GEORGIA: EUMM SEEKS TO FORMALIZE ARRANGEMENTS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 002050 SIPDIS DEPT FOR GEORGIA COORDINATION GROUP AND EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RU GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: EUMM SEEKS TO FORMALIZE ARRANGEMENTS ON THE GROUND Classified By: CDA KENT LOGSDON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) has made some progress in expanding its reach and effectiveness by making initial contact with Russian and South Ossetian authorities, increasing its patrols, and initiating discussions with Georgian authorities on an agreement to provide advance notice re force movements and a second agreement to be signed with all three parties on law enforcement cooperation. Direct contact with the Russians and South Ossetians is clearly important, and the increased frequency of patrols is helpful in the face of continuing incidents along the de facto boundaries. The agreements could be useful, but all sides are unlikely to agree to them in the short term. Georgia's willingness to report force movements could score diplomatic points, and we have encouraged the EUMM to seek a similar agreement with Russia to throw Georgia's cooperation in starker relief. Despite these positive developments, post believes the EUMM needs to be a bit more realistic in its assessment of the situation on the ground. End summary and comment. INITIAL MEETINGS WITH SOUTH OSSETIANS ¶2. (SBU) In his October 30 weekly briefing for ambassadors, EUMM Head of Mission Hansjorg Haber noted that the EUMM had made initial contact with South Ossetian officials on October ¶27. EUMM officials crossed the administrative boundary at four different places that week, meeting with Russian officials at Ergneti and Koshka and South Ossetian officials at Monasteri and Akhmaji. An EUMM patrol was also allowed to cross at Monasteri a second time and continue to the village of Abrevi; South Ossetian forces explained they were allowing this movement, which was not simply a meeting at the boundary but an actual patrol, because the EUMM was conducting a "civilian" patrol. ¶3. (SBU) Haber noted that the four meetings had allowed the EUMM to establish initial working-level contacts with the Russian commander of Tskhinvali, Colonel Tarasov, and the South Ossetian "minister" of internal affairs, Mikhail Mindzayev. Haber said he would be willing to meet separately with the South Ossetians one or two more times, but at that point would insist on Georgian involvement in any future meetings. The Georgian side has told Haber it is ready to meet with South Ossetians to discuss practical issues. The South Ossetian side indicated it was not opposed in principle to working with the Georgian ministry of internal affairs, but was not "morally and psychologically ready" at the moment. At a November 3 meeting with Charge, however, Haber expressed frustration with the November 1 "government shuffle" in South Ossetia, noting that he would have to find a new contact, now that Mindzayev had been replaced. ¶4. (SBU) A member of Haber's staff noted that the initial October 27 meeting with South Ossetians was preceded by an abortive attempt to meet on October 26, which the South Ossetian side tried to use--and may have intentionally staged--as a propaganda tool. The South Ossetians invited the EUMM to meet on October 26 at Didi Gromi, but did not appear at the appointed time; the EUMM waited 90 minutes, then left. An item later appeared in the Ossetian press accusing the EUMM of crossing the administrative boundary and Qaccusing the EUMM of crossing the administrative boundary and thereby violating its mandate. DRAFT AGREEMENTS ¶5. (C) Haber explained that the EUMM had proposed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Georgian Ministry of Defense to establish a protocol for informing the EUMM of any military movements near the administrative boundary. Haber explained that the EUMM's quest for such an agreement arose out of the diplomatic commitment President Saakashvili made to President Sarkozy regarding the non-use of force. Although the MoD's reaction was initially positive, it later hesitated out of concern that such an agreement would be a breach of Georgia's sovereignty. Georgia also noted that the agreement's proposed territorial scope would come very close to Tbilisi, and emphasized the importance of being able to move troops as necessary to defend Tbilisi, especially with an apparently increased Russian presence in southeastern South Ossetia, in particular in the Akhalgori Valley. Haber noted that so far he had not seen any violations of the Georgian government's oral pledge to the EUMM to keep military units out of the areas adjacent to South Ossetia, but the government was pushing the envelope with a small TBILISI 00002050 002 OF 003 presence to the east of the Akhalgori Valley. He added he had seen some progress on distinguishing between actual military units and special forces of the Interior Ministry, but would like to see more. ¶6. (SBU) The Charge asked if the EUMM planned to seek a similar MOU with the Russian side; Haber seemed surprised by the question and said no. The Charge suggested that such a move, in addition to being more balanced, might make it easier for the Georgian side to take such a step. Estonian Ambassador Toomas Lukk strongly concurred. Haber expressed two concerns: that the EUMM would have no way of verifying Russian actions, and that the EUMM could not sign anything that would confer legitimacy on South Ossetia. He ultimately agreed to consider the idea, but without much apparent enthusiasm. At a subsequent November 3 meeting with the Charge, Haber said that the Georgians had been in touch to express interest in continuing the discussion about signing this MOU and that the EUMM planned to reengage and was ready to negotiate the wording of the text. ¶7. (SBU) Haber told the Ambassadors that the EUMM had proposed a less formal agreement among the Georgian, Russian and South Ossetian sides to establish a working-level arrangement for law enforcement bodies to cooperate. The idea would be to enable direct discussions on security incidents and arrangements for working together to respond, such as a hotline. Haber raised the issue again with the Charge on November 3, suggesting that such a mechanism might help the parties ensure that the regular "border" flare-ups did not escalate. According to Haber, the Georgian side expressed interest, although had some questions; the EUMM has heard nothing so far from the other two parties. ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS ¶8. (SBU) Haber explained that in Brussels he had proposed some administrative changes to the EUMM. In particular, in order to strengthen the mission's disposition around South Ossetia, the EUMM might reduce the geographic purview of the Gori field office, in order to enable it to cover its territory more effectively, adding some extra territory to the Tbilisi office's mandate. The mission would also seek to increase the number of patrols it runs out of Gori, in particular night patrols, which it will seek to conduct all night. That week the EUMM had drastically increased its total number of patrols from 115 the previous week to 495, including 45 night patrols (an increase from 19). The mission was also seeking to improve its Rapid Reaction Force's ability to respond to incidents in western Georgia. ¶9. (SBU) Haber noted that the mission would like to establish a more balanced mix of nationalities within individual patrols, because a patrol staffed by personnel from the same country might have a different set of priorities than a patrol from a different country. Practical considerations, however, such as language compatibility and the fact that some countries had contributed vehicles in tandem with observers, made this easier said than done. The mission was also trying to improve its Georgian language capacity; virtually all of its current interpreters speak only Russian. SPECIFIC POINTS OF CONCERN: PEREVI, ERITSKALI AND KODORI ¶10. (SBU) Haber reported that on October 26, an EUMM patrol was stopped at the Russian checkpoint outside Perevi. Qwas stopped at the Russian checkpoint outside Perevi. Russian troops have on two occasions admitted to EUMM patrols that their checkpoint is outside of South Ossetia (OSCE has reported hearing the same admission),and all maps indicate the village itself is outside. Nevertheless, the troops insisted they had to escort the patrol into the village. Because they had no vehicles, however, the Russians insisted the EUMM patrol proceed on foot into the village. Local villagers, who are primarily farmers, reported that they are unable to access the meadows across the boundary, which they customarily use for grazing their cattle. The EUMM also heard that South Ossetian forces plan to establish a checkpoint north of Perevi. The road leading north out of the village of Perevi turns to the east and enters South Ossetia; it is not clear exactly where a new South Ossetian checkpoint would stand. ¶11. (SBU) An EUMM staff member reviewed the events of October 25 in Eritskali (see septel),in which EUMM monitors actually witnessed an exploson that killed two, including the local head of administration. Haber later said EUMM monitors had TBILISI 00002050 003 OF 003 heard from locals that the attack may have been a "settling of accounts," seeming to downplay the potential political import of the event. He also later expressed satisfaction that this had been the only fatal incident along the two administrative boundaries since the EUMM began its operations, adding that Brussels was also "pleasantly surprised" by the relative lack of serious incidents. ¶12. (SBU) A member of Haber's staff reported that the EUMM conducted its first patrol into the Kodori Valley, going as far as the Khida Pass, from which it saw a Russian checkpoint. The EUMM did not attempt to pass the checkpoint. COMMENT: THE GLASS MAY HAVE SOME WATER, BUT IS NOT YET HALF FULL ¶13. (C) Considering that it has been on the ground for less than a month, the EUMM has made impressive strides in establishing itself and contributing to stability on the ground. Establishing contacts with the Russians and South Ossetians is a positive development; the administrative adjustments they propose will most likely improve their operations; and the agreements they have proposed could ultimately make a real difference in reducing the chance of violence. However, challenges remain. The Russian side should have provided a good contact weeks ago; it is not clear that the EUMM yet has one with the South Ossetian side, and in any case the Ossetians have not shown themselves as reliable partners. The agreements will be a long time coming; even if the Georgians agree to a unilateral commitment, they will at best gain a diplomatic victory in the short term. Most importantly, it may be that EUMM is underestimating the seriousness of current flashpoints. The South Ossetian administrative boundary has not seen any deaths in recent weeks, but it has seen several incidents that could easily have ended in fatalities. The Eritskali events were more serious than Haber seemed to suggest, and he was not even aware of several other deaths in the Gali region reported in the press. Although the proposed agreements represent an important step toward medium-term cooperation and conflict prevention, we are still in the stage of averting immediate threats. End comment. LOGSDON