UZBEKS TO RESPOND TO AMBASSADOR HANFORD'S LETTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 000708 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN AND DRL E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018 TAGS: PHUM KIRF PGOV PREL UZ SUBJECT: UZBEKS TO RESPOND TO AMBASSADOR HANFORD'S LETTER ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REF: A. 07 TASHKENT 1300 ¶B. TASHKENT 210 ¶C. TASHKENT 552 ¶D. TASHKENT 500 ¶E. TASHKENT 620 ¶F. TASHKENT 623 Classified By: POLOFF R. FITZMAURICE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a May 28-31 visit to Uzbekistan, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John Hanford met with government officials to discuss Uzbekistan's Country of Particular Concern (CPC) designation under the International Religious Freedom Act and the contents of a draft confidential letter, delivered by Hanford to the Uzbeks the week before his visit, which lays out steps the government could take to increase religious freedom and have its CPC designation eventually lifted. On May 29, Hanford met with State Advisor for Interethnic and Religious Affairs Bahrom Abduhalim, Religious Affairs Committee Chairman Ortiq Yusupov, and Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov. Although not all of the government officials had fully digested the contents of Hanford's draft letter, they demonstrated a willingness to discuss religious freedom issues and to engage in an exchange of letters with Hanford. Unsurprisingly, they were defensive of the government's record, noting that many registered religious groups enjoyed a high degree of freedom and that Uzbekistan never deserved the CPC designation it was given in November 2006. On June 7, the MFA confirmed to the Ambassador that the government would enter into an exchange of letters with Hanford, and that Abduhalim would coordinate the draft response to Hanford's letter. The MFA signaled that the response would be positive, accepting all but three of the points in Hanford's draft. During his visit, Hanford also met with a variety of religious leaders, scholars, and representatives of human rights organizations (septels). The prospect of progress in this key area of human rights is yet another reason why post strongly recommends against any steps that might invoke U.S. sanctions against Uzbekistan. End summary. HANFORD EXPLAINS CPC DESIGNATION AND "VIETNAM MODEL" LETTER -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In his meetings with government officials, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John Hanford explained that as a result of Uzbekistan being designated a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRF Act) in November 2006 for particularly severe violations of religious freedom, the United States was obliged to choose an action from a list prescribed in the IRF Act - usually a sanction. Hanford explained an alternative action allowed under the IRF Act is an agreement, which could take the form of an exchange of letters with him on steps the government would take to improve religious freedom. The text of the letters could be kept confidential. The exchange of letters would be based on a model used with Vietnam, in which Vietnam agreed to implement particular changes in its religion policy, and as a result of strong improvements in the agreed areas the CPC designation was lifted after two years. The idea of an exchange of letters had been broached with the government during Hanford's first visit to Uzbekistan last summer (ref A),and Hanford's May visit was aimed at securing agreement on the Vietnam model and beginning to negotiate the final text of his letter, which would include numerous steps that the government would take to improve religious freedom, grouped into four broad categories: giving priority to the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion; protecting against abuses of the law and expanding opportunities for legal redress; expanding opportunities for religious education; and taking additional steps to promote religious freedom as well as greater understanding and tolerance among religious groups. Hanford delivered the draft of his letter to the Uzbek Embassy in Washington on May 22, and the Ambassador also provided a copy to the MFA in Tashkent on May ¶23. ¶3. (C) Hanford further explained to the Uzbek government that to accomplish this in time for this year's announcement of CPC designation and accompanying actions, they must negotiate the final text of Hanford's letter within the next six to eight weeks. Once an agreement is reached on the final text of Hanford's letter, the Uzbeks would then issue their own letter simply stating that they had received Hanford's letter and agreed with its contents. Eventually, if Uzbekistan followed through in its commitments, the USG would lift its CPC designation. Meanwhile, the agreement could serve as an alternative to sanctions pursuant to the CPC designation as long as Uzbekistan continued to make progress in fulfilling its commitments in the agreement. Hanford emphasized to the government officials that the contents of the letter could be kept confidential with only limited distribution within the U.S. government. It would be shown to key congressional leaders and the U.S. Commission on International Freedom, but any public statements about it would be very general in nature. HANFORD NOTES RECENT GOU PROGRESS...AND BACKTRACKING -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) In his meetings, Hanford noted some positive developments on religious freedom since Uzbekistan's CPC designation was made in 2006. In particular, he noted that the environment for moderate Muslims, the vast majority of the population, appears to have improved, with increasing numbers freely attending mosques throughout the country. (Note: The number of individuals being sentenced for alleged membership in religious extremist organizations also appears to be decreasing, but it is difficult to judge this with certainty, since human rights organizations are not always granted access to trials. End Note.) Hanford welcomed the amnesty of individuals convicted on the basis of their religious beliefs, including two Protestants who were amnestied in December 2007 and January 2008 (ref B). He also observed that the government has made progress on combating the use of torture by law enforcement, noting that it had so far addressed 15 of the 22 recommendations from United Nations Special Rapporteur for Torture Van Boven's 2003 report (ref C). ¶5. (C) Hanford also noted some recent backtracking by the government on freedom for religious minorities, particularly for some Protestant groups and Jehovah's Witnesses. He also reminded officials of three religious prisoners of conscience who remain behind bars: Pentecostal Pastor Dmitry Shestakov and Jehovah's Witnesses Irfan Hamidov and Olim Turayev (ref D). ...AS MULTIPLE SANCTIONS DECISIONS LOOM ON THE HORIZON -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador accompanied Hanford to all of his meetings with government officials and reminded the Uzbeks that the U.S. government would be making a separate determination in June on whether to apply visa restrictions against selected officials complicit in the 2005 Andijon events or other gross human rights violations, based on legislation the President signed in December 2007. The Ambassador emphasized to the Uzbeks that any agreement the Uzbeks reached with Hanford on exchanging letters, and especially any subsequent improvements on religious freedom, would be helpful as the U.S. government decides whether or not to apply the visa restrictions in June. MEETING WITH STATE ADVISOR ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS -------------- -- ¶7. (C) Hanford's first meeting was with State Advisor for Interethnic and Religious Affairs Bahrom Abduhalim, whom Hanford had not met previously. Abduhalim was clearly empowered from on high to move forward in negotiating an exchange of letters. He said he had carefully read over Hanford's letter, noting that many of its proposed steps "were acceptable." However, he added that any proposed reforms must take into consideration the "mentality, culture, and living conditions" of the Uzbek people. Abduhalim observed that time was short and said the government would soon appoint interlocutors to negotiate the final text of the letter with Hanford. Abduhalim noted the government would be willing to host a conference for local and international specialists on religion, suggesting that such a conference could be implemented under the framework of President Karimov's recent decree on the 60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Abduhalim stressed the government's desire to be removed from the CPC list, and asked Hanford what exactly his government could do to have the designation lifted. Hanford answered that besides entering into an exchange of letters, the government could amnesty additional religious prisoners of conscious and ease the registration criteria to allow more religious groups to be registered. ¶8. (C) Abduhalim argued that the government had done much to improve religious freedom in Uzbekistan since its CPC designation in 2006 and that several points in Hanford's letter had already been addressed. In particular, he noted that the number of Hajj pilgrims had increased in recent years to 5,000, and that about 4,000 more went on the Umrah, or small hajj. (Note: The number of pilgrims increased to 5,000 for the December 2006 and December 2007 Hajjs, but this is still only about 20 percent of the total possible number of Uzbek pilgrims under Saudi Arabia's quota system, estimated at approximately 25,000 pilgrims or 1,000 pilgrims for every 1 million of population. End note.) Abduhalim said the government did not want to limit the number of pilgrims participating in the Hajj, but insisted that "not everyone" in Uzbekistan wished to participate in the Hajj, and the Uzbek government was "attempting to build a secular society" anyway. ¶9. (SBU) Biographical note: Abduhalim struck us as a well-informed and conscientious official, and a possible interlocutor with whom Hanford could negotiate the final text of his letter. He also spoke rather good English, and has studied at Oxford (perhaps on a short exchange program). Abduhalim was appointed as State Advisor to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan for Religious Affairs and Interethnic Relations in December 2006. From 2004 to 2006, he served as the Director of the Academy of Science's Oriental Studies Institute. From 2002 to 2004, he was a Vice Rector of Westminster University in Tashkent. From 1990 to 2002, he worked as a research fellow at the Oriental Studies Institute. From 1987 to 1990, he served as an interpreter at the Soviet Embassy in the Yemen Arab Republic. From 1985 to 1987, he served as a junior research fellow at the Oriental Studies Institute. From 1983 to 1985, he worked as a specialist in the Ministry of Agriculture's Department of Foreign Scientific and Technology Cooperation. From 1981 to 1983, he served as an interpreter at the Soviet Embassy in Libya. From 1976 to 1981, he was a student of Tashkent State University's Department of Arabic Philology. End note. MEETING WITH RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN YUSUPOV -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Hanford next met with Religious Affairs Committee Chairman Ortik Yusupov, with whom he had met last summer. The MFA had not shared a draft of Hanford's letter with Yusupov, who said he was briefed on its contents. After Hanford provided him a copy of the letter, Yusupov said that he would look at it carefully and promised Hanford that the government would provide a response. ¶11. (C) Hanford raised with Yusupov the recent airing on state television of a documentary that was harshly critical of religious minorities, especially of certain Protestant groups and Jehovah's Witnesses. Hanford explained that such programs could potentially increase social prejudices against religious minorities and fuel intolerance. Yusupov responded that he had seen the documentary, and remarked that Uzbekistan did not censor its mass media. He also accused the groups depicted in the film of proselytizing, which is against Uzbek law, and argued that the point of the documentary was to encourage all such organizations to follow Uzbek law. He also explained that his office receives a large number of letters from ordinary citizens, complaining that they received unsolicited approaches by Christian missionaries. Yusupov stressed that the government's religion policy was aimed at preserving harmony between Uzbekistan's different religions and avoiding social conflict. ¶12. (C) After Yusupov commented that he had only recently returned to Uzbekistan from a business trip to Saudi Arabia, Ambassador Hanford spoke of his efforts to convince the Saudi government to cease using literature in its schools which preached hate and intolerance of other faiths. Yusupov agreed with Hanford that Uzbekistan and the United States had a shared interest in preventing the distribution of hate literature. He reported that the Uzbek government complained to the Saudis after its Hajj pilgrims received such literature in previous years, and now insisted that a sample of all Saudi literature given to pilgrims be first shared with Uzbek authorities. Yusupov added that Uzbekistan now distributes its own literature to pilgrims, explaining Hajj procedures and what they could expect to encounter while in Saudi Arabia, and also provides training for individuals leading the groups of pilgrims. With evident pride, Yusupov pointed towards an award from the Saudi Hajj Ministry to the Uzbek government for sending the "most well-educated and best behaved" pilgrims. ¶13. (C) Comment: The fact that the MFA had cut Yusupov out of the loop by not sharing with him Hanford's letter was telling, and clearly indicated that the government did not intend for him to become Hanford's main interlocutor. We actually prefer that Yusupov not be Hanford's main negotiating partner, as we have found him to be rather closed-minded and difficult to deal with in the past (for example, Yusupov never answered the Ambassador's request to meet with him and the Israeli Ambassador to discuss the government's threats to deport AmCit Rabbi Gurevich, who was eventually deported, ref F). We also heard from a leading member of the local Protestant community that Yusupov was much less willing to meet with representatives of minority religions than his predecessors. We originally had hoped that Deputy Foreign Minister and former Religious Affairs Chairman Shoazim Minovarov would be Hanford's main interlocutor, but he was appointed Uzbek Ambassador to Egypt a few months before Hanford's return visit to Uzbekistan. End comment. MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NOROV -------------- ¶14. (C) Hanford's final meeting on May 29 was with Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov, who agreed that it was important that the United States and Uzbekistan continued their dialogue on religious freedom, as long as the dialogue was continued on the basis of "mutual respect." Norov observed that the Uzbek government had achieved much in regards to religious freedom since the Soviet era, when almost all religious expression was forbidden. Norov stated that his government was firmly against the use of torture, and denied that anyone had been sent to prison purely for their religious beliefs. Norov also affirmed that both the United States and Uzbekistan faced the common threat of religious extremism. He recognized that the government could not combat religious extremism purely through law-enforcement means, but also had a responsibility to promote a more moderate and "enlightened" form of Islam. ¶15. (C) Norov saw no contradiction between the Uzbek Constitution's guarantee of religious freedom and its restrictive 1998 law on religion, arguing instead that the Uzbek Constitution "paved the way" for the later law. Though the Constitution guarantees all individuals the freedom to choose their religion, according to Norov, the Constitution forbids individuals from imposing their religion on others. Norov observed that after independence, religious organizations were more or less unregulated, and Wahhabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia - often the descendants of Uzbeks who fled Central Asia after the Russian revolution - took advantage of the situation by seeking to propagate their extreme views, which were in stark contrast to the more tolerant strain of Hanafi Islam prevalent in Central Asia. Recognizing that such missionaries were breeding intolerance and social strife, Norov explained that the government began to regulate religious organizations more thoroughly, starting with the 1998 law on religion, which instituted more stringent registration requirements for religious groups (and also outlawed almost all religious activity by non-registered groups, including those which are entirely peaceful). ¶16. (C) Norov suggested that the activity of Christian missionaries was also a potential threat to stability. To illustrate his point, he referred to an incident which occurred on May 19 in Naryn, Kyrgyzstan, in which local residents prevented the burial of a 14-year old Baptist convert in a local Muslim graveyard (later reported by Forum 18 on June 2). Norov also alleged that several Baptist churches in Kyrgyzstan were burned to the ground last summer. ¶17. (C) Norov shared with Hanford many of the same talking points on human rights he would later make to Assistant Secretary Boucher on June 2 (ref F). He complained of "double standards" being applied to Uzbekistan, noting that Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state singled out for CPC status. In his view, the religious freedom situation was no better in Uzbekistan's neighboring countries. He noted that large numbers of individuals had also been arrested in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan for alleged affiliation with religious extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir. Norov also contrasted the construction of the elaborate Kipchak Mosque in Turkmenistan, which Norov said had cost 200 million dollars and which almost no one used for worship, with the completion last year of Tashkent's Hazrati Imam mosque, which routinely accommodates a large number of worshipers, including men, women, and youth. He also referred to comments allegedly made by Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Volleback that Uzbekistan could serve as a model of interethnic harmony and stability for other countries. ¶18. (C) Hanford assured Norov that his office also looked carefully at violations of religious freedom in other Central Asian states. He noted that Turkmenistan was almost given CPC designation a few years ago, but that it avoided designation by making substantial revisions to its laws on religion, including decriminalizing violations and reducing the required number of congregants a religious organization must have before it could be registered from 500 to only 5. ¶19. (C) Norov emphasized that the government was interested in pursuing greater cooperation with the U.S. on security issues, especially promoting stability in Afghanistan. Referring to statements made by President Karimov on the 15th Anniversary of Uzbekistan's Constitution in December 2007, Norov noted that Uzbekistan was willing to deepen relations with the West, especially with the United States, as long as there was sufficient "political will" to overcome "artificial barriers" in the relationship. Norov also argued that applying political pressure on Uzbekistan on human rights issues was against the interests of the United States. He observed that Central Asia was gaining importance in world affairs and that the United States was competing for influence in the region with Iran, Russia, and China. Norov added that Uzbekistan and the United States had common interests in the security sphere, noting that Uzbekistan rejected Iranian membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and resisted the SCO's militarization. Finally, Norov accused human rights organizations of pressuring the U.S. government into designating Uzbekistan as a Country of Particular Concern and applying sanctions against it. ¶20. (C) Comment: Per Hanford's discussions with Norov and Yusupov, the Uzbeks appear to have a fundamentally different conception of missionary activity than we do, viewing it as imposing one's religion on others, rather than simply sharing one's religious views. The Uzbeks clearly link proselytism, whether by Muslim or Christian missionaries, with the potential for social unrest, which they seek to avoid at all costs, especially in the wake of the 2005 Andijon events. If we can convince the Uzbek government, instead, to distinguish between religious groups that seek to impose their views and groups that simply seek to share their beliefs with willing listeners, we may be able to convince them to ease their ongoing harassment of minority religions, including some Protestant groups and Jehovah's Witnesses. End comment. GOVERNMENT WILL RESPOND TO HANFORD'S LETTER -------------- ¶21. (C) On June 7, the MFA confirmed to the Ambassador that the government would enter into an exchange of letters with Hanford and that State Advisor for Interethnic and Religious Affairs Bahrom Abduhalim would coordinate the draft response to Hanford's letter. The MFA told the Ambassador that the response would be substantive but would contain differences from Hanford's draft. The Ambassador encouraged MFA to minimize differences, to the extent possible. He also pressed for an early response so that negotiations could get underway quickly given the September deadline. COMMENT -------------- ¶22. (C) Ambassador Hanford achieved his major goal of convincing the Uzbek government to agree to a confidential exchange of letters on improving religious freedom in Uzbekistan along the Vietnam model. We were pleased to see that Abduhalim, rather than the more hard-lined Yusupov, has apparently been chosen to coordinate the GOU's response. Based on the Ambassador's discussion with the MFA on June 7, we expect to receive a draft response from the government soon. The MFA signaled that the response would be positive, accepting all but three of the points in Hanford's draft. The Uzbeks appear particularly interested in hosting a conference for religious leaders and international experts, possibly including an interfaith dialogue component between Muslim leaders and representatives of minority religious confessions (septel). We also hope the Uzbeks will take seriously many of Hanford's other suggestions, including easing its restrictive registration laws for peaceful religious organizations. ¶23. (C) Our major concern is that any negotiations between Ambassador Hanford and the government could be derailed by a decision to impose visa restrictions on Uzbek officials in June. Once such sanctions are imposed against Uzbekistan, the government may lose any incentive to continue negotiating with Hanford to avoid further sanctions as a result of its CPC designation. ¶24. (U) This message has been cleared by Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom John Hanford. NORLAND