GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA, TORN BETWEEN TWO LOVERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TBILISI 002174 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RU GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: ABKHAZIA, TORN BETWEEN TWO LOVERS Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. Two recent encounters with the Abkhaz de facto leadership produced two different perspectives on the current Abkhaz outlook. UN Special Representative Verbeke concluded that the Abkhaz realize they have burned their bridges with most of the international community and, for good or ill, are committed to a "marriage" with Russia. EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund, on the other hand, after a visit to Sukhumi and Gali, argued that the Abkhaz are still very interested in cooperation with Europe and don't want to be left alone with Russia. It is not necessarily true that one of these two accounts is wrong; they probably represent the two poles of Abkhazia's internal struggle to grapple with its future course. Eklund's account of his trip to Abkhazia exposed rifts within the EU about the appropriate level of engagement with Abkhazia at this time, with the French Ambassador here (representing the EU Presidency) arguing against Eklund's point of view in an EU Monitoring Mission briefing, noting that the Abkhaz should not be able to get EU assistance if they will not accept the EU Monitoring Mission in Abkhazia. In the French view, if Abkhazia still wants engagement, it should be expected to make reasonable concessions on security and the humanitarian situation. End summary and comment. Verbeke: A Bride in Hand . . . ¶2. (C) UN Special Representative Johan Verbeke, who has an office in Sukhumi, told the Ambassador November 13 about recent conversations he held with the Abkhaz leadership, including de facto "President" Bagapsh and "Foreign Minister" Shamba. Verbeke contrasted the conversations with those from a month earlier, when he had first arrived. In the earlier meetings, the Abkhaz were still hoping to cultivate relationships wih countries other than Russia, including in particular Europe. To Verbeke they seemed at the time to be playing a game with Russia, in which they accepted that they would enjoy only quasi-independence (i.e., dependence on Russia) for a while, but would later seek a more robust version that would allow for broader relationships. Now, however, Verbeke sensed a significant change in their attitude: they seem to have accepted that, for good or ill, they have made a choice to orient themselves completely toward Russia. Although this would probably not have been their ideal choice, they now seem to Verbeke to realize that, by aligning themselves so closely with Russia, they have effectively cut off the possibility of broader relationships. ¶3. (C) Verbeke went on to draw the analogy of a man choosing a wife. Although he might be tempted to wait around for his dream mate, he ultimately might also decide to go with a reasonably acceptable, if not perfect, bride. According to Verbeke, Abkhazia seems to have accepted that Russia is its bride, and it's now too late to go back. By accepting this decision, Abkhazia thinks it now has more clarity on its future and can pursue Russian engagement and investment without constantly second-guessing itself. It realizes it has closed a window, but it has come to terms with that decision. Eklund: The EU is Welcome ¶4. (C) At the weekly EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) briefing on November 20, EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund told members QNovember 20, EU Ambassador to Georgia Per Eklund told members of the diplomatic community about his recent trip to Abkhazia. (Note: Post believes this was the first trip to Abkhazia by the chief of a bilateral mission since the war; Verbeke is the only other COM who has made the trip, as far as we are aware. End note.) He explained that the Abkhaz with whom he met, including Shamba, expressed great interest in continued engagement with the EU, including in particular on assistance programs in such areas as shelter, sanitation and schools. The only complication to continued cooperation was that Abkhazia couldn't accept assistance designated for Georgia. Eklund seemed to suggest that the EU should seek to take advantage of this openness. (Note: The EU is the largest donor currently running programs in Abkhazia, with seven ongoing programs. Working-level officials have been traveling to Abkhazia on the EU's behalf since the war. End note.) In a later conversation, the DCM asked Eklund whether he had seen any sign of the attitude Verbeke described; Eklund said no, that all the Abkhaz he saw seemed as ready as ever to develop relationships with various partners. To Engage or Not to Engage: an Intra-EU Dispute ¶5. (C) French Ambassador Eric Fournier offered an unusually pointed rejoinder to Eklund's remarks during the weekly EUMM briefing session. Referring to an earlier report from the EUMM that Abkhazia was unwilling to accept EUMM monitors, Fournier questioned whether the EU should allow Abkhazia to selectively accept assistance from the EU but not the EUMM. He suggested that this pick-and-choose approach to engagement was Abkhazia's clever way of achieving a kind of "soft recognition," because it could receive the support it needed to improve conditions while reinforcing a sense of reality about its territorial boundary and legitimacy. Fournier went on to criticize the de facto authorities in sharp language for maintaining the Georgian population of Gali as "hostages," questioning whether the EU should support such a regime. After a moment of tense silence, Eklund responded icily that EU members would clearly need to continue this discussion in another forum. ¶6. (C) In his conversation with the DCM, Eklund offered a bit of background to the exchange. Fournier, in his capacity as representative of the current EU president, had objected to and tried to block Eklund's trip to Abkhazia. Eklund, however, had himself objected to Fournier's intervention, maintaining that the EU president had no authority to interfere with the EU's bilateral mission in Georgia. The exchange at the EUMM briefing thus reflected a still-unresolved dispute within the EU membership about how best to approach the current situation in Abkhazia. Comment: Torn Between Two Lovers ¶7. (C) To a greater extent than South Ossetia, Abkhazia has over the years tried to keep open the possibility of engagement with countries other than Russia. According to Verbeke, the Abkhaz maintained this hope even after the war, but then lost it as they realized the scope of international disapproval of Russia's recognition. Considering Abkhazia's pressing needs for development, it is understandable that at some point they might realize that they cannot wait around forever for their ideal arrangement and decide to throw in their lot with Russia alone. As Eklund's experience shows, however, they likely still harbor hopes for additional partners and financial assistance and will continue to pursue such opportunities whenever possible. The question for the international community is to what extent we should maintain the pressure on Abkhazia, and Russia, by keeping them isolated, and to what extent we should seek to engage with them, at the risk of lending further legitimacy. It is a tricky balance, as the intra-EU spat demonstrates. Fournier's trenchant objection to Abkhazia's selective approach points toward a reasonable balance. Engagement must be tied to cooperation in all areas, including reasonable steps to improve security and the humanitarian situation, such as accepting EU monitors. TEFFT