UZBEKISTAN: NO OFFICIAL COMMENT ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000973 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018 TAGS: PREL ASEC MOPS UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: NO OFFICIAL COMMENT ON RUSSIA-GEORGIA YET, BUT HINTS OF PRO-RUSSIA STANCE REF: TASHKENT 929 Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan has yet to announce an official position on the Russia-Georgia conflict, but an Embassy contact and local press reports have provided hints that Tashkent may be quietly siding with Moscow on this issue. According to a Regional Security Office contact in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),Uzbekistan's National Security Council recently sent a special memorandum supporting the Russian position to MVD leadership as well as senior members of other GOU ministries. The quasi-independent website uzmetronom.com suggested on August 20 that Uzbekistan's plane with humanitarian aid bound for South Ossetia landed in Vladikavkaz instead of Tbilisi because Karimov recognizes "the correctness of Russia's actions..." and may be ready to recognize South Ossetia's cessation from Georgia. (Note: Uzmetronom's editor, Sergey Yezhkov, has close ties to the National Security Service. End note.) While the main state-controlled newspapers Pravda Vostoka and Narodnoye Slovo have avoided mention of the Russia-Georgia conflict, Uzbekistan's media--when it has taken a position--has come out in support of Russia. Uzbekistan's Surkhandaryo Province newspaper "Chagoniyon" accused Georgia of attacking South Ossetia and stated that President Saakhashvili had made a mistake in an attempt to raise his prestige and show his power, and Uzbekistan's "Ahborot" television program also backed the Russian position. ¶2. (C) Comment: Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has assured us that an official statement on Russia-Georgia will be forthcoming, but it is unclear when we can expect to see this. Tashkent's measured behavior suggests that the Government of Uzbekistan is weighing the pros and cons of taking a public stance and carefully balancing its relations with the U.S. and Russia. While Uzbekistan has become increasingly suspicious of Russia over the past year, the significant ties between Russia and Uzbekistan could also be influencing Tashkent's behavior; Tashkent may judge that an overt condemnation of Russian actions could entail more costs from an antagonized Russia than benefits from the U.S. Russian Ambassador to Uzbekistan Mukhametshin told us last year that one million Uzbeks work in Russia each year, sending about $1.5 billion back to Uzbekistan annually, and that the number seems to be growing. (Comment: This is an example of possible Russian leverage over Uzbekistan; Uzbekistan's GDP in 2007 was roughly $22 billion according to a 2008 IMF Article IV Consultation-Staff Report released in July.) Furthermore, Russia is Uzbekistan's primary trading partner. Another factor that may be affecting Tashkent's view of the Russia-Georgia situation is Uzbekistan's far greater access to Russian media than Western media. BUTCHER