FERGHANA VALLEY ACTIVISTS AND IMAMS REPORT LESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000777

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA, DRL, AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2018
TAGS: PHUM KIRF PGOV PINR PREL SOCI UZ
SUBJECT: FERGHANA VALLEY ACTIVISTS AND IMAMS REPORT LESS
EXTREMIST ACTIVITY

REF: A. TASHKENT 633

B. 07 TASHKENT 314

C. TASHKENT 722

D. TASHKENT 299

Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During a three-day visit to the Ferghana
Valley on June 25 - 27, poloff met with several human rights
activists and religious leaders who reported that religious
extremist organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir have become less
active (or at least less visible) in recent years. While
imams credited government efforts to promote a moderate form
of Islam, human rights activists believed that the real cause
has been the government's long-standing repressive measures
against suspected members, as well as increased labor
migration from the region, which they believe has drained the
number of potential recruits. The human rights activists
also reported that the number of persons in the Ferghana
Valley convicted on religious extremism charges have declined
in the past year. They also observed that prison conditions
have improved, including for religious prisoners, but
authorities continue to arbitrarily lengthen the sentences of
many religious prisoners shortly before they are due to be
released. Religious observance in prisons also continues to
be restricted. The activists also made an unusual report of
an anti-American sermon at a mosque in Margilan. While it is
difficult to determine whether extremist groups have become
less active or just less visible, we believe that the
government's long-standing repressive measures, increased
labor migration, and greater efforts by the government to
promote a moderate brand of Islam may all play a role in this
phenomenon. The activists' contention that the number of
convictions for religious extremism has declined in the past
year also tracks with our own observations, although such
cases continue to occur, especially in other regions of the
country. End summary.

SON OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST RELEASED FROM PRISON
-------------- --------------


2. (C) On June 25, poloff met with Ferghana-based human
rights activist Abdusalom Ergashev, Margilan-based human
rights activist Akmadjan Madmarov, and Madmarov's son
Hamidullo, who was released from prison on June 6 after
completing a seven-year sentence on religious extremism
charges (ref A). Ahmadjan Madmarov has two other sons and
two nephews still in prison on religious extremism charges
(ref B). Madmarov has long-maintained that none of his
relatives were actually involved in any religious extremist
groups.


3. (C) Hamidullo Madmarov told poloff that for the next year,
he remains under parole and must inform local authorities
anytime he plans to leave Ferghana province. He also must
periodically check in with authorities and report what he is
doing and with whom he meets. Hamidullo's passport expired
while he was in prison, but he has been given a new passport
since his release. Hamidullo told poloff that he wished not
to talk in detail about his experiences in prison, but
observed that he was poorly fed and had lost 20 kilos while
confined. He also noted with irony that before he was
convicted for religious extremism, he served in the border
guards under the National Security Service, and even was part
of a protective detail for President Karimov at the Bukhara
airport in 1999.

HAMIDULLO CONTRACTED TUBERCULOSIS IN PRISON
--------------


4. (C) Hamidullo reported contracting tuberculosis in
prison, and while his tuberculosis was not active, he was

still in need of treatment, which his family cannot afford.
Akmadjan Madmarov and Ergashev explained that while treatment
for tuberculosis at government clinics is nominally free, in
reality, individuals need to pay bribes in order to receive
the appropriate medicine. In addition, they noted that
better treatment was available at a private clinic in
Margilan (where recently released activist Mutabar Tojiboyeva
was treated, see septel),but they could not afford to pay
for the clinic (Comment: We have submitted a Defender's Fund
Application to pay for Hamidullo's tuberculosis treatment.
End comment.)

ONE SON RELEASED, OTHER HAS HIS SENTENCE EXTENDED...
-------------- --------------


5. (C) While Akmadjan Madmarov was obviously elated that
Hamidullo had been released from prison, he also reported
that authorities arbitrarily lengthened the sentence of his
other son Habibullah Madmarov by three-and-half years in
April, claiming that he was still a danger to society.
Habibullah completed his original sentence in February.
Akmadjan added that he has not been allowed to see Habibullah
for 10 months, and was only able to have a ten minute phone
conversation with him in April. Akmadjan reported being told
at one point by authorities that they would release his sons
if he did not speak with any representatives of foreign
organizations or Embassies. However, Akmadjan said he did
not believe the authorities, noting that many of their
previous promises have turned out to be false. He stressed
that he was a committed activist and had no plans to cease
his human rights activities. Akmadjon's third son, Abdulla,
is also still imprisoned at the Tavaksay prison in Tashkent
province.


6. (C) Akmadjan Madmarov argued that Hamidullo, rather than
Habibullah, was the exception - authorities continue to
routinely and arbitrarily lengthen the sentences of religious
prisoners as they approach the end of their original
sentences. At Prison Colony 29 in Navoi province, where one
of his nephews is being held, Madmarov reported that 63 other
prisoners convicted of religious extremism had their
sentences lengthened in the past year. He further stated
that of 28 individuals from Margilan who had completed their
original prison sentences since January, only 3 individuals,
including his son Hamidullo, were actually released.
Likewise in 2007, Akmadjon reported that only 4 out of 78
religious prisoners from Margilan who had completed their
sentences were released from prison (Comment: Madmarov also
told poloff's predecessor in March 2007 that only 4 religious
prisoners had been released under the November 2006 amnesty,
presumably in 2007, see ref B. Either the authorities did
not release any more religious prisoners in 2007 after March
or Madmarov's figures are not fully accurate. End comment.)


7. (C) Akmadjan Madmarov reported speaking with the director
of Prison Colony 29, who allegedly told him that while
individuals must sign confessions and statements of regret
over involvement in religious extremist organizations before
they are released, only a minority of those who sign such
documents are actually released. Instead, the director
reportedly told Madmarov that he receives a list from the
National Security Service of the religious prisoners to be
released.


8. (C) Even when released, Akmadjan Madmarov noted that it
is very difficult for ex-religious prisoners to find
employment. Of the 98 religious prisoners from Ferghana
province who had been released since 1998, he said that only
eight of them have since found employment. The ex-religious
prisoners are not permitted to travel abroad in search of
work, and must depend on their families for support or end up
selling everything they own. He also reported that 14 of the

98 individuals who were released had been eventually retried
and sent back to prison on religious extremism charges,
including eight individuals in a single case from 2003.

MADMAROV REPORTS IMPROVING PRISON CONDITIONS....
-------------- ---


9. (C) As reported recently by several other human rights
activists (including Tojiboyeva, see septel),Madmarov
reported that conditions at prisons, including for religious
prisoners, have improved over the last year. He reported
that since July 2007, religious prisoners at several prisons,
including Tavaksay, have been reintegrated with the general
prison population, leading to an improvement in their general
treatment. Madmarov reported that religious prisoners were
first separated from the general prisoner population
following the Andijon events in 2005, and generally endured
much harsher conditions than other prisoners.

...BUT RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE STILL RESTRICTED
--------------


10. (C) Akmadjan Madmarov reported that the ability of
prisoners to observe their religion continues to be
restricted. While prison libraries have Korans, religious
prisoners are often not allowed to use them, and their
ability to pray is also sometimes limited. On the other
hand, he reported that prisoners convicted of other offences
have fewer restrictions on their religious practices.

ACTIVITIES OF EXTREMIST GROUPS LESS VISIBLE
--------------


11. (C) Both Akmadjan Madmarov and Ergashev reported that
extremist groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir have been less
visibly active in the Ferghana Valley over the past year and
were no longer distributing pamphlets or organizing meetings
or study sessions for members or new recruits. They said
that such extremist organizations have been largely driven
underground by the authorities' long-standing repressive
measures against suspected members, which spiked immediately
after the 2005 Andijon events. They also reported that
another factor affecting the activities of religious
extremist organizations is the continued outmigration of
large numbers of male labor migrants from the Ferghana Valley
to Kazakhstan and Russia, which has drained the number of
potential recruits. As economic conditions worsen and staple
prices rise, Ergashev and Akmadjan noted that labor migration
from the region continues to increase.

FEWER RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM CONVICTIONS IN PAST YEAR
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Akmadjon Madmarov and Ergashev also reported that
the government has pursued fewer criminal cases against
suspected religious extremists in the Ferghana Valley in the
past year. In 2007, they were aware of only one case in
which five individuals in Kokand were sentenced to between
seven and nine years' imprisonment on religious extremism
charges. They were unaware of any individuals being
convicted of religious extremism in Ferghana or Margilan in

2007. They speculated that the lack of convictions was
largely the result of extremist groups becoming less active
than before. They added that those individuals who had been
released from prison have been careful not to meet with one
another or do anything that might arouse suspicions. In
addition, they reported that there were no known protests in
the Ferghana Valley of women whose relatives were convicted
of religious extremism in the past few years, as there had
been previously.

NUMBER OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICAL MOSQUES HOLDS STEADY

-------------- --------------


13. (C) Akmadjon Madmarov and Ergashev reported that they
knew of no new mosques, either official or unofficial, which
opened in either Margilan or Ferghana in the past year. In
addition, two maddrassahs in the Ferghana Valley that
authorities converted into medical facilities remain closed
(poloff also drove by one of the former maddrassahs, which
still looks like a maddrassah from the side, but has been
given a new glass-window facade on the front). Akmadjan said
that he often worshipped at an unregistered mosque in his
mahalla (neighborhood),as it was much closer to his house
than the nearest officially registered mosque. He noted that
authorities did not interfere in the activities of such
smaller mosques, despite their lack of registration. The
activists also noted that two weeks before President Karimov
visited Margilan in September 2007, local authorities ordered
all mosques in the city to be closed temporarily. The
mosques reportedly reopened as normal after the President's
departure.

MARGILAN IMAM REPORTEDLY ATTACKS PRESIDENT BUSH IN SERMON
-------------- --------------


14. (C) Akmadjan Madmarov reported that an imam in Margilan
recently claimed that President Bush was anti-Muslim during
Friday prayers and criticized American efforts in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Akmadjan said he was shocked to
hear the imam's words, turning to his son, who was also at
the mosque, to make sure he heard the imam's words correctly.
He later confirmed that other imams in Margilan had made the
same remarks during Friday prayers that week. Ergashev also
confirmed that he heard the same points raised by an imam in
Ferghana (Comment: Imams receive talking points from the
state-controlled Muftiate in Tashkent each week, and rarely
deviate from those talking points during Friday prayers. It
would be highly unlikely for an imam to make such statements
unless they were approved in advance by the authorities. The
fact that the talking points were used by other imams the
same week also suggests that this was a coordinated
government message. Local Embassy staff did not hear any
similar sermons being made in Tashkent. We will investigate.
End comment.)


15. (C) Akmadjan allowed that there were occasions in the
past where imams clearly veered from government-approved
talking points during Friday Prayers. He remembered that
around the time Saddam Hussein was arrested by American
soldiers in Iraq, he heard another imam in Margilan criticize
"such dictators" and state that Hussein's arrest demonstrated
that if countries did not "clear out their sewers, then the
Americans would do it for them."

MEETING WITH IMAM HAFIZOV IN FERGHANA
--------------


16. (C) On June 25, poloff met with Abduvali Hafizov, the
Head Imam of the Yangi-Chek Mosque in Ferghana. The meeting
was arranged by Ergashev, who attends the Yangi-Chek Mosque.
Hafizov is an alumnus of an International Visitors (IV)
program exchange which sent Uzbek Muslim leaders to the
United States for several weeks in 2002. Hafizov shared his
fond memories of the United States with poloff, noting that
he had learned much about the practice of Islam and other
religions in America. He noted with regret that the program
was no longer continuing, and articulated his belief that it
should be restarted in the future. According to him, the
program helped promote tolerance between different religions
and people (Note: After 2002, the International Research and
Exchanges Board (IREX) and Washington University administered
a similar program which sent Uzbek religious leaders to the
United States, but the program was halted after the Uzbek

government forced the closure of IREX's Tashkent office in

2005. End note.)


17. (C) Hafizov explained to poloff the history of the
Yangi-Chek mosque, Ferghana's largest, which was constructed
in the 1890s and was one of only four mosques in the Ferghana
Valley which continued to operate in the Soviet era. He
denied that the Uzbek government made the registration
process for new mosques difficult, pointing out that while
only 82 mosques functioned in the whole of Uzbekistan during
the Soviet era, there were now more than 360 registered
mosques in Ferghana province alone. He added that
authorities further tolerated the operation of roughly 2,000
unofficial (and unregistered) mosques in Ferghana province.
He explained that these mosques were often small and meant to
serve individual mahallas (neighborhoods),and were sometimes
based in community halls. He reported that roughly 2,500
individuals attended his mosque during Friday prayers.


18. (C) Hafizov reported that religious extremist
organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir were less of a threat now
than they were during the 1990s, when he said the government
tolerated the activities of Muslim missionaries, often
Wahhabists, who came to the Ferghana Valley from the Middle
East. Hafizov said that the government no longer tolerated
the presence of such missionaries, which he believed has gone
a long way in stemming the religious extremist threat in the
Ferghana Valley. He also argued that the government has
successfully promoted a moderate form of Islam.


19. (C) Hafizov had kind words for former Mufti Muhammad
Sodiq, who participated in the same IV program in 2002. He
described Sodiq as a "great religious scholar" who had done
much to promote "moderate Islam" and "greater understanding
between different religions." (Comment: Hafizov positive
feelings for Sodiq contrasted sharply with those expressed by
Uzbek historian and religious scholar Bakhtiyor Babadjanov
during a recent meeting with Ambassador-at-Large for
Religious Freedom John Hanford, see septel. Babadjanov
argued that Sodiq was "not an extremist" but "anti-infidel"
and preached intolerance of other religions. Babadjanov is a
respected and legitimate scholar who nonetheless seems to
know what is required of him to stay within the government's
good graces. We believe the government is using him in an
attempt to discredit former Mufti Mohammad Sodiq, who remains
one of the most influential non-governmental figures in
Uzbekistan. End comment.)

MEETING WITH IMAM TURSUNOV IN NAMANGAN
--------------


20. (C) On June 27, poloff met with Abdulhay Tursunov, Imam
of the Mulla Kyrgyz Mosque and Maddrassah complex in
Namangan. Tursunov participated in the same IV program as
Imam Hafizov, and also shared many positive memories of the
United States with poloff. Tursunov expressed his view that
not only should the United States continue to send Uzbek
imams to the America, but that more Sunni religious leaders
from the United States should visit Uzbekistan. He fondly
remembered a visit in 2001 by National Chairman of the
Islamic Supreme Council of America (ISCA) Shaykh Muhammad
Hisham Kabbani, who met with President Karimov.

TURSUNOV WARY OF SHIITE, WAHHABIST INFLUENCES
--------------


21. (C) However, Tursunov was adamant that only Sunni, and
not Shiite, Muslim religious leaders should be sent to
Uzbekistan from the United States, as the Shiites "have
different religious practices." Tursunov also questioned why
the United States retained close relations with Saudi Arabia,
observing that Saudi Arabia aggressively promoted intolerant

Wahhabist ideology abroad, which he believed was a threat to
both the United States and Uzbekistan. Tursunov was shocked
to discover (at least what he considered to be) Wahhabist
literature in Islamic libraries in the United States. He
said he tried to explain to American Muslims the dangers of
such material.

TOUR OF THE MULLA KYRGYZ MADDRASSAH AND MOSQUE
-------------- -


22. (C) Tursunov provided poloff a tour of his maddrassah,
one of only eleven in Uzbekistan and two in Namangan
province. Tursunov observed that during the Soviet era, the
mosque and maddrassah complex were used as a wine factory.
Currently, he said almost 200 students, all boys, studied at
the maddrassah, which has a four-year course of study.
Students may enter the maddrassah after completing the ninth
grade of primary school and taking entrance exams in Uzbek
history, Uzbek language, foreign language (either English or
Russian),and mathematics. "Even if a boy already knows the
Koran by heart, we will not accept him unless he scores well
on the entrance exams," commented one teacher. Competition
is fierce; Tursunov said that roughly ten candidates applied
for every open slot.


23. (C) Students at the maddrassah spend approximately half
their time studying religious subjects and half their time
studying secular subjects, including foreign languages
(Arabic, English, and Russian) and mathematics. Tursunov
explained that the maddrassah provided a professional
secondary education, roughly equivalent to that provided by
colleges or lyceums, rather than a university-level
education. Tursunov reported that almost all of the
maddrassah graduates became imams, largely in Namangan
province, while a few continued higher-level religious
studies at the Tashkent Islamic University. He reported that
one student from the maddrassah was studying in Egypt on an
Uzbek-government program and that another student recently
traveled to Egypt to participate in a Koran-reading contest.
The maddrassah appeared somewhat threadbare but in no worse
shape than other colleges and maddrassahs poloff has observed
in Uzbekistan.


24. (C) Tursunov reported that shortly after independence,
foreign "Wahhabists" operated the maddrassah for roughly two
years and taught an "intolerant form of Islam" to its
students. After recognizing the threat, Tursunov said the
government forced out the alleged Wahhabists and made
Tursunov the maddrassah's director. Tursunov reported that
religious extremist groups were less active in Namangan
province in recent years, and thanks to the "government's
efforts," have largely been driven underground. He admitted
that religious extremism was a problem in the 1990s, but
alleged that extremist groups were no longer able to attract
new recruits. He believed that Uzbeks were more susceptible
to the influence of extremist groups shortly after
independence, as they knew little about "true Islam" during
the Soviet era. However, Tursunov believed that the
government had adequately promoted a moderate Islam, and
extremist ideology was therefore becoming less attractive to
citizens.


25. (C) Tursunov also provided poloff a tour of the
one-hundred year old Mulla Kyrgyz Mosque, whose unique
cupola-shaped design is based on the ancient Sultan Sanjar
mausoleum in Merv, Turkmenistan. Tursunov said that roughly
150 individuals attended Friday prayers at the mosque, mostly
students and teachers at the maddrassah, though local
residents were welcome to attend as well. Tursunov explained
that fourth-year students at the maddrassah practiced leading
Friday prayers at the mosque. Poloff observed that the
courtyard of the mosque, unlike that of most other mosques in

Uzbekistan, was full of government propaganda posters,
possibly due to the presence of the maddrassah.

FRIDAY PRAYERS AT NAMANGAN'S LARGEST MOSQUE
--------------


26. (C) After sharing lunch at the maddrassah, Imam Tursunov
invited poloff to attend Friday prayers at the Mulla Bazaar
mosque, Namangan's largest, which was built in 1989. Despite
arriving half an hour early, poloff observed that already
over a thousand individuals were there, completely filling
the two floors of the mosque itself. By the time the prayers
had begun, the crowd had swelled to perhaps two or three
thousand individuals, all men (Note: According to Uzbek
custom, women rarely attend Friday prayers at mosques. End
note.) Poloff observed that men of all ages were
well-represented in the crowd, especially those under 30
years of age. In addition, poloff observed many teenagers
and even boys under the age of ten, despite frequent reports
on independent websites that police officers often prevented
young boys and teenagers from attending Friday prayers.
Police were present outside the mosque and blocked off the
adjacent street, but the number of officers did not appear
excessive and seemed to be in line with normal crowd-control
procedures.


27. (C) After the prayers, Imam Tursunov introduced poloff
to an elderly sheikh, who used to teach Islamic jurisprudence
at the Mir-i Arab Maddrassah in Bukhara, which before
independence was the only government-approved maddrassah in
the entire Soviet Union. The sheikh noted that many of his
students from the Soviet era are now important religious
leaders throughout the former Soviet Union, including former
and current Muftis in Saint Petersburg, Moscow, Kazan,
Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian republics. He noted
that the former President of Chechnya, Akhmad Kadyrov, also
studied at the Mir-i Arab Maddrassah.

COMMENT
--------------


28. (C) While imams at state-sanctioned mosques may be
expected to downplay the threat of religious extremism, their
observations that extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir have
become less active in the Ferghana Valley tracks with what
poloff was told by independent human rights activists who
have covered the issue for years. The exact reasons for the
decline in extremist activity remain unclear. While it is
possible that extremist groups have only become less visible
and have not, in fact, become less active, we do not believe
this is the case. Rather, we agree with human rights
activists that the government's long-standing repressive
measures against suspected members have deterred new
recruits. It is also possible that many of their members
have already been sentenced to prison (and are not being
released when they finish their sentences). As the activists
also pointed out, another possibility is that increased labor
migration from the region has drained the pool of available
recruits. We should also not discount the possibility that
the government has been more successful in recent years in
promoting a more moderate brand of Islam. The open displays
of moderate religious observance that poloff viewed in the
Ferghana Valley also tracks with our own observations that
religious freedom has modestly increased lately for the
country's Muslims, the vast majority of the population.


29. (C) It is welcome news that the number of individuals
convicted on religious extremism charges appears to be
declining, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, the
traditional hotbed of religious conservatism in Uzbekistan
(and Central Asia as a whole). Cases of individuals being
convicted of religious extremism and mistreated by Uzbek

authorities continue in other regions of the country.
Recently, for example, two women in Tashkent were convicted
of membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir. On June 20, a human rights
activist reported that four individuals were tortured and
sentenced to six years' imprisonment in Surkhundarya province
(ref C). In March, 13 individuals were convicted of
religious extremism in Bukhara based on coerced testimony
(ref D). Nevertheless, despite the continuation of such
cases, the overall number of convictions appears to have
declined in the past year. Our long-standing concern is that
individuals in religious extremism cases are often denied due
process of law and are physically abused.


30. (C) We have now heard from multiple human rights
activists representing different organizations that
conditions at Uzbek prisons have improved in the past year,
including for religious prisoners. We believe that improving
conditions, including the government's apparent decision to
reintegrate religious prisoners with the general prison
population, is at least partly the result of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) restarting
prison visits in March. We also believe that the
continuation of ICRC prison visits remains the best hope for
encouraging further improvement in prison conditions.


31. (C) On a less positive note, though the government has
released some religious prisoners in recent years, including
Madmarov's son, it continues to arbitrarily lengthen the
sentences of many other religious prisoners. Human rights
groups frequently estimate that between 5,000 and 7,000
political prisoners reside in Uzbek jails, the vast majority
of whom were sentenced on religious extremism charges (we
know of approximately only 30 imprisoned human rights
activists and political opposition figures). While some of
these individuals are actual religious extremists, others
have been imprisoned on false charges of religious extremism,
and many more were probably imprisoned after attending little
more than introductory meetings of extremist cells.
Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom John Hanford and
other U.S. officials are continuing to negotiate steps the
Uzbek government could take to review the cases of such
individuals. We believe that a government commission might
be the best tool for helping some of these individuals be
amnestied and released from prison.
NORLAND