GEORGIA: WAR CRIMES ISSUES AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TBILISI 001751

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM KAWC RU GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: WAR CRIMES ISSUES AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE
WILLIAMSON FOCUSES ON ETHNIC CLEANSING

REF: TBILISI 1522

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary and Comment: Ambassador-at-Large Clint
Williamson visited Georgia September 10-11 to highlight USG
concerns over war crimes and ethnic cleansing allegations
from the August conflict and to stress the need to hold
perpetrators accountable. Williamson frankly told GOG
officials that perceptions of U.S. bias, combined with
limited access to the Russian-controlled territories, would
hamper USG efforts to help conduct an investigation. He
recommended that to ensure impartiality, the OSCE or EU
should do so. He commended GOG officials on their work thus
far and discussed with them the option of referring the case
to the International Criminal Court, in addition to their
ongoing legal proceedings in the International Court of
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights. GOG
officials agreed that the USG might best serve them by
sharing techniques to catalogue and sort information.
Collection of information has been hampered by the fact that
the GOG does not have access to many of the locations of
alleged crimes, and concrete numbers of the missing and dead
are not available. Williamson said he intended to discuss
these issues with the French in their EU Presidency capacity
and with the Finns in their OSCE chair capacity. Georgian
Ministry of Justice officials said that their hearing before
the International Court of Justice had gone very well and
expected a response within two weeks. Post recommends that
the Department consider sending Georgian officials to
Washington to learn how to catalogue investigation
information more efficiently. End Summary and Comment.

Ministry of Justice


2. (C) Ambassador Williamson met with a variety of senior
level officials in Tbilisi, as well as regional officials in
the city of Gori, that was occupied by Russian troops for
several weeks in August. During a September 10 meeting,
Deputy Minister of Justice Tina Burjaliani told Ambassador
Williamson she had just returned from The Hague and the
International Court of Justice, where Georgia's three-day
hearing went better than anticipated. She cautioned that the
basis of the Georgian case was very narrow (racial
discrimination, ethnic cleansing). The Russians attempted to
brush these allegations aside, saying that Russian forces
were justified as they were part of the wartime events and
not a systematically focused discrimination campaign against
Georgians. Burjaliani portrayed the Russians' arguments as
weak and was hopeful that the Court would grant a provisional
measure in favor of the Georgians within two weeks.


3. (C) Burjaliani thought that the International Criminal
Court (ICC) might want to take on the Georgians' case. She
expressed concern, however, that the ICC might eventually
conclude that the scale of the crimes did not warrant
prosecution, thereby handing the Russians a propaganda
victory. Her recommendation to her superiors was to not
pursue it at this time. She was wary that the Russians would
cry foul if they did file with the ICC, pointing out that
there was overlapping jurisdiction between the ICJ and the
ICC. Williamson countered that this was not a valid
argument, because the ICJ exercised civil jurisdiction in
actions between governments, while the ICC jurisdiction was
criminal and pertained to individuals. Burjaliani, who
seemed unsure of how the GOG would proceed, noted that the
ICC case's impact might be minimal, because even if the ICC
indicted South Ossetian de facto authorities, it was unlikely
they would ever be arrested. Williamson indicated that even
if indicted individuals were not arrested, there was some
value in having perpetrators publicly charged, since this
placed them and their "state" into a rogue category. He
added that there were no 100 percent guarantees as to how an
investigation might come out, so ultimately the Georgians
would have to weigh all of these considerations and come to
their own conclusions as to the value of an ICC referral. He
stressed that it was unlikely that the ICC would initiate its
own investigation into the Russia-Georgia conflict, however,
so if Georgia was interested in having the ICC investigate,
the Government would have to make a formal request to the
Office of the Prosecutor.


4. (C) Williamson suggested that the Georgians also
consider offering compensation payments to Ossetian families
who had experienced the loss of family members due to
Georgian military actions, drawing the parallel between this
and the U.S. military condolence payments in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Williamson said that such actions would not
acknowledge criminal responsibility but would be a show of
goodwill by the Georgians indicating a willingness to

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acknowledge that persons had died accidentally as a result of
ongoing military operations. If the Georgians were prepared
to make such an offer, it would need to be predicated on an
independent investigation into the number of deaths and which
side was responsible in each case. It would be awkward for
the Russians, or the South Ossetians, to block such an
inquiry if their citizens were potentially being compensated.
If an investigation were allowed to go forward, it would
almost certainly prove that the number of deaths attributed
to Georgian military actions was greatly inflated.
Burjaliani expressed interest in exploring this initiative
and said that the Georgians would be willing to learn more
about how this had been done in other settings. She did note
that it would be a delicate matter domestically to provide
payments to Ossetians when so many IDPs were in dire
circumstances and not getting any such remuneration. She
said that this could likely be overcome, though, if it were
dealt with appropriately.


5. (C) Finally, Burjaliani said that she would very much
appreciate written information on how best to catalogue the
information that they are now collecting. The Prosecutor's
Office had been very helpful but needed better instruction on
this procedure. Williamson agreed to share this information
via the Department of Justice's legal representative at post.
(Comment: We might consider sending Georgian prosecutors to
Washington to meet with Ambassador Williamson and his staff
to develop a tool to catalogue the information being
collected. Another possibility would be to support sending
Georgian pathologists to meet with expert war crimes
pathologists to help them learn how to conduct war
crimes-related autopsies. End Comment.)

Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria


6. (C) DFM Bokeria discussed with Ambassador Williamson the
tradeoffs associated with Georgia's filing a case with the
ICC. Bokeria said the GOG was considering such a case, but
was concerned that the effort involved would not yield any
concrete results. Williamson agreed that it was unlikely
that the ICC would independently look into the cases of war
crimes if Georgia did not request it, but suggested that even
if the case only resulted in a limited number of perpetrators
being indicted, it could have some value. Williamson was
skeptical that Russian officials would be indicted, but
indicated that ICC would likely be less hesitant about
pursuing cases against South Ossetian de facto authorities.
Williamson underlined that being branded a "war criminal"
nevertheless had long-ranging ramifications that would affect
the de facto authorities well into the future. Williamson
again stressed that the GOG would have to make its own
decision about pursuing an ICC investigation, but that this
appeared to be the only viable option for prosecutions if
that was the end result they were seeking.


7. (C) When asked by Bokeria for an assessment of what
could be done, Ambassador Williamson stated that the
allegations of ethnic cleansing appeared to be the most
viable for further investigation. Although there seem to
have been some isolated execution-style killings and other
individually targeted crimes, these appear to be relatively
small in number, and at this point are difficult to
substantiate because of lack of access to crime scenes and
victims. The witness testimony as to forced displacements
can be corroborated through other independent means, such as
imagery, and reinforced by international monitors'
observations, should access issues be overcome. Bokeria
added that it would be easier for the Georgians to show a
systematic effort by paramilitary organizations under the
South Ossetian officials' control, as opposed to Russian
forces, to force ethnic Georgians out of South Ossetia.
Using current satellite imagery, it appeared easy to show
that Georgian villages were systematically burned and that a
large number are now vacant.


8. (C) Bokeria was unhappy with Council of Europe
Commissioner for Human Rights Thomas Hammarberg's report on
the situation in South Ossetia, suggesting that the report
was too soft on the Russians and cautiously worded to avoid
controversy. Although Bokeria acknowledged the constraints
on any attempted U.S. investigation, he said that any effort
by OSCE to investigate would be hampered by Russian
influence. Bokeria complimented Human Rights Watch (HRW) for
its balanced reporting thus far on the situation, but noted
that human rights NGOs sometimes fail to analyze situations
from the perspective of military necessity. Williamson
agreed that it was important to have this perspective, but
suggested that using U.S. military experts would not be the
best option. He mentioned that the ICTY had used experts
from non-NATO countries, such as Ireland, and that this might

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be a possibility worth exploring.

Presidential Advisor Zurab Adeishvili


9. (C) Adeishvili said that in contrast to Georgians in
South Ossetia, the 2,000 Georgians living in Kodori had not
experienced the same degree of displacement during the
conflict. After the early 1990's when many ethnic Georgians
fled Abkhazia, very few Georgians remained except for the
Georgians in Gali. Conversely, in South Ossetia many
Georgians had intermarried with South Ossetians and 60,000 of
them still remained.


10. (C) Adeishvili said that Abkhazia is much more valuable
to Russia than South Ossetia due to its strategic coastline
and natural resources. He felt that South Ossetia would
become a burden for the Russians, as they would have to
subsidize the entire region. Abkhazia, however, is valuable
to the Russians and the Georgians. First, he opined, if the
Ukrainians forced the Russians out of Sebastopol, then the
logical place for their warm water port would be Sukhumi.
Second, the Enguri power station which straddles Georgia and
Abkhazia provides a significant source of power for which the
Abkhaz do not pay. Currently, the Abkhaz population
(150,000) uses 1 billion kilowatt hours - - three times that
of Adjara, the neighboring Georgian region, where 300,000
people use 400,000 kilowatts of power. Third, this power
plant generates 40% of Georgia's power and therefore
represents a serious vulnerability. The informal arrangement
for the last 15 years has been that Georgian technical
experts were permitted in Abkhazia to keep the plant going.
If Russia were to shut down the plant, Georgia's power supply
would be greatly reduced.

Prosecutor's Office


11. (C) Acting Prosecutor General Giorgi Latsabidze told
Williamson that the Prosecutor General's Office had no
experience in prosecuting war crimes, but has done its best
to investigate allegations based on current Georgian laws.
Latsabidze envisioned that the crimes committed could be
categorized as individual crimes (rape, abductions, summary
executions) or ethnic cleansing. Of the two, the latter
would be easier to prove in a court of law. Although heinous
individual crimes did occur, they were not of a large enough
number to cause an international outcry. For the moment,
Latsabidze said numbers were sketchy, but estimated there
were fewer than 100 summary executions, and around 200
missing persons. Latsabidze's biggest challenge was not
having access to the locations where the alleged crimes took
place. In response to the Prosecutor General's formal
request for U.S. investigative assistance, Ambassador
Williamson stated that we would face the same problems with
access and that we would not be seen as an unbiased actor,
thus undermining the results of any investigation in which
the U.S. actively participated. Williamson indicated that it
might be possible to explore other options, including support
from other governments (e.g., the UK or the Netherlands),
that have specialists experienced in war crimes
investigations.

Public Defender


12. (C) Ambassador Williamson met Sozar Subari, Ombudsman,
and representatives of The Georgian Young Lawyers Association
(GYLA) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) in the offices of the
Public Defender's Office on September 11. Officials from all
three groups worried that the Russians and South Ossetians
were engaging in a policy of ethnic cleansing. While these
groups had reports of other abuses, they were limited in
scope, with GYLA saying it knew of not more than ten
executions and the Ombudsman saying he believed there have
been 49 civilian deaths. Subari, whose office began to
document facts gleaned from IDPs as they arrived at shelters,
noted that in Akhalgori, in the far eastern part of South
Ossetia which had never been a part of the conflict zone,
South Ossetian officials were forcing residents to take
Russian citizenship or leave. Subari added that de facto
South Ossetian president Kokoity said he intended to make
Tskhinvali the new capital of South Ossetia. Subari told
Ambassador Williamson that the 54 villages in the district of
Tskhinvali had an 80% Georgian population, with only two
villages having been traditionally Ossetian.


13. (C) HRW indicated that its Georgian representatives had
been in South Ossetia both officially and unofficially since
the conflict began and that its Moscow-based representatives,
along with the Russian human rights NGO Memorial, had entry
into South Ossetia as well. HRW expressed concern about the
border region between South Ossetia and Gori, which remains

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insecure. A withdrawal of Russian forces might create a
security vacuum that would worsen the already fragile
situation. During a September 12 press conference in Moscow,
HRW Moscow and Memorial representatives accused Russia of
letting South Ossetian militias raze Georgian homes in
enclaves and villages both in and adjacent to Georgia proper
which were loyal to Tbilisi, and even mixed Ossetian/Georgian
villages. HRW said that the strongest allegation against the
Georgians was the excessive use of force in the form of
massive shelling. HRW stressed the need for a robust
security mission, saying that its organization could only do
so much and that the international community needed to be
involved to get a full accounting. Williamson noted that he
would push for this during his subsequent visits to Paris and
Helsinki.

National Security Council


14. (C) Ambassador Williamson met with Georgian National
Security Council (NSC) officials to stress the importance of
collecting evidence and establishing facts. The NSC admitted
that most of the analysts working on the conflict had just
been hired, yet they displayed a coherent understanding of
the facts on the ground. The NSC reported that current
statistics showed 14 missing Georgian soldiers and 326
Georgians killed (154 military, 155 civilian and 17 police).
The primary cause of death was shelling, bombing and
landmines. The NSC had few reports of other crimes, saying
that because of stigmas, there was only one report of rape
and that the numbers of abductions depend on whether one
counts abductions that were for the purpose of negotiation
and exchange of prisoners. Williamson recounted his
experiences in the former Yugoslavia, explaining that Serb
forces would often surround an area and allow paramilitary
forces to destroy villages. The NSC responded that this same
tactic was being used on Georgian villages in South Ossetia;
there was a Russian policy to allow time for looting before
taking villages. Bolstering the ethnic cleansing claim, NSC
officials reported that the Russians had threatened Georgians
in Akhalgori with forced departure if they did not accept
Russian passports. The NSC told Williamson that it had
registered 127,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs),but
41,000 had already returned. Their estimates show that at a
minimum, 20,000 IDPs will most likely never be able to return
to their homes. Williamson complimented NSC officials on
their data collection and analysis, saying that their ability
to collect data under the circumstances and with no advanced
planning was impressive. He added that evidence collection
must be a priority and that hopefully monitoring missions
would include specialists who could help document crimes.

Governor of Gori


15. (C) Ambassador Williamson visited Gori and met with
Governor Vladimir Vardzelashvili. Still shaken by recent
events, Vardzelashvili described violence by Russian forces
and the situation on the ground. When asked about looters,
Vardzelashvili claimed looters were Russian, because locals
would have identified South Ossetians. Williamson reiterated
U.S. support for investigating abuses and toured the city,
visiting affected areas.


16. (U) This cable was cleared by Ambassador Williamson.
TEFFT