THE TROUBLE WITH GEORGIA'S OPPOSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 000503 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM GG SUBJECT: THE TROUBLE WITH GEORGIA'S OPPOSITION REF: A. TBILISI 444 ¶B. TBILISI 364 ¶C. TBILISI 437 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Mark X. Perry for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Recent protests and a hunger strike (ref A) by opposition MPs demonstrate the continuing radicalization of Georgia's opposition. The opposition's confrontational style and inability to negotiate effectively with the government beg the more important question: Why is Georgia's opposition so ineffective? In Georgia, the problem is not the lack of an opposition, but rather the state of the opposition and Georgian political culture. Fragmented, devoid of effective leaders who shine in the spotlight, politically immature, and without a clear agenda, the opposition is at pains to articulate any public platform or goals. Although they compelled the ruling National Movement (UNM) to negotiate (ref B),they have been unable to cement an agreement among themselves or with the UNM. One underlying cause of the opposition's incoherence is that Georgia has no history of multi-party governance. No precedent exists in the country's history for a democratic transfer of power. This lack of political experience challenges all of Georgia's parties and largely explains the current situation. Despite the opposition's poor state, they have made some notable progress and we should not write them off just yet. They, or those who will follow them, are critical to Georgia's democratic development. The government's current denunciations of the opposition notwithstanding, many Georgians recall current authorities using the opposition's same tactics not so long ago. End Summary. -------------- Opposition Protests, Hunger Strike Continues -------------- ¶2. (U) A review of the past few weeks provides a snapshot of the opposition's inconsistent and often extreme tactics. On March 9, the United National Council of Opposition (UNC) staged a protest before Parliament. The opposition New Rightists began a hunger strike (ref A) the next day in Speaker Burjanadze's Parliamentary office. On March 14 Burjanadze called on the opposition to halt their hunger strike and resume dialogue. The opposition responded with a call for Burjanadze's resignation and another street protest on March 16. Meanwhile, MP and former presidential candidate Levan Gachechiladze has used increasingly vulgar language to publicly deride both Burjanadze and President Saakashvili. The hunger strike continued on March 21. The same day, Burjanadze refused the "compromise proposal" the opposition put forth after meeting with the Georgian Orthodox Church Patriarch. These actions confirm Post's earlier forecast of further radicalization in Georgia's opposition, but beg the more important question: Why is Georgia's opposition so ineffective? -------------- The Problems with the Opposition -------------- ¶3. (C) During his November 2, 2007 visit to Tbilisi, EUR Assistant Secretary Daniel Fried said that, like any functioning democracy, "Georgia needs a strong, active opposition." In Georgia, the problem is not the lack of an opposition, but rather two things: the state of the opposition itself, and Georgia's immature political culture. The country lacks any experience with a multi-party system or a democratic transfer of power between governments. During a recent roundtable on election code reform, an Estonian elections consultant told Poloff, "The problem here is with the (political) culture. Neither side trusts the other. The Georgians are basically where we were in 1994." -------------- Internal Challenges -------------- ¶4. (C) Currently, the opposition (including the UNC as well as the Republican, New Rights, Christian Democrats, and Labor parties) suffers from multiple problems. First and foremost, the opposition is fragmented into multiple, disparate parties. Egotistical personalities regularly form new individual parties (five new ones in the past two weeks) they can chair, rather than play a supporting role in an established party. Many of these weakened parties now face widening cracks within their own ranks (the Republicans left the UNC, key lieutenants have left Okruashvili's Movement for TBILISI 00000503 002 OF 004 a United Georgia, and 15 of Gachechiladze's election headquarters staff quit citing his "uncertain" political vision). ¶5. (C) Complicating matters, even when the opposition MPs work together they have no power to check the UNM's constitutional (two-thirds, plus one) majority in Parliament. Having been rendered impotent in the voting process, the opposition MPs have taken the symbolic stand of boycotting Parliament on all issues except national security. This only further removes them from any involvement in the democratic process. ¶6. (C) General difficulties the opposition parties face include a dearth of skillful, charismatic political leaders. To overcome this lack of natural talent, many opposition leaders compensate with increased volume. Furthermore, no opposition parties have clearly articulated programs or platforms in a broad way to the public. ¶7. (C) A further problem is that the opposition possesses no meaningful funds with which to pursue its agenda. Opposition leaders often argue that Saakashvili's UNM extorts "campaign contributions" from large businesses in Georgia. True or not, the opposition parties have no significant benefactors since the death of businessman Badri Patarkatsishvili. ¶8. (C) In the face of their powerless position, the opposition has generally displayed little strategic thinking or consistent tactics. The main "unity" of the united opposition largely consists of jointly trying to oust President Saakashvili from power, so that they can seize it themselves - hence the second problem. Opposition parties tend to do little real research to identify issues with voters, and don't always trust the results of independent research, such as the Post-funded IRI political surveys (ref C). -------------- Some Real Accomplishments -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite the myriad challenges, the opposition is neither totally inept, nor stupid. Since November 2007, the UNC has held together longer than anyone thought possible, notwithstanding the Republican Party's recent departure. The opposition challenged Saakashvili in the January 5 election and showed the entire country that Saakashvili's once unanimous support no longer exists. With a combination of public pressure in the street and reaching out behind the scenes, they brought the UNM to the negotiating table on a diverse range of issues. Consequently, the UNC did achieve some measure of success over the past six months. Examples include: Saakashvili's resignation and the ensuing presidential campaign, lowering the party-list threshold for Parliament to five percent, restoring parliamentary elections to the spring, and adding opposition representation to the electoral commissions. -------------- Closing the Deal -------------- ¶10. (C) However, politics in Georgia is a rough business, and the UNM plays the game better than anyone on the other side. The opposition and UNC have been unable to come to consensus among themselves on many issues. The UNM has, and will, exploit this vulnerability every time. Republican Party Chairman David Usupashvili told Poloff, after trying to negotiate between the UNC and Burjanadze, that he "understands now why every opposition politician wants their own party, so they can always get their way." ¶11. (C) The art of compromise does not much exist in Georgia, and can hardly be seen at all among the opposition politicians. Even when they can reach agreement with the government, they have been hard pressed to close the deal. Often, the UNM will agree to something (such as lowering the threshold or changing the majoritarian system),but will exploit the opposition's inability to agree to newly-attached conditions prior to setting the government concessions in stone. The opposition has not figured out how to pocket a concrete agreement, and use it to build their political capital toward future issues. Rather, when they realize they have been had by the UNM, their primary reaction has been to resort to the street and denounce the government. Often, they follow this emotional action with equally immature rhetoric. -------------- All is Not Yet Lost TBILISI 00000503 003 OF 004 -------------- ¶12. (C) The UNC is badly worn down from their hunger strike and has lost public standing. Still, the opposition has some opportunity with a public that appears hungry for an alternative to the UNM's perceived heavy-handedness. The fact that people are tired of the protests does not reflect increased support for the current government. A recent survey by the local think tank, the International Center for Conflict and Negotiation, showed that Saakashvili and his government are not all that popular. The results showed that respondents anticipate some significant change in government after the parliamentary elections. IRI's February poll results (ref C) showed that roughly one-third of the country does not like Saakashvili, nor many of his cabinet members. Although UNM government leaders currently denounce the opposition's protests and rhetoric, many Georgians remember well these same officials protesting and joining in hunger strikes not so long ago when Shevardnadze was President. In fact, many in the current government were allied with many in the current opposition in bringing about the Rose Revolution. For example, Gachechiladze served as Saakashvili's parliamentary campaign manager in 2001, and the two worked closely together during the revolution. ¶13. (C) Some opposition politicians, notably Usupashvili and the Industrialists' Zurab Tkemeladze, have opposed calls for further radicalization. They continue to desire legitimate compromise with the UNM that will allow their parties a bona fide chance to earn true representation in Parliament. Without better funding and some engaging candidates (like Saakashvili, who is a natural at working the crowds and debating the issues),this remains a daunting task. Given the UNM hard-liners' propensity to press their current advantage and stack the deck for elections and composition of Parliament in their favor, the opposition has their work cut out for them. -------------- The Way Ahead -------------- ¶14. (C) The future of democratic development in Georgia requires that a stronger opposition form, in order to make Parliament a bona fide check on the executive branch. This will also require the evolution of Georgian political culture to accommodate multiple parties, political compromise, and governance without an unchecked majority. ¶15. (C) How can this happen? Among the current opposition, there is not a great deal with which to work. The opposition is incredibly weak and the UNM has demonstrated scant willingness to make unilateral moves to surrender any of their real power, even in the interest of building democracy. The UNM's argument is that it cannot willingly give up power to an opposition so radicalized that it has announced it will impeach President Saakashvili. After the May parliamentary elections -- the last in Saakashvili's presidency -- this argument will be less convincing. Post continues to encourage dialogue and compromise between the sides. As importantly, Post continues to believe that truly fair parliamentary elections are the best way forward - and is providing assistance toward these. -------------- Other Opposition Possibilities? -------------- ¶16. (C) The UNM has flaked off a bit at the edges already, but it has never been riven in two. Besides a slow maturing by today's opposition leaders, another possibility is a major fracture in the UNM. Last year, Irakli Okruashvili was unable to pull away sufficient support to make himself viable. We know that Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze has toyed with the idea, but for the time being has rejected it. Such a split has occurred in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe within a short time after their democratic revolutions, but Saakashvili's movement has proved unusually durable. There is no guarantee that two, or perhaps more, parties resulting from a split would be stronger or any less personality-driven than in the current situation. ¶17. (C) Another unrealized possibility lies in the trade union movement in Georgia. The 350,000 union members in Georgia have distinct needs and concerns, which are shared by a large number of their family and friends. The unions have only recently ousted corrupt and ineffective leaders and are just beginning to find their voice as representatives of the workers in collective bargaining, against some significant odds. For the time being, they have pronounced themselves apolitical, which has been a historically wise choice in the TBILISI 00000503 004 OF 004 former Soviet Union. However, the labor unions, loosely unified under Georgia's version of the AFL-CIO, the Georgia Trades Union Council (GTUC),form a block of votes that properly organized could be mobilized for any candidate, as is the case in the United States. The GTUC member unions can be somewhat fractious, but if the union leadership could articulate a program, and party candidates would compete for their support, it might result in a stronger, more issues-based opposition. The Embassy recently sponsored an International Visitor program for the GTUC president and several other labor leaders, who came away impressed by the way the labor movement in the United States participates in the political process. More such experiences and encouragement might spark a salutory move into politics on the unions' part, despite the risks. -------------- May Elections and Beyond -------------- ¶18. (C) For now, however, the responsible opposition that exists should be encouraged toward competing to the best of its ability in the upcoming elections and must avoid the temptation to boycott. Similarly, any push by the UNM to unfairly gain an exaggerated advantage in Parliament (whether by coercion or administrative means) should be rejected, as this will only further alienate the government from the people and lead to more opportunity for an undemocratic opposition personality to emerge. The best outcome for the foreseeable future is likely to be a Parliament in which the opposition has a greater role, obliging it to become more responsible. This would lay the groundwork for the opposition to put forth ideas that resonate with the public, and to find candidates who can effectively carry that message. PERRY