UZBEKISTAN: EXPECTING RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON

S E C R E T TASHKENT 000991

SIPDIS
NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN, EUR/RUS FOR KATE SZPILA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ASEC EAID GG RS UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: EXPECTING RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON
RUSSIA-GEORGIA, COY ON STANCE FOR NOW

REF: A. SECSTATE 89769

B. SECSTATE 90978

C. TASHKENT 973

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

Safe Official Position on Russia-Georgia
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1. (C) On August 25, Charge d'Affaires met with Uzbekistan's
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Americas Department Chief Takhir
Mamadjanov to urge the Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) to
press Russia not to recognize the separatist regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and to convey the other points in
reftel demarches. Mamadjanov thanked Charge for the
information, promising that the GOU will study it carefully
and that he will provide it to higher leadership. The GOU
will then inform the U.S. Government of Uzbekistan's
reaction. When Charge inquired as to whether the GOU was
preparing an official statement on the Russia-Georgia
situation, Mamadjanov said he had no such knowledge of this.
He stated that the Government of Uzbekistan's position is
that all parties should adhere to the six-point
Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire agreement.

The Russians are Coming...
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2. (S/NF) A reliable Embassy contact in the Government of
Uzbekistan also told us on August 25 that the mood in the
Presidential Apparat is tense because of fears concerning
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's September 1-2 visit to
Tashkent. Some members of the apparat believe that while the
publicly stated purpose of Putin's visit is to discuss
economic issues, Putin in fact intends to put pressure on
Uzbekistan regarding the Russia-Georgia situation, and wants
to determine whose side Uzbekistan is on with regard to it.
The apparat cannot proceed on developing its policy on
Russia-Georgia because President Karimov is currently
residing at his dacha at Karnasai. (Note: Karnasai is
located in the northeastern portion of Tashkent province,
near Charvak reservoir. End note.) Some pro-U.S. members of
the apparat believed that the Russia-Georgia situation was a
bad sign that could portend further Russian meddling in
Eurasia, the contact said. The source also stated that
Russia had invited First Deputy Prime Minister Rustam Azimov
to Russia because it is aware that Azimov is one of the most
pro-U.S. members of Uzbekistan's Cabinet of Ministers.
(Comment: As of August 26, press reporting corroborated that
Azimov had departed for Moscow, and indicated that Putin's
visit to Tashkent would be one of the main topics for
discussion. It is possible that Russia-Georgia will come up
during these talks as well. End comment.)

... and are Putting the Screws to Uzbekistan
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3. (S/NF) The contact believed that Russia had begun putting
pressure on Uzbekistan prior to the conflict between Russia
and Georgia as a punitive measure in response to the
improving relations between Uzbekistan and the West. Over
the past month, Russia had begun to expel Uzbek migrant
workers from Russia and had suspended investment in certain
oil and gas sector projects. While both sides had previously

expected to come to an agreement this year allowing 600,000
Uzbek migrant workers to work in Russia legally, Moscow had
decided a month ago to cap the legal number at only 30,000,
the source said.

Comment
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4. (S/NF) We have seen no other indications that corroborate
the Embassy contact's claims about the new number of Uzbek
migrant workers legally permitted in Russia, or that Russia
has already begun to expel some of these workers. If Russia
does commit to a dramatic reduction in the number of Uzbek
workers there, this would be a significant step with serious
implications for Uzbekistan's economy. We do not expect
Mamadjanov to play a very important role on developing
Uzbekistan's position on the Russia-Georgia situation, as
shown by his stated promise to deliver the information to his
higher-ups as well as the other GOU contact's implication
that decisionmaking on this issue is frozen until Karimov's
return. Despite our demarche, at this point we think it is
unlikely that Uzbekistan will push Russia on Georgia. The
extent to which Moscow pushes Tashkent to support its
position on Russia-Georgia using the various sticks and
carrots at its disposal will be influential in determining
the GOU's stance on the issue.
BUTCHER