DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH SRSG ARNAULT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000114 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/CARC, IO AND DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNOMIG KPKO GG SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA MEETS WITH SRSG ARNAULT Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 19 meeting with Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Jean Arnault, DAS Bryza discussed the current situation in Abkhazia and progress on the self-assessment of the United Nations Observer Mission to Georgia (UNOMIG) operations. Arnault told Bryza that the past three months have been quiet in Abkhazia, aside from a few minor, isolated incidents, but noted an "amazing" level of propaganda coming from the Georgians on Abkhazia, which could destabilize the situation. Contrary to Georgian media claims, he said, there was no Abkhaz interference with Georgian voters living in Gali that prevented them from going to the polls, although he acknowledged that statements made by de-facto foreign minister Shamba raised fears among the ethnic Georgian population. Arnault said the UN review of the Friends process would focus on two main issues: the ineffectiveness of the current strategy to resolve the conflict by pursuing CBM's and other grassroots cooperation; and the limitations of the current negotiating format. He doubted that the review would produce a radically improved strategy. He said that UNOMIG is still reviewing the issue of establishing an artillery radar in Upper Kodori, but said that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would likely be a more practical and inexpensive solution. Bryza said that regardless of the outcome of the review, he thought that there were several underlying issues the Friends could explore to move the peace process forward in a decisive way: improved Georgian-Russian relations, de-isolation of the Abkhaz by increasing their economic ties to Georgia and sources of information, and the 2014 Sochi Olympics. End Summary. Abkhazia: a quiet three months -------------- ¶2. (C) Arnault characterized the situation in Abkhazia as quiet, with no major incidents between the Georgians and Abkhaz for over three months. He noted, however, that there had been an "amazing" amount of propaganda about Abkhazia coming from the Georgian media and said that with a decision on Kosovo coming soon, it will be necessary to work with the Georgians to tone down their rhetoric. He was particularly critical of Georgia's Rustavi 2 television stations and said his staff was weary of chasing down untrue reports of Abkhaz provocations. Bryza asked if the Abkhaz had responded in kind and Arnault said no, adding that these kinds of scare tactics work against Georgia by scaring their own people. Although he acknowledged that statements by de-facto "Foreign Minister" Shamba to the effect that Georgians living in Gali who wanted to vote in the election should move to Georgia raised fears among the ethnic Georgian population, he said there has been no truth to recent Georgian media reports of Abkhaz burning Georgian houses in Gali, harassing Georgian journalists, or interfering with Georgian voters going to the polls on January 5. ¶3. (C) Bryza asked Arnault about UNOMIG's proposal to establish UAV patrols over the Upper Kodori Gorge and whether these UAVs would be equipped with infrared sensors. Arnault said yes, the UAV's would be equipped with infrared sensors, and therefore would able to determine the direction from which artillery fire occurred even several minutes after such attacks. Arnault added that UNOMIG was still evaluating the feasibility of establishing an artillery radar, but thought that UAV patrols would be more cost efficient and potentially more effective than the radar. Arnault said that UNOMIG will make its pitch to the Georgians on the UAVs soon and should have them in place by spring. Friends Review -------------- ¶4. (C) Arnault said that the UN review of UNOMIG and the Friends process would focus on two main issues: the ineffectiveness of the current peace strategy of pursuing CBM's and other grassroots cooperation rather than focusing on a political settlement; and the limitations of the current negotiating format. The current strategy of focusing on resolving simple disputes and building on them to resolve larger issues has not been working, he said. The Georgians believe that taking a bottom-up approach hinders progress on the larger goal of resolving the conflict, while the Abkhaz argue that this approach prevents their long term goal of independence. Both sides have come to the conclusion that confidence building measures will not work to achieve their ends, he said, which is a cause for real concern because it has been at the center of UNOMIG's conflict negotiation strategy since 2003. Still, he said he was not sure whether the review would produce a comprehensive new conflict resolution strategy. TBILISI 00000114 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The review also needs to evaluate all of the negotiation mechanisms currently in place, he said, and determine ways to reinvigorate the process. Arnault characterized the Geneva meetings between the sides and the Group of Friends of the Secretary General as not the most vibrant means of getting the parties together. The Georgians continue to view negotiations negatively, he said, because they feel that time is against them. There is a sense among the Georgians that with each passing day the Abkhaz become more integrated into Russian economic and social systems and the sentiment for independence in Abkhazia only becomes more entrenched. If all the Georgians have to offer the Abkhaz are long term confidence building measures, he said, it will not be enough to persuade the Abkhaz to reunite with Georgia. ¶6. (C) On the other hand, Arnault noted that the Abkhaz also realize that Russian social and economic initiatives are not aimed at building ties between two independent states. He said he thought Abkhaz de-facto president Bagapsh realizes that joining a confederation with Georgia is likely to be their best option. Bryza agreed with Arnault's assessment of Abkhaz sentiment toward Russia, saying that he does not think the Abkhaz want to be absorbed into Russia. He asked Arnault if he thought there would be a way to exploit Abkhaz fear of integration into Russia. Arnault replied that the Russians have told him that they constantly tell the Georgians that they (the Georgians) know what to do to resolve the situation. Arnault said he did not know what the Russians wanted, but suspected it was Georgia renouncing its NATO bid. Bryza asked if it was now possible to propose this idea of confederation or if it was premature. Arnault said that it was too early, particularly with Kosovo independence looming and the Georgian parliamentary elections coming in May. The Abkhaz were disappointed with the results of the January 5 elections and the weakening of Saakashvili, which, he said, opens up the potential for renewed Georgian-Russian ties, believing that this undermines their quest for independence. ¶7. (C) Bryza agreed with Arnault that the current strategy for resolving the conflict was not working and raised three issues that, if built upon, may help reinvigorate the peace process. Following his January 18 meeting with FM Bezhuashvili, Bryza noted a renewed Georgian focus on taking concrete steps to improve Georgian-Russian relations that could lead to a bilateral breakthrough and a warming of ties. Bryza also suggested that it was time to de-isolate the Abkhaz and start integrating their economic interests with Georgia and raised the issue of the 2014 Sochi Olympics as a potential lever for negotiations with the Russians. Arnault said that the issue of Abkhaz isolation is tied to larger issues and would not be feasible unless Georgian-Russian ties improved, but agreed that it needed to be done. He also thought that the Russians must be thinking of an end game in Abkhazia well ahead of the 2014 Olympics, but did not speculate on how it might play out. ¶8. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable. TEFFT