UZBEKISTAN: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF CENTCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000965

SIPDIS

FOR CENTCOM GENERAL DEMPSEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2018
TAGS: PREL ASEC KNNP MARR MASS PBTS PGOV PINS SNAR
UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF CENTCOM
GENERAL DEMPSEY

Classified By: Poloff Steven Prohaska for reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Embassy Tashkent warmly welcomes your visit
to Uzbekistan as an important opportunity to cement recent
improvements in U.S.-Uzbekistan cooperation. Recent months
have shown increasing dialogue and net improvements in the
relationship, particularly in the defense and security
sectors. During your visit you will meet with a select group
of senior Government of Uzbekistan (GOU) officials. We ask
that you encourage the Government of Uzbekistan to cooperate
with the U.S. across a variety of fronts, particularly with
regard to further support of our stabilization goals in
Afghanistan, counternarcotics cooperation, and additional
steps in human rights. As noted in other reporting, Karimov
is a president in control. Nevertheless, he is also in his
third and quite possibly final presidential term. The
political undercurrents of succession preparations are quiet
but clear; now is a time when the messages we send and the
relationships we cultivate matter. End summary.

Civility Restored in Bilateral Relations
--------------


2. (C) U.S.-Uzbekistan relations have regained in the past
year a level of civility. Harassment of Embassy personnel has
largely ceased; our officers and local staff are able to
travel and to meet with contacts on a regular basis. Our NGO
partners have told us that they have been given the green
light by Government of Uzbekistan authorities to meet with us
and resume normal relations. Some problems continue, but
across the Government of Uzbekistan, contacts with the
Embassy have picked up. Ambassador Norland has met privately
with President Karimov four times (once with Central
Command's Admiral Fallon) and has had several other
encounters. Karimov has in every instance underscored his
interest in positive relations, and indeed, recently stated
that we are moving beyond merely "restoring relations."

Uzbekistan-Afghanistan Relations, Northern Ground Line of
Communication
--------------


3. (C) The Government of Uzbekistan has expressed serious
concerns about the security situation in Afghanistan,
particularly with regard to dramatic increases in drug
production and increasing Taliban activity, and the potential
for spillover into Uzbekistan. While senior Government of
Uzbekistan officials have repeatedly indicated their lack of
faith in President Karzai, and are pessimistic about the
results of international efforts thus far, they are clearly
interested in seeing improved stability there. Uzbekistan
has indicated that achieving this depends on a multifaceted
strategy encompassing socioeconomic development of the
country and agreement among major stakeholders. During the
April 2-4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council summit in Bucharest, President Karimov
floated a "6 plus 3" proposal recommending the creation of a
United Nations-administered "Contact Group" consisting of the
states bordering Afghanistan--Iran, China, Pakistan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--plus Russia, the
United States, and NATO. The proposal is not our preferred
vehicle, as it does not include representatives from the
Government of Afghanistan in the group. At the end of April,
Tashkent also hosted a large-scale international conference
dedicated to addressing the security situation in Afghanistan
and promoting a regional approach to the problems there,
which underscores the GOU's continuing concerns and may
foreshadow additional gatherings devoted to regional
security.


4. (C) Currently, some sixty percent of aviation fuel
necessary for Coalition operations in Afghanistan passes by
rail through Uzbekistan. Ninety-nine percent of all of the
fuel that Afghanistan's aviation forces use, and tons of
bottled water for our troops in Afghanistan each month, also
transit Uzbekistan's territory. Uzbekistan is a vital and
relatively secure logistical pipeline in support of
operations in Afghanistan now and offers the potential of
becoming even more important in the near term given its
favorable geographic position and transportation
infrastructure and given continued instability in Pakistan.
The Government of Uzbekistan continues to invest considerable
resources into improving and expanding its railroad
infrastructure, and the state joint stock company Uzbekistan
Railroad has upgraded many of its Soviet-inherited rail
facilities and built new lines between Nukus and Navoi and
between Karshi and Termez. Uzbekistan Railroad's lines
terminate in Hayraton, Afghanistan in the northern Balkh
Province, which provides easy and safe access to Bagram
Airbase and other U.S./NATO operating points in eastern
Afghanistan.


5. (SBU) On January 29, the Government of Uzbekistan approved
the use of the Uzbekistani-German Termez Airbase as a transit
point into Afghanistan for U.S. personnel assigned to NATO
and/or International Security Assistance Force missions.
Uzbekistan has since indicated that it is willing to expand
the currently limited "case by case" permission granted in
this initial agreement to a blanket one, like the one the
Germans exercise now, but are asking for a diplomatic note
from German authorities to formalize the agreement. This
effort is pending. This expansion of the current "Termez
Bridge" agreement promises a much-needed alternate route for
moving U.S. personnel supporting operations in Afghanistan.


6. (C) The USG is hoping to follow the German Government's
and NATO's model in securing a transit agreement to transport
critical non-lethal goods across Uzbekistan in support of
operations in Afghanistan. The transit agreement would
provide an important alternate logistical route into
Afghanistan as well as a safeguard to limits on the current
primary supply conduit through Pakistan. Recent transit
problems with numerous contractor-controlled DOD shipments
becoming held up due to issues with the State Customs
Committee underscore the need for such an agreement. DAO
recommendation: During recent U.S.-Uzbekistan security
assistance consultative talks in Tampa, J4 CC BG Dowd
discussed the possibility of a NGLOC agreement with
Uzbekistan's Deputy Defense Minister Niyazov and proposed a
follow-up October 2008 visit to Uzbekistan. We recommend
raising this possible visit as an ideal opportunity to lay
out the framework for a U.S.-Uzbekistan NGLOC agreement based
on the pending NATO and existing German agreements.


7. (SBU) Uzbekistan has indicated its willingness to provide
electricity to Afghanistan and hopes to complete construction
of a 43-km link between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan within the
next six months. A round of Afghanistan-Uzbekistan talks
took place in April on construction of the 220 KV power
transmission line from the Surkhan substation in Uzbekistan
to the Afghan border. A group of Uzbek engineers traveled to
Afghanistan in early June and inspected the Afghan-built
220KV line from the border to Kabul. We have heard that
their inspection left them fully satisfied. Although the
Afghans were given to believe that construction of the
Uzbekistani transmission line would begin soon even in the
absence of a formal agreement, we understand that
construction has not yet begun. The sides have yet to settle
on the price and terms of the electricity that Uzbekistan
will sell to Afghanistan. During the April talks, the
Uzbekistani side hinted that the Afghans should expect to pay
much more than the $0.04 kW/hr that it has paid for
Uzbekistan's electricity in the past. A new round of talks
is taking place during the week of August 18-22.


8. (SBU) The United States has contributed to efforts to
enhance the security of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border,
and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs (INL) funded $575,000 of a $1,810,875 border security
assistance project implemented by the United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime at Hayraton checkpoint near Termez. A
subsequent INL-funded project kicked off in June to upgrade
security and cargo interdiction capabilities at the Termez
River Port.

Kagan Disaster, Ongoing CENTCOM/ARCENT Assistance Efforts
-------------- --------------


9. (C) A series of explosions rocked the Kagan Ammunition
Depot--which stored nearly 200,000,000 rounds of
ammunition--southeast of Bukhara on July 10, 2008. Despite
an initial rejection of the Embassy's offer of assistance, we
speculate that the GOU reversed its position once Ministry of
Defense (MOD) officials conveyed the scale of the disaster
and MOD's lack of sufficient equipment for clean-up efforts
to senior members of the GOU. President Karimov also
expressed his appreciation to the Ambassador for the offer of
USG assistance and indicated that this would be very helpful.
MOD leaders have asserted that they need help dealing with
the remaining 70-80 percent of the depot's unexploded
munitions. They have established a 300-man
sapper/engineering battalion to address the problem and
project that the site will require a clean-up effort lasting
at least one year. CENTCOM/ARCENT representatives are
currently facilitating the delivery of over 180 metal
detectors and the movement of a 5-man Military Training Team
to Kagan. DAO Recommendation: The 2008 CENTCOM Uzbekistan
Security Assistance Plan had two EOD-related training events.
The Kagan Depot disaster highlights the opportunity to
discuss many more such events.

Foreign Policy
--------------


10. (C) While Uzbekistan belongs to a variety of regional
security organizations including the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Russian-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),and the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),Uzbekistan's often
half-hearted participation in these underscores its
continuing wariness of such fora. Uzbekistan has not
actively participated in CSTO military exercises, and
President Karimov has vowed that Uzbekistan's policy on
Afghanistan will never be filtered through the CSTO.
Uzbekistan sees some value in security and economic
cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and is host to the organization's Regional Anti-Terrorist
Structure, but has refrained from active participation in
many of the SCO's military/security activities. Uzbekistani
officials have indicated their strong opposition to Iranian
membership in the organization and have told us that they
would oppose any anti-Western initiatives within the
framework of the organization.


11. (C) Disputes over access to water and Uzbekistan's
perception that its neighbors are not doing enough to combat
the spread of drugs, terrorism, and contraband into the
country fuel tension between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. Uzbekistan continues to maintain that water is
not a commodity and that water allocation should be based on
agricultural needs and population levels. Cotton exports
still generate the bulk of Uzbekistan's foreign currency
earnings, and Tashkent fears the effects of a reduction in
water flows on its cotton harvest. Indeed, Uzbek officials
have complained that the upstream countries have been
releasing too much water in the winter (to generate
electricity),and not enough in the summer, which deprives
Uzbekistan of the water it needs. In particular, Uzbekistan
opposes any upstream projects--such as the planned Kambarata
and Rogun hydropower projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
respectively--that would provide the upstream states with
greater control over water flows.

State of Play Within the Ministry of Defense
--------------


12. (C) Despite very encouraging and cordial CENCTOM/DAO-MOD
Action Officer Working Group meetings in Tashkent in April, a
strange silence followed from MOD contacts. They later
indicated that all future communications with MOD would
require diplomatic notes addressed to the MFA, in place of
direct DAO-MOD communication. MFA contacts believed the
order had come from Uzbekistan's National Security Service.
President Karimov later overturned this requirement during a
recent meeting with the Ambassador. Defense Minister
Mirzayev raised the possibility of a military intelligence
exchange in May 2008, and we ask that you engage on this
possible exchange with Mirzayev or his proxy directly--this
visit is an excellent opportunity for the ACDR to engage the
Ministry of Defense to establish a vigorous intelligence
exchange program focusing on Afghanistan.

Counternarcotics and Other Security Cooperation
-------------- --


13. (C) In Fall 2007, GOU officials began to hint that they
would welcome the resumption of cooperation with the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA),which suspended its
activities early in 2007 due to limited effectiveness in
working with the host government. DEA officials traveled to
Tashkent in April 2008 and had productive meetings with
officials from several partner agencies. Following up on the
positive signals, the Embassy submitted a diplomatic note
formally proposing the reestablishment of a DEA office.
Disappointingly, the belated response from the Government of
Uzbekistan rejected the proposal; MFA officials, however,
explained that up to three DEA special agents would be
authorized to augment the Embassy staff, but only as "U.S.
Diplomats" assigned to the Embassy Political Section. DEA is
still considering this highly unusual proposal, but it
suggests that some influential Government of Uzbekistan
officials remain opposed to resumption of cooperation on
counternarcotics affairs. We ask that you follow up on the
possibility of DEA returning during your meetings with the
Government of Uzbekistan.

Further mil-to-mil security cooperation points that we
recommend the Acting Commander address with counterparts
during this visit:

- Propose SOCCENT re-engage Uzbekistan by offering
counternarcotics riverine patrol boat training in November
2008 for the 14 patrol boats they delivered to the Border
Guards in 2007, which would follow similar U.S.-provided
contractor training in early spring 2008. Uzbekistan's MOD
will sign letters of recommendation for medical supplies and
boat training needs just prior to ACDR's arrival. J5 Desk
Officer Major Schupay will meet with the MOD team regarding
this issue on 26 August.

- Recommend ACDR engage State Commission for Drug Control
Deputy Chair Kamol Dusmetov and MOD representatives on joint
counternarcotics cooperation. Dusmetov's office has recently
agreed to establishing a counternarcotics program with
CENTCOM.


14. (C) Uzbekistan possesses a world-class set of radiation
portal monitors--27 total at various points of entry on
Uzbekistan's borders--installed by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency's (DTRA) WMD-PPI project. The GOU shared
data with us from this system during a November 2007 seizure
of radioactive materials bound for Iran. In recent months,
DTRA and Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS)
projects have provided Uzbekistani authorities with
additional radioisotope identification devices that have
strengthened Uzbekistan's ability to detect and interdict
materials of proliferation concern, and ongoing INL projects
are helping to train law enforcement officers on trafficking
in persons issues and are improving the capabilities of
Uzbekistan's main forensic laboratory. Uzbekistan has
recently joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism and participates in the Proliferation Security
Initiative.

Human Rights: Keeping Uzbekistan on Track
--------------


15. (SBU) The issue of human rights continues to be the most
important challenge to improved relations with Uzbekistan.
The country has taken several positive steps in the past
year, including allowing the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) to restart prison visits; adopting new
anti-human trafficking legislation which increases
protections for victims; adopting two International Labor
Organization (ILO) conventions on child labor; abolishing the
death penalty; increasing the independence of the judiciary
by implementing a new "habeas corpus" law; and releasing
several political prisoners. In addition, though repressive
measures against suspected Muslim extremists continue, they
seem to have abated somewhat. The Government of Uzbekistan
appears to have recognized a need to encourage the growth of
moderate Islam, and the result has been a drop in the appeal
of radical alternatives.


16. (SBU) The restart of ICRC prison visits was an especially
important step forward, as a majority of the country's human
rights abuses occur behind prison walls. Several human
rights activists have since reported improving conditions at
several prisons across the country. We believe that Admiral
Fallon, who visited the ICRC while visiting Tashkent in
February, was instrumental in convincing Uzbekistan to come
to terms with the ICRC on restarting prison visits in March
for an initial six-month trial period.


17. (SBU) Lately, however, Uzbekistan is threatening to
backslide on human rights, potentially complicating other
aspects of the relationship as well. For example, in the
past few months, Uzbekistan has run documentaries on
state-television attacking Radio Free Europe reporters and
religious minorities; imprisoned three Jehovah's Witnesses;
and detained a prominent journalist and activist in
Karakalpakstan. We also have seen a recent up-tick in
harassment of activists and religious minorities in several
regions of the country.


18. (SBU) Uzbekistan still seems to believe that it can
isolate discussion of human rights from other areas of the
relationship; we need to reinforce that it cannot. Progress
on security and other types of cooperation must go
hand-in-hand with progress on human rights. We believe that
by raising a few specific human rights cases, you will help
reinforce this idea with Uzbekistan, as well as have a
positive impact on those cases.


19. (SBU) We ask that you praise Uzbekistan for allowing ICRC
to restart prison visits and encourage them to continue
cooperation with ICRC past the initial six-month trial
period. We also would like you to express concern over
reports of the deterioriating health of political prisoners
Sanjar Umarov and Erkin Musaev and ask that Uzbekistan
consider releasing both men on medical grounds.

Economy Strong, but Little Trickle-Down
--------------


20. (SBU) Uzbekistan's macroeconomic performance continues to
be strong. According to official GOU figures, in 2007 the
economy grew 9.5 percent, and the country had a large current
account surplus corresponding to 19 percent of GDP. The
balance of payments continued to be strong with a surplus of
USD 7.5 billion. The official debt ratio is now 17-18
percent of GDP and is likely to fall below 15 percent in the
next few years. Uzbekistan practices a policy of "import
substitution" that helps to insulate it from international
financial markets.


21. (SBU) In 2008, the Government of Uzbekistan hopes to
maintain an eight percent growth rate, largely from exports
and industrial production. Although assessing the
Uzbekistani economy as strong, the International Monetary
Fund believes Uzbekistan's predictions for economic growth in
2008 to be overly optimistic.


22. (SBU) The benefits of Uzbekistan's strong macroeconomic
performance are slow to be seen in the lives of Uzbekistani
citizens. Although gross national income per capita is
growing, the official inflation estimate of 6.5 percent
contrasts with World Bank estimates that show the cost of
living rising by 20 percent and more annually. Ranking among
the five most corrupt countries in the world, Uzbekistan has
a shadow economy that accounts for 20 percent of GDP by
official estimates and by up to 45-50 percent of GDP in
independent assessments. According to the World Bank, over a
quarter of the population lives below the poverty line and is
able to spend less than USD 1.1 per day.
Nevertheless--largely due to underemployment--unemployment is
a low 0.75 percent according to government figures and eight
percent according to the International Labor Organization.
As much as 9-18 percent of Uzbekistan's GDP comes in the form
of remittances from workers who have migrated abroad, largely
to Kazakhstan and Russia.


23. (SBU) Enhancing financial mediation and confidence in the
banking system, as well as improving the business
climate--including through the liberalization of trade and
payments--are crucial if Uzbekistan is to achieve the
government's ambitious growth objectives and create
much-needed jobs for this young population. Great legal
predictability is needed. Foreign investors have complained
that Uzbekistani courts do not always honor contractual
arbitration agreements. At the same time, the General
Motors-UzAvtoprom joint venture is off to a good start, and
GM is now considering a substantial expansion of its
operations in Uzbekistan.

Action Summary
--------------


24. (C) We ask that you raise the following issues during
your meetings with GOU officials:

(1) A possible October 2008 visit of J4 CC BG Dowd to
Uzbekistan to discuss a potential U.S.-Uzbekistan NGLOC
agreement based on the pending NATO and existing German
agreements.

(2) Additional EOD-related training events to complement the
2008 CENTCOM Uzbekistan Security Assistance Plan.

(3) Establishment of a vigorous bilateral intelligence
exchange program focusing on Afghanistan.

(4) The possibility of DEA returning to Uzbekistan, and other
joint counternarcotics cooperation.

(5) Counternarcotics riverine patrol boat training in
November 2008.

(6) Encouragement of continued Uzbekistan-ICRC cooperation
past the initial six-month trial period.

(7) Expressing concern over the health of political prisoners
Sanjar Umarov and Erkin Musaev and requesting that the GOU
release both men on medical grounds.
BUTCHER