UZBEKISTAN: EXPECTING RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON

S E C R E T TASHKENT 000991 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS FOR KATE SZPILA E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ASEC EAID GG RS UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: EXPECTING RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA, COY ON STANCE FOR NOW REF: A. SECSTATE 89769 ¶B. SECSTATE 90978 ¶C. TASHKENT 973 Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d). Safe Official Position on Russia-Georgia -------------- ¶1. (C) On August 25, Charge d'Affaires met with Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Americas Department Chief Takhir Mamadjanov to urge the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) to press Russia not to recognize the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and to convey the other points in reftel demarches. Mamadjanov thanked Charge for the information, promising that the GOU will study it carefully and that he will provide it to higher leadership. The GOU will then inform the U.S. Government of Uzbekistan's reaction. When Charge inquired as to whether the GOU was preparing an official statement on the Russia-Georgia situation, Mamadjanov said he had no such knowledge of this. He stated that the Government of Uzbekistan's position is that all parties should adhere to the six-point Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire agreement. The Russians are Coming... -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) A reliable Embassy contact in the Government of Uzbekistan also told us on August 25 that the mood in the Presidential Apparat is tense because of fears concerning Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's September 1-2 visit to Tashkent. Some members of the apparat believe that while the publicly stated purpose of Putin's visit is to discuss economic issues, Putin in fact intends to put pressure on Uzbekistan regarding the Russia-Georgia situation, and wants to determine whose side Uzbekistan is on with regard to it. The apparat cannot proceed on developing its policy on Russia-Georgia because President Karimov is currently residing at his dacha at Karnasai. (Note: Karnasai is located in the northeastern portion of Tashkent province, near Charvak reservoir. End note.) Some pro-U.S. members of the apparat believed that the Russia-Georgia situation was a bad sign that could portend further Russian meddling in Eurasia, the contact said. The source also stated that Russia had invited First Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov to Russia because it is aware that Azimov is one of the most pro-U.S. members of Uzbekistan's Cabinet of Ministers. (Comment: As of August 26, press reporting corroborated that Azimov had departed for Moscow, and indicated that Putin's visit to Tashkent would be one of the main topics for discussion. It is possible that Russia-Georgia will come up during these talks as well. End comment.) ... and are Putting the Screws to Uzbekistan -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) The contact believed that Russia had begun putting pressure on Uzbekistan prior to the conflict between Russia and Georgia as a punitive measure in response to the improving relations between Uzbekistan and the West. Over the past month, Russia had begun to expel Uzbek migrant workers from Russia and had suspended investment in certain oil and gas sector projects. While both sides had previously expected to come to an agreement this year allowing 600,000 Uzbek migrant workers to work in Russia legally, Moscow had decided a month ago to cap the legal number at only 30,000, the source said. Comment -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) We have seen no other indications that corroborate the Embassy contact's claims about the new number of Uzbek migrant workers legally permitted in Russia, or that Russia has already begun to expel some of these workers. If Russia does commit to a dramatic reduction in the number of Uzbek workers there, this would be a significant step with serious implications for Uzbekistan's economy. We do not expect Mamadjanov to play a very important role on developing Uzbekistan's position on the Russia-Georgia situation, as shown by his stated promise to deliver the information to his higher-ups as well as the other GOU contact's implication that decisionmaking on this issue is frozen until Karimov's return. Despite our demarche, at this point we think it is unlikely that Uzbekistan will push Russia on Georgia. The extent to which Moscow pushes Tashkent to support its position on Russia-Georgia using the various sticks and carrots at its disposal will be influential in determining the GOU's stance on the issue. BUTCHER