BUKHARA ACTIVIST: BETTER-TRAINED IMAMS FENDING OFF

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000878

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/29/2018
TAGS: PHUM KIRF PGOV PINR PREL SOCI EG SA RS UZ
SUBJECT: BUKHARA ACTIVIST: BETTER-TRAINED IMAMS FENDING OFF
EXTREMISM

REF: A. TASHKENT 299

B. TASHKENT 777

C. 07 TASHKENT 1325

D. TASHKENT 708

E. 07 TASHKENT 1301

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During a two-day visit to Bukhara on July 15
- 16, poloff discussed the current state of the region's
Muslim community with a prominent local human rights activist
and imams at Sunni and Shiite mosques. The activist,
Shukhrat Ganiev, observed that that Muslim religiosity,
especially among youth, was continuing to increase at the
same time that authorities have allowed Muslims greater
freedom to observe their religion, particularly in the past
year. While he expressed concern that Uzbek labor migrants
were importing more conservative interpretations of Islam
from abroad and that Uzbek prisons were serving as incubators
for extremism, Ganiev argued that the government in recent
years has been more successful in promoting a moderate form
of Islam by offering greater educational opportunities for
the country's imams. The young imams who have benefited from
this training (and who also preach a moderate form of Islam
native to Uzbekistan) have enjoyed greater success in
engaging the local community in recent years, helping to
drain support for more conservative and extremist elements.
Ganiev introduced poloff to two such young (but respected)
imams at one of Bukhara's principal Sunni mosques. We
generally agree with Ganiev's main observation that improved
training for the country's imams appears to be sapping
support for religious extremism, but reports from the imams
that students at Uzbek madrassahs are continuing to risk
persecution by studying abroad (with or without official
permission) in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran suggests
that demand for religious education is still outstripping
supply. Religious educational opportunities for Shiites also
remain inadequate.


2. (C) In their discussion with poloff, the Sunni imams
also: reported that Bukhara's famed Mir-i Arab Madrassah was
under pressure from Russian authorities to begin accepting
Russian students; requested Embassy assistance on several
projects, including establishing a website to serve as a
forum for Uzbek clerics to share religious opinions and
creating a center to preserve and translate ancient Bukharan
religious texts; and expressed interest in participating in
an exchange program with the United States to learn more
about the practices of American Muslims. We believe it is in
the Embassy's best interest to support these projects, which
have the potential to build stronger ties with the country's
religious leaders and further promote the tolerant form of
Islam native to Uzbekistan. End summary.

RIGHTS ACTIVIST SAYS SITUATION IMPROVING FOR BELIEVERS
-------------- --------------


3. (C) On July 15, poloff had a long-ranging discussion with
Bukhara-based human rights activist Shukhrat Ganiev on the
state of the region's Muslim community. Ganiev observed that
religiosity, especially among youth, was increasing in
Bukhara province, and that the number of persons attending
Friday prayers continued to rise. While the majority of
individuals attending Friday prayers five years ago were over
40 years of age, Ganiev noted that now the majority of
worshipers appeared to be under 30. At the same time, Ganiev
noted that authorities have relaxed their grip and allowed
Muslims greater freedom to observe their religion,
particularly in the past year. For example, Ganiev heard few
reports of authorities pressuring youth not to attend mosques
in the past year as compared to previous years.



4. (C) Ganiev reported that Bukhara city was home to 75
officially-registered mosques, which he believed was adequate
to serve the population's spiritual needs (he estimated
Bukhara's population at about 225,000 persons).
Consequently, he observed that there were very few unofficial
mosques in Bukhara. He knew of only three non-registered
"Mahalla" (neighborhood) mosques that operate without
interference (though under the eye of imams at registered
mosques) in regions of the city that were relatively far from
any of the officially-registered mosques. Ganiev observed
that approximately 5,000 persons regularly attended prayers
at Bukhara's largest Friday mosque.

BUKHARA TRADITIONALLY HOME TO TOLERANT STRAIN OF ISLAM
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Ganiev explained that the influence of religious
extremist organizations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, was always
less in Bukhara, home to a tolerant form of Sufi Islam, than
in other regions of the country - particularly the Ferghana
Valley, which traditionally has practiced a more conservative
interpretation of Sunni Islam. He allowed that there were
individuals in Bukhara who preached a less tolerant form of
Islam, but he maintained that extremist organizations like
Hizb ut-Tahrir were no longer active in the province, or at
least not visibly so (Comment: While 13 individuals were
sentenced to long prison terms on religious extremism charges
in Bukhara in February - ref A - all of the defendants were
reportedly from Kashkadarya province. End comment.) He
noted that extremist elements, including Hizb ut-Tahrir, were
more active in Bukhara province roughly ten years ago,
although never to the same degree as in the Ferghana Valley.

LABOR MIGRANTS IMPORTING MORE CONSERVATIVE VIEWS
-------------- ---


6. (C) Ganiev observed that young Uzbek migrants working
abroad were importing back to Bukhara more conservative views
on Islam. He noted that this was true not only of Uzbeks who
worked to the Middle East, but also of those who worked in
Russia, Kazakhstan, and South Korea (Note: Most Uzbek labor
migrants head to either Kazakhstan or Russia. End note.)
While abroad, Ganiev explained that these migrants
occasionally fall under the influence of Muslims from other
countries, such as Pakistan (particularly in South Korea),
who practice more conservative forms of Islam. Upon
returning to Uzbekistan, these young men frequently argue
with elders over Islamic practice, arguing in favor of more
conservative interpretations (Comment: We also cannot
discount the possibility that groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir are
attempting to recruit Uzbek labor migrants in countries like
Russia and Kazakhstan were they are able to operate
relatively more freely than in Uzbekistan. End comment.)

FEARS THAT PRISONS ARE BECOMING INCUBATORS FOR EXTREMISM...
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Ganiev was concerned that Uzbekistan's prisons were
serving as incubators for extremism. As he noted, large
numbers of individuals have been sentenced to prison terms
for alleged extremism over the years, many of whom have been
exposed to worse conditions than other prisoners. This in
turn has developed a greater sense of camaraderie between
such prisoners, fueling their extremism. Furthermore, Ganiev
believed that individuals who were only moderately
conservative when originally arrested have become radicalized
over the course of their incarceration. His view has been
informed by his visits to prisons to meet with individuals
convicted of extremism and from discussions with their
relatives. (Comment: Lately, we have received reports from

several activists of prison conditions improving since last
year, including that religious prisoners have been
reintegrated into the general prison population. Most
likely, these changes were made in anticipation of the
restart of International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
prison monitoring this year, but it is also possible that
authorities have finally recognized that segregating
religious prisoners and exposing them to worse treatment is
counterproductive. End comment.)


8. (C) Ganiev also reported incidences where the families of
religious prisoners were becoming radicalized themselves. As
an example, he noted speaking with a teacher at a local
school in Bukhara whose son was sentenced to prison on
religious extremism charges two years ago. Since her son's
incarceration, the teacher has reportedly begun to wear the
hijab as a symbol of protest, and in conversations with
Ganiev, has spoken of her son as a martyr.

LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING AND AMNESTY COMMISSION - POTENTIAL
TOOLS TO COMBAT EXTREMISM
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Ganiev believed that in order to combat religious
extremism, it was necessary to offer better training for law
enforcement officials so that fewer innocent individuals are
sent to prison and radicalized. When asked by poloff whether
he supported the re-establishment of a government commission
to review the cases of religious prisoners for amnesty,
Ganiev replied that it would be a useful tool for releasing
innocent people out of prison. However, he noted that in its
previous incarnation, the commission was marred by charges of
corruption. According to Ganiev, family members paid 3,000
dollar bribes to the commission to have relatives released
from prison (Comment: It is impossible for us to verify these
allegations. Whether or not the commission in its original
form was tainted by corruption, we still believe its
recreation is a worthwhile idea to pursue. According to
State Advisor for Religious Affairs Abdukhalimov, the
commission's activities resulted in the release of over a
thousand individuals convicted on religious extremism
charges. End comment.)

BETTER-TRAINED IMAMS NOW FENDING OFF THE EXTREMISTS
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Despite the importation by labor migrants of more
conservative views on Islam from abroad and the
radicalization of prisoners, Ganiev argued that the
government in recent years has been more successful in
promoting a moderate form of Islam. Principally, Ganiev
believes the government has achieved this by providing clergy
with more professional training through relatively new
institutions such as the Tashkent Islamic University
(Comment: While a secular institution, some graduates of the
Tashkent Islamic University have become imams after
completing additional studies at madrassahs or the Muftiate's
Islamic University. End comment.) According to Ganiev,
graduates of these institutions are better trained than imams
who were educated during the Soviet era or during the early
years of independence. These young imams, who preach a
moderate form of Islam, have been more successful in engaging
the religious community in recent years, helping to drain
support for more conservative and extremist elements.


11. (C) In contrast, Ganiev argued that in the 1990s,
official mosques lacked well-trained clergy. During this
time, conservative and extremist (and largely unofficial)
religious leaders, some of whom trained abroad (and some of
whom lacked any training whatsoever),were able to make
inroads among believers. Ganiev was still concerned about a

"lost generation" of believers who came of age in the late
1990s and early 2000s, some of whom remain under the
influence of conservative and extremist preachers.

MEETING WITH POPULAR SUNNI IMAM
--------------


12. (C) On July 16, poloff met with Imam Ikromjon Yuldash
and Deputy Imam Shukhrat Rakhimov at the Hazrati Imam Mosque,
one of the oldest and best known mosques in Bukhara. Ganiev,
who arranged the meeting, pointed to Imam Yuldash as an
example of a young imam who has benefited from more
professional training for clergy. With 75
officially-registered mosques in the city, Ganiev explained
that Bukharans enjoyed a "free market" of mosques, and the
city's Muslims tended to gravitate towards those with the
most engaging preachers (Comment: Uzbekistan's Muftiate,
based in Tashkent, controls the content of imams' sermons and
delivers talking points to Uzbekistan's imams ahead of Friday
prayers. Nevertheless, Ganiev explained that the delivery of
such talking points by some imams is more artful than others,
and imams do not exclusively quote from such talking points.
End comment.) According to Ganiev, Imam Yuldash, despite his
relatively young age, has become one of the city's most
popular imams due to his rhetorical skills and erudition.


13. (C) Imam Yuldash told poloff that he became the Hazrati
Mosque's Head Imam ten years ago at the age of 22 after
completing three-years of study at the Mir-i Arab Madrassah
in Bukhara, followed by an additional three years of study at
the Tashkent Islamic University (Note: The normal course of
study at each institution is four years. Ganiev portrayed
Imam Yuldash as being a prodigy. End note.) Deputy Imam
Rakhimov was only 22 years old and graduated from the Mir-i
Arab Madrassah. He recently received an offer to head his
own mosque elsewhere in Bukhara province, but said he
declined because he preferred to continue his training under
Imam Yuldash. Throughout the meeting, both Imams expressed
great interest in pursuing further opportunities for
professional development.


14. (C) Imam Yuldash said that approximately 1,500 persons,
both men and women, attended Friday prayers at his mosque
(Note: Ganiev, who attended Friday prayers at the Hazrati
Mosque, noted that this number had steadily increased over
time. End note.). In contrast to the Ferghana Valley, Imam
Yuldash explained that women have traditionally attended
Friday prayers in Bukhara, though they pray separately from
men. He showed poloff a newly constructed hall at the mosque
for women.

IMAM OFFERS PRIVATE RELIGIOUS EDUCATION
--------------


15. (C) Ganiev also explained that Imam Yuldash offered
private religious education to Bukharan youth at the Mosque
in his free time. Ganiev noted that he brought his own son
to study with Imam Yuldash because he respected his tolerant
and optimistic views. Imam Yuldash shared with poloff his
belief that one of the most important roles for religion was
to provide hope to people as they struggled with the hurdles
of everyday life, including poverty. He criticized other
imams for being too harsh in their sermons and making people
"more depressed."

SUNI IMAMS STRESS TOLERANT NATURE OF ISLAM IN BUKHARA
-------------- --------------


16. (C) Both Imams stressed the particularly tolerant strain
of Sufi Islam practiced in Bukhara, which they believed
matched well with they city's multinational and

multi-confessional populace. Imam Yuldash noted that
religious minorities, including Shiites, Bukharan Jews, and
Christians, had attended Friday prayers at his mosque, and
reported good relations with the leaders of minority
confessions. He agreed with Ganiev that the Islam practiced
in Bukhara has always been more tolerant than other regions
of the country. In contrast, he noted that Sunnis in the
Ferghana Valley, in particular, were less tolerant of Shiites
(Comment: Indeed, poloff heard a Sunni imam express
suspicions of Shiites during a recent visit to the Ferghana
Valley, ref B).

MIR-I ARAB MADRASSAH PLANS TO GO INTERNATIONAL
-------------- -


17. (C) In addition to running the Hazrati Imam Mosque, Imam
Yuldash teaches courses at Bukhara's famed Mir-i Arab
Madrassah, which before independence was the only
government-approved madrassah in the entire Soviet Union.
Many of its Soviet-era students are now important religious
leaders throughout the former Soviet Union, including former
and current Muftis in Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan,
Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian republics. Since
independence, Imam Yuldash explained that the Madrassah has
trained almost exclusively Uzbeks, though it remains
Uzbekistan's most prestigious madrassah and attracts students
from throughout the country, including the Ferghana Valley.


18. (C) Imam Yuldash reported that the Madrassah was
planning "to become international again" and accept greater
numbers of students from other post-Soviet countries,
particularly Russia. He noted that the Madrassah was "under
heavy pressure" from Russian authorities (whether from the
Russian government or the Russian Muftiate was unclear) to
begin accepting Russian students (particularly Muslim Tatars
and Bashkirs) as early as next year. He reported that
Russian authorities have discussed the issue with the Uzbek
government and that all that remained was for President
Karimov to "sign a decree."


19. (C) Imam Yuldash believed that Muslim religious
education within Russia was substandard, and speculated that
Russian authorities wished to send their future Muslim
religious leaders to Uzbekistan, which taught a moderate form
of Islam, rather than to places in the Middle East or South
Asia, where Russian students might be exposed to more
conservative or extremist teachings. He also believed that
Russian authorities were actively working to promote
religion, whether Orthodox or Muslim, within Russia society
as a means of filling a "spiritual void" and combating social
ills, including rampant alcoholism and drug abuse.


20. (C) Comment: At least from Imam Yuldash's description,
the initiative for the Mir-i Arab Madrassah to become
international is coming from the Russian side. It is
significant that Russian authorities are seeking to send more
of their students to Uzbekistan, which - along with the
opening of branches of Russian universities in Uzbekistan
over the past few years (ref C) - can be seen as an attempt
to rebuild cultural links with Uzbekistan and maintain its
influence in the region. As Imam Yuldash noted, it is also
likely that Russian authorities would prefer for their future
Muslim leaders to study in Uzbekistan rather than in the
Middle East or South Asia. End comment.

RELIGIOUS STUDENTS HEADING ABROAD FOR TRAINING
-------------- -


21. (C) Imam Yuldash said that students at Uzbek madrassahs
could request government permission to study abroad. He
noted that a total of six students from the Mir-i Arab

Madrassah have studied in Egypt, which he said has an
agreement with the Uzbek government (Imam Yuldash also
described Egypt as a "secular country like Uzbekistan" which
supports the development of a "moderate strain of Islam.")
With regret he noted that only one of the students had
successfully completed their studies in Egypt. Two of the
students reportedly left Egypt to study in Saudi Arabia,
where they remain (Imam Yuldash noted that the students had
"broken the law" by doing so, and indicated that they could
therefore not return to Uzbekistan). The other students
reportedly left Egypt early because of "poor living
conditions" there.


22. (C) While Imam Yuldash briefly left the room, Deputy
Imam Rakhimov added that he knew of individuals who had
studied in both Iran and Saudi Arabia and were able to return
to Uzbekistan without incident. He believed that these
students had somehow received government permission to do so,
but was unsure. Imam Rakhimov added that he knew of five
acquaintances who were currently studying in Saudi Arabia.
He expected that they would be closely watched by the
National Security Service (NSS) upon their return to
Uzbekistan.

IMAM REQUESTS COOPERATION WITH THE EMBASSY
--------------


23. (C) Imam Yuldash inquired about the possibility of
receiving Embassy assistance on three different projects.
First, he requested assistance in creating a website that
could be used as a forum for Uzbek imams to share their views
on Islamic law and practice "from an Uzbek perspective."
According to Imam Yuldash, Uzbek clerics currently lacked
their own website. He said that former Mufti Mohammad Sodiq
has a website, but it was infrequently updated. While he
praised Sodiq as a "great scholar," he also pointedly
observed that Sodiq "was no longer an imam." Imam Yuldash
also reported that there were a few religious websites
operated from Namangan (in the Ferghana Valley),but said
these sites largely translated into Uzbek the edicts of
religious scholars from the Middle East. Imam Yuldash
believed strongly that simply translating religious material
from the Middle East into Uzbek was inadequate, noting that
Uzbekistan and the Middle East shared "one religion, but
different cultures." Rather than "importing its religion
from abroad," Imam Yuldash argued that Uzbekistan needed to
preserve and further develop its own traditional brand of
Sufi Islam.


24. (C) Second, Imam Yuldash requested Embassy assistance in
creating a center to preserve and translate into modern
Uzbek, Russian, and English old Bukharan texts on Islam.
Both Imam Yuldash and Ganiev reported that many families in
Bukhara possess ancient religious texts which have never been
properly studied or translated. Ganiev observed that the
Tashkent Islamic University had its own center to preserve
religious texts, but argued that it did not have the
resources or the staff to study and preserve additional works
from Bukhara. Imam Yuldash noted that many Bukharans had
only a superficial knowledge about the history of their city
and its many illustrious Sufi scholars. He believed that
preserving and translating such works would better educate
the local population about the history of their city and
promote the moderate strain of Islam native to the region.



25. (C) Third, Imam Yuldash said that the Mir-i Arab
Madrassah was in need of funding to open a new Russian and
English language learning center. He said that the Madrassah
currently offered Russian and English lessons, but said they
were of poor quality and not geared towards public speaking,

which was most needed by students. Imam Yuldash was
especially concerned that the Madrassah lacked adequate
instructors to teach Islamic rhetoric in Russian,
particularly since the Madrassah expected an influx of
Russian students shortly. He noted that the few teachers of
Russian language still remaining at the Madrassah were
expected to retire within the next five to ten years. Imam
Yuldash (who spoke passable Russian with poloff) admitted
that he had rarely spoken Russian himself since he began
working at the mosque and was in need of greater practice.

IMAMS EXPRESS INTEREST IN VISITING THE UNITED STATES
-------------- --------------


26. (C) Both Imam Yuldash and Deputy Imam Rakhimov had never
traveled to the United States before and expressed great
interest in visiting the country. They were particularly
interested in how mosques operated in America and about the
lives of American Muslims. Poloff explained that the United
States used to have an exchange program for Muslim leaders
from Uzbekistan and hoped to restart the program again in the
near future (Comment: Restarting exchange programs for
religious leaders from Uzbekistan was one of the points
discussed during Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom
John Hanford's recent visit to Uzbekistan, ref D. Given his
relative youth and influence in the community, Imam Yuldash
would be an especially strong candidate for any future
Embassy exchange programs focusing on religious leaders from
Uzbekistan. End comment.)

HISTORY OF BUKHARA'S HAZRATI IMAM MOSQUE
--------------


27. (C) Before the meeting with the Sunni imams, Ganiev
explained to poloff the history of the Hazrati Imam Mosque,
which tradition holds to be Bukhara's oldest mosque.
According to Ganiev, the Mosque was closed throughout the
Soviet era, when it was used as a storehouse for salt, which
destroyed the Mosque's original frescoes. He reported that
the Mosque finally reopened around 1996 with private
donations from local businessman and citizens (including
Ganiev),as well as support from unnamed "Middle Eastern
donors." At that time, Ganiev observed that there were few
restrictions on the ability of private citizens to raise
funds and open mosques. After the passage of the 1998 Law on
Religion, he explained that it became very difficult to
acquire the necessary government permissions to open new
mosques. In addition, Ganiev noted that mosques are now
required to pay land taxes and taxes on any donations that
they receive.

MEETING WITH SHIITE IMAM
--------------


28. (C) After the meeting with the Sunni imams, poloff and
Ganiev observed midday prayers at the Hoji Mir-Ali Shia
Mosque in Bukhara and spoke with its head imam, Ibrohim
Habibov. Imam Habibov estimated that approximately 300,000
Shiites lived in Bukhara province and another one million
lived in Samarkand province (Comment: Habibov's estimate of
the number of Shiites in Bukhara province was about 100,000
persons greater than the estimate he gave Ambassador Hanford
last year, ref C. The exact number of Shiites is unknown as
the government has not conducted a census since independence.
Estimates of religious and ethnic minorities are sensitive
issues in Uzbekistan, and official figures are largely
considered to be deliberate underestimates. As poloff's
visit to the mosque on July 16 was more "impromptu" than
Hanford's visit last year, it is possible that Imam Habibov
felt less pressure to downplay his estimate. End comment.)
He explained that most of the Shiites in Bukhara are Iranians

and descendants of slaves originally kidnapped by Turkmen
tribes from Persia. In contrast, the Samarkand Shiites are
largely Azeris and descendants of soldiers who served under
Persian Shah Nader, who invaded the territory of modern-day
Uzbekistan in the 18th century.


29. (C) Imam Habibov said that three officially-registered
Shiite mosques operated in Bukhara province and strongly
hinted that other unofficial Shiite mosques might also exist
(Comment: Ganiev later explained that many Shiites worshipped
at private residences which served as unofficial mosques. He
did not know of any incidences of Shiites being persecuted
for hosting prayers at their home, which is technically
illegal under Uzbek law and an offence for which some
Christian groups have been punished. End comment). Imam
Habibov reported that there were officially-registered Shiite
mosques also in Samarkand province, but did not know the
number.

(LACK OF) TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SHIITE IMAMS
-------------- --------------


30. (C) When asked how Shiite imams were trained when there
were no Shiite madrassahs in the country, Imam Habibov
replied that Shiite imams attend the country's Sunni
madrassahs, including Bukhara's Mir-i Arab Madrassah. He
also noted that Shiite students augment these lessons by
reading widely on Shiite practice in their spare time. The
Shiite Imam observed that a few Shiites have traveled to Iran
for religious training, but noted that doing so "was illegal"
and that such individuals could later not work in "official
mosques."

SHIITE IMAM ALSO STRESSES TOLERANT NATURE OF BUKHARAN ISLAM
-------------- --------------


31. (C) Imam Habibov echoed the words of the Sunni imams
regarding the multi-religious, multiethnic, and highly
tolerant nature of Bukharan society. He noted that two of
the individuals who attended the midday prayers were Sunnis
and observed that many Shiites attend prayers at Sunni
mosques. Imam Habibov pointed out a nearby Sunni mosque
which was less than a hundred meters away, and explained that
the mosques enjoyed neighborly relations, with Sunnis
inviting Shiites to their mosque to pray, and vice versa.
Poloff spoke with one of the Shiite congregants, who noted
that his wife was Sunni, and that their children worshipped
at both Sunni and Shiite mosques. The congregant said he
would leave it up to his children to decide whether they
identify as Sunni or Shiite. Another congregant said he was
also a product of a mixed Sunni-Shiite marriage, and that
half his brothers were Sunni, and himself and two other
brothers were Shiites.


32. (C) Poloff also observed that renovation was continuing
at the Hoji Mir-Ali Mosque, which Imam Habibov explained was
supported by private donations and Bukhara's hokimiyat
(regional administration). He added that the renovation was
proceeding slowly because it was difficult to find sufficient
craftsman (Ganiev believed that many of Bukhara's skilled
craftsman have already migrated abroad to Kazakhstan and
Russia).

COMMENT
--------------


33. (C) We generally agree with Ganiev's main observation
that the government appears to be providing better training
for the country's official imams, which in turn seems to be
helping to drain support for more conservative and extremist
elements. Nevertheless, the news that some students at Uzbek

madrassahs are potentially breaking Uzbek law and risking
persecution by studying abroad in countries like Saudi Arabia
and Iran suggests that demand for religious education is
still outstripping supply. There is still a need for more
religious educational establishments in the country for both
Sunnis and Shiites. We will continue to argue that it is in
the government's best interests (and our own best interests)
for it to increase domestic opportunities for religious
study, which in turn will further promote the moderate form
of Islam native to Uzbekistan. Otherwise, young Uzbeks will
continue to go abroad for religious study and bring back with
them more conservative, and even extremist, interpretations
of Islam.


34. (C) We believe that some of the projects Imam Yuldash
mentioned could form the basis of greater cooperation between
the Embassy and Uzbekistan's Muslim community. In
particular, we might be able to support the creation of a
website for Uzbek clerics to share religious opinions and the
opening of a center to preserve and translate ancient
Bukharan religious texts through the Embassy's Democracy
Commission small grants program. The preservation and
translation of the religious texts might also be a good
project next year for the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural
Preservation. The stumbling block, of course, is whether the
imams can receive permission from the country's secular
authorities to pursue such cooperation with the Embassy.
Ganiev can potentially play a role here, as he has
demonstrated an ability to work constructively with local
authorities in Bukhara province to accomplish community
projects. In addition, we have heard reports in the last few
months that non-governmental organizations have received the
green light to apply for democracy commission grants, and we
are optimistic that the government may also allow these
projects go forward as well. Both projects have the
potential to further promote the tolerant form of Islam
native to Uzbekistan, a shared interest of both our
governments.

BUTCHER