SCENESETTER FOR GEO MINDEF DAVIT KEZERASHVILI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000207 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2023 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL RU GG SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GEO MINDEF DAVIT KEZERASHVILI COUNTERPART VISIT TO SECDEF 18-23 FEBRUARY 2008 Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C//NF) Summary: Continued U.S. support for Georgia's NATO aspirations and mil-mil cooperation will likely dominate your meeting with Minister of Defense Kezerashvili. The development and reform of the Georgian Armed Forces into a NATO interoperable force is part of the foundation for a Georgian security and foreign policy aimed at integrating Georgia into Europe. Georgia's contributions to Iraq and Kosovo have demonstrated Georgia's willingness to participate in global security operations and while this participation serves Georgia's interests it also supports long term U.S. strategic goals in the region. Currently negotiations are ongoing to ensure Georgia's continued participation in these operations. While the political will exists to continue participating in these operations, the Georgian Armed Forces recognizes the need for continued U.S. military assistance in order to transform their force into a viable force that can secure the Georgian people as well as continue to contribute as security provider on the world stage. End Summary. Political background and Internal Issues Impacting Georgian Security Decisions: ¶2. (U) When President Saakashvili took office in 2004, Georgia was nearly a failed state, but it is much changed now. Georgia is a strategically significant country to the United States because of its government's commitment to democracy, independence from Russia, free market economic reform and control of corruption, its aspirations for NATO and EU membership, and support for the War on Terrorism, most notably by the contribution of 2000 troops to Iraq coalition forces. Georgia has the third largest contingent of troops in Iraq. Its success or failure sends a distinct message to other countries of the former Soviet Union, and in the Middle East as well, about the wisdom of a Western-oriented, democratic, free market orientation. Additionally, Georgia sits astride the main alternative corridor for trade in oil, gas and other goods to Europe from Central Asia and farther East. Without Georgia's cooperation, no strategy for bringing additional Azeri, Kazakh or Turkmen oil and gas to the world market without passing through Russia can succeed. These facts begin to explain as well why Russia is openly hostile to Saakashvili's vision of an independent Georgia. ¶3. (U) Recent election - The January 5 presidential election was judged by the U.S. Embassy, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe to be, despite some problems, in essence consistent with most international standards for democratic elections. There were problems, however, which the Georgian government has committed to address before parliamentary elections in the spring. ¶4. (U) Separatist regions - Georgia's long-simmering problems with its separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could erupt in controversy in February when Kosovo will likely declare independence. Russia has threatened to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if the U.S. and Europeans recognize Kosovo, recent remarks by Russian FORMIN Lavrov notwithstanding. Such a move by Russia, which has long supported the separatist regimes, will be extremely destabilizing to the government of Georgia. We believe the government is sufficiently committed to its NATO membership drive that it would not jeopardize that goal by taking military action. It will, however, have to resist internal pressure to do so. ¶5. (U) Energy issues - Georgia hosts a major gas pipeline from Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field to Turkey. It also facilitates transit of millions of barrels of Azeri and Kazakh oil via pipelines and rail transport. Where Georgia was subject to frequent blackouts in 2003, it has greatly increased output of hydroelectric power and is now supplying paying customers with reliable 24 hour electricity. It still needs large amounts of expensive Russian gas, especially in winter, but in 2007 it began receiving significant amounts of gas from Azerbaijan. Over time Georgia will be less and less dependent on Russian supplies. Military Related Issues ¶6. (C//NF) Future Georgian Contribution to Operations in Iraq: The 1st Georgian Infantry Brigade relieved the 3rd Georgian Infantry Brigade at Forward Operating Base Delta in Iraq on 4 February 2008, and is currently scheduled to re-deploy on 30 JUN 2008. Following the re-deployment of 3rd Brigade, Georgia will leave a contingent of 500 soldiers in TBILISI 00000207 002 OF 003 Iraq until such time as the U.S. says that Georgian participation OIF is no longer needed. Letters recently sent by DASD Cagan and MNF-I have requested that the Georgian Government extend the Georgian military's deployment to Wasit Province until the end of 2008. Negotiations to that effect began with DASD Cagan,s visit to Tbilisi in January of 2008 and are on-going. The current Georgian position is that the relatively newly-formed 4th Brigade is the only unit that can reasonably follow the 1st Brigade, and that a transfer of authority can take place no later than August 2008. The Georgians have offered 4th Brigade for the mission. Initial indications are that should the U.S. assist in training the unit; the MOD will equip the unit with national funds. Many details on the specifics remain to be discussed, including to what standard the unit must be equipped. Kezerashvili is certain to raise this subject but it seems unlikely that he will be empowered to conclude a final agreement with President Saakashvili,s forthcoming visit to the White House, tentatively scheduled for March of 2008. ¶7. (S//NF) Operational Effectiveness of Georgian Units: MND-C is so pleased with Georgian performance to date that they have asked them to assume another off-FOB mission. The Georgian 3rd Brigade was targeted by insurgents in Wasit Province with mortars, direct fire and IEDs, including EFP devices in NOV/DEC 2008. The Iranians subsequently threatened attacks targeting Georgian forces as punishment for the GoG's extradition of Iranian arms merchant Amir Ardebeli on 26 JAN ¶08. ¶8. (C) Special Forces: The Georgian Special Forces Brigade recently reorganized into a battalion structure and has completed the move to a new base in the Dighomi area of Tbilisi. ODC-Tbilisi is currently executing the Special Forces Capacity Building Program (SFCBP),for which SOCEUR is the executive agent. Since this program is largely but not exclusively funded by 1206, there cannot be a specific linkage between the SFCBP and the deployment of Georgian Special Forces to Afghanistan, though that is the Georgian intent. The MOD hopes that when the first SF company completes the program in June 2008 that they will be certified for operations as a part of ISAF. The SFCBP has a focus on foreign internal defense, as that is what the most likely Georgian SOF mission in ISAF would be, though it includes advanced infantry skills and basic direct action missions. Due to the specific needs of the unit, the SFCBP will be a composite of JCET training exercises and contractor based training. ¶9. (U) NATO and ISAF: The Georgian military leadership desires closer ties to NATO as well as continued close ties with the US military. Georgia has offered to NATO company sized SF units for deployment to Afghanistan for six-months at a time, which we,ve folded into the SFCBP timeline. Georgia has additionally requested that these forces be geographically co-located with U.S. SOF within the ISAF theater, with the understanding that Georgian SF will work under ISAF while U.S. SOF will not. Georgian is already participating in ISAF with a detail of medical professionals deployed in support of a Lithuanian PRT and the Georgians are in negotiations with the French and Dutch to assist them in Afghanistan as well. ¶10. (C) Current Trends: Rumors suggest that by the time of the delegations arrival that there will be an across-the-board promotion for senior military members. Current Chief of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Staff Colonel Zaza Gogava is rumored to be promoted to Brigadier General the week of 4-8 FEB, with all three Deputy Chiefs of Defense being promoted from LTC to COL. This is likely a response to NATO IS/IMS and several senior U.S. VIPs comments that the current Georgian military rank structure is a disadvantage for Georgia, and that the CHOD needs to be a General Officer. It is premature to think that these promotions herald the beginning of a serious effort to revise and rationalize the Georgian officer rank structure, though a program to do so has existed for at least six months. ¶11. (C) Minister of Defense Kezerashvili and his assistants continue to push ahead with reform programs. The January 2008 PARP assessment visit was largely positive noting meaningful progress in many areas, while noting the absence of evidence that more complex programs are being implemented (specifically, PPBS and the afore-mentioned uniformed human resources management program). ¶12. (C) The November protests, crackdown and subsequent state of emergency have done significant damage to Georgia,s MAP case to some NATO allies. European countries that were reticent about Georgia,s accession to NATO for unrelated TBILISI 00000207 003 OF 003 reasons (their relationship with Russia) now have ample ammunition to deny Georgia MAP for violations of democratic principles. Georgia is attempting to regain the high ground after the fall crisis be redoubling it efforts on continued reform. We should encourage this strategy. TEFFT