FRUSTRATED MFA OFFICIAL VENTS ABOUT UZBEK POWER

S E C R E T TASHKENT 000713 SIPDIS //C O R R E C T E D C O P Y//FIXED PARAGRAPH MARKINGS// DEPT FOR INL ANDREW BUHLER TREASURY FOR ANNE WALLWORK AND DAVID TEITELBAUM MOSCOW FOR TREASURY KEVIN WHELAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KCRM UZ SUBJECT: FRUSTRATED MFA OFFICIAL VENTS ABOUT UZBEK POWER STRUCTURE; ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ISSUES AT STAKE REF: A. TASHKENT 644 ¶B. TASHKENT 493 Classified By: Political Officer Tim Buckley for reasons 1.4 (B,D) ¶1. (S) Summary: At a June 20 reception at the Ambassador's residence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Americas Desk Chief Ismat Fayzullaev expressed to poloff his deep frustration with the Uzbek government structure. He criticized Foreign Minister Norov as "weak" and noted that rank-and-file diplomats resent that "he never defends his staff." As a result, Fayzullaev added, "all the ministries beat up on the MFA." He is particularly upset that he is personally being blamed by important members of the Presidential Apparat after a mix-up over who would pay for a proposed trip by GOU officials to discuss anti-money laundering issues in Washington. Fayzullaev confirmed that even this proposed mid-level delegation was personally reviewed and authorized by President Karimov, and someone must now bear the blame if the trip does not happen. While this information is consistent with what we have long understood about the inner workings of the Government of Uzbekistan, it is extraordinary to hear it in such stark terms from our main interlocutor at the MFA, who is clearly disgruntled about his situation and requested assistance from us to ease the pressure on him. End summary. MFA Feeling the Heat -------------- ¶2. (C) As the Embassy's main operational-level interlocutor, Fayzullaev is in daily contact with many officers at post. Poloffs noticed he was agitated in telephone conversations on June 20. He was desperate to find either U.S. funding sources or a solid excuse relating to a proposed trip by GOU officials from the Central Bank and the Office of the General Prosecutor to discuss Uzbek anti-money laundering policies with U.S. Treasury officials in Washington (reftels). The trip was proposed by Central Bank Deputy Chairman Alisher Akmalov in a meeting with emboffs on April 23 and, after the requisite follow up diplomatic note from the Embassy expressing our interest in the offer, the MFA finally sent us a diplomatic note indicating that four mid-level officials (but curiously not Akmalov) were authorized to travel to the U.S. ¶3. (S) After two months of bureaucratic wrangling, the Uzbeks suddenly approved the trip and wanted it to happen immediately. Apparently, despite Akmalov's stated offer to emboffs, he later insisted to officials in the Presidential Apparat that the MFA indicated the trip would be funded by the U.S. Government. Fayzullaev, who was eager to get out of his monitored office and talk to poloff on the safer premises of the Ambassador's residence, snarled "that f---ing Central Bank is denying that they made the offer" and they shifted the responsibility to the MFA, where in turn the burden is falling squarely on his shoulders. All the Way to the President's Desk -------------- ¶4. (S) The reason this matters so much is that the proposed trip to assuage concerns about Uzbek money laundering policies was passed all the way up the chain of the Presidential Apparat to President Karimov himself, but only once it was formally stated in our diplomatic note on May 3. Once Karimov mulled over and approved the trip, according to Fayzullaev, it is duly expected to happen post haste. No one wants to go back and tell Karimov it did not materialize, so someone will have to take the blame. (Comment: This is consistent with what we have heard about Karimov as a micro-manager. Fayzullaev added that Karimov is also personally involved in reviewing the list of mid-level law enforcement officers proposed to participate in the upcoming INL-funded training session at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, Hungary. End comment.) Brother, Can You Spare a Diplomatic Note? -------------- ¶5. (S) Fayzullaev angrily concluded the Apparat's finger is pointing at him, and he appealed to poloff to scour possible funding sources from the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to come up with some money at the eleventh hour. If such U.S. Government funding is not possible, as poloff indicated (not least because it changes the whole dynamic of the trip, and makes it less of a good faith effort by the GOU to come forward and explain itself),Fayzullaev asked that we at least submit a diplomatic note -- something for him to lean on -- indicating that we "could not identify funds at this time" but that "we will keep this in mind in the near future." He suggested we cite Akmalov's absence from the list of approved participants as a reason the trip could not happen, as the rank of the delegation dropped. (Comment: It may be that Akmalov knows the Uzbeks have a weak defense for gutting its anti-money laundering policies and does not want to try to convince experts otherwise on U.S. turf. The more mid-level officials are happy for a chance to travel, said Fayzullaev, and can always claim, correctly, that the decision is above their pay grade. Yet nobody will want to tell Karimov that his 2007 decree suspending portions of the anti-money laundering law needs to be rescinded.) ¶6. (S) Comment continued: A senior international financial institution (IFI) official based in Tashkent echoed this theme in a conversation with the Ambassador. He noted that benign Uzbek intentions in trying to restore domestic public confidence in the banking system had probably accounted for the misguided Presidential decree providing an amnesty on deposits. This IFI official believes senior Uzbek officials are now looking for help in getting the bad news to Karimov that his decree has created new anti-money laundering-related problems for Uzbekistan on the international scene. It is in our interest to in effect help these officials work around their own President. End comment.) It's Not About the Money -------------- ¶7. (S) Poloff pointed out that the proposed trip by four GOU officials to Washington for a few days would not really cost much money and suggested that the official travelers could receive discounted tickets on the national airline. Fayzullaev retorted that "the Central Bank has plenty of f---ing resources" and indicated the real reason is that the trip was likely presented to Karimov in a different light. At this point, Akmalov probably started backtracking by putting the onus on the MFA to guarantee funding (Comment: Thus, the very reason the symbolism of the Uzbeks paying their way is important to us would make it unacceptable to Karimov, who would not want to appear to be on the defensive. End comment.) No Help from the Boss -------------- ¶8. (S) Fayzullaev is furious about the situation and, while there is no love lost for the Central Bank, he made clear that it has become routine for "all the ministries to beat up on the MFA." This is, he said candidly, because Foreign Minister Norov "is weak" and nobody respects him. Fayzullaev noted that "Norov had a chance to stop Akmalov earlier in the process over the anti-money laundering meeting but did nothing," thereby increasing the likelihood the blame would stay within the MFA and on his shoulders in particular. Norov is resented within the ministry, said Fayzullaev, "because he never defends his diplomats" and has allowed MFA to become an easy target in a challenging environment in which bureaucrats want to pass the buck out of fear. Comment: -------------- ¶9. (C) This situation is consistent with what we have generally surmised about the inner workings of the Government of Uzbekistan, but it is extraordinary to hear it in such stark terms from our main interlocutor at the MFA. In his third and possibly last term as President, Karimov appears to retain a powerful grip on even minute affairs of state while instilling fear in his chain of subordinates. While we have understood that MFA is not among the power ministries, Fayzullaev's frustrated comments suggest it is more and more seen as a doormat by other GOU officials. ¶10. (C) Akmalov's abrupt change of course in this story is also interesting. We were surprised by his confident offer in April to visit Washington and explain to Treasury officials that the anti-money laundering regime is effective, which we surmised meant he had pre-authorization to do so since Uzbek officials never go out on a limb at official meetings. His subsequent backtracking and finger-pointing to the MFA may mean he miscalculated the level of support he had within the Apparat, which suggests that even senior officials aren't sure of who has influence. As noted in paragraph 6 above, U.S. policy needs to incorporate a strategic dimension that now in effect helps Uzbek technocrats work around their own President while Uzbek political vagaries unfold. NORLAND