Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08TASHKENT973
2008-08-22 08:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:
UZBEKISTAN: NO OFFICIAL COMMENT ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000973
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NO OFFICIAL COMMENT ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA
YET, BUT HINTS OF PRO-RUSSIA STANCE
REF: TASHKENT 929
Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000973
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NO OFFICIAL COMMENT ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA
YET, BUT HINTS OF PRO-RUSSIA STANCE
REF: TASHKENT 929
Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan has yet to announce an
official position on the Russia-Georgia conflict, but an
Embassy contact and local press reports have provided hints
that Tashkent may be quietly siding with Moscow on this
issue. According to a Regional SECURITY Office contact in
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),Uzbekistan's NATIONAL
Security COUNCIL recently sent a special memorandum
supporting the Russian position to MVD leadership as well as
senior members of other GOU ministries. The
quasi-independent website uzmetronom.com suggested on August
20 that Uzbekistan's plane with humanitarian aid bound for
South Ossetia landed in Vladikavkaz instead of Tbilisi
because Karimov recognizes "the correctness of Russia's
actions..." and may be ready to recognize South Ossetia's
cessation from Georgia. (Note: Uzmetronom's editor, Sergey
Yezhkov, has close ties to the NATIONAL SECURITY Service.
End note.) While the main state-controlled newspapers Pravda
Vostoka and Narodnoye Slovo have avoided mention of the
Russia-Georgia conflict, Uzbekistan's media--when it has
taken a position--has come out in support of Russia.
Uzbekistan's Surkhandaryo Province newspaper "Chagoniyon"
accused Georgia of attacking South Ossetia and stated that
President Saakhashvili had made a mistake in an attempt to
raise his prestige and show his power, and Uzbekistan's
"Ahborot" television program also backed the Russian
position.
2. (C) Comment: Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
assured us that an official statement on Russia-Georgia will
be forthcoming, but it is unclear when we can expect to see
this. Tashkent's measured behavior suggests that the
Government of Uzbekistan is weighing the pros and cons of
taking a public stance and carefully balancing its relations
with the U.S. and Russia. While Uzbekistan has become
increasingly suspicious of Russia over the past year, the
significant ties between Russia and Uzbekistan could also be
influencing Tashkent's behavior; Tashkent may judge that an
overt condemnation of Russian actions could entail more costs
from an antagonized Russia than benefits from the U.S.
Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Mukhametshin told us last
year that one million Uzbeks work in Russia each year,
sending about $1.5 billion back to Uzbekistan annually, and
that the number seems to be growing. (Comment: This is an
example of possible Russian leverage over Uzbekistan;
Uzbekistan's GDP in 2007 was roughly $22 billion according to
a 2008 IMF Article IV Consultation-Staff Report released in
July.) Furthermore, Russia is Uzbekistan's primary trading
partner. Another factor that may be affecting Tashkent's
view of the Russia-Georgia situation is Uzbekistan's far
greater access to Russian media than Western media.
BUTCHER
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NO OFFICIAL COMMENT ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA
YET, BUT HINTS OF PRO-RUSSIA STANCE
REF: TASHKENT 929
Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan has yet to announce an
official position on the Russia-Georgia conflict, but an
Embassy contact and local press reports have provided hints
that Tashkent may be quietly siding with Moscow on this
issue. According to a Regional SECURITY Office contact in
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),Uzbekistan's NATIONAL
Security COUNCIL recently sent a special memorandum
supporting the Russian position to MVD leadership as well as
senior members of other GOU ministries. The
quasi-independent website uzmetronom.com suggested on August
20 that Uzbekistan's plane with humanitarian aid bound for
South Ossetia landed in Vladikavkaz instead of Tbilisi
because Karimov recognizes "the correctness of Russia's
actions..." and may be ready to recognize South Ossetia's
cessation from Georgia. (Note: Uzmetronom's editor, Sergey
Yezhkov, has close ties to the NATIONAL SECURITY Service.
End note.) While the main state-controlled newspapers Pravda
Vostoka and Narodnoye Slovo have avoided mention of the
Russia-Georgia conflict, Uzbekistan's media--when it has
taken a position--has come out in support of Russia.
Uzbekistan's Surkhandaryo Province newspaper "Chagoniyon"
accused Georgia of attacking South Ossetia and stated that
President Saakhashvili had made a mistake in an attempt to
raise his prestige and show his power, and Uzbekistan's
"Ahborot" television program also backed the Russian
position.
2. (C) Comment: Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
assured us that an official statement on Russia-Georgia will
be forthcoming, but it is unclear when we can expect to see
this. Tashkent's measured behavior suggests that the
Government of Uzbekistan is weighing the pros and cons of
taking a public stance and carefully balancing its relations
with the U.S. and Russia. While Uzbekistan has become
increasingly suspicious of Russia over the past year, the
significant ties between Russia and Uzbekistan could also be
influencing Tashkent's behavior; Tashkent may judge that an
overt condemnation of Russian actions could entail more costs
from an antagonized Russia than benefits from the U.S.
Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Mukhametshin told us last
year that one million Uzbeks work in Russia each year,
sending about $1.5 billion back to Uzbekistan annually, and
that the number seems to be growing. (Comment: This is an
example of possible Russian leverage over Uzbekistan;
Uzbekistan's GDP in 2007 was roughly $22 billion according to
a 2008 IMF Article IV Consultation-Staff Report released in
July.) Furthermore, Russia is Uzbekistan's primary trading
partner. Another factor that may be affecting Tashkent's
view of the Russia-Georgia situation is Uzbekistan's far
greater access to Russian media than Western media.
BUTCHER