BUKHARA ACTIVIST: BETTER-TRAINED IMAMS FENDING OFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000878 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2018 TAGS: PHUM KIRF PGOV PINR PREL SOCI EG SA RS UZ SUBJECT: BUKHARA ACTIVIST: BETTER-TRAINED IMAMS FENDING OFF EXTREMISM REF: A. TASHKENT 299 ¶B. TASHKENT 777 ¶C. 07 TASHKENT 1325 ¶D. TASHKENT 708 ¶E. 07 TASHKENT 1301 Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a two-day visit to Bukhara on July 15 - 16, poloff discussed the current state of the region's Muslim community with a prominent local human rights activist and imams at Sunni and Shiite mosques. The activist, Shukhrat Ganiev, observed that that Muslim religiosity, especially among youth, was continuing to increase at the same time that authorities have allowed Muslims greater freedom to observe their religion, particularly in the past year. While he expressed concern that Uzbek labor migrants were importing more conservative interpretations of Islam from abroad and that Uzbek prisons were serving as incubators for extremism, Ganiev argued that the government in recent years has been more successful in promoting a moderate form of Islam by offering greater educational opportunities for the country's imams. The young imams who have benefited from this training (and who also preach a moderate form of Islam native to Uzbekistan) have enjoyed greater success in engaging the local community in recent years, helping to drain support for more conservative and extremist elements. Ganiev introduced poloff to two such young (but respected) imams at one of Bukhara's principal Sunni mosques. We generally agree with Ganiev's main observation that improved training for the country's imams appears to be sapping support for religious extremism, but reports from the imams that students at Uzbek madrassahs are continuing to risk persecution by studying abroad (with or without official permission) in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran suggests that demand for religious education is still outstripping supply. Religious educational opportunities for Shiites also remain inadequate. ¶2. (C) In their discussion with poloff, the Sunni imams also: reported that Bukhara's famed Mir-i Arab Madrassah was under pressure from Russian authorities to begin accepting Russian students; requested Embassy assistance on several projects, including establishing a website to serve as a forum for Uzbek clerics to share religious opinions and creating a center to preserve and translate ancient Bukharan religious texts; and expressed interest in participating in an exchange program with the United States to learn more about the practices of American Muslims. We believe it is in the Embassy's best interest to support these projects, which have the potential to build stronger ties with the country's religious leaders and further promote the tolerant form of Islam native to Uzbekistan. End summary. RIGHTS ACTIVIST SAYS SITUATION IMPROVING FOR BELIEVERS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) On July 15, poloff had a long-ranging discussion with Bukhara-based human rights activist Shukhrat Ganiev on the state of the region's Muslim community. Ganiev observed that religiosity, especially among youth, was increasing in Bukhara province, and that the number of persons attending Friday prayers continued to rise. While the majority of individuals attending Friday prayers five years ago were over 40 years of age, Ganiev noted that now the majority of worshipers appeared to be under 30. At the same time, Ganiev noted that authorities have relaxed their grip and allowed Muslims greater freedom to observe their religion, particularly in the past year. For example, Ganiev heard few reports of authorities pressuring youth not to attend mosques in the past year as compared to previous years. ¶4. (C) Ganiev reported that Bukhara city was home to 75 officially-registered mosques, which he believed was adequate to serve the population's spiritual needs (he estimated Bukhara's population at about 225,000 persons). Consequently, he observed that there were very few unofficial mosques in Bukhara. He knew of only three non-registered "Mahalla" (neighborhood) mosques that operate without interference (though under the eye of imams at registered mosques) in regions of the city that were relatively far from any of the officially-registered mosques. Ganiev observed that approximately 5,000 persons regularly attended prayers at Bukhara's largest Friday mosque. BUKHARA TRADITIONALLY HOME TO TOLERANT STRAIN OF ISLAM -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Ganiev explained that the influence of religious extremist organizations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, was always less in Bukhara, home to a tolerant form of Sufi Islam, than in other regions of the country - particularly the Ferghana Valley, which traditionally has practiced a more conservative interpretation of Sunni Islam. He allowed that there were individuals in Bukhara who preached a less tolerant form of Islam, but he maintained that extremist organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir were no longer active in the province, or at least not visibly so (Comment: While 13 individuals were sentenced to long prison terms on religious extremism charges in Bukhara in February - ref A - all of the defendants were reportedly from Kashkadarya province. End comment.) He noted that extremist elements, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, were more active in Bukhara province roughly ten years ago, although never to the same degree as in the Ferghana Valley. LABOR MIGRANTS IMPORTING MORE CONSERVATIVE VIEWS -------------- --- ¶6. (C) Ganiev observed that young Uzbek migrants working abroad were importing back to Bukhara more conservative views on Islam. He noted that this was true not only of Uzbeks who worked to the Middle East, but also of those who worked in Russia, Kazakhstan, and South Korea (Note: Most Uzbek labor migrants head to either Kazakhstan or Russia. End note.) While abroad, Ganiev explained that these migrants occasionally fall under the influence of Muslims from other countries, such as Pakistan (particularly in South Korea), who practice more conservative forms of Islam. Upon returning to Uzbekistan, these young men frequently argue with elders over Islamic practice, arguing in favor of more conservative interpretations (Comment: We also cannot discount the possibility that groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir are attempting to recruit Uzbek labor migrants in countries like Russia and Kazakhstan were they are able to operate relatively more freely than in Uzbekistan. End comment.) FEARS THAT PRISONS ARE BECOMING INCUBATORS FOR EXTREMISM... -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ganiev was concerned that Uzbekistan's prisons were serving as incubators for extremism. As he noted, large numbers of individuals have been sentenced to prison terms for alleged extremism over the years, many of whom have been exposed to worse conditions than other prisoners. This in turn has developed a greater sense of camaraderie between such prisoners, fueling their extremism. Furthermore, Ganiev believed that individuals who were only moderately conservative when originally arrested have become radicalized over the course of their incarceration. His view has been informed by his visits to prisons to meet with individuals convicted of extremism and from discussions with their relatives. (Comment: Lately, we have received reports from several activists of prison conditions improving since last year, including that religious prisoners have been reintegrated into the general prison population. Most likely, these changes were made in anticipation of the restart of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) prison monitoring this year, but it is also possible that authorities have finally recognized that segregating religious prisoners and exposing them to worse treatment is counterproductive. End comment.) ¶8. (C) Ganiev also reported incidences where the families of religious prisoners were becoming radicalized themselves. As an example, he noted speaking with a teacher at a local school in Bukhara whose son was sentenced to prison on religious extremism charges two years ago. Since her son's incarceration, the teacher has reportedly begun to wear the hijab as a symbol of protest, and in conversations with Ganiev, has spoken of her son as a martyr. LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AND AMNESTY COMMISSION - POTENTIAL TOOLS TO COMBAT EXTREMISM -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Ganiev believed that in order to combat religious extremism, it was necessary to offer better training for law enforcement officials so that fewer innocent individuals are sent to prison and radicalized. When asked by poloff whether he supported the re-establishment of a government commission to review the cases of religious prisoners for amnesty, Ganiev replied that it would be a useful tool for releasing innocent people out of prison. However, he noted that in its previous incarnation, the commission was marred by charges of corruption. According to Ganiev, family members paid 3,000 dollar bribes to the commission to have relatives released from prison (Comment: It is impossible for us to verify these allegations. Whether or not the commission in its original form was tainted by corruption, we still believe its recreation is a worthwhile idea to pursue. According to State Advisor for Religious Affairs Abdukhalimov, the commission's activities resulted in the release of over a thousand individuals convicted on religious extremism charges. End comment.) BETTER-TRAINED IMAMS NOW FENDING OFF THE EXTREMISTS -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite the importation by labor migrants of more conservative views on Islam from abroad and the radicalization of prisoners, Ganiev argued that the government in recent years has been more successful in promoting a moderate form of Islam. Principally, Ganiev believes the government has achieved this by providing clergy with more professional training through relatively new institutions such as the Tashkent Islamic University (Comment: While a secular institution, some graduates of the Tashkent Islamic University have become imams after completing additional studies at madrassahs or the Muftiate's Islamic University. End comment.) According to Ganiev, graduates of these institutions are better trained than imams who were educated during the Soviet era or during the early years of independence. These young imams, who preach a moderate form of Islam, have been more successful in engaging the religious community in recent years, helping to drain support for more conservative and extremist elements. ¶11. (C) In contrast, Ganiev argued that in the 1990s, official mosques lacked well-trained clergy. During this time, conservative and extremist (and largely unofficial) religious leaders, some of whom trained abroad (and some of whom lacked any training whatsoever),were able to make inroads among believers. Ganiev was still concerned about a "lost generation" of believers who came of age in the late 1990s and early 2000s, some of whom remain under the influence of conservative and extremist preachers. MEETING WITH POPULAR SUNNI IMAM -------------- ¶12. (C) On July 16, poloff met with Imam Ikromjon Yuldash and Deputy Imam Shukhrat Rakhimov at the Hazrati Imam Mosque, one of the oldest and best known mosques in Bukhara. Ganiev, who arranged the meeting, pointed to Imam Yuldash as an example of a young imam who has benefited from more professional training for clergy. With 75 officially-registered mosques in the city, Ganiev explained that Bukharans enjoyed a "free market" of mosques, and the city's Muslims tended to gravitate towards those with the most engaging preachers (Comment: Uzbekistan's Muftiate, based in Tashkent, controls the content of imams' sermons and delivers talking points to Uzbekistan's imams ahead of Friday prayers. Nevertheless, Ganiev explained that the delivery of such talking points by some imams is more artful than others, and imams do not exclusively quote from such talking points. End comment.) According to Ganiev, Imam Yuldash, despite his relatively young age, has become one of the city's most popular imams due to his rhetorical skills and erudition. ¶13. (C) Imam Yuldash told poloff that he became the Hazrati Mosque's Head Imam ten years ago at the age of 22 after completing three-years of study at the Mir-i Arab Madrassah in Bukhara, followed by an additional three years of study at the Tashkent Islamic University (Note: The normal course of study at each institution is four years. Ganiev portrayed Imam Yuldash as being a prodigy. End note.) Deputy Imam Rakhimov was only 22 years old and graduated from the Mir-i Arab Madrassah. He recently received an offer to head his own mosque elsewhere in Bukhara province, but said he declined because he preferred to continue his training under Imam Yuldash. Throughout the meeting, both Imams expressed great interest in pursuing further opportunities for professional development. ¶14. (C) Imam Yuldash said that approximately 1,500 persons, both men and women, attended Friday prayers at his mosque (Note: Ganiev, who attended Friday prayers at the Hazrati Mosque, noted that this number had steadily increased over time. End note.). In contrast to the Ferghana Valley, Imam Yuldash explained that women have traditionally attended Friday prayers in Bukhara, though they pray separately from men. He showed poloff a newly constructed hall at the mosque for women. IMAM OFFERS PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION -------------- ¶15. (C) Ganiev also explained that Imam Yuldash offered private religious education to Bukharan youth at the Mosque in his free time. Ganiev noted that he brought his own son to study with Imam Yuldash because he respected his tolerant and optimistic views. Imam Yuldash shared with poloff his belief that one of the most important roles for religion was to provide hope to people as they struggled with the hurdles of everyday life, including poverty. He criticized other imams for being too harsh in their sermons and making people "more depressed." SUNI IMAMS STRESS TOLERANT NATURE OF ISLAM IN BUKHARA -------------- -------------- ¶16. (C) Both Imams stressed the particularly tolerant strain of Sufi Islam practiced in Bukhara, which they believed matched well with they city's multinational and multi-confessional populace. Imam Yuldash noted that religious minorities, including Shiites, Bukharan Jews, and Christians, had attended Friday prayers at his mosque, and reported good relations with the leaders of minority confessions. He agreed with Ganiev that the Islam practiced in Bukhara has always been more tolerant than other regions of the country. In contrast, he noted that Sunnis in the Ferghana Valley, in particular, were less tolerant of Shiites (Comment: Indeed, poloff heard a Sunni imam express suspicions of Shiites during a recent visit to the Ferghana Valley, ref B). MIR-I ARAB MADRASSAH PLANS TO GO INTERNATIONAL -------------- - ¶17. (C) In addition to running the Hazrati Imam Mosque, Imam Yuldash teaches courses at Bukhara's famed Mir-i Arab Madrassah, which before independence was the only government-approved madrassah in the entire Soviet Union. Many of its Soviet-era students are now important religious leaders throughout the former Soviet Union, including former and current Muftis in Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan, Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian republics. Since independence, Imam Yuldash explained that the Madrassah has trained almost exclusively Uzbeks, though it remains Uzbekistan's most prestigious madrassah and attracts students from throughout the country, including the Ferghana Valley. ¶18. (C) Imam Yuldash reported that the Madrassah was planning "to become international again" and accept greater numbers of students from other post-Soviet countries, particularly Russia. He noted that the Madrassah was "under heavy pressure" from Russian authorities (whether from the Russian government or the Russian Muftiate was unclear) to begin accepting Russian students (particularly Muslim Tatars and Bashkirs) as early as next year. He reported that Russian authorities have discussed the issue with the Uzbek government and that all that remained was for President Karimov to "sign a decree." ¶19. (C) Imam Yuldash believed that Muslim religious education within Russia was substandard, and speculated that Russian authorities wished to send their future Muslim religious leaders to Uzbekistan, which taught a moderate form of Islam, rather than to places in the Middle East or South Asia, where Russian students might be exposed to more conservative or extremist teachings. He also believed that Russian authorities were actively working to promote religion, whether Orthodox or Muslim, within Russia society as a means of filling a "spiritual void" and combating social ills, including rampant alcoholism and drug abuse. ¶20. (C) Comment: At least from Imam Yuldash's description, the initiative for the Mir-i Arab Madrassah to become international is coming from the Russian side. It is significant that Russian authorities are seeking to send more of their students to Uzbekistan, which - along with the opening of branches of Russian universities in Uzbekistan over the past few years (ref C) - can be seen as an attempt to rebuild cultural links with Uzbekistan and maintain its influence in the region. As Imam Yuldash noted, it is also likely that Russian authorities would prefer for their future Muslim leaders to study in Uzbekistan rather than in the Middle East or South Asia. End comment. RELIGIOUS STUDENTS HEADING ABROAD FOR TRAINING -------------- - ¶21. (C) Imam Yuldash said that students at Uzbek madrassahs could request government permission to study abroad. He noted that a total of six students from the Mir-i Arab Madrassah have studied in Egypt, which he said has an agreement with the Uzbek government (Imam Yuldash also described Egypt as a "secular country like Uzbekistan" which supports the development of a "moderate strain of Islam.") With regret he noted that only one of the students had successfully completed their studies in Egypt. Two of the students reportedly left Egypt to study in Saudi Arabia, where they remain (Imam Yuldash noted that the students had "broken the law" by doing so, and indicated that they could therefore not return to Uzbekistan). The other students reportedly left Egypt early because of "poor living conditions" there. ¶22. (C) While Imam Yuldash briefly left the room, Deputy Imam Rakhimov added that he knew of individuals who had studied in both Iran and Saudi Arabia and were able to return to Uzbekistan without incident. He believed that these students had somehow received government permission to do so, but was unsure. Imam Rakhimov added that he knew of five acquaintances who were currently studying in Saudi Arabia. He expected that they would be closely watched by the National Security Service (NSS) upon their return to Uzbekistan. IMAM REQUESTS COOPERATION WITH THE EMBASSY -------------- ¶23. (C) Imam Yuldash inquired about the possibility of receiving Embassy assistance on three different projects. First, he requested assistance in creating a website that could be used as a forum for Uzbek imams to share their views on Islamic law and practice "from an Uzbek perspective." According to Imam Yuldash, Uzbek clerics currently lacked their own website. He said that former Mufti Mohammad Sodiq has a website, but it was infrequently updated. While he praised Sodiq as a "great scholar," he also pointedly observed that Sodiq "was no longer an imam." Imam Yuldash also reported that there were a few religious websites operated from Namangan (in the Ferghana Valley),but said these sites largely translated into Uzbek the edicts of religious scholars from the Middle East. Imam Yuldash believed strongly that simply translating religious material from the Middle East into Uzbek was inadequate, noting that Uzbekistan and the Middle East shared "one religion, but different cultures." Rather than "importing its religion from abroad," Imam Yuldash argued that Uzbekistan needed to preserve and further develop its own traditional brand of Sufi Islam. ¶24. (C) Second, Imam Yuldash requested Embassy assistance in creating a center to preserve and translate into modern Uzbek, Russian, and English old Bukharan texts on Islam. Both Imam Yuldash and Ganiev reported that many families in Bukhara possess ancient religious texts which have never been properly studied or translated. Ganiev observed that the Tashkent Islamic University had its own center to preserve religious texts, but argued that it did not have the resources or the staff to study and preserve additional works from Bukhara. Imam Yuldash noted that many Bukharans had only a superficial knowledge about the history of their city and its many illustrious Sufi scholars. He believed that preserving and translating such works would better educate the local population about the history of their city and promote the moderate strain of Islam native to the region. ¶25. (C) Third, Imam Yuldash said that the Mir-i Arab Madrassah was in need of funding to open a new Russian and English language learning center. He said that the Madrassah currently offered Russian and English lessons, but said they were of poor quality and not geared towards public speaking, which was most needed by students. Imam Yuldash was especially concerned that the Madrassah lacked adequate instructors to teach Islamic rhetoric in Russian, particularly since the Madrassah expected an influx of Russian students shortly. He noted that the few teachers of Russian language still remaining at the Madrassah were expected to retire within the next five to ten years. Imam Yuldash (who spoke passable Russian with poloff) admitted that he had rarely spoken Russian himself since he began working at the mosque and was in need of greater practice. IMAMS EXPRESS INTEREST IN VISITING THE UNITED STATES -------------- -------------- ¶26. (C) Both Imam Yuldash and Deputy Imam Rakhimov had never traveled to the United States before and expressed great interest in visiting the country. They were particularly interested in how mosques operated in America and about the lives of American Muslims. Poloff explained that the United States used to have an exchange program for Muslim leaders from Uzbekistan and hoped to restart the program again in the near future (Comment: Restarting exchange programs for religious leaders from Uzbekistan was one of the points discussed during Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom John Hanford's recent visit to Uzbekistan, ref D. Given his relative youth and influence in the community, Imam Yuldash would be an especially strong candidate for any future Embassy exchange programs focusing on religious leaders from Uzbekistan. End comment.) HISTORY OF BUKHARA'S HAZRATI IMAM MOSQUE -------------- ¶27. (C) Before the meeting with the Sunni imams, Ganiev explained to poloff the history of the Hazrati Imam Mosque, which tradition holds to be Bukhara's oldest mosque. According to Ganiev, the Mosque was closed throughout the Soviet era, when it was used as a storehouse for salt, which destroyed the Mosque's original frescoes. He reported that the Mosque finally reopened around 1996 with private donations from local businessman and citizens (including Ganiev),as well as support from unnamed "Middle Eastern donors." At that time, Ganiev observed that there were few restrictions on the ability of private citizens to raise funds and open mosques. After the passage of the 1998 Law on Religion, he explained that it became very difficult to acquire the necessary government permissions to open new mosques. In addition, Ganiev noted that mosques are now required to pay land taxes and taxes on any donations that they receive. MEETING WITH SHIITE IMAM -------------- ¶28. (C) After the meeting with the Sunni imams, poloff and Ganiev observed midday prayers at the Hoji Mir-Ali Shia Mosque in Bukhara and spoke with its head imam, Ibrohim Habibov. Imam Habibov estimated that approximately 300,000 Shiites lived in Bukhara province and another one million lived in Samarkand province (Comment: Habibov's estimate of the number of Shiites in Bukhara province was about 100,000 persons greater than the estimate he gave Ambassador Hanford last year, ref C. The exact number of Shiites is unknown as the government has not conducted a census since independence. Estimates of religious and ethnic minorities are sensitive issues in Uzbekistan, and official figures are largely considered to be deliberate underestimates. As poloff's visit to the mosque on July 16 was more "impromptu" than Hanford's visit last year, it is possible that Imam Habibov felt less pressure to downplay his estimate. End comment.) He explained that most of the Shiites in Bukhara are Iranians and descendants of slaves originally kidnapped by Turkmen tribes from Persia. In contrast, the Samarkand Shiites are largely Azeris and descendants of soldiers who served under Persian Shah Nader, who invaded the territory of modern-day Uzbekistan in the 18th century. ¶29. (C) Imam Habibov said that three officially-registered Shiite mosques operated in Bukhara province and strongly hinted that other unofficial Shiite mosques might also exist (Comment: Ganiev later explained that many Shiites worshipped at private residences which served as unofficial mosques. He did not know of any incidences of Shiites being persecuted for hosting prayers at their home, which is technically illegal under Uzbek law and an offence for which some Christian groups have been punished. End comment). Imam Habibov reported that there were officially-registered Shiite mosques also in Samarkand province, but did not know the number. (LACK OF) TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SHIITE IMAMS -------------- -------------- ¶30. (C) When asked how Shiite imams were trained when there were no Shiite madrassahs in the country, Imam Habibov replied that Shiite imams attend the country's Sunni madrassahs, including Bukhara's Mir-i Arab Madrassah. He also noted that Shiite students augment these lessons by reading widely on Shiite practice in their spare time. The Shiite Imam observed that a few Shiites have traveled to Iran for religious training, but noted that doing so "was illegal" and that such individuals could later not work in "official mosques." SHIITE IMAM ALSO STRESSES TOLERANT NATURE OF BUKHARAN ISLAM -------------- -------------- ¶31. (C) Imam Habibov echoed the words of the Sunni imams regarding the multi-religious, multiethnic, and highly tolerant nature of Bukharan society. He noted that two of the individuals who attended the midday prayers were Sunnis and observed that many Shiites attend prayers at Sunni mosques. Imam Habibov pointed out a nearby Sunni mosque which was less than a hundred meters away, and explained that the mosques enjoyed neighborly relations, with Sunnis inviting Shiites to their mosque to pray, and vice versa. Poloff spoke with one of the Shiite congregants, who noted that his wife was Sunni, and that their children worshipped at both Sunni and Shiite mosques. The congregant said he would leave it up to his children to decide whether they identify as Sunni or Shiite. Another congregant said he was also a product of a mixed Sunni-Shiite marriage, and that half his brothers were Sunni, and himself and two other brothers were Shiites. ¶32. (C) Poloff also observed that renovation was continuing at the Hoji Mir-Ali Mosque, which Imam Habibov explained was supported by private donations and Bukhara's hokimiyat (regional administration). He added that the renovation was proceeding slowly because it was difficult to find sufficient craftsman (Ganiev believed that many of Bukhara's skilled craftsman have already migrated abroad to Kazakhstan and Russia). COMMENT -------------- ¶33. (C) We generally agree with Ganiev's main observation that the government appears to be providing better training for the country's official imams, which in turn seems to be helping to drain support for more conservative and extremist elements. Nevertheless, the news that some students at Uzbek madrassahs are potentially breaking Uzbek law and risking persecution by studying abroad in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran suggests that demand for religious education is still outstripping supply. There is still a need for more religious educational establishments in the country for both Sunnis and Shiites. We will continue to argue that it is in the government's best interests (and our own best interests) for it to increase domestic opportunities for religious study, which in turn will further promote the moderate form of Islam native to Uzbekistan. Otherwise, young Uzbeks will continue to go abroad for religious study and bring back with them more conservative, and even extremist, interpretations of Islam. ¶34. (C) We believe that some of the projects Imam Yuldash mentioned could form the basis of greater cooperation between the Embassy and Uzbekistan's Muslim community. In particular, we might be able to support the creation of a website for Uzbek clerics to share religious opinions and the opening of a center to preserve and translate ancient Bukharan religious texts through the Embassy's Democracy Commission small grants program. The preservation and translation of the religious texts might also be a good project next year for the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation. The stumbling block, of course, is whether the imams can receive permission from the country's secular authorities to pursue such cooperation with the Embassy. Ganiev can potentially play a role here, as he has demonstrated an ability to work constructively with local authorities in Bukhara province to accomplish community projects. In addition, we have heard reports in the last few months that non-governmental organizations have received the green light to apply for democracy commission grants, and we are optimistic that the government may also allow these projects go forward as well. Both projects have the potential to further promote the tolerant form of Islam native to Uzbekistan, a shared interest of both our governments. BUTCHER