GEORGIA NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT ARRIA IN EXCHANGE

S E C R E T TBILISI 001845 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL RU GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA NOT WILLING TO ACCEPT ARRIA IN EXCHANGE FOR UNOMIG RENEWAL Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary. Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili told the Ambassador October 3 that Georgia was opposed to inviting de facto Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities to New York for an Arria-style meeting in exchange for the renewal of UNOMIG. She also asked for United States assistance in convincing certain countries, such as China and Gulf countries, to attend the October 22 donors conference. End summary. GEORGIA WILL NOT ACCEPT SOMETHING FOR NOTHING ¶2. (S) Tkeshelashvili called in the Ambassador October 3 to formally state Georgia's opposition to inviting the Abkhaz and South Ossetians to New York for an Arria-format meeting. Despite suggestions that such a meeting would be worthwhile in order to get a UNOMIG renewal, the FM declared that the Georgia is not willing to make what they consider a serious concession for a mission they see as not very valuable. Georgia would accept a technical rollover of UNOMIG, but is not willing to pay the price of Abkhaz and South Ossetians being invited to New York. Furthermore, the FM stressed that Russia may agree to renew UNOMIG now, but then decide at a later date, even six months from now, to end the mission. The FM met with the Ambassador after seeing the German, British and French Ambassadors. She said she had also instructed Georgian Ambassador to the UN Alasania and Georgian Ambassador to the United States Sikharulidze to urgently demarche us on the issue. ROLE OF UNOMIG ¶3. (C) The FM explained that in the Georgian view, UNOMIG was not very effective prior to the conflict, and it is now even less effective. The mission of UNOMIG is ambiguous and has a very narrow scope. It is not tied to any peacekeeping mission and without a mandate, cannot be a security guarantor itself. The only real role of UNOMIG now is to protect the human rights of Georgian citizens in the Gali region, but the FM thought that the existing UN human rights office in Gali could easily assume this mission. RUSSIA CREATING BARRIERS ¶4. (C) The FM said that Russia was playing a dangerous game in attempting to establish a pattern requiring all international observers wishing to enter South Ossetia to do so only via North Ossetia. She said that Georgia had permitted this practice for humanitarian organizations after the war, but now Russia was seeking to make this a permanent practice. This does not augur well for conceding to Russia on UNOMIG renewal. If Georgia concedes on UNOMIG and allows an Arria meeting, not only will Georgia receive what they feel is nothing in return for a serious concession, but Russia will feel empowered to continue to play this obstructionist role in the future. DONOR CONFERENCE ¶5. (C) The FM also asked the Ambassador for help in convincing China and countries from the Gulf to attend the donors conference. The Ambassador responded that while the Chinese may support the concept of territorial integrity, he understood they were unlikely to give money. The FM noted that it was a hard time to have a donors conference given the poor global economic situation. BOMBING IN TSKHINVALI ¶6. (C) Finally, the Ambassador asked the FM if she had any information on the explosion in Tskhinvali, in which, according to press reports, six people (later seven) were reportedly killed when a car filled with explosives blew up near a Russian peacekeepers base. She had no information at the time, having only just been informed of the incident, but replied that it was nonsense to consider that the Georgian government was involved. The FM speculated that it could have been the Russians trying to stir something up to delay the peace process and the withdrawal of Russian troops by October 10. TEFFT