REPUBLICANS COOL BUT RESIGNED TO NATIONAL MOVEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000743 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM GG SUBJECT: REPUBLICANS COOL BUT RESIGNED TO NATIONAL MOVEMENT DOMINANCE REF: TBILISI 707 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, reason 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: David Usupashvili, Chairman of the Republican Party of Georgia, spoke on April 23 with EUR/CARC Director Paul Wohlers. Usupashvili regretted the decision of Nino Burjanadze not to run for a parliamentary seat because it sets up a confrontation between the radical wing of the United National Movement (UNM) and the radical opposition. The Republican Party hopes to pick up a few of Burjanadze's disappointed supporters and garner 3-15% of the vote. However, Usupashvili sees his party as handicapped by its reluctance to join the United Opposition, which leaves an impression the party is too close to President Saakashvili. Usupashivili finds both the UNM's party list candidates, and its candidates for the majoritarian seats to be uninspiring. He fears the failure to grant a Membership Action Plan to Georgia at Bucharest raises the chances that Russia will try to foment trouble in the upcoming elections to ensure no MAP will be granted in December or later. Wohlers met supporters of a Republican Party activist from the Azerbaijani-minority town of Sadakhlo, whom Usupashvili said had been arrested for his political activism. The conversation revealed that the true facts and the connection to the activists political views were far from clear. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Usupashvili said that in his view, matters in the pre-election period are developing in the wrong direction. He is concerned about the decision of the Speaker of Parliament, Nino Burjanadze, not to run in the May 21 election. The opposition's hopes were on Burjanadze to help President Saakashvili learn from his mistakes in November and to change the electoral system. However, he said, the government ultimately broke its agreement to make the electoral changes, hammered out with Burjanadze after the January presidential elections. Burjanadze's departure leaves voters a choice of the radical pro-Saakashvili UNM and the radical anti-Saakashvili opposition. A small percentage of Burjanadze's supporters will gravitate to the Republicans, Usupashvili hopes. ¶3. (C) Usupashvili was not impressed by the UNM's list of candidates for the 75 seats to be chosen by proportional, party-list vote. To him, the UNM's list looks a bit like Shevardnadze's list in the 1999 elections. It contains persons Usupashvili regards as Zviadists (Gamsakhurdia supporters) who have little understanding of open, Western ideas and orthodox nationalists. He thinks the list is not a signal of a clean election to come or a clear signal of the UNM's party program. Others on the list were, as Usupashvili sees it, responsible for the troubles of November 2007. While Saakashvili confidant Giga Bokeria is off the list, others, like Givi Targamadze, Nika Rurua and Khatuna Goghishvili remain. Referring to the April 21 fracas over the presentation of the UNM's party list (reftel) as a bad start to the election campaign, Usupashvili wondered how anyone could expect a fair election process. Usupashvili said the Central Election Commission lost a great deal of credibility because of that incident. He cannot understand why people who know Georgia well (read USG officials) are doing nothing. ¶4. (C) In the 75 single mandate districts, Usupashvili said eighty percent of the candidates are businessmen, whom Saakashvili has pressured into running because he cannot get "respected politicians" in their districts. In two cases, Usupashvilis said, the businessman-candidates have offered to finance Republican Party candidates because they want to lose and return to their businesses. Overall, he predicts the opposition will win 60% of the proportional seats and 50% of the majoritarian, single mandate seats. The Republicans will garner 3-15% of the vote, he thinks. He says that the Republicans will not do well if they campaign on the issues rather than an anti-Saakashvili line. But the party faces a dilemma, because if it takes a hard line against Saakashvili, the electorate will wonder why they are not part of the United Opposition. As it is, by not joining the opposition, the Republicans' image has suffered from being seen as in league with Saakashvili and with the Americans. ¶5. (C) Usupashvili thinks the failure to secure a Membership Action Plan at Bucharest gave power to Russia by making a fair election a condition for NATO membership. Usupashvili estimates that at least four parties contending in the May 21 election are directed from Moscow. The temptation will be strong for the the Russians to interfere and make the election a "shameful" event. He added that by provoking a "small war" in Abkhazia, the Russians can change the status quo, which in turn would give the West a reason to change its TBILISI 00000743 002 OF 002 heretofore steadfast support for Georgia's sovereignty over the territory. ¶6. (C) In the end, Usupashvili said, the UNM has only repression, administrative resources and money to achieve victory. While the meeting was taking place, Usupashvili received a report of the arrest of a protester outside the President's office, Irakli Kakabadze, which Usupashvili found illustrative. Then Usupashvili complained that a Republican Party organizer in the Azerbaijani minority town of Sadakhlo was arrested, ostensibly for not paying back a loan to a bank, but in reality for his political activities. He also complained about police circulating around Republican Party offices in Marneuli, Bolnisi and other Azerbaijani minority towns. It later turned out that Kakabadze was arrested for painting grafitti on the Chancery building and his intention was very likely to provoke an arrest. Wohlers had a chance to meet supporters of the Republican Party organizer from Sadakhlo, and the conversation showed that the person in question was indeed in arrears on his loan and the bank was the German-owned Pro-Credit Bank, which we regard as an unlikely conduit for UNM pressure. In short, the situation was far from crystal clear and the debtor's Republican Party activism may not have been the source of his troubles as Usupashvili assumed. ¶7. (U) Paul Wohlers did not have a chance to clear this telegram. TEFFT