DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH SRSG ARNAULT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000114

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC, IO AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNOMIG KPKO GG
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH SRSG ARNAULT

Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a January 19 meeting with Special
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Jean Arnault,
DAS Bryza discussed the current situation in Abkhazia and
progress on the self-assessment of the United Nations
Observer Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG) operations. Arnault
told Bryza that the past three months have been quiet in
Abkhazia, aside from a few minor, isolated incidents, but
noted an "amazing" level of propaganda coming from the
Georgians on Abkhazia, which could destabilize the situation.
Contrary to Georgian media claims, he said, there was no
Abkhaz interference with Georgian voters living in Gali that
prevented them from going to the polls, although he
acknowledged that statements made by de-facto foreign
minister Shamba raised fears among the ethnic Georgian
population. Arnault said the UN review of the Friends
process would focus on two main issues: the ineffectiveness
of the current strategy to resolve the conflict by pursuing
CBM's and other grassroots cooperation; and the limitations
of the current negotiating format. He doubted that the review
would produce a radically improved strategy. He said that
UNOMIG is still reviewing the issue of establishing an
artillery radar in Upper Kodori, but said that unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) would likely be a more practical and
inexpensive solution. Bryza said that regardless of the
outcome of the review, he thought that there were several
underlying issues the Friends could explore to move the peace
process forward in a decisive way: improved Georgian-Russian
relations, de-isolation of the Abkhaz by increasing their
economic ties to Georgia and sources of information, and the
2014 Sochi Olympics. End Summary.

Abkhazia: a quiet three months
--------------


2. (C) Arnault characterized the situation in Abkhazia as
quiet, with no major incidents between the Georgians and
Abkhaz for over three months. He noted, however, that there
had been an "amazing" amount of propaganda about Abkhazia
coming from the Georgian media and said that with a decision
on Kosovo coming soon, it will be necessary to work with the
Georgians to tone down their rhetoric. He was particularly
critical of Georgia's Rustavi 2 television stations and said
his staff was weary of chasing down untrue reports of Abkhaz
provocations. Bryza asked if the Abkhaz had responded in
kind and Arnault said no, adding that these kinds of scare
tactics work against Georgia by scaring their own people.
Although he acknowledged that statements by de-facto "Foreign
Minister" Shamba to the effect that Georgians living in Gali
who wanted to vote in the election should move to Georgia
raised fears among the ethnic Georgian population, he said
there has been no truth to recent Georgian media reports of
Abkhaz burning Georgian houses in Gali, harassing Georgian
journalists, or interfering with Georgian voters going to the
polls on January 5.


3. (C) Bryza asked Arnault about UNOMIG's proposal to
establish UAV patrols over the Upper Kodori Gorge and whether
these UAVs would be equipped with infrared sensors. Arnault
said yes, the UAV's would be equipped with infrared sensors,
and therefore would able to determine the direction from
which artillery fire occurred even several minutes after such
attacks. Arnault added that UNOMIG was still evaluating the
feasibility of establishing an artillery radar, but thought
that UAV patrols would be more cost efficient and potentially
more effective than the radar. Arnault said that UNOMIG will
make its pitch to the Georgians on the UAVs soon and should
have them in place by spring.

Friends Review
--------------


4. (C) Arnault said that the UN review of UNOMIG and the
Friends process would focus on two main issues: the
ineffectiveness of the current peace strategy of pursuing
CBM's and other grassroots cooperation rather than focusing
on a political settlement; and the limitations of the current
negotiating format. The current strategy of focusing on
resolving simple disputes and building on them to resolve
larger issues has not been working, he said. The Georgians
believe that taking a bottom-up approach hinders progress on
the larger goal of resolving the conflict, while the Abkhaz
argue that this approach prevents their long term goal of
independence. Both sides have come to the conclusion that
confidence building measures will not work to achieve their
ends, he said, which is a cause for real concern because it
has been at the center of UNOMIG's conflict negotiation
strategy since 2003. Still, he said he was not sure whether
the review would produce a comprehensive new conflict
resolution strategy.

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5. (C) The review also needs to evaluate all of the
negotiation mechanisms currently in place, he said, and
determine ways to reinvigorate the process. Arnault
characterized the Geneva meetings between the sides and the
Group of Friends of the Secretary General as not the most
vibrant means of getting the parties together. The Georgians
continue to view negotiations negatively, he said, because
they feel that time is against them. There is a sense among
the Georgians that with each passing day the Abkhaz become
more integrated into Russian economic and social systems and
the sentiment for independence in Abkhazia only becomes more
entrenched. If all the Georgians have to offer the Abkhaz
are long term confidence building measures, he said, it will
not be enough to persuade the Abkhaz to reunite with Georgia.



6. (C) On the other hand, Arnault noted that the Abkhaz
also realize that Russian social and economic initiatives are
not aimed at building ties between two independent states.
He said he thought Abkhaz de-facto president Bagapsh realizes
that joining a confederation with Georgia is likely to be
their best option. Bryza agreed with Arnault's assessment of
Abkhaz sentiment toward Russia, saying that he does not think
the Abkhaz want to be absorbed into Russia. He asked Arnault
if he thought there would be a way to exploit Abkhaz fear of
integration into Russia. Arnault replied that the Russians
have told him that they constantly tell the Georgians that
they (the Georgians) know what to do to resolve the
situation. Arnault said he did not know what the Russians
wanted, but suspected it was Georgia renouncing its NATO bid.
Bryza asked if it was now possible to propose this idea of
confederation or if it was premature. Arnault said that it
was too early, particularly with Kosovo independence looming
and the Georgian parliamentary elections coming in May. The
Abkhaz were disappointed with the results of the January 5
elections and the weakening of Saakashvili, which, he said,
opens up the potential for renewed Georgian-Russian ties,
believing that this undermines their quest for independence.


7. (C) Bryza agreed with Arnault that the current strategy
for resolving the conflict was not working and raised three
issues that, if built upon, may help reinvigorate the peace
process. Following his January 18 meeting with FM
Bezhuashvili, Bryza noted a renewed Georgian focus on taking
concrete steps to improve Georgian-Russian relations that
could lead to a bilateral breakthrough and a warming of ties.
Bryza also suggested that it was time to de-isolate the
Abkhaz and start integrating their economic interests with
Georgia and raised the issue of the 2014 Sochi Olympics as a
potential lever for negotiations with the Russians. Arnault
said that the issue of Abkhaz isolation is tied to larger
issues and would not be feasible unless Georgian-Russian ties
improved, but agreed that it needed to be done. He also
thought that the Russians must be thinking of an end game in
Abkhazia well ahead of the 2014 Olympics, but did not
speculate on how it might play out.


8. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.
TEFFT