GEORGIA: GOVERNMENT CONFIDENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TBILISI 001608 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND GCG E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM RU GG SUBJECT: GEORGIA: GOVERNMENT CONFIDENT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION NOT UNITED ON MUCH REF: A) TBILISI 1525 B) TBILISI 1602 Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Introduction and Comment: Tbilisi Mayor and Saakashvili insider Gigi Ugulava told the Ambassador that polling data indicates that Saakashvili and his Government enjoy broad public support, but noted that the Government needed to use the next 12-18 months to focus on rehabilitation and reconstruction in the country in order to ensure stability. In Ugulava's view, Saakashvili needed to stay focused on domestic issues and reassure the public by giving them realistic expectations of what would be ahead. On the opposition's side of the fence, smaller opposition parties signed on to the government-sponsored Charter of Georgian Politicians, but four key groups refused to sign touting the agreement as no more than government propoganda to shirk responsibility for its actions during the crisis. The Charter envisages a joint anti-crisis commission, whose role remains unclear although President Saakashvili in his September 16 state of the union address called for the group to have an implementing role in supporting IDPs. The New Rightists, Republicans, Labor, and the United Opposition (UNC) parties all refused to sign, leaving them free to publicly criticize government actions during the conflict. Upon her return from the United States, Nino Burjanadze did not sign the Charter because, according to her, "it was not a serious document." She instead called for a transparent analysis of the government's actions during the crisis. ¶2. (C) Ugulava -- buoyed by recent polling results -- believed that the government enjoys broad public support and made a compelling case for the stability of Saakashvili's government, at least for now. The opposition seems intent on gaining political advantage from the current crisis, and is seeking ways to reestablish its credibility with voters after being soundly defeated in the presidential and parliamentary elections. Whether it is seeking to shore up its public support or is worried about the chorus of critical opposition voices, the government has taken a step towards involving the opposition in governance by inviting opposition members to sit down with key MPs and international observers. In his 9/16 address to the Parliament (reftel B),the President called for important reforms to Georgia's democracy. On the opposition's side, the four larger parties, by not signing the Charter, have turned down the opportunity to engage with the government and are sticking with their thus far, unsuccessful strategy -- gaining popular support, and eventually political power, based on a purely anti-Saakashvili platform. Some, including the Republicans, may feel they have been burned during negotiations with the government in past, and likely believe the government will not grant the Commission any real authority. Others, such as Labor, see no benefit to dealing with the government at all. And some, like former Speaker Nino Burjanadze, are still flirting with the idea of opposing Saakashvili. While the government faces the very real challenges of managing its response to the current crisis, we fully expect these opposition figures to continue to be the Government's fiercest critics and seek political advantages wherever they can find them. Whether they can translate these advantages into popular support remains to be seen. End Introduction and Comment. Saakashvili Confidante Tells the Ambassador That the Government Enjoys Popular Support ¶3. (C) During an August 10 meeting with the Ambassador and DCM, Government insider and Saakashvili confidante Tbilisi Mayor Giorgi Ugulava provided some interesting insights on the domestic scene. Ugulava started out by noting that the polling commissioned by the Government from Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner research had concluded that President Saakashvili needed to focus on domestic issues, specifically reconstruction and rehabilitation. He said that Rossner,s polls and focus groups showed that Georgians are now concerned about social and economic issues, and the upcoming winter, not the international scene. In general, Saakashvili and the Government enjoyed high approval ratings and Rossner,s polling found that there was a strong sense of unity among Georgians that was translating into support for the Government. Fifty-seven percent of respondents believed that the Russians or Russian PM Vladimir Putin were responsible for the war compared to 18 percent who held President Saakashvili responsible. Interior Minister Merabishvili had the highest rating of any minister in the Government. (Note: Rosner's polling sent via email to EUR/CARC.) TBILISI 00001608 002 OF 003 ¶4. (C) With regard to the opposition, Rosner,s polls found that support and sympathy for the opposition had plummeted. The demands of several opposition politicians that Saakashvili and the Government step down had been met with anger by the population. In the popular view, the opposition demands would lead to instability and a catastrophe for the country. According to Ugulava, the opposition had no basis in popular opinion upon which to argue for a change in government. ¶5. (C) The focus groups uncovered important differences between regions. Tbilisi voters noted that although the war had been lost, Georgia had won in the battle for international support. On the other hand, Gori residents were more angry and expressed great hate for the Ossetians. However, regardless of region, Rosner,s data showed a strong sense of unity in support of Georgia and the Government. Ugulava acknowledged that this sense of unity was temporary and that the Government would have to continue to work hard to maintain support. In Ugulava,s view, people were worried that the end of the conflict could bring a return to the conditions of 1993 following the Abkhaz War when the economy collapsed and the Government was unable to respond. This time, the Government had succeeded in restoring "normalcy' very quickly. This was taking place even in Gori as the Government pushed ahead with making repairs and rehabilitating damaged buildings and infrastructure. With regard to the IDPs, Ugulava said that "they blame Russia for everything." As soon as the IDPs left the Tskhinvali area, they understood that Russia was openly pushing for regime change. ¶6. (C) With regard to the issue of who started the conflict, Ugulava said that this was not an important domestic issue -- he believed people were not interested. However, he acknowledged that people here were asking why the Government didn,t know what the Russian reaction to Georgian actions in South Ossetia would be and that was a concern for the Government. Ugulava said that the Government was making the argument to the population that they had no choice but to engage to protect the Georgian population in the villages of South Ossetia. He also admitted that there had been an assumption in the Government that Tskhinvali could have been held, but only if the international community had defended Georgia,s actions immediately. (The conversation with Ugulava took place before the New York Times' publication of its 9/16 article on Georgian intercepts showing Russian armor moving through the Roki Tunnel before Georgia commenced its attack on Tskhinvali.) ¶7. (C) When asked about the possibility of political changes, Ugulava said that there was no push for a change or for a Government reshuffle -- and the Rossner polling supported this. The opposition,s call for new elections was unpopular, because it was associated with rallies, demonstrations and instability. The opposition statements calling for the Government,s resignation were "scaring people" and interpreted as a challenge to Georgia,s unified anti-Russian stance. He suggested that the opposition had only its small group of supporters in the Vake region of Tbilisi as a sounding board and they were out of touch with the rest of the country. In his view, Nino Burjanadze was not serious and did not have enough support. "She needs to show the public that she is serious competition, but she has no discipline." Ugulava noted that her decision to get the Government to approve the sale of a large home to her for one lari (as she was leaving Government) made her vulnerable politically. ¶8. (C) Ugulava suggested that it was important for the political elite to stay united behind the Government in order to reassure Ministers who were insecure about their futures. With regard to the business elite, Ugulava said that they were concerned about mortgage and banking problems. They saw Saakashvili as the guarantor of stability and reform and they would continue to support him. The Charter of Georgian Politicians ¶9. (SBU) Given the strong popular support enjoyed by President Saakashvili and the Government, the decision to reach out to the opposition appears to have been made partly in response to international concerns about the health of civil society and partly in an effort to bring some of the Government's harshest critics back into a dialogue. All of the opposition politicians who participated in reftel discussions to form an anti-crisis coalition readily agreed to the first three tenets of the Charter, namely: territorial integrity, NATO membership and EU integration, TBILISI 00001608 003 OF 003 and that all protests should take place by constitutional means. However, there was disagreement among the parties on the fourth clause, which states that the government will undertake democratic reforms and form an anti-crisis commission. Due to this fourth clause, the United National Council, Republican Party, the Labor Party, and New Rightists all refused to sign the charter. Kakha Kukava, co-leader of the Conservative Party said it was yet another propaganda move by the authorities, adding that "the real opposition" would not accept it. One member of Parliament from the ruling United National Movement (UNM) suggested in an informal discussion with Poloff that the charter was mostly for show. This MP suggested that it would help prevent any drastic moves by the Opposition -- at least until Russian forces depart undisputed Georgian territory. (Comment: This conversation was separate from the consultations, and the MP was not a key member of the UNM. End comment.) Some oppositionists believed the government could tout this Commission as an example of engaging the opposition without actually doing so, could prove to be a distraction from legitimate criticism of the government. ¶10. (SBU) On September 5, the Charter was signed by: David Bakradze - Speaker of the Parliament, United National Movement (UNM) Mikheil Machavariani - First Vice Speaker of the Parliament, UNM Giorgi Targamadze - Leader of the Parliament Minority, Chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (CDM) Levan Vepkhadze - Vice Speaker of the Parliament, General Secretary of CDM Bachuki Kardava - Chairman of the National Democratic Party Zurab Tkemaladze - Chairman of the Industrialists Paata Davitaia - Chairman of On Our Own (Abkhaz refugees political party) Jondi Bagaturia - Chairman of Georgia Troupe Gia Tortladze - Independent MP, Chairman of Parliament opposition faction Gia Tsagareishvili - Independent MP, member of the Parliament Minority ¶11. (SBU) Speaker Bakradze declared the document "open for joining" until September 8, 2008, and called on other parties to join. As of September 12, 2008, no other parties had joined, and the non-signatory parties were drafting their own parallel charter. Koba Davitashvili, the Chairman of the Party of People and member of the United Opposition, and Marina Muskhelishvili from Georgia's Way (both members of the United Opposition) attended the consultations, but have not yet signed. It is also unclear whether Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, leader of the Freedom Party, will sign. ¶12. (C) Although she would not bring a huge electoral following with her, well-respected former Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze is publicly flirting with the opposition and is considering her next move (additional info septel). Upon her return from a visit to the United States, she told the press that she "would not sign the Charter, as it is a declaration of obvious principles and not a serious document." Rather she said, only after the commission releases its findings will she announce her position on government responsibility for the crisis and whether she would support Gamkrelidze's and Natelashvili's recent calls for Saakashvili's resignation. She defended her actions by saying the country needs transparent analysis of the crisis now and that difficult questions should not be prohibited. TEFFT