GEORGIA: RUSSIAN FORCES WITHDRAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001868

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR GEORGIA MONITORING GROUP AND EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: RUSSIAN FORCES WITHDRAW

REF: TBILISI 1847

Classified By: DCM KENT LOGSDON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary and comment. Multiple sources confirm
Russian forces withdrew from nearly all remaining posts on
undisputed Georgian territory on October 8, two days before
the deadline. Russian military and local Georgian officials
signed documents transferring the points outside Abkhazia
back to Georgia; Russian officials sought to sign similar
documents with EUMM monitors for the points outside South
Ossetia, but the EUMM refused. Both uniformed and special
forces of the Georgian Interior Ministry began moving into
the areas abandoned by the Russians; they will reportedly
establish ten offices in the areas adjacent to South Ossetia,
where they had two before the conflict. As Georgian forces
approach the administrative boundary of South Ossetia, all
eyes will be on how they manage to maintain order with
Ossetian forces nearby. The EUMM hopes to facilitate
communication between the Georgians and the Ossetians through
this process. Akhalgori remains an area of particular
concern. There is real potential for misunderstanding among
various parties about the EUMM's proper role in ensuring
security. End summary and comment.

RUSSIANS DEPART


2. (C) EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). OSCE and UNOMIG sources
confirmed that Russian forces withdrew from nearly all the
remaining posts in undisputed Georgian territory October 8.
Outside Abkhazia only one post remains, near Pakhulani.
UNOMIG understood this post to be outside the Abkhaz
administrative boundary, but Russian forces at the post said
it was inside Abkhazia and they would not be leaving. UNOMIG
noted to the Embassy, however, that Colonel Rogozin,
commander of Russian forces in western Georgia, had included
Pakhulani in the list of posts to be abandoned. The
Pakhulani checkpoint is just south of the Enguri Dam, but
does not control access to the dam, because other roads also
lead there.


3. (SBU) EUMM and OSCE sources confirmed that, as of 1600 on
October 8, the Russian withdrawal from the areas adjacent to
South Ossetia was nearly complete, with the few remaining
Russian forces expected to leave shortly, including a few
forces waiting for a truck to pick up a loaded container at
the Natsreti/Shavshvebi post.


4. (C) EUMM sources told the Embassy that in western Georgia,
Russian officials signed documents with low-level local
Georgian officials transferring authority over the posts back
to Georgia. The Russian side asked EUMM monitors to sign the
documents as witnesses, but the monitors refused. Georgian
officials suggested to the EUMM that the documents had no
legal weight, because the Georgian officials who signed them
had no authority to do so. The EUMM also noted that,
although the Russian officials affixed an official stamp to
the documents, the Georgians did not, further limiting any
legal significance. Outside South Ossetia, Russian officials
asked EUMM monitors to be the primary signatories on the same
documents, suggesting that the EUMM would be responsible for
securing the posts upon the Russians' departure; the EUMM
refused.

GEORGIANS MOVE IN


5. (C) All monitoring organizations likewise confirmed that,
as the Russian forces departed, Georgian Interior Ministry
forces moved into the area. The size of the Interior forces
moving in varied widely, from one or two officers to several
vehicles full. The Interior Ministry informed post the
composition of the forces included both uniformed and special
forces. The Deputy Head of the EUMM, Gilles Janvier, told
PolOff that the Georgians intended eventually to establish
ten permanent offices in the areas abandoned by the Russians,
although they had only had two in the region before the
conflict.

WHO'S IN CHARGE?


6. (C) As noted in reftel, the Russian departure will place
Georgian forces next to large sections of Ossetian-controlled
areas for the first time since the August conflict.
Considering the multiple incidents of violence in recent
weeks, there is a real danger of such incidents continuing.
All sides seem to recognize this danger. By seeking direct
EUMM involvement in the transfer of the posts outside South

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Ossetia, the Russians seem to be seeking a binding commitment
from the EUMM -- a civilian, unarmed mission -- to be
directly involved in providing security. Janvier explained
to PolOff that the EUMM's responsibility is not to provide
security directly, but to monitor the provision of security
by the appropriate authorities. Head of the EUMM Hansjorg
Haber explained to PolOffs in a separate meeting that the
EUMM is interested in facilitating communication between
Georgian and de facto interior forces in hopes of improving
coordination. The Georgians themselves seemed to Haber to be
receptive to such coordination; they seemed unconcerned about
whether such contact would confer legitimacy on de facto
officials. Haber thought the South Ossetians would be the
ones to refuse such contact.


7. (C) In discussions earlier in the week, the Russians asked
Haber to sign two memoranda of understanding (MOU) after
their withdrawal was complete. One would limit the presence
of Georgian armed troops in the areas abandoned by the
Russians, and one would certify that Russia has met its
obligation to pull back to pre-war positions and that the
EUMM would not seek country-wide Georgia access (including
Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Haber explained that the EUMM
would of course refuse to sign such documents. He noted that
the first proposed MOU sought to blur the distinction between
Georgian interior and military troops and thereby limit the
extent to which police units could be deployed.


7. (C) In response to Russian concerns about the Georgian
Interior Ministry's weapons, Haber inspected the Gori police
station and its weapons, coming away convinced that they were
appropriate. He suggested that the biggest threat came from
Ossetian irregulars; a member of his staff thought there were
50 or 60 troublemakers that would continue to try to provoke
the Georgians, and he thought it would be difficult for the
Georgians not to respond.

AKHALGORI -- STILL A CONCERN


8. (C) Haber suggested the Georgians harbor unreasonably high
hopes for the disposition of Akhalgori. They indicated to
him that they expected the Russians would return the area to
Georgian control, but he thought the Russians would hold onto
Akhalgori as a bargaining chip for some time. He noted,
however, that the Russians will have a difficult time
supporting Akhalgori logistically. There is currently only
one cumbersome dirt road leading to Akhalgori from
Tshkhinvali that does not cross into undisputed Georgian
territory. It will be impassable in winter, and supplying
the area will therefore be very difficult from within South
Ossetia.

COMMENT: PROVOCATIONS POSSIBLE, BUT CONFUSION AS WELL


9. (C) An OSCE military monitor suggested to PolOffs that the
EUMM's mission was to provide security. Haber's reports of
his conversations with the Russians, along with their request
for EUMM certification of various arrangements, suggest the
Russians believe so as well. Janvier took pains to clarify
that the EUMM was very much a monitoring mission; that it
would not be providing security directly, but taking steps to
monitor the provision of security by the appropriate
authorities. The different interpretations of the EUMM's
role seem to hinge on different readings of point 2 of the
September 8 Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement, which calls for
European Union "observers" to replace Russian "peacekeeping
forces." In the coming days and weeks, as the potential for
provocations increases, all the monitoring missions will play
an important role in tracking the situation, but it will be
up to the actual authorities on the ground -- be they
legitimate or de facto -- to take whatever steps are
necessary and appropriate. We will encourage the Georgian
authorities to show restraint in those decisions, and we will
have to look to the Russians to do the same on the Ossetian
side, but we must beware of the potential argument that the
EUMM is not taking sufficiently active steps to provide
security itself.
TEFFT