DAS BRYZA MEETS ELECTION TASK FORCE MEMBERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 000183 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/CARC E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM GG SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA MEETS ELECTION TASK FORCE MEMBERS Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: On January 18, EUR DAS Matt Bryza and Ambassador met with Elections Task Force Members MP Nino Nakashidze, and D/MOIA Eka Zguladze, as well as with key Saakashvili insider MP Giga Bokeria and UNM Spokesman David Bakradze on leave from his position as Minister of Conflict Resolution to discuss the problems of the Presidential election, expectations for the Parliamentary elections, and UNM plans for the next term. The group attributed election day tabulation problems to honest mistakes and were convinced that Saakashvili won fairly in the first round. Bokeria and Zguladze discounted the opposition's claims of widespread intimidation pointing out the sheer number of opposition public meetings wouldn't have been possible if that were the case. They attributed large turnouts in the minority regions to historical voting patterns and family voting practices. As a group they were dissatisfied with ODIHR's report, citing that it did not account for GoG responses and therefore was unbalanced. They also complained that ODIHR's report was leaked prematurely to all Georgian media outlets by a local staff member at the European Commission in Tbilisi. With regard to Parliamentary elections, UNM expects to still retain a majority after elections, even if the current majoritarian system is changed. Bokeria anticipated that the Georgian economy will slow as the government in the second term will focus more on social problems and less on large-scale unpopular reforms. They worried about the ability of Parliament to continue reforms if the UNM loses its sizeable majority. End Summary. Elections Aftermath -------------- ¶2. (C) Members of the Government Elections Task Force pointed out that the majority of the post election tabulation snafus were simple mistakes and the several day delay between closing the polls and announcing the official results was no different than the practice in many countries in the West. When asked about the cursory dismissal by the courts of 230 complaints brought by NGOs about election day infractions, Bokeria said that most of the complaints were of a technical nature and would not have impacted the result of the election. Bakradze said that a call for a second round is based on a political consensus of what the opposition may want, but is not based on law. Saakashvili had cleared a majority and the law stipulates that a second round is thus not required. Other members questioned the competence of NGOs monitoring the election, alleging that NGOs are politically biased and court cases should focus on substantive rather than procedural issues. All maintained that even if Saakashvili had not won in the first round, he would have won in a second round. They saw the election as a plebiscite on Saakashvili. Voters chose the opposition in the first round because they were against Saakashvili, and not because they supported opposition candidates. If a second round had occurred, they would have "come to their senses" and re-elected Saakashvili. Allegations of Intimidation Unfounded -------------- ¶3. (C) Zguladze discounted the notion that on election day voters were intimidated by police. She said that there was only one allegation of police intimidation from an NGO in the Tsalka region, and in this instance the NGO representative SIPDIS was uncooperative in providing information. There were four or five instances of police who were called to a polling station to restore order, but once order was restored, they quickly departed. (Note: The electoral code forbids police from being inside the polling station where the ballot box is located, unless called by the CEC chairman to restore order. Once order is restored, the police should immediately leave.) Zguladze pointed out that two people were arrested on election day for stuffing ballots, and this in itself was a sign of maturity of the police, who previously may have beaten the offenders rather than arresting them. There was one other instance of a clash between supporters, but the offenders were arrested and processed under administrative provisions of the law. ¶4. (C) All dismissed widespread intimidation and pointed to public statements by MOIA Merabishvili against such actions. Bokeria maintained that if an environment of intimidation had existed in the pre-election period, the opposition could not have organized so many protests within Tbilisi and the regions. If the opposition's claims of intimidation are true, why have they not presented witnesses so that the offenders could be prosecuted? Bokeria added that the opposition has contributed to the drama of intimidation by using such slogans as "To the grave with Saakashvili" and TBILISI 00000183 002 OF 003 raising fear by promoting tensions by spreading propaganda about disappearing ink, taking photos of ballots, and waving around suspect protocols in front of the media, but then only presenting 18 of them to the CEC for validation. Bokeria maintained the opposition used the restraint of the UNM to paint a picture of intimidation, using this allegation to seek even more concessions from the government. Turnout and NATO in the Minority Regions -------------- ¶5. (C) Members of the Task Force discounted many of the opposition's complaints about large scale falsification of results and questions on high turn out in the minority regions. They attributed the results to historically large turnout tendencies, strong history of family voting and lack of competition in the regions. Bokeria anticipated that there would be more competition during the Parliamentary elections there, but the incidents of family group voting would not change. He maintained that Saakashvili was the only candidate many of the minority voters knew, as few if any opposition candidates ventured to the regions. Bokeria did say if there were complaints that bureaucrats were pressuring voters to turn out in large numbers or were falsifying protocols, that this would be promptly investigated. ¶6. (C) With regard to the NATO plebiscite, Bokeria said that those counting precinct ballots noticed on election day that Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti voted for Saakashvili, but against NATO. He attributed this to a lack of knowledge about NATO despite an intensive public awareness campaign to promote NATO entry amongst voters. He dismissed Conservative Party Kakha Kukava's comment that the NATO referendum was not a success, as 77% per cent was an exceptionally high percentage of support for any country. Bokeria acknowledged that Georgia would require extra effort to convince Europeans that they should belong to NATO after November 7 events. Sore Points with OSCE and Ambassador Boden -------------- ¶7. (C) All were unhappy with the performance of Ambassador Boden and his ODIHR team. Bokeria said that OSCE made factual errors in its report. Georgian authorities had raised these issues with Ambassador Dieter Boden, but these errors were not corrected in the final version of the report. Nakashidze said the problems with the report were often translation errors, vague language, or if a problem was indicated, the report did not include the scale of the problem. They were all stung by the quote of Boden carried in the German press which reportedly accidentally took one instance of fraud and made it appear widespread. This, they lamented, has been widely repeated in the Russian press. According to Bokeria, a Georgian who works for the European Commission leaked ODIHR's final report to all Georgian media outlets before it was made available to the public, just two days before Saakashvili's inauguration. Nakashidze and Zguladze said that Boden was approachable, but was reluctant to give them concrete examples of problems. Bokeria complained that it took him a week to reach the report's political analyst, but then the answer to most of his questions was, "We have our own methodology." Parliamentary Results -------------- ¶8. (C) The two MPs anticipated that the turn out for the Parliamentary elections would be less. Bokeria noted a discriminatory undertone to the anti-Saakashvili vote in Tbilisi, saying that the Tbilisi intelligentsia saw the election as a chance to "get the villagers out of Tbilisi" referencing himself and others whose families are not from Tbilisi originally, but who are in Saakashvili's inner circle. With regard to changing the Parliamentary representation from the winner-take-all mandate to some other form, Bokeria said that UNM stands a good chance of remaining in the majority regardless of the configuration. While he didn't discount that more opposition members in Parliament would be a good thing, he said that 50/50 representation from UNM and opposition parties would result in a deadlock where nothing gets done. All worried that the upcoming Parliamentary elections, if they bring in opposition in substantial numbers, could stall or stop current GoG reform efforts. They wondered how this could impact Western and especially European, perceptions of Georgia, especially with regard to its NATO aspirations. What's next? -------------- TBILISI 00000183 003 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Bokeria said that this election had shown them that radical reforms are unpopular, and one of UNM's mistakes was not to react to rising inflation right away. UNM's inaction, he believed, was translated to the populace as indifference. Well publicized property seizures during the past year was a serious misstep too, where the government failed to inform the public of its policy. The UNM plans a small scale deregulation of customs but no other major economic reforms for the short run. He anticipates that there will be an economic slow down as a result. Bokeria said the UNM had refrained from making any kind of negative statements during the campaign period, and particularly, did not comment on the video tapes of Patarkatsishvili. He said in any other country, a candidate that had been caught planning a coup, would have been taken off the ballot. He went on to say getting Patarkatsishvili out of politics and the media would be a difficult battle. Bokeria questioned News Corporation's motives in Imedi, saying that News Corporation has not invested any money in Georgia. Bokeria said he would meet Martin Pompadour, Executive Vice-President of News Corp, should he be willing to travel to Georgia. ¶10. (C) Turning to foreign policy, Bokeria said that he detected a slight hardening in Moscow's position on the recognition of Kosovo, and thus Russia's possible recognition of Abkhazia. All agreed that it was good that Russia had not been a factor in the elections. ¶11. (C) Bokeria said that the opposition is challenging Saakashvili's legitimacy as president, not because they believe he did not win in the first round, but as leverage to gain additional concessions in the run-up to the Parliamentary elections. DAS Bryza congratulated the group on their efforts to reach out to the opposition, lauding them for reaching an accommodation with the opposition on the composition of the Public Broadcasting Station. Nakashidze, Zguladze, and Bokeria cautioned that the more the UNM gives in, the harder the opposition pushes for more concessions. The opposition alleges if a television station is not like Imedi was, then it is not free. Bokeria said particularly worrisome are the opposition claims that somehow respected NGO leaders Alex Rondeli and Gia Nodia are now "traitors" for their opinions, although their viewpoints are quite neutral. ¶12. (C) Bokeria said UNM would like a reputable international company to conduct exit polls during the Parliamentary elections, citing specifically Gallup. ¶13. (U) DAS Bryza has approved this cable. TEFFT