, which is all that counts, Merabishvili insisted. According to Merabishvili, many Abkhaz have friends in Russia and young Abkhaz dream about studying in Moscow, not Paris or London. Only a major economic downturn in Russia could bring about change, he said. Bryza countered that Georgian policy keeps the Abkhaz population isolated and pushes them into the arms of Russia. He encouraged Merabishvili to explore opening transport links and development projects. The Abkhaz know they get no humanitarian or development assistance from Russia, he added. ¶5. (C) Bryza told Merabishvili that the United States will work with its allies to resist and roll back Russia's provocative actions, which are alienating the Europeans and gaining Georgia support from them. He said UNOMIG chief Jean Arnault had conceded it was time to find an alternative to the Friends group, which is essentially a broken mechanism. De facto president Bagapsh had suggested to him the possibility of Georgian and Abkhaz meetings where the U.S. and the Russians would be present as guarantors. Merabishvili doubted whether such a new forum was possible. The Abkhaz have decided their fate is with the Russians, he said, and predicted that in 10 years the region will be absorbed into Russia. Merabishvili said he believes the Abkhaz are content with that. Russia is becoming more developed and an easier place to do business, and Georgia can't develop fast enough to compete. It will be hard to change the Abkhaz attitude, and no Abkhaz will be willing to admit he wants the region to rejoin Georgia, he concluded. Bryza once again said that the Abkhaz now have no other option than Russia. Georgia can provide an alternative through a real negotiation supported by the international community, Bryza said. Merabishvili doubted that any Abkhaz official would meet with the Georgians, and said that in any event the Abkhaz are not ready to offer any concessions. He speculated that if Russia thinks the U.S. and Europe are not determined to resist, they will lose all fear and take direct action to incorporate Abkhazia. As the meeting closed, Bryza warned Merabishvili that war is a bad option for Georgia, and will destroy any chance for the country to enter NATO as well as cost it valuable support in Washington and European capitals. He asked Merabishvili to be open to a new strategy of negotiations. Merabishvili agreed to remain open. ¶6. (C) DAS Bryza also used his earlier meeting with Zguladze and Utiashvili to press them to support a new negotiating format. Utiashvili was more willing than Merabishvili to admit that there is concern among the Abkhaz about increasing Russian influence. However, he did not see much willingness on the part of the Abkhaz leadership to make trouble for themselves by changing direction against the wishes of Russia. ANOTHER UAV DOWNED -------------- ¶7. (C) Merabishvili confirmed that the Abkhaz had shot down a Georgian UAV on May 12 with a ground-based SS-11 missile. However, he said, the Georgian government intended to deny the incident entirely in order to keep the situation calm in the run-up to elections. He refused to speculate about whether the UAV overflights are a violation of any international agreements relating to Abkhazia. KEEPING THE ELECTIONS FAIR -------------- ¶8. (C) At the May 10 meeting, DAS Bryza told Zguladze that although the early reports about the course of the election campaign had suggested it was fairer than the presidential elections in January, lately he had been hearing about pressure on companies from the financial police and on teachers from their school administrators to support the National Movement with money and votes. Zguladze responded that teachers are being targeted by the opposition for support because they are economically vulnerable, and the National Movement is also trying to reach them in its campaign. She said that no hard facts have been presented to support pressure on teachers to vote for the National Movement. However, the Ministry is looking for a major case to prosecute in order to send an appropriate "hands off" message. She noted that one candidate was recently removed from the National Movement's party list due to inappropriate campaign tactics among teachers. Moreover, the government TBILISI 00000808 003 OF 003 has sent a message to all levels of the police, schools and other local government entities not to misuse their positions politically. Zguladze said that Georgian society is still very hierarchical and will heed such warnings. It is still up to governors to monitor the diverse groups and ensure compliance. Zguladze said that the Ministry of Interior has initiated eight criminal cases based on election day behavior during the presidential campaign. Four cases have gone to court and two individuals have been sentenced, she said. ¶9. (C) Bryza told Zguladze that opposition politicians are concerned about a provision in the new election law that allows persons who allege misconduct to review only fifteen minutes of videotape from polling place cameras before and after the time of the alleged incident. They contend that this is an intentional restriction of the opposition's ability to obtain redress for irregularities. Zguladze responded that the videotaping system was never intended to provide an alternate means of counting votes, but rather is a source of evidence for specific problems. In the first place, she noted, no other country she knew of provides such a safeguard at all. She said that after the presidential elections the ombudsman had reviewed the tapes from at least one precinct fully, counted the number of voters entering and alleged that the number of votes cast was larger than that number. Zguladze said that once voters from a special precinct (in most cases soldiers from nearby military bases) that was included in the precinct's total were counted, the numbers matched. The government's objective is to speed the vote count, she said, and allowing review of the whole day's tapes, in an effort to spot violations, would delay the final vote tally indefinitely and would not contribute to the democratic process. ¶10. (C) For similar reasons, she said, strict time limitations for filing and considering vote challenges have been enacted. Limitations such as this can seem wrong if taken out of context, but the government's goal is to have the results of the elections settled and released as soon as possible. At the same time, the new law gives complainants an opportunity they did not have before to correct technical deficiencies in their complaints, so they are more likely to be considered on their merits. DAS Bryza asked Zguladze why she did not go on television herself and make the case supporting the government's approach, since she seemed to have a reasonable explanation for every issue raised by the opposition. Zguladze declined, saying that she does not want to politicize her office. In her opinion, Parliament and the Central Election Commission are the right entities to explain the rules and the reasons for them, and have done a good job of it so far. ¶11. (C) In the May 12 meeting with DAS Bryza, Minister Merabishvili insisted that the May 21 elections will be fairer and that no real case of police misconduct in the pre-election period has been alleged. He claimed that the opposition has plans to cause civil disturbances after the elections, whatever the results, and the government will respond with the extent of force allowed by law. He has instructed law enforcement not to react to minor provocations in the pre-election period, however, such as an attempt by the opposition to nail up the doors of the Central Election Commission Chairman's office on May 1. COMMENT -------------- ¶12. (C) Comment: Merabishvili is among the most hawkish on Abkhaz issues of President Saakashvili's advisors. His despair about the deepening alliance between the Abkhaz and the Russians, and the unlikelihood of success in direct talks, reflects the views of other more hard-line advisors. DAS Bryza's conversation with Merabishvili points up the importance of a firm stance against what is seen as Russia's "creeping annexation" of Abkhazia and continued diplomacy to create a viable forum for negotiations. Both efforts require active participation by the Europeans -- and not only by Georgia's natural allies among the new members of the European Union, but also among the French, Germans and others. ¶13. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this telegram. TEFFT