RUSSIAN CHECKPOINTS STILL PRESENT, POTENTIALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 001689 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR RU GG SUBJECT: RUSSIAN CHECKPOINTS STILL PRESENT, POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING REF: TBILISI 1654 (NOTAL) Classified By: DCM Kent Logsdon for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and comment. According to the Georgian National Security Council (NSC),13 Russian checkpoints remain on undisputed Georgian territory as of September 23 -- 6 in western Georgia and 7 in the east, outside South Ossetia, along with 1 supply base in the west and 1 communications center in the east. The total number of Russian servicemen staffing the points is about 1,620, with units near South Ossetia generally larger, although frequent movement of forces makes precise figures for individual points difficult. Equipment in Georgia proper includes 4 tanks, 219 armored vehicles, 4 helicopter landing pads, and 1 anti-aircraft system. NSC staff characterized the western points as designed to control the Enguri Dam and those in the east as more mobile, with large numbers of elite paratrooper units at various points and 150 armored vehicles at Megvrekisi just south of Tskhinvali. Post notes that the presence of any Russian forces on undisputed Georgian territory threatens stability, as extremely limited contact between Russian and Georgian forces, even in close quarters, make any incident or misunderstanding a potential flashpoint. In addition, Russian attempts to control the Enguri Dam could result in the cut off of hydroelectric power to Georgia from the dam (reftel) which could cause immediate energy shortages. End summary and comment. ¶2. (SBU) NSC staff offered a briefing on Russian checkpoints to the diplomatic corps at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 23. Based on visits to 12 of 16 checkpoints open through September 18 (three have since closed),the presentation included basic information about the checkpoints, summarized below. The presentation also highlighted that the existence of these checkpoints violated point 5 of the August 12 cease-fire agreement on the withdrawal of both sides to pre-war positions. The blocking of access to humanitarian relief providers through these checkpoints violated point 3 of the agreement. In addition, the presentation suggested that the presence of Russian forces contributed to general insecurity, listing cases of killings, looting, theft, kidnapping, as well as, harassment and ethnic cleansing of Georgian civilians on territory controlled by Russian forces. According to NSC staff, much of the information was collected through personal visits of NSC staff to the checkpoints, although in some cases, Russian forces did not allow any access to the checkpoint. During these visits, the NSC staff identified themselves as journalists. ¶3. (SBU) The information provided below derives from the NSC's presentation, unless otherwise noted. THE CHECKPOINTS ¶4. (SBU) Western Georgia. As of September 23, the following points remain in western Georgia: Anaklia, Ganmukhuri (both in Zugdidi District),Potskho, Khoko (both in Tsalenjikha District),Kanti (between Tsalenjikha and Chkorotskhu Districts),and Chkorotskhu (in Chkorotskhu District). In addition there is a supply base in Onaria, near Zugdidi. Anaklia, Ganmukhuri, Potskho and Khoko are all converted CIS Peacekeepers checkpoints; Kanti and Chkorotoskhu are new, established after August 13, 2008. One between Mujava and Chale closed on September 22, after the NSC conducted their visits. NSC staff noted that the location of these points generally suggested an intent to maintain control of the Enguri Dam, which is located outside the administrative boundary of Abkhazia, and provides hydroelectric power to Georgia. ¶5. (SBU) South of South Ossetia. As of September 23, the following points remain south of South Ossetia: Perevi (in Sachkere District),Ptsa (in Kareli District),Variani, Karaleti, Ergneti, Megvrekisi-Bhrotsleti (all in Gori District),and Odzisi (on the administrative border between Mtskheta and Akhalgori Districts). In addition there is a communications center near Shavshebi. All these points were established after August 13, 2008. One checkpoint at Ali closed on September 21, and one at Jvari Pass closed about the same time. NSC staff noted that all of these points were minutes away from the east-west highway and could therefore be used to shut down the primary east-west transportation route. ¶6. (C) Post notes one discrepancy on the map provided by the NSC. According to the OSCE and sensitive sources, the communications center at Shavshebi is on a mountain ridge south of the main east-west highway. (This checkpoint is TBILISI 00001689 002 OF 002 referred to in some reports as Natsreti; the villages of Shavshebi and Natsreti are close together, quite close to the highway, and the Russian presence is near both.) On the NSC map, however, the Shavsebi communications center is located north of the highway. Sensitive sources note that Russian vehicles regularly use the main highway to travel to and from this location. ¶7. (SBU) NSC staff observed all points except Ptsa, Megvrekisi, Ergneti and Odzisi, to which they were denied access to by Russian forces or to which they could not gain access for security reasons. ¶8. (SBU) NSC staff also noted that in many cases, a Georgian police checkpoint was present close to, and often in sight of the Russian checkpoints. STAFFING, EQUIPMENT, AND CONCERNS ¶9. (SBU) In general, the NSC staff noted that checkpoints in western Georgia had smaller, platoon-size units (between 20 and 60, with Kanti having 100 servicemen),while those south of South Ossetia had larger, company-size units (about 100 troops each). Most in the west had 3-6 armored personnel carriers (APCs),while most in the east had about 7 paratrooper armored vehicles (BMDs); exact numbers were difficult to establish, because not all vehicles are visible from positions safe for the observers (such as the road). Megvrekisi was the major exception; NSC staff estimated it had 150 armored vehicles, serving as a hub for troop movements among points outside South Ossetia. Onaria had 4 tanks, 4 APCs and 150 servicemen; Shavshebi had 20 servicemen. Anaklia, Potskho, Perevi, and Odzisi all had helicopter landing pads; Khoko had an anti-aircraft system. ¶10. (SBU) The NSC also noted some specific concerns. South Ossetian forces reportedly cross into undisputed Georgian territory and visit the checkpoint at Perevi on a regular basis. The commander of the Ptsa checkpoint is reportedly ethnically Ossetian. At a number of checkpoints, snipers are regularly present. RUSSIAN AND GEORGIAN (NON-)COMMUNICATION ¶11. (SBU) In response to a question, NSC staff suggested that Georgian and Russian forces have extremely limited direct contact. In those cases where Russian and Georgian forces are in sight of each other, they will occasionally communicate through visible signals, but they did not communicate on even this basic level if snipers were present on the Russian side for fear of being misinterpreted. OSCE sources have told post that Russian commanders do provide information about troop movements directly to senior Georgian officials, but that is the only regular avenue of direct contact between Russia and Georgia on the status of the checkpoints. The OSCE also said that, in the case of incidents (such as the recent shooting at Karaleti), lower-level Russian and Georgian officials may exchange information, but only on a limited basis. COMMENT: REAL POTENTIAL FOR PROBLEMS ¶12. (C) The lack of regular contact and coordination between Russian and Georgian officials renders a tense situation potentially explosive. With large numbers of armed personnel and substantial military equipment on both sides, any accident, provocative act or even rumor could spark renewed conflict. Recent killings of Georgian police officers in Karaleti, Ganmukhuri and Khurcha, along with the downing of a Russian drone September 22, demonstrate that serious incidents can and will happen. Post has urged the Georgian side to show restraint, and OSCE and UNOMIG monitors have moved quickly to respond to reports of incidents to prevent escalation. Until Russian troops withdraw completely from undisputed Russian territory, however, the possibility for real trouble remains. End comment. TEFFT